CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13302 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HQR5-GXVV-5FF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-24 18:30 – Updated: 2024-10-24 18:30iniNet Solutions SpiderControl SCADA PC HMI Editor has a path traversal vulnerability. When the software loads a malicious ‘ems' project template file constructed by an attacker, it can write files to arbitrary directories. This can lead to overwriting system files, causing system paralysis, or writing to startup items, resulting in remote control.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10313"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-24T18:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "iniNet Solutions SpiderControl SCADA PC HMI Editor has a path traversal \nvulnerability. When the software loads a malicious \u2018ems\u0027 project \ntemplate file constructed by an attacker, it can write files to \narbitrary directories. This can lead to overwriting system files, \ncausing system paralysis, or writing to startup items, resulting in \nremote control.",
"id": "GHSA-hqr5-gxvv-5ff4",
"modified": "2024-10-24T18:30:44Z",
"published": "2024-10-24T18:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10313"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-298-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-HQV3-QQ72-78CV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-02 17:09 – Updated: 2021-08-25 19:03All versions of package startserver are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to missing sanitization.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "startserver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-23430"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-25T19:03:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-24T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "All versions of package startserver are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to missing sanitization.",
"id": "GHSA-hqv3-qq72-78cv",
"modified": "2021-08-25T19:03:15Z",
"published": "2021-09-02T17:09:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23430"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xudafeng/startserver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xudafeng/startserver/blob/bef0c4e4d21da42a40ce87cf25fd54ac8d8cb2d8/lib/index.js%23L71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-STARTSERVER-1296388"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in startserver"
}
GHSA-HQW4-8893-J4H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-23 20:49 – Updated: 2023-09-11 16:36Affected versions of simple-npm-registry resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "simple-npm-registry"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:40:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `simple-npm-registry` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-hqw4-8893-j4h7",
"modified": "2023-09-11T16:36:04Z",
"published": "2018-07-23T20:49:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/simple-npm-registry"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hqw4-8893-j4h7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/452"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in simple-npm-registry"
}
GHSA-HQW7-X8RP-Q6J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30LG SuperSign Media Editor getSubFolderList Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG SuperSign Media Editor. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the getSubFolderList method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-20330.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41181"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T03:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "LG SuperSign Media Editor getSubFolderList Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG SuperSign Media Editor. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the getSubFolderList method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-20330.",
"id": "GHSA-hqw7-x8rp-q6j4",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1220"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HQWV-QV7P-5XVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-21 12:30 – Updated: 2023-03-24 18:30A CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory vulnerability exists in Custom Reports that could cause a remote code execution when a victim tries to open a malicious report. Affected Products: IGSS Data Server(IGSSdataServer.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), IGSS Dashboard(DashBoard.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), Custom Reports(RMS16.dll)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-27981"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-21T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory vulnerability exists in Custom Reports that could cause a remote code execution when a victim tries to open a malicious report. Affected Products: IGSS Data Server(IGSSdataServer.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), IGSS Dashboard(DashBoard.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), Custom Reports(RMS16.dll)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior).",
"id": "GHSA-hqwv-qv7p-5xvx",
"modified": "2023-03-24T18:30:25Z",
"published": "2023-03-21T12:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2023-073-04\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2023-073-04.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HR2Q-XF62-R4HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:57 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:57Directory traversal vulnerability in dodosmail.php in DodosMail 2.5 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the dodosmail_header_file parameter. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-3163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-07-14T23:41:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in dodosmail.php in DodosMail 2.5 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the dodosmail_header_file parameter. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-hr2q-xf62-r4hc",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:57:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:57:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43625"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30112"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HR2V-4R36-88HR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-04-10 15:33Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions <=3.20.1 and <=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause helm pull --untar [chart URL | repo/chartname] to write the Chart's contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the --destination and --untardir flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart's name.
Impact
The bug enables writing the Chart's contents (unpackaged/untar'ed) to the output directory <output dir>/, instead of the expected <output dir>/<chart name>/, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.
Note: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.
Patches
This issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3
A Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be "." or ".."), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.
Workarounds
Ensure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot ("..") or dot ("."). In addition, ensuring that the pull --untar flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.
Credits
Oleh Konko @1seal
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "helm.sh/helm/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "helm.sh/helm/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.20.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35206"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T21:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Helm is a package manager for Charts for Kubernetes. In Helm versions \u003c=3.20.1 and \u003c=4.1.3, a specially crafted Chart will cause `helm pull --untar [chart URL | repo/chartname]` to write the Chart\u0027s contents to the immediate output directory (as defaulted to the current working directory; or as given by the `--destination` and `--untardir` flags), rather than the expected output directory suffixed by the chart\u0027s name.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe bug enables writing the Chart\u0027s contents (unpackaged/untar\u0027ed) to the output directory `\u003coutput dir\u003e/`, instead of the expected `\u003coutput dir\u003e/\u003cchart name\u003e/`, potentially overwriting the contents of the targeted directory.\n\nNote: a chart name containing POSIX dot-dot, or dot-dot and slashes (as if to refer to parent directories) do not resolve beyond the output directory as designed.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been resolved in Helm v3.20.2 and v4.1.3\n\nA Chart with an unexpected name (those specified to be \".\" or \"..\"), or a Chart name which results in a non-unique directory will be rejected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nEnsure the the name of the Chart does not comprise/contain POSIX pathname special directory references ie. dot-dot (\"..\") or dot (\".\"). In addition, ensuring that the `pull --untar` flag (or equivalent SDK option) refers to a unique/empty output directory prevents chart extraction from inadvertently overwriting existing files within the specified directory.\n\n### Credits\n\nOleh Konko\n@1seal",
"id": "GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr",
"modified": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T15:33:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/security/advisories/GHSA-hr2v-4r36-88hr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/4e7994d4467182f535b6797c94b5b0e994a91436"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm/releases/tag/v4.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Helm Chart extraction output directory collapse via `Chart.yaml` name dot-segment"
}
GHSA-HR35-82JP-J7RC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-17 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-17 06:30The Eventer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.7 via the eventer_woo_download_tickets() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10799"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-17T06:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Eventer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.7 via the eventer_woo_download_tickets() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-hr35-82jp-j7rc",
"modified": "2025-01-17T06:30:54Z",
"published": "2025-01-17T06:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/eventer-wordpress-event-manager-plugin/20972534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aea5f970-243f-4642-83e1-34db11c4ca63?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HR3X-C6GR-97W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:27 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:27Directory traversal vulnerability in download2.php in AGENCY4NET WEBFTP 1 allows remote attackers to read and delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0091"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-04T01:46:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in download2.php in AGENCY4NET WEBFTP 1 allows remote attackers to read and delete arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-hr3x-c6gr-97w4",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:27:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:27:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/28309"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2008-January/001865.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/0051"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HR5V-J9H9-XJHG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-10 17:29Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Advisory Details
Title: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized mediaUrl / fileUrl Parameter Keys (CWE-22)
Description:
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces by using the mediaUrl or fileUrl parameter key in message tool calls. The normalizeSandboxMediaParams function only checks ["media", "path", "filePath"] keys, while mediaUrl and fileUrl escape normalization entirely. Combined with handlePluginAction dropping mediaLocalRoots from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.
Details
The vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:
1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in normalizeSandboxMediaParams:
In src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:
// Line 212
const mediaKeys: Array<"media" | "path" | "filePath"> = ["media", "path", "filePath"];
The mediaUrl and fileUrl parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by resolveSandboxedMediaSource.
2. Dropped mediaLocalRoots in handlePluginAction:
In src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts, the handlePluginAction function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits mediaLocalRoots from the context:
// Lines 684-697
const handled = await dispatchChannelMessageAction({
channel,
action,
cfg,
params,
accountId: accountId ?? undefined,
requesterSenderId: input.requesterSenderId ?? undefined,
sessionKey: input.sessionKey,
sessionId: input.sessionId,
agentId,
gateway,
toolContext: input.toolContext,
dryRun,
// mediaLocalRoots is MISSING here
});
Despite ChannelMessageActionContext defining mediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[] (in src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts line 478), plugins receive undefined and fall back to getDefaultMediaLocalRoots(), which permits reads of the entire ~/.openclaw/ directory tree — including all agents' workspaces.
Attack chain:
1. A sandboxed agent (Agent-A at ~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/) calls the message tool with { mediaUrl: "~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt" }
2. normalizeSandboxMediaParams skips the mediaUrl key (not in allowlist)
3. handlePluginAction dispatches without mediaLocalRoots
4. Plugin calls loadWebMedia with default roots, which allows ~/.openclaw/workspace/**
5. Agent-B's secret file content is read and sent as a channel attachment
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed
- OpenClaw Docker image built (openclaw-gateway:latest)
Steps:
- Start the vulnerable gateway container:
cd llm-enhance/cve-finding/Path_Traversal/CVE-2026-27522-Media_Root_Bypass-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5
- Run the exploit:
python3 poc_exploit.py
-
The exploit writes a secret file to
~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txtinside the container, then invokesnormalizeSandboxMediaParamswith Agent-A's sandbox policy and{ mediaUrl: <agent-b-secret-path> }. ThemediaUrlkey bypasses normalization, andloadWebMediareads the file successfully. -
Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:
python3 control-sandbox_enforced.py
Log of Evidence
Exploit output:
=== CVE-2026-27522 Variant: Sandbox Media Root Bypass ===
[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running exploit script with Bun...
[VULNERABLE] mediaUrl bypassed normalizeSandboxMediaParams!
Agent-A sandboxRoot: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a
mediaUrl targets Agent-B: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt
args after normalization: {"mediaUrl":"/root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt"}
[EXPLOITED] Agent-B secret file content: AGENT-B-SECRET-API-KEY-sk-12345abcdef
=== EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===
Agent-A read Agent-B's secret file via mediaUrl, bypassing sandbox.
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE — mediaUrl bypasses sandbox enforcement
Control experiment output:
=== Control Experiment: Sandbox Enforcement for 'media' Key ===
[*] Container 'openclaw-media-bypass-test' is running
[*] Running control script with Bun...
[SAFE] normalizeSandboxMediaParams blocked 'media' key as expected!
Error: Path escapes sandbox root (/tmp/sandbox-ZKvGQX): /tmp/victim-2cuAOO/secret.txt
=== CONTROL EXPERIMENT PASSED ===
The 'media' parameter IS correctly checked by sandbox enforcement.
Only unchecked keys (mediaUrl, fileUrl) bypass the sandbox.
[+] CONTROL PASSED: 'media' key is correctly enforced by sandbox
Impact
This is a sandbox escape vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent's tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces. This includes:
- API keys and secrets stored in other agents' sandboxes
- Session data and conversation logs
- Configuration files with sensitive credentials
- Any file within the ~/.openclaw/ directory tree
This completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project's Docker and sandboxing documentation.
Affected products
- Ecosystem: npm
- Package name: openclaw
- Affected versions: <= 2026.3.14 (current latest)
- Patched versions:
Severity
- Severity: High
- Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses
- CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Occurrences
| Permalink | Description |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227 | The normalizeSandboxMediaParams function with incomplete mediaKeys allowlist — mediaUrl and fileUrl are not checked. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697 | The handlePluginAction dispatch call that omits mediaLocalRoots from the context passed to dispatchChannelMessageAction. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478 | The ChannelMessageActionContext type that defines mediaLocalRoots but never receives it from handlePluginAction. |
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T18:31:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n### Advisory Details\n**Title**: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)\n\n**Description**:\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents\u0027 workspaces by using the `mediaUrl` or `fileUrl` parameter key in message tool calls. The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function only checks `[\"media\", \"path\", \"filePath\"]` keys, while `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` escape normalization entirely. Combined with `handlePluginAction` dropping `mediaLocalRoots` from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:\n\n**1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in `normalizeSandboxMediaParams`:**\n\nIn `src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts`, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:\n\n```typescript\n// Line 212\nconst mediaKeys: Array\u003c\"media\" | \"path\" | \"filePath\"\u003e = [\"media\", \"path\", \"filePath\"];\n```\n\nThe `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by `resolveSandboxedMediaSource`.\n\n**2. Dropped `mediaLocalRoots` in `handlePluginAction`:**\n\nIn `src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts`, the `handlePluginAction` function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context:\n\n```typescript\n// Lines 684-697\nconst handled = await dispatchChannelMessageAction({\n channel,\n action,\n cfg,\n params,\n accountId: accountId ?? undefined,\n requesterSenderId: input.requesterSenderId ?? undefined,\n sessionKey: input.sessionKey,\n sessionId: input.sessionId,\n agentId,\n gateway,\n toolContext: input.toolContext,\n dryRun,\n // mediaLocalRoots is MISSING here\n});\n```\n\nDespite `ChannelMessageActionContext` defining `mediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[]` (in `src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts` line 478), plugins receive `undefined` and fall back to `getDefaultMediaLocalRoots()`, which permits reads of the entire `~/.openclaw/` directory tree \u2014 including all agents\u0027 workspaces.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n1. A sandboxed agent (Agent-A at `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/`) calls the message tool with `{ mediaUrl: \"~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt\" }`\n2. `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` skips the `mediaUrl` key (not in allowlist)\n3. `handlePluginAction` dispatches without `mediaLocalRoots`\n4. Plugin calls `loadWebMedia` with default roots, which allows `~/.openclaw/workspace/**`\n5. Agent-B\u0027s secret file content is read and sent as a channel attachment\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Docker installed\n- OpenClaw Docker image built (`openclaw-gateway:latest`)\n\n**Steps:**\n\n1. Start the vulnerable gateway container:\n\n```bash\ncd llm-enhance/cve-finding/Path_Traversal/CVE-2026-27522-Media_Root_Bypass-variant-exp/\ndocker compose up -d\nsleep 5\n```\n\n2. Run the exploit:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc_exploit.py\n```\n\n3. The exploit writes a secret file to `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt` inside the container, then invokes `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` with Agent-A\u0027s sandbox policy and `{ mediaUrl: \u003cagent-b-secret-path\u003e }`. The `mediaUrl` key bypasses normalization, and `loadWebMedia` reads the file successfully.\n\n4. Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:\n\n```bash\npython3 control-sandbox_enforced.py\n```\n\n### Log of Evidence\n\n**Exploit output:**\n```\n=== CVE-2026-27522 Variant: Sandbox Media Root Bypass ===\n\n[*] Container \u0027openclaw-media-bypass-test\u0027 is running\n[*] Running exploit script with Bun...\n\n[VULNERABLE] mediaUrl bypassed normalizeSandboxMediaParams!\n Agent-A sandboxRoot: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a\n mediaUrl targets Agent-B: /root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt\n args after normalization: {\"mediaUrl\":\"/root/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt\"}\n[EXPLOITED] Agent-B secret file content: AGENT-B-SECRET-API-KEY-sk-12345abcdef\n\n=== EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===\nAgent-A read Agent-B\u0027s secret file via mediaUrl, bypassing sandbox.\n\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE \u2014 mediaUrl bypasses sandbox enforcement\n```\n\n**Control experiment output:**\n```\n=== Control Experiment: Sandbox Enforcement for \u0027media\u0027 Key ===\n\n[*] Container \u0027openclaw-media-bypass-test\u0027 is running\n[*] Running control script with Bun...\n\n[SAFE] normalizeSandboxMediaParams blocked \u0027media\u0027 key as expected!\n Error: Path escapes sandbox root (/tmp/sandbox-ZKvGQX): /tmp/victim-2cuAOO/secret.txt\n\n=== CONTROL EXPERIMENT PASSED ===\nThe \u0027media\u0027 parameter IS correctly checked by sandbox enforcement.\nOnly unchecked keys (mediaUrl, fileUrl) bypass the sandbox.\n\n[+] CONTROL PASSED: \u0027media\u0027 key is correctly enforced by sandbox\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **sandbox escape** vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent\u0027s tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents\u0027 workspaces. This includes:\n- API keys and secrets stored in other agents\u0027 sandboxes\n- Session data and conversation logs\n- Configuration files with sensitive credentials\n- Any file within the `~/.openclaw/` directory tree\n\nThis completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project\u0027s Docker and sandboxing documentation.\n\n### Affected products\n- **Ecosystem**: npm\n- **Package name**: openclaw\n- **Affected versions**: \u003c= 2026.3.14 (current latest)\n- **Patched versions**: \u003cNone\u003e\n\n### Severity\n- **Severity**: High\n- **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n\n### Weaknesses\n- **CWE**: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\n### Occurrences\n\n| Permalink | Description |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227) | The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function with incomplete `mediaKeys` allowlist \u2014 `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` are not checked. |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697) | The `handlePluginAction` dispatch call that omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context passed to `dispatchChannelMessageAction`. |\n| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478) | The `ChannelMessageActionContext` type that defines `mediaLocalRoots` but never receives it from `handlePluginAction`. |",
"id": "GHSA-hr5v-j9h9-xjhg",
"modified": "2026-04-10T17:29:38Z",
"published": "2026-03-30T18:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hr5v-j9h9-xjhg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.