CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13073 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FR4H-3CPH-29XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-27 00:02 – Updated: 2026-06-27 00:03Summary
The hoisted dependency alias issue tracked as GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv / CAND-PNPM-059 has been addressed in both pnpm and pacquet.
A crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted node_modules directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as .bin or .pnpm could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This patch validates package-name semantics and path containment before graph insertion or filesystem work.
Security boundary
- The TypeScript hoisted graph uses the shared safe join helper at the actual
dep.namesink. - The helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved package names.
- Pacquet validates the hoister's
dep.0.namebefore adding the graph node or recursing. - Both implementations return
ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME. - Pacquet uses the same dependency-name containment rule at its hoisted graph sink as it uses for direct dependency aliases.
Exploit replay
Before the patch, a traversal alias in a hoisted lockfile imported package files outside the intended install root. With this patch, both pnpm and pacquet reject the alias before graph insertion or filesystem work, and the escaped file is not created.
Files changed
fs/symlink-dependency/src/safeJoinModulesDir.tsprovides the TypeScript containment helper.installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.tsvalidates the parsed dependency name at the hoisted graph sink.pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/{hoisted_dep_graph.rs,safe_join_modules_dir.rs}mirrors that boundary in Rust.- TypeScript and Rust tests cover traversal, reserved aliases, and valid scoped names.
Commands run
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency test
PASS: 24 tests
$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer test test/index.ts
PASS: exploit regression and positive install control
$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib
PASS: 426 tests
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS
Validation
- TypeScript symlink helper: 24 passed.
- TypeScript exploit regression: 1 passed.
- TypeScript positive hoisted-install control: 1 passed.
- Targeted strict TypeScript compiles: passed.
- Targeted ESLint: zero errors.
- Pacquet helper tests: 3 passed.
- Full pacquet package-manager library suite: 426 passed.
cargo fmt, parsed two-document lockfile validation, andgit diff --check: passed.
Patch
Ready-for-review private PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-fr4h-3cph-29xv/pull/1
GitHub reports the branch as mergeable and has requested review from zkochan. GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork PRs; the commands and outcomes above are the recorded local validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability
Compatibility
Valid unscoped and scoped package aliases continue to work. The changeset covers @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency, @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer, and pnpm; pacquet is updated in the same commit for CLI parity.
Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.34.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-27T00:02:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe hoisted dependency alias issue tracked as GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv / CAND-PNPM-059 has been addressed in both pnpm and pacquet.\n\nA crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted `node_modules` directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as `.bin` or `.pnpm` could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This patch validates package-name semantics and path containment before graph insertion or filesystem work.\n\n## Security boundary\n\n- The TypeScript hoisted graph uses the shared safe join helper at the actual `dep.name` sink.\n- The helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved package names.\n- Pacquet validates the hoister\u0027s `dep.0.name` before adding the graph node or recursing.\n- Both implementations return `ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME`.\n- Pacquet uses the same dependency-name containment rule at its hoisted graph sink as it uses for direct dependency aliases.\n\n## Exploit replay\n\nBefore the patch, a traversal alias in a hoisted lockfile imported package files outside the intended install root. With this patch, both pnpm and pacquet reject the alias before graph insertion or filesystem work, and the escaped file is not created.\n\n## Files changed\n\n- `fs/symlink-dependency/src/safeJoinModulesDir.ts` provides the TypeScript containment helper.\n- `installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts` validates the parsed dependency name at the hoisted graph sink.\n- `pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/{hoisted_dep_graph.rs,safe_join_modules_dir.rs}` mirrors that boundary in Rust.\n- TypeScript and Rust tests cover traversal, reserved aliases, and valid scoped names.\n\n## Commands run\n\n```text\n$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency test\nPASS: 24 tests\n$ pnpm --filter @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer test test/index.ts\nPASS: exploit regression and positive install control\n$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib\nPASS: 426 tests\n$ cargo fmt --all -- --check\nPASS\n```\n\n## Validation\n\n- TypeScript symlink helper: 24 passed.\n- TypeScript exploit regression: 1 passed.\n- TypeScript positive hoisted-install control: 1 passed.\n- Targeted strict TypeScript compiles: passed.\n- Targeted ESLint: zero errors.\n- Pacquet helper tests: 3 passed.\n- Full pacquet package-manager library suite: 426 passed.\n- `cargo fmt`, parsed two-document lockfile validation, and `git diff --check`: passed.\n\n## Patch\n\nReady-for-review private PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-fr4h-3cph-29xv/pull/1\n\nGitHub reports the branch as mergeable and has requested review from `zkochan`. GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork PRs; the commands and outcomes above are the recorded local validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability\n\n## Compatibility\n\nValid unscoped and scoped package aliases continue to work. The changeset covers `@pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency`, `@pnpm/installing.deps-restorer`, and `pnpm`; pacquet is updated in the same commit for CLI parity.\n\n---\nWritten by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).",
"id": "GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv",
"modified": "2026-06-27T00:03:02Z",
"published": "2026-06-27T00:02:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules"
}
GHSA-FR6F-XMFX-RRPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2025-02-10 20:34Magento versions 2.3.5-p1 and earlier, and 2.3.5-p1 and earlier have a path traversal vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.5-p2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-11T17:19:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-29T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Magento versions 2.3.5-p1 and earlier, and 2.3.5-p1 and earlier have a path traversal vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6f-xmfx-rrpq",
"modified": "2025-02-10T20:34:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:24:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/9436781734e47c83e96977fa770d255217680d5e#diff-7c7399d1d47cdaf120a1a503b7ad87f496d98790203dc82b395ec6bc2d430a55"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb20-47.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento path traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-FR6Q-JV7J-35G3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-02 00:01 – Updated: 2022-02-07 19:12Path Traversal in NPM w-zip prior to 1.0.12.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "w-zip"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0401"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-03T20:50:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-01T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Path Traversal in NPM w-zip prior to 1.0.12.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6q-jv7j-35g3",
"modified": "2022-02-07T19:12:42Z",
"published": "2022-02-02T00:01:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0401"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yuda-lyu/w-zip/commit/d7039d034e02fa358e6656565157cedf5fa83288"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yuda-lyu/w-zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/d93259aa-ad03-43d6-8846-a00b9f58876d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in w-zip"
}
GHSA-FR89-RJQ8-J557
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:34Directory traversal vulnerability in SavySoda WiFi HD Free before 7.0 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-3923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-11-26T16:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in SavySoda WiFi HD Free before 7.0 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a ..%2f (encoded dot dot slash) in a GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-fr89-rjq8-j557",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:34:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-3923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/89172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs/advisories/TWSL2013-034.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FR8X-3VFX-F45H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 19:27 – Updated: 2026-05-05 19:27Summary
attachments: pocs.zip
Submodule names coming from .gitmodules are exposed as unvalidated names and are later reused to derive the submodule git directory as:
<superproject common_dir>/modules/<submodule name>
Because the submodule name is joined directly as a filesystem path component, a name such as ../../../escaped-target.git escapes .git/modules after normalization. The current implementation then uses that escaped path in both state() and open().
The updated PoC demonstrates the real sink, not just string construction:
state()reportsrepository_exists=truefor the traversed path;open()returns a repository whose normalizedcommon_dir()matches the attacker-chosen repository outside.git/modules.
Root cause analysis
The relevant flow is:
gix-submodule/src/access.rsexposes unvalidated submodule names from configuration.gix/src/submodule/mod.rsderives the git directory by doingcommon_dir().join("modules").join(name)with no confinement check.gix/src/submodule/mod.rsuses that derived path during state resolution and repository opening.
There is no normalization-and-confinement step between “submodule name from configuration” and “filesystem path used for repository existence checks / open.” As a result, traversal segments in the submodule name directly influence which repository path is inspected and opened.
Reproduce steps
Use the attached PoC zip that contains the pocs/ workspace.
- Unzip the PoC archive.
- Enter
pocs/F002. -
Run:
cargo run --quiet -
Compare the output with
pocs/F002/result.txt.
Key outputs are:
submodule_name=../../../escaped-target.gitderived_git_dir_raw=.../.git/modules/../../../escaped-target.gitderived_git_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.gitescaped_target=.../artifacts/escaped-target.gitrepository_exists=truesubmodule_opened=trueopened_common_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.gitnormalized_git_dir_matches_target=trueopened_common_dir_matches_target=truetarget_outside_modules_root=true
These outputs show that gitoxide is not only constructing a traversable path string. It is actually using the escaped path for repository existence checks and for opening a repository object.
Impact
Confirmed impact:
- a malicious submodule name can redirect submodule state inspection away from
.git/modules/<name>to an attacker-chosen repository path outside.git/modules; Submodule::state()can report repository existence for the wrong repository;Submodule::open()can return a repository object backed by that attacker-chosen path.
This is best described as a path-traversal / repository-confusion issue in submodule repository resolution.
This report does not claim command execution from this behavior alone. The demonstrated impact is repository redirection: callers that enumerate, inspect, or operate on submodules can be steered into using the wrong repository.
Recommended fix
Two complementary fixes are advisable:
- do not reuse raw submodule names as filesystem path fragments;
- either use a validated/sanitized name for filesystem derivation,
- or derive the storage path from a safe identifier instead of the user-controlled name;
- add an explicit confinement check after path derivation;
- normalize or canonicalize the candidate path,
- verify that the result stays under
<common_dir>/modules, - reject names that contain traversal segments, path separators, or any representation that can escape the modules root.
In short, submodule names may remain opaque configuration identifiers, but they should not be treated as trusted filesystem subpaths.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.52.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gitoxide"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.52.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.83.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:27:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## **Summary**\nattachments:\n[pocs.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26431422/pocs.zip)\n\nSubmodule names coming from `.gitmodules` are exposed as unvalidated names and are later reused to derive the submodule git directory as:\n\n```\n\u003csuperproject common_dir\u003e/modules/\u003csubmodule name\u003e\n```\n\nBecause the submodule name is joined directly as a filesystem path component, a name such as `../../../escaped-target.git` escapes `.git/modules` after normalization. The current implementation then uses that escaped path in both `state()` and `open()`.\n\nThe updated PoC demonstrates the real sink, not just string construction:\n\n- `state()` reports `repository_exists=true` for the traversed path;\n- `open()` returns a repository whose normalized `common_dir()` matches the attacker-chosen repository outside `.git/modules`.\n\n## **Root cause analysis**\n\nThe relevant flow is:\n\n1. [`gix-submodule/src/access.rs`](https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/v0.52.0/gix-submodule/src/access.rs) exposes unvalidated submodule names from configuration.\n2. [`gix/src/submodule/mod.rs`](https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/v0.52.0/gix/src/submodule/mod.rs) derives the git directory by doing `common_dir().join(\"modules\").join(name)` with no confinement check.\n3. [`gix/src/submodule/mod.rs`](https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/blob/v0.52.0/gix/src/submodule/mod.rs) uses that derived path during state resolution and repository opening.\n\nThere is no normalization-and-confinement step between \u201csubmodule name from configuration\u201d and \u201cfilesystem path used for repository existence checks / open.\u201d As a result, traversal segments in the submodule name directly influence which repository path is inspected and opened.\n\n## **Reproduce steps**\n\nUse the attached PoC zip that contains the `pocs/` workspace.\n\n1. Unzip the PoC archive.\n2. Enter `pocs/F002`.\n3. Run:\n \n ```\n cargo run --quiet\n ```\n \n4. Compare the output with `pocs/F002/result.txt`.\n\nKey outputs are:\n\n- `submodule_name=../../../escaped-target.git`\n- `derived_git_dir_raw=.../.git/modules/../../../escaped-target.git`\n- `derived_git_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git`\n- `escaped_target=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git`\n- `repository_exists=true`\n- `submodule_opened=true`\n- `opened_common_dir_normalized=.../artifacts/escaped-target.git`\n- `normalized_git_dir_matches_target=true`\n- `opened_common_dir_matches_target=true`\n- `target_outside_modules_root=true`\n\nThese outputs show that gitoxide is not only constructing a traversable path string. It is actually using the escaped path for repository existence checks and for opening a repository object.\n\n## **Impact**\n\nConfirmed impact:\n\n- a malicious submodule name can redirect submodule state inspection away from `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e` to an attacker-chosen repository path outside `.git/modules`;\n- `Submodule::state()` can report repository existence for the wrong repository;\n- `Submodule::open()` can return a repository object backed by that attacker-chosen path.\n\nThis is best described as a path-traversal / repository-confusion issue in submodule repository resolution.\n\nThis report does **not** claim command execution from this behavior alone. The demonstrated impact is repository redirection: callers that enumerate, inspect, or operate on submodules can be steered into using the wrong repository.\n\n## **Recommended fix**\n\nTwo complementary fixes are advisable:\n\n1. do not reuse raw submodule names as filesystem path fragments;\n - either use a validated/sanitized name for filesystem derivation,\n - or derive the storage path from a safe identifier instead of the user-controlled name;\n2. add an explicit confinement check after path derivation;\n - normalize or canonicalize the candidate path,\n - verify that the result stays under `\u003ccommon_dir\u003e/modules`,\n - reject names that contain traversal segments, path separators, or any representation that can escape the modules root.\n\nIn short, submodule names may remain opaque configuration identifiers, but they should not be treated as trusted filesystem subpaths.",
"id": "GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h",
"modified": "2026-05-05T19:27:51Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T19:27:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-fr8x-3vfx-f45h"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gix and gitoxide: unvalidated submodule name traverses out of .git/modules and redirects state() / open() to another repository"
}
GHSA-FR8X-M9PR-H4RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-10 12:30 – Updated: 2025-05-10 12:30The WordPress Review Plugin: The Ultimate Solution for Building a Review Website plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.5 via the Post custom fields. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where PHP file types can be uploaded and included, or pearcmd is enabled on a server with register_argc_argv also enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-2158"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-10T10:15:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WordPress Review Plugin: The Ultimate Solution for Building a Review Website plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 5.3.5 via the Post custom fields. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where PHP file types can be uploaded and included, or pearcmd is enabled on a server with register_argc_argv also enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-fr8x-m9pr-h4rh",
"modified": "2025-05-10T12:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-05-10T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2158"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-review/tags/5.3.5/includes/functions.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-review/tags/5.3.5/includes/shortcodes.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a058e6bf-109f-4985-8aad-08858553c4c3?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR8X-PM73-6F4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-28 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-05 00:31Nagios XI < 2024R1.3.2 contains a remote code execution vulnerability by chaining two flaws: an arbitrary file upload and a path traversal in the Core Config Snapshots interface. The issue arises from insufficient validation of file paths and extensions during MIB upload and snapshot rename operations. Exploitation results in the placement of attacker-controlled PHP files in a web-accessible directory, executed as the www-data user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-28T16:15:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Nagios XI \u003c 2024R1.3.2 contains a remote code execution vulnerability by chaining two flaws: an arbitrary file upload and a path traversal in the Core Config Snapshots interface. The issue arises from insufficient validation of file paths and extensions during MIB upload and snapshot rename operations. Exploitation results in the placement of attacker-controlled PHP files in a web-accessible directory, executed as the www-data user.",
"id": "GHSA-fr8x-pm73-6f4h",
"modified": "2025-11-05T00:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-08-28T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://theyhack.me/Nagios-XI-Authenticated-RCE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog/nagios-xi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/products/security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/products/security/#nagios-xi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nagios-xi-authenticated-arbitrary-file-upload-path-traversal-rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRCQ-4FFQ-V4MW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:12 – Updated: 2023-09-11 20:34Affected versions of lessindex resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "lessindex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:22:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `lessindex` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-frcq-4ffq-v4mw",
"modified": "2023-09-11T20:34:25Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:12:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/lessindex"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/423"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in lessindex"
}
GHSA-FRF6-MGQW-PHRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-04 12:31The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.16. This is due to a missing file name/path validation against path traversal sequences. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server by embedding a crafted path traversal string in a forum post body and then deleting the post.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-04T12:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.16. This is due to a missing file name/path validation against path traversal sequences. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server by embedding a crafted path traversal string in a forum post body and then deleting the post.",
"id": "GHSA-frf6-mgqw-phrc",
"modified": "2026-04-04T12:31:04Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T12:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=wpforo/tags/2.4.16/classes/Posts.php\u0026new_path=wpforo/tags/2.4.17/classes/Posts.php\u0026old=3471614\u0026new=3483044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f215e320-8563-4d25-9963-ed3664b4901d?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRGP-QR7C-8F9Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:15 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:15Directory traversal vulnerability in the AutartiTarot (com_autartitarot) component 1.0.3 for Joomla! allows remote authenticated users, with "Public Back-end" group permissions, to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the controller parameter in an edit task to administrator/index.php. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-0801"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-02T20:30:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the AutartiTarot (com_autartitarot) component 1.0.3 for Joomla! allows remote authenticated users, with \"Public Back-end\" group permissions, to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the controller parameter in an edit task to administrator/index.php. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-frgp-qr7c-8f9q",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:15:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:15:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/62041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1001-exploits/joomlaautartitarot-traversal.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/38434"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38034"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.