CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13049 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F3VW-587G-R29G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-03 15:50 – Updated: 2020-08-31 19:01Versions of sapper prior to 0.27.11 are vulnerable to Path Traversal. It is possible to access sensitive files on the server through HTTP requests containing URL-encoded ../.
You may test a sapper application running in prod mode with curl -vvv http://localhost:3000/client/750af05c3a69ddc6073a/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd.
Recommendation
Upgrade to version 0.27.11 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sapper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.27.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T19:01:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Versions of `sapper` prior to 0.27.11 are vulnerable to Path Traversal. It is possible to access sensitive files on the server through HTTP requests containing URL-encoded `../`. \n\nYou may test a `sapper` application running in prod mode with `curl -vvv http://localhost:3000/client/750af05c3a69ddc6073a/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd`.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 0.27.11 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-f3vw-587g-r29g",
"modified": "2020-08-31T19:01:20Z",
"published": "2020-09-03T15:50:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1494"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Path Traversal in sapper"
}
GHSA-F3WR-J648-3C97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-22 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-22 18:31NGINX Agent's "config_dirs" restriction feature allows a highly privileged attacker to gain the ability to write/overwrite files outside of the designated secure directory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-22T18:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NGINX Agent\u0027s \"config_dirs\" restriction feature allows a highly privileged attacker to gain the ability to write/overwrite files outside of the designated secure directory.",
"id": "GHSA-f3wr-j648-3c97",
"modified": "2024-08-22T18:31:23Z",
"published": "2024-08-22T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000140630"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F3X3-49J2-R3JP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:49Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OpenEMR 4.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the formname parameter to (1) contrib/acog/print_form.php; or (2) load_form.php, (3) view_form.php, or (4) trend_form.php in interface/patient_file/encounter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-0991"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-02-07T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OpenEMR 4.1.0 allow remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the formname parameter to (1) contrib/acog/print_form.php; or (2) load_form.php, (3) view_form.php, or (4) trend_form.php in interface/patient_file/encounter.",
"id": "GHSA-f3x3-49j2-r3jp",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:49:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:49:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0991"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/72914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.ch/advisory/HTB23069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2012-02/0004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/78727"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/78728"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/78729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/78730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/47781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.open-emr.org/wiki/index.php/OpenEMR_Patches"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51788"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F3XW-VGC7-F7H8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 06:43 – Updated: 2024-10-30 18:09Directory traversal vulnerability in PEAR::Archive_Tar 1.2, and other versions before 1.3.2, allows remote attackers to create and overwrite arbitrary files via certain crafted pathnames in a TAR archive.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pear/archive_tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2006-0931"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-30T18:09:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2006-02-28T11:02:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in PEAR::Archive_Tar 1.2, and other versions before 1.3.2, allows remote attackers to create and overwrite arbitrary files via certain crafted pathnames in a TAR archive.",
"id": "GHSA-f3xw-vgc7-f7h8",
"modified": "2024-10-30T18:09:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T06:43:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-0931"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pear/Archive_Tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://pear.php.net/bugs/bug.php?id=6933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://pear.php.net/package/Archive_Tar/download"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.hamid.ir/security/phptar.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PEAR::Archive_Tar Directory Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-F42M-MVFV-CGW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 18:18A path traversal vulnerability exists in the mlflow/mlflow repository due to improper handling of URL parameters. By smuggling path traversal sequences using the ';' character in URLs, attackers can manipulate the 'params' portion of the URL to gain unauthorized access to files or directories. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary data smuggling into the 'params' part of the URL, enabling attacks similar to those described in previous reports but utilizing the ';' character for parameter smuggling. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized information disclosure or server compromise.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.9.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1593"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-16T18:18:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in the mlflow/mlflow repository due to improper handling of URL parameters. By smuggling path traversal sequences using the \u0027;\u0027 character in URLs, attackers can manipulate the \u0027params\u0027 portion of the URL to gain unauthorized access to files or directories. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary data smuggling into the \u0027params\u0027 part of the URL, enabling attacks similar to those described in previous reports but utilizing the \u0027;\u0027 character for parameter smuggling. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized information disclosure or server compromise.",
"id": "GHSA-f42m-mvfv-cgw5",
"modified": "2024-04-16T18:18:31Z",
"published": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1593"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/dbdc6bd6-d09a-46f2-9d9c-5138a14b6e31"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mlflow vulnerable to Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-F42W-655X-JC67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-03-22 15:31NetNumber Titan Master 7.9.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the drp endpoint that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences. Attackers can manipulate the path parameter with base64-encoded payloads containing ../ sequences to bypass authorization and retrieve sensitive system files like /etc/shadow.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-25610"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T14:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NetNumber Titan Master 7.9.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the drp endpoint that allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files by injecting directory traversal sequences. Attackers can manipulate the path parameter with base64-encoded payloads containing ../ sequences to bypass authorization and retrieve sensitive system files like /etc/shadow.",
"id": "GHSA-f42w-655x-jc67",
"modified": "2026-03-22T15:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-22T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25610"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.netnumber.com/products/#data"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netnumber-titan-master-path-traversal-via-drp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F44V-7QGW-9GH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:24 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:24Summary
PraisonAI's template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for example
github:owner/repo/template@v1.0.0. The resolver stores the user-controlled
template path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into
~/.praison/cache/templates/github/<owner>/<repo>/<template>/<ref> without
normalizing each segment or checking that the final path remains inside the
template cache root.
A crafted ref such as ../../../../../../outside-delete-target therefore
escapes the cache directory. The first load can write .cache_meta.json outside
the cache. If the normal cache hierarchy for the same owner/repo/template has
already been created, the same path reaches shutil.rmtree(cache_path) and
removes an attacker-selected outside directory before replacing it with cache
metadata.
This is distinct from the old template Zip Slip advisory. No malicious archive member is needed, and the PoV disables network access entirely. The bug is in cache-key construction for GitHub template URIs.
Affected versions
Confirmed vulnerable:
v2.6.0v3.9.24v3.9.26v4.5.126v4.5.128v4.6.9v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.57- current head
2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1
Recommended affected range: >= 2.6.0, <= 4.6.57.
No fixed version is known at the time of this report.
Impact
An attacker who can cause a user or service to load an attacker-supplied PraisonAI GitHub template URI can:
- create
.cache_meta.jsonoutside the template cache directory; - delete a directory reachable by the PraisonAI process after a normal cache entry exists for the same owner/repo/template prefix;
- corrupt user configuration, project state, or application data reachable by the process permissions.
Root cause
Current-head code path:
praisonai/templates/resolver.py:GITHUB_PATTERNcapturespathandrefwith broad regex groups and returns them without segment validation.praisonai/templates/security.py:is_source_allowed()allows GitHub sources by default whenallow_any_githubis true.praisonai/templates/registry.py:get_template()resolves a GitHub URI, fetches the template, calculates a checksum, then callsself.cache.put(...).praisonai/templates/cache.py:_get_cache_path()builds the cache path asself.cache_dir / "github" / resolved.owner / resolved.repo / resolved.path / ref.praisonai/templates/cache.py:put()removes an existingcache_pathwithshutil.rmtree(cache_path), recreates it, copies content, and writes.cache_meta.json.
There is no check equivalent to:
- reject absolute path segments;
- reject
./..in owner, repo, template path, or ref; - resolve the candidate path;
- require
os.path.commonpath([cache_root, candidate]) == cache_root.
Local-only PoV
Run from a PraisonAI source checkout:
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from praisonai.templates.cache import TemplateCache
from praisonai.templates.loader import TemplateLoader
from praisonai.templates.registry import TemplateRegistry
def loader(cache_dir):
cache = TemplateCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)
registry = TemplateRegistry(cache=cache, offline=False)
registry._make_request = lambda url, headers=None: (_ for _ in ()).throw(
RuntimeError("network disabled")
)
return TemplateLoader(cache=cache, registry=registry)
with TemporaryDirectory(prefix="prai-cache-ref-pov-") as tmp:
root = Path(tmp)
cache_dir = root / "cache" / "templates"
write_target = root / "outside-write-target"
loader(cache_dir).load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-write-target"
)
delete_target = root / "outside-delete-target"
delete_target.mkdir()
canary = delete_target / "canary.txt"
canary.write_text("delete-me")
ldr = loader(cache_dir)
ldr.load("github:attacker/repo/template@main")
ldr.load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-delete-target"
)
safe_target = root / "safe-control"
safe_target.mkdir()
safe_canary = safe_target / "canary.txt"
safe_canary.write_text("must-remain")
loader(root / "safe-cache" / "templates").load(
"github:attacker/repo/template@main"
)
print("outside metadata written:", (write_target / ".cache_meta.json").exists())
print("outside canary exists after malicious ref:", canary.exists())
print("safe canary exists after normal ref:", safe_canary.exists())
Expected output:
outside metadata written: True
outside canary exists after malicious ref: False
safe canary exists after normal ref: True
The PoV uses only temporary directories and disables network fetches.
I also confirmed the same behavior without monkeypatching network fetches. With a non-existent GitHub repository, PraisonAI makes real GitHub requests, handles the failed fetch, returns a fallback template config, and still writes/deletes through the escaped cache path. The PoV above disables network only to keep the reproducer deterministic and harmless.
Release sweep
The same PoV was run against checked-out tags:
praisonai-current metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.57 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.56 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.10 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.6.9 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.128 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v4.5.126 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.26 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v3.9.24 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
praisonai-v2.6.0 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True
git log shows the affected template cache/resolver/registry files were added
in the v2.6.0 release commit e7a8ce8e.
Suggested fix
Validate every cache path segment before joining:
- owner and repo: strict GitHub owner/repo-name regex;
- template path: split on
/and reject empty,.,.., and absolute forms; - ref: reject
/, path separators, empty segments,.,.., and absolute forms, or encode/hash the ref before using it in a filesystem path.
Then enforce a final boundary check:
cache_root = self.cache_dir.resolve()
candidate = (cache_root / "github" / owner / repo / safe_path / safe_ref).resolve()
if os.path.commonpath([str(cache_root), str(candidate)]) != str(cache_root):
raise ValueError("template cache path escapes cache root")
A more robust design is to hash untrusted URI fields into opaque directory names instead of using raw remote identifiers as path segments.
Also consider failing closed when a GitHub template fetch returns no files. Currently a failed fetch can still result in a cached empty template directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.57"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:24:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s template loader accepts GitHub template URIs with refs, for example\n`github:owner/repo/template@v1.0.0`. The resolver stores the user-controlled\ntemplate path and ref verbatim, and the cache layer later joins those values into\n`~/.praison/cache/templates/github/\u003cowner\u003e/\u003crepo\u003e/\u003ctemplate\u003e/\u003cref\u003e` without\nnormalizing each segment or checking that the final path remains inside the\ntemplate cache root.\n\nA crafted ref such as `../../../../../../outside-delete-target` therefore\nescapes the cache directory. The first load can write `.cache_meta.json` outside\nthe cache. If the normal cache hierarchy for the same owner/repo/template has\nalready been created, the same path reaches `shutil.rmtree(cache_path)` and\nremoves an attacker-selected outside directory before replacing it with cache\nmetadata.\n\nThis is distinct from the old template Zip Slip advisory. No malicious archive\nmember is needed, and the PoV disables network access entirely. The bug is in\ncache-key construction for GitHub template URIs.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nConfirmed vulnerable:\n\n- `v2.6.0`\n- `v3.9.24`\n- `v3.9.26`\n- `v4.5.126`\n- `v4.5.128`\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.6.10`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n- current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n\nRecommended affected range: `\u003e= 2.6.0, \u003c= 4.6.57`.\n\nNo fixed version is known at the time of this report.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can cause a user or service to load an attacker-supplied\nPraisonAI GitHub template URI can:\n\n- create `.cache_meta.json` outside the template cache directory;\n- delete a directory reachable by the PraisonAI process after a normal cache\n entry exists for the same owner/repo/template prefix;\n- corrupt user configuration, project state, or application data reachable by\n the process permissions.\n\n## Root cause\n\nCurrent-head code path:\n\n- `praisonai/templates/resolver.py`: `GITHUB_PATTERN` captures `path` and `ref`\n with broad regex groups and returns them without segment validation.\n- `praisonai/templates/security.py`: `is_source_allowed()` allows GitHub sources\n by default when `allow_any_github` is true.\n- `praisonai/templates/registry.py`: `get_template()` resolves a GitHub URI,\n fetches the template, calculates a checksum, then calls `self.cache.put(...)`.\n- `praisonai/templates/cache.py`: `_get_cache_path()` builds the cache path as\n `self.cache_dir / \"github\" / resolved.owner / resolved.repo /\n resolved.path / ref`.\n- `praisonai/templates/cache.py`: `put()` removes an existing `cache_path` with\n `shutil.rmtree(cache_path)`, recreates it, copies content, and writes\n `.cache_meta.json`.\n\nThere is no check equivalent to:\n\n1. reject absolute path segments;\n2. reject `.` / `..` in owner, repo, template path, or ref;\n3. resolve the candidate path;\n4. require `os.path.commonpath([cache_root, candidate]) == cache_root`.\n\n## Local-only PoV\n\nRun from a PraisonAI source checkout:\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom tempfile import TemporaryDirectory\nfrom praisonai.templates.cache import TemplateCache\nfrom praisonai.templates.loader import TemplateLoader\nfrom praisonai.templates.registry import TemplateRegistry\n\ndef loader(cache_dir):\n cache = TemplateCache(cache_dir=cache_dir)\n registry = TemplateRegistry(cache=cache, offline=False)\n registry._make_request = lambda url, headers=None: (_ for _ in ()).throw(\n RuntimeError(\"network disabled\")\n )\n return TemplateLoader(cache=cache, registry=registry)\n\nwith TemporaryDirectory(prefix=\"prai-cache-ref-pov-\") as tmp:\n root = Path(tmp)\n cache_dir = root / \"cache\" / \"templates\"\n\n write_target = root / \"outside-write-target\"\n loader(cache_dir).load(\n \"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-write-target\"\n )\n\n delete_target = root / \"outside-delete-target\"\n delete_target.mkdir()\n canary = delete_target / \"canary.txt\"\n canary.write_text(\"delete-me\")\n\n ldr = loader(cache_dir)\n ldr.load(\"github:attacker/repo/template@main\")\n ldr.load(\n \"github:attacker/repo/template@../../../../../../outside-delete-target\"\n )\n\n safe_target = root / \"safe-control\"\n safe_target.mkdir()\n safe_canary = safe_target / \"canary.txt\"\n safe_canary.write_text(\"must-remain\")\n loader(root / \"safe-cache\" / \"templates\").load(\n \"github:attacker/repo/template@main\"\n )\n\n print(\"outside metadata written:\", (write_target / \".cache_meta.json\").exists())\n print(\"outside canary exists after malicious ref:\", canary.exists())\n print(\"safe canary exists after normal ref:\", safe_canary.exists())\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\noutside metadata written: True\noutside canary exists after malicious ref: False\nsafe canary exists after normal ref: True\n```\n\nThe PoV uses only temporary directories and disables network fetches.\n\nI also confirmed the same behavior without monkeypatching network fetches. With\na non-existent GitHub repository, PraisonAI makes real GitHub requests, handles\nthe failed fetch, returns a fallback template config, and still writes/deletes\nthrough the escaped cache path. The PoV above disables network only to keep the\nreproducer deterministic and harmless.\n\n## Release sweep\n\nThe same PoV was run against checked-out tags:\n\n```text\npraisonai-current metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.57 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.56 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.10 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.6.9 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.5.128 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v4.5.126 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v3.9.26 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v3.9.24 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\npraisonai-v2.6.0 metadata_write= True outside_delete= True safe_control= True\n```\n\n`git log` shows the affected template cache/resolver/registry files were added\nin the `v2.6.0` release commit `e7a8ce8e`.\n\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nValidate every cache path segment before joining:\n\n- owner and repo: strict GitHub owner/repo-name regex;\n- template path: split on `/` and reject empty, `.`, `..`, and absolute forms;\n- ref: reject `/`, path separators, empty segments, `.`, `..`, and absolute\n forms, or encode/hash the ref before using it in a filesystem path.\n\nThen enforce a final boundary check:\n\n```python\ncache_root = self.cache_dir.resolve()\ncandidate = (cache_root / \"github\" / owner / repo / safe_path / safe_ref).resolve()\nif os.path.commonpath([str(cache_root), str(candidate)]) != str(cache_root):\n raise ValueError(\"template cache path escapes cache root\")\n```\n\nA more robust design is to hash untrusted URI fields into opaque directory names\ninstead of using raw remote identifiers as path segments.\n\nAlso consider failing closed when a GitHub template fetch returns no files.\nCurrently a failed fetch can still result in a cached empty template directory.",
"id": "GHSA-f44v-7qgw-9gh9",
"modified": "2026-06-18T14:24:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T14:24:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-f44v-7qgw-9gh9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion"
}
GHSA-F474-2MPQ-X44C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-30 18:22 – Updated: 2022-04-30 18:22Directory traversal vulnerability in Monkey HTTP Daemon 0.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via .. (dot dot) sequences.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2002-2154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2002-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Monkey HTTP Daemon 0.1.4 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via .. (dot dot) sequences.",
"id": "GHSA-f474-2mpq-x44c",
"modified": "2022-04-30T18:22:36Z",
"published": "2022-04-30T18:22:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-2154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-09/0298.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10188.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5792"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F499-JV47-9WXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-08-06 21:40 – Updated: 2023-09-06 20:04Affected versions of desafio resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
no patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "desafio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:33:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `desafio` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nno patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-f499-jv47-9wxf",
"modified": "2023-09-06T20:04:27Z",
"published": "2018-08-06T21:40:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/desafio"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f499-jv47-9wxf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/397"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in desafio"
}
GHSA-F4F9-627C-JH33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:08 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:10Summary
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.
The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as /etc/passwd or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.
Details
The vulnerable chain was:
objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.phpaccepted attacker-controlleddownloadURL_gifimage- traversal scrubbing used
str_replace('../', '', ...), which was bypassable with overlapping input such as....// - same-origin
/videos/...URLs were accepted url_get_contents()andtry_get_contents_from_local()resolved the request into a local filesystem read- the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination
- invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk
This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.
Proof of concept
- Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.
- Send:
POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php
downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd
- Query:
GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1
- Recover the generated GIF URL from
videosURL.gif.url. - Download that GIF URL.
- Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as
/etc/passwd, byte-for-byte.
Impact
An authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin /videos/... path to downloadURL_gifimage. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as /etc/passwd, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.
Recommended fix
- Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers
- Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin
/videos/...fetches to resolve into local file reads - Constrain any local shortcut path handling with
realpath()and strict base-directory allowlists - Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage
- Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "WWBN/AVideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:08:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T20:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.\n\nThe vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as `/etc/passwd` or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable chain was:\n\n1. `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `downloadURL_gifimage`\n2. traversal scrubbing used `str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)`, which was bypassable with overlapping input such as `....//`\n3. same-origin `/videos/...` URLs were accepted\n4. `url_get_contents()` and `try_get_contents_from_local()` resolved the request into a local filesystem read\n5. the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination\n6. invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk\n\nThis made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n1. Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.\n2. Send:\n\n```text\nPOST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php\ndownloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd\n```\n\n3. Query:\n\n```text\nGET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1\n```\n\n4. Recover the generated GIF URL from `videosURL.gif.url`.\n5. Download that GIF URL.\n6. Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as `/etc/passwd`, byte-for-byte.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin `/videos/...` path to `downloadURL_gifimage`. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as `/etc/passwd`, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n- Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers\n- Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` fetches to resolve into local file reads\n- Constrain any local shortcut path handling with `realpath()` and strict base-directory allowlists\n- Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage\n- Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path",
"id": "GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33",
"modified": "2026-04-24T21:10:48Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:08:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/2375eb5e0a6d3cbcfb05377657d0820a7d470b1d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WWBN AVideo\u0027s GIF poster fetch bypasses traversal scrubbing and exposes local files through public media URLs"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.