CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13025 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C3M5-P52Q-PVHF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-05 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-27 18:31Absolute File Traversal vulnerabilities allows access and modification of un-intended resources. Affected products:
ABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.08.02; NEXUS Series v3.08.02; MATRIX Series v3.08.02
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51549"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-36"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-05T13:15:08Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Absolute File Traversal vulnerabilities allows access and modification of un-intended resources.\u00a0\nAffected products:\n\n\nABB ASPECT - Enterprise v3.08.02; \nNEXUS Series v3.08.02; \nMATRIX Series v3.08.02",
"id": "GHSA-c3m5-p52q-pvhf",
"modified": "2025-02-27T18:31:04Z",
"published": "2024-12-05T15:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51549"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK108469A7497\u0026LanguageCode=en\u0026DocumentPartId=\u0026Action=Launch"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3MJ-X5CV-CPHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 06:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 06:31A vulnerability was identified in zhayujie CowAgent up to 2.1.0. The affected element is the function _add_url/_add_package of the file agent/skills/service.py of the component Skill Installation Handler. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 2.1.2 is sufficient to fix this issue. The identifier of the patch is e85290cddcbb5ffc9c235927f4c92e5b4c3ec264. It is advisable to upgrade the affected component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15331"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T05:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in zhayujie CowAgent up to 2.1.0. The affected element is the function _add_url/_add_package of the file agent/skills/service.py of the component Skill Installation Handler. The manipulation of the argument Name leads to path traversal. The attack may be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 2.1.2 is sufficient to fix this issue. The identifier of the patch is e85290cddcbb5ffc9c235927f4c92e5b4c3ec264. It is advisable to upgrade the affected component.",
"id": "GHSA-c3mj-x5cv-cphr",
"modified": "2026-07-10T06:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T06:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zhayujie/CowAgent/issues/2873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zhayujie/CowAgent/pull/2886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zhayujie/CowAgent/commit/e85290cddcbb5ffc9c235927f4c92e5b4c3ec264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zhayujie/CowAgent"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zhayujie/CowAgent/releases/tag/2.1.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-15331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/853104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/377274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/377274/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3PW-9G68-56J8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:54 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:54Directory traversal vulnerability in magick/module.c in ImageMagick 6.9.4-7 allows remote attackers to load arbitrary modules via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-10048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-23T17:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in magick/module.c in ImageMagick 6.9.4-7 allows remote attackers to load arbitrary modules via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-c3pw-9g68-56j8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:54:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:54:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1410451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-02/msg00028.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-02/msg00031.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/12/26/9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95186"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3PX-H233-H6FQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 22:39 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:30Summary
ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user's password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane's Docker control plane, RCE on the host.
Details
Root cause #1 — CreateProject writes compose content without validation (backend/internal/services/project_service.go:1605-1644):
func (s *ProjectService) CreateProject(ctx context.Context, name, composeContent string, envContent *string, user models.User) (*models.Project, error) {
// ... directory setup ...
if err := projects.SaveOrUpdateProjectFiles(projectsDirectory, projectPath, composeContent, envContent); err != nil {
_ = s.db.WithContext(ctx).Delete(proj).Error
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to save project files: %w", err)
}
// ...
}
Compare with UpdateProject (project_service.go:2494, :2577), which calls validateComposeContentForUpdate. That validator (line 2599) loads the compose with missingIncludeStubResourceLoaderInternal, which calls ValidateIncludePathForWrite (includes.go:139) and rejects includes outside the project directory. CreateProject bypasses this entirely, so any malicious include: array survives to disk.
Root cause #2 — GetProjectFileContent reads include files before path validation (backend/internal/services/project_service.go:831-872):
includes, parseErr := projects.ParseIncludes(composeFile, envMap, true)
if parseErr == nil {
for _, inc := range includes {
if inc.RelativePath == relativePath {
return project.IncludeFile{
Path: inc.Path,
RelativePath: inc.RelativePath,
Content: inc.Content, // <-- arbitrary file content returned here
}, nil
}
}
}
fullPath := filepath.Join(proj.Path, relativePath)
// ... IsSafeSubdirectory check at line 870 — never reached when include matches ...
Root cause #3 — ParseIncludes reads include files from anywhere by design (backend/pkg/projects/includes.go:24-72):
// Security Model for Include Files:
// - READ: Docker Compose allows include files from anywhere (parent dirs, absolute paths, etc.)
// We allow reading from any path to maintain compatibility with standard Docker Compose behavior
// - WRITE/DELETE: Restricted to files within the project directory only for security
parseIncludeItemInternal at includes.go:97-101 builds fullPath = filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(baseDir, includePath)) and os.ReadFile(fullPath) at line 105 — no containment check. The returned RelativePath (line 124) is filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(includePath)), which preserves ../../../../etc/passwd verbatim for the equality match in GetProjectFileContent.
Authorization surface: The handler GET /api/environments/{id}/projects/{projectId}/file (backend/internal/huma/handlers/projects.go:268-279) and POST /api/environments/{id}/projects (line 242-253) only declare BearerAuth/ApiKeyAuth. There is no admin-role gate on either handler — GetProjectFile (line 582) and CreateProject (line 524) simply call humamw.GetCurrentUserFromContext. The default user role assigned in users.go:223 is "user" (not admin), and that role is sufficient to exploit.
Resulting primitive: arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process (uid/gid of the container). Sensitive targets include /app/data/arcane.db (SQLite containing argon2 password hashes and API keys for every user), /app/data/secrets/*, mounted host configuration, SSH keys (if mounted), and Docker socket-adjacent secrets.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read as the Arcane backend process for any authenticated user, including users with the lowest-privilege
"user"role. - Credential disclosure:
arcane.dbcontains argon2 password hashes for every account (including admins) and API key material — supports offline cracking and direct token exfiltration. - Privilege escalation: a
"user"-role attacker can recover or replay admin credentials, then exercise full Arcane functionality (Docker container/exec/volume control), which on a typical deployment with the host Docker socket mounted is host RCE. - Configuration / secret exposure: any environment files, OIDC client secrets, registry credentials, or files mounted into the container are reachable.
- The scope crosses the security authority of other user accounts (S:C), since one authenticated user reads credentials belonging to other users and to the admin.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.19.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47179"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T22:39:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T18:17:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent` returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project\u0027s compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because `ProjectService.CreateProject` writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares `include: [\u0027../../../../etc/passwd\u0027]`, then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including `/app/data/arcane.db` (the SQLite database containing every user\u0027s password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane\u0027s Docker control plane, RCE on the host.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause #1 \u2014 `CreateProject` writes compose content without validation** (`backend/internal/services/project_service.go:1605-1644`):\n\n```go\nfunc (s *ProjectService) CreateProject(ctx context.Context, name, composeContent string, envContent *string, user models.User) (*models.Project, error) {\n // ... directory setup ...\n if err := projects.SaveOrUpdateProjectFiles(projectsDirectory, projectPath, composeContent, envContent); err != nil {\n _ = s.db.WithContext(ctx).Delete(proj).Error\n return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to save project files: %w\", err)\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nCompare with `UpdateProject` (project_service.go:2494, :2577), which calls `validateComposeContentForUpdate`. That validator (line 2599) loads the compose with `missingIncludeStubResourceLoaderInternal`, which calls `ValidateIncludePathForWrite` (includes.go:139) and rejects includes outside the project directory. `CreateProject` bypasses this entirely, so any malicious `include:` array survives to disk.\n\n**Root cause #2 \u2014 `GetProjectFileContent` reads include files before path validation** (`backend/internal/services/project_service.go:831-872`):\n\n```go\nincludes, parseErr := projects.ParseIncludes(composeFile, envMap, true)\nif parseErr == nil {\n for _, inc := range includes {\n if inc.RelativePath == relativePath {\n return project.IncludeFile{\n Path: inc.Path,\n RelativePath: inc.RelativePath,\n Content: inc.Content, // \u003c-- arbitrary file content returned here\n }, nil\n }\n }\n}\n\nfullPath := filepath.Join(proj.Path, relativePath)\n// ... IsSafeSubdirectory check at line 870 \u2014 never reached when include matches ...\n```\n\n**Root cause #3 \u2014 `ParseIncludes` reads include files from anywhere by design** (`backend/pkg/projects/includes.go:24-72`):\n\n```go\n// Security Model for Include Files:\n// - READ: Docker Compose allows include files from anywhere (parent dirs, absolute paths, etc.)\n// We allow reading from any path to maintain compatibility with standard Docker Compose behavior\n// - WRITE/DELETE: Restricted to files within the project directory only for security\n```\n\n`parseIncludeItemInternal` at includes.go:97-101 builds `fullPath = filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(baseDir, includePath))` and `os.ReadFile(fullPath)` at line 105 \u2014 no containment check. The returned `RelativePath` (line 124) is `filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(includePath))`, which preserves `../../../../etc/passwd` verbatim for the equality match in `GetProjectFileContent`.\n\n**Authorization surface**: The handler `GET /api/environments/{id}/projects/{projectId}/file` (`backend/internal/huma/handlers/projects.go:268-279`) and `POST /api/environments/{id}/projects` (line 242-253) only declare `BearerAuth`/`ApiKeyAuth`. There is no admin-role gate on either handler \u2014 `GetProjectFile` (line 582) and `CreateProject` (line 524) simply call `humamw.GetCurrentUserFromContext`. The default user role assigned in `users.go:223` is `\"user\"` (not admin), and that role is sufficient to exploit.\n\n**Resulting primitive**: arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process (uid/gid of the container). Sensitive targets include `/app/data/arcane.db` (SQLite containing argon2 password hashes and API keys for every user), `/app/data/secrets/*`, mounted host configuration, SSH keys (if mounted), and Docker socket-adjacent secrets.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read** as the Arcane backend process for any authenticated user, including users with the lowest-privilege `\"user\"` role.\n- **Credential disclosure**: `arcane.db` contains argon2 password hashes for every account (including admins) and API key material \u2014 supports offline cracking and direct token exfiltration.\n- **Privilege escalation**: a `\"user\"`-role attacker can recover or replay admin credentials, then exercise full Arcane functionality (Docker container/exec/volume control), which on a typical deployment with the host Docker socket mounted is host RCE.\n- **Configuration / secret exposure**: any environment files, OIDC client secrets, registry credentials, or files mounted into the container are reachable.\n- The scope crosses the security authority of other user accounts (S:C), since one authenticated user reads credentials belonging to other users and to the admin.",
"id": "GHSA-c3px-h233-h6fq",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T22:39:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-c3px-h233-h6fq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/commit/b6cbffabf61dbc3f12a28d3b5830e3c6b7e67daf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arcane Has an Authenticated Arbitrary Host File Read via Docker Compose Include Directives"
}
GHSA-C3QC-XQJ2-MQFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-09 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-24 21:30An issue in Mojoportal v2.7.0.0 and below allows an authenticated attacker to list all css files inside the root path of the webserver via manipulation of the "s" parameter in /DesignTools/ManageSkin.aspx
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-24689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-09T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue in Mojoportal v2.7.0.0 and below allows an authenticated attacker to list all css files inside the root path of the webserver via manipulation of the \"s\" parameter in /DesignTools/ManageSkin.aspx",
"id": "GHSA-c3qc-xqj2-mqfj",
"modified": "2025-03-24T21:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-02-09T21:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/blakduk/Advisories/blob/main/Mojoportal/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mojoportal.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3VH-5C97-8M3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:16 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:16Directory traversal vulnerability in the web-based management interface on the TP-LINK TL-WR841N router with firmware 3.13.9 build 120201 Rel.54965n and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the URL parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-6276"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-01-26T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the web-based management interface on the TP-LINK TL-WR841N router with firmware 3.13.9 build 120201 Rel.54965n and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the URL parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-c3vh-5c97-8m3h",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:16:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:16:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/185100"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-C3VP-6J3V-43R7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:16 – Updated: 2024-05-14 21:34In Tiny File Manager 2.4.1, there is a vulnerability in the ajax file backup copy functionality that allows authenticated users to place backup copies of files (with the .bak extension) into different directories.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-12103"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-04-28T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Tiny File Manager 2.4.1, there is a vulnerability in the ajax file backup copy functionality that allows authenticated users to place backup copies of files (with the .bak extension) into different directories.",
"id": "GHSA-c3vp-6j3v-43r7",
"modified": "2024-05-14T21:34:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:16:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prasathmani/tinyfilemanager/issues/357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/prasathmani/tinyfilemanager/commit/a0c595a8e11e55a43eeaa68e1a3ce76365f29d06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cyberaz0r.info/2020/04/tiny-file-manager-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.quantumleap.it/news/advisory"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.quantumleap.it/tiny-file-manager-path-traversal-recursive-directory-listing-and-absolute-path-file-backup-copy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3X2-V6M7-XHGM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:25 – Updated: 2022-10-07 18:16A local, arbitrary code execution vulnerability exists in the SplitCompat.install endpoint in Android's Play Core Library versions prior to 1.7.2. A malicious attacker could create an apk which targets a specific application, and if a victim were to install this apk, the attacker could perform a directory traversal, execute code as the targeted application and access the targeted application's data on the Android device. We recommend all users update Play Core to version 1.7.2 or later.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-12T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A local, arbitrary code execution vulnerability exists in the SplitCompat.install endpoint in Android\u0027s Play Core Library versions prior to 1.7.2. A malicious attacker could create an apk which targets a specific application, and if a victim were to install this apk, the attacker could perform a directory traversal, execute code as the targeted application and access the targeted application\u0027s data on the Android device. We recommend all users update Play Core to version 1.7.2 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-c3x2-v6m7-xhgm",
"modified": "2022-10-07T18:16:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:25:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.oversecured.com/Oversecured-automatically-discovers-persistent-code-execution-in-the-Google-Play-Core-Library"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://developer.android.com/reference/com/google/android/play/core/release-notes#1-7-2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3X3-FRH6-QX5W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:25 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:45Before version 4.8.2, WordPress allowed a Directory Traversal attack in the Customizer component via a crafted theme filename.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-23T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Before version 4.8.2, WordPress allowed a Directory Traversal attack in the Customizer component via a crafted theme filename.",
"id": "GHSA-c3x3-frh6-qx5w",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:45:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:25:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://core.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/41397"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/news/2017/09/wordpress-4-8-2-security-and-maintenance-release"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039553"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3XC-PX9V-223R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 00:34 – Updated: 2025-12-18 00:34Bludit versions before 3.13.1 contain an authenticated file download vulnerability in the Backup Plugin that allows logged-in users to access arbitrary files. Attackers can exploit the plugin's download functionality by manipulating file path parameters to read sensitive system files through directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53907"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T23:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Bludit versions before 3.13.1 contain an authenticated file download vulnerability in the Backup Plugin that allows logged-in users to access arbitrary files. Attackers can exploit the plugin\u0027s download functionality by manipulating file path parameters to read sensitive system files through directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-c3xc-px9v-223r",
"modified": "2025-12-18T00:34:07Z",
"published": "2025-12-18T00:34:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bludit.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51541"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/bludit-authenticated-arbitrary-file-download-via-backup-plugin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.