Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

13215 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-82CG-3HV7-74GC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:15 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:15
VLAI
Summary
Allure Report: Path Traversal in HTTP Server Allows Arbitrary File Read
Details

Summary

The built-in HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open is vulnerable to path traversal. The server resolves request URI paths directly against the report directory without normalizing or validating that the resolved path stays within the report directory. An attacker who can reach the server can read any file accessible to the Allure process by sending a request containing ../ sequences.

Details

When allure serve or allure open is executed, Commands.setUpServer() creates an HTTP server with a handler that serves files from the report directory:

allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java:325-339

protected HttpServer setUpServer(final String host, final int port, final Path reportDirectory) throws IOException {
    final HttpServer server = HttpServer
            .create(new InetSocketAddress(Objects.isNull(host) ? "localhost" : host, port), 0);

    server.createContext("/", exchange -> {
        final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve("." + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath());  // line 330
        if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) {
            serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve("index.html"));
        } else {
            serveFile(exchange, resolve);
        }
    });

    return server;
}

On line 330, the handler constructs a file path by concatenating "." with the raw request URI path and resolving it against reportDirectory. For a request to /../../../etc/passwd:

  1. exchange.getRequestURI().getPath() returns "/../../../etc/passwd"
  2. String concatenation produces "./../../../etc/passwd"
  3. reportDirectory.resolve("./../../../etc/passwd") resolves to e.g. /tmp/allure-report/./../../../etc/passwd
  4. The OS resolves this to /etc/passwd

There is no call to .normalize() followed by a .startsWith(reportDirectory) containment check. The serveFile() method (line 341) reads and returns any regular file without further validation.

Additionally, URI.getPath() returns the percent-decoded path, so %2e%2e is decoded to .., enabling traversal via /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd which bypasses clients that normalize .. in raw form.

The server defaults to binding on localhost (line 327), which limits remote exploitation. However, the --host option allows users to bind to any interface (e.g., --host 0.0.0.0), which is commonly used in CI/CD and containerized environments. Even when bound to localhost, the vulnerability is exploitable by: - Other local users on shared/multi-tenant systems - DNS rebinding attacks from malicious web pages visited by the user - Adjacent containers in CI/CD environments that share a network namespace

PoC

Step 1: Start the Allure server (simulating a typical CI/CD scenario with network binding):

allure serve ./test-results --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9090

Step 2: Read /etc/passwd via path traversal:

curl --path-as-is 'http://localhost:9090/../../../etc/passwd'

Step 3: Alternative using percent-encoded traversal (works even with clients that normalize ..):

curl 'http://localhost:9090/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd'

Step 4: Read sensitive application files (e.g., environment variables, SSH keys):

curl --path-as-is 'http://localhost:9090/../../../home/user/.ssh/id_rsa'
curl --path-as-is 'http://localhost:9090/../../../proc/self/environ'

Each command returns the full contents of the requested file if readable by the Allure process.

Impact

An attacker who can reach the Allure HTTP server can read any file on the system that the Allure process has permissions to access. This includes:

  • System credentials: /etc/shadow (if running as root), SSH private keys, cloud provider credentials
  • Application secrets: Environment variables via /proc/self/environ, configuration files, API keys
  • Source code and data: Any file on the filesystem accessible to the running user

In CI/CD environments where Allure is commonly used, this could expose build secrets, deployment credentials, and other sensitive CI/CD artifacts. The lack of authentication means any client that can reach the server's port can exploit this vulnerability.

Recommended Fix

Normalize the resolved path and verify it remains within the report directory before serving:

server.createContext("/", exchange -> {
    final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve("." + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath()).normalize();
    if (!resolve.startsWith(reportDirectory.normalize())) {
        exchange.sendResponseHeaders(403, 0);
        exchange.getResponseBody().close();
        return;
    }
    if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) {
        serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve("index.html"));
    } else {
        serveFile(exchange, resolve);
    }
});

The .normalize() call collapses .. sequences, and the .startsWith() check ensures the resolved path is still within the report directory. Requests attempting traversal receive a 403 Forbidden response.

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.38.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.qameta.allure:allure-commandline"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55846"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe built-in HTTP server started by `allure serve` and `allure open` is vulnerable to path traversal. The server resolves request URI paths directly against the report directory without normalizing or validating that the resolved path stays within the report directory. An attacker who can reach the server can read any file accessible to the Allure process by sending a request containing `../` sequences.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen `allure serve` or `allure open` is executed, `Commands.setUpServer()` creates an HTTP server with a handler that serves files from the report directory:\n\n**`allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java:325-339`**\n```java\nprotected HttpServer setUpServer(final String host, final int port, final Path reportDirectory) throws IOException {\n    final HttpServer server = HttpServer\n            .create(new InetSocketAddress(Objects.isNull(host) ? \"localhost\" : host, port), 0);\n\n    server.createContext(\"/\", exchange -\u003e {\n        final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve(\".\" + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath());  // line 330\n        if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) {\n            serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve(\"index.html\"));\n        } else {\n            serveFile(exchange, resolve);\n        }\n    });\n\n    return server;\n}\n```\n\nOn line 330, the handler constructs a file path by concatenating `\".\"` with the raw request URI path and resolving it against `reportDirectory`. For a request to `/../../../etc/passwd`:\n\n1. `exchange.getRequestURI().getPath()` returns `\"/../../../etc/passwd\"`\n2. String concatenation produces `\"./../../../etc/passwd\"`\n3. `reportDirectory.resolve(\"./../../../etc/passwd\")` resolves to e.g. `/tmp/allure-report/./../../../etc/passwd`\n4. The OS resolves this to `/etc/passwd`\n\nThere is no call to `.normalize()` followed by a `.startsWith(reportDirectory)` containment check. The `serveFile()` method (line 341) reads and returns any regular file without further validation.\n\nAdditionally, `URI.getPath()` returns the percent-decoded path, so `%2e%2e` is decoded to `..`, enabling traversal via `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` which bypasses clients that normalize `..` in raw form.\n\nThe server defaults to binding on `localhost` (line 327), which limits remote exploitation. However, the `--host` option allows users to bind to any interface (e.g., `--host 0.0.0.0`), which is commonly used in CI/CD and containerized environments. Even when bound to localhost, the vulnerability is exploitable by:\n- Other local users on shared/multi-tenant systems\n- DNS rebinding attacks from malicious web pages visited by the user\n- Adjacent containers in CI/CD environments that share a network namespace\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Start the Allure server (simulating a typical CI/CD scenario with network binding):\n```bash\nallure serve ./test-results --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9090\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Read `/etc/passwd` via path traversal:\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is \u0027http://localhost:9090/../../../etc/passwd\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Alternative using percent-encoded traversal (works even with clients that normalize `..`):\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://localhost:9090/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 4:** Read sensitive application files (e.g., environment variables, SSH keys):\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is \u0027http://localhost:9090/../../../home/user/.ssh/id_rsa\u0027\ncurl --path-as-is \u0027http://localhost:9090/../../../proc/self/environ\u0027\n```\n\nEach command returns the full contents of the requested file if readable by the Allure process.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can reach the Allure HTTP server can read any file on the system that the Allure process has permissions to access. This includes:\n\n- **System credentials:** `/etc/shadow` (if running as root), SSH private keys, cloud provider credentials\n- **Application secrets:** Environment variables via `/proc/self/environ`, configuration files, API keys\n- **Source code and data:** Any file on the filesystem accessible to the running user\n\nIn CI/CD environments where Allure is commonly used, this could expose build secrets, deployment credentials, and other sensitive CI/CD artifacts. The lack of authentication means any client that can reach the server\u0027s port can exploit this vulnerability.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nNormalize the resolved path and verify it remains within the report directory before serving:\n\n```java\nserver.createContext(\"/\", exchange -\u003e {\n    final Path resolve = reportDirectory.resolve(\".\" + exchange.getRequestURI().getPath()).normalize();\n    if (!resolve.startsWith(reportDirectory.normalize())) {\n        exchange.sendResponseHeaders(403, 0);\n        exchange.getResponseBody().close();\n        return;\n    }\n    if (Files.isDirectory(resolve)) {\n        serveFile(exchange, resolve.resolve(\"index.html\"));\n    } else {\n        serveFile(exchange, resolve);\n    }\n});\n```\n\nThe `.normalize()` call collapses `..` sequences, and the `.startsWith()` check ensures the resolved path is still within the report directory. Requests attempting traversal receive a 403 Forbidden response.",
  "id": "GHSA-82cg-3hv7-74gc",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:50Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:15:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/allure-framework/allure2/security/advisories/GHSA-82cg-3hv7-74gc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/allure-framework/allure2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Allure Report: Path Traversal in HTTP Server Allows Arbitrary File Read"
}

GHSA-82H5-9GW3-Q456

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-07 18:30
VLAI
Details

Directory Traversal vulnerability in Mgt-commerce CloudPanel v.2.0.0 thru v.2.4.0 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information and execute arbitrary code via the service parameter of the load-logfiles function.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-24320"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-14T18:15:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in Mgt-commerce CloudPanel v.2.0.0 thru v.2.4.0 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information and execute arbitrary code via the service parameter of the load-logfiles function.",
  "id": "GHSA-82h5-9gw3-q456",
  "modified": "2024-08-07T18:30:40Z",
  "published": "2024-06-14T18:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datack.my/cloudpanel-v2-0-0-v2-4-0-authenticated-user-session-hijacking-cve-2024-24320"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82HX-PVJJ-2M99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:50 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:17
VLAI
Details

Citrix SD-WAN 10.2.x before 10.2.3 and NetScaler SD-WAN 10.0.x before 10.0.8 allow Directory Traversal.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-12990"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-16T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Citrix SD-WAN 10.2.x before 10.2.3 and NetScaler SD-WAN 10.0.x before 10.0.8 allow Directory Traversal.",
  "id": "GHSA-82hx-pvjj-2m99",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:17:08Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:50:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12990"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.citrix.com/search?searchQuery=%2A\u0026lang=en\u0026sort=relevance\u0026prod=\u0026pver=\u0026ct=Security+Bulletin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.citrix.com/search?searchQuery=*\u0026lang=en\u0026sort=relevance\u0026prod=\u0026pver=\u0026ct=Security+Bulletin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2019-31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/109133"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82J3-HF72-7X93

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 23:23 – Updated: 2024-11-04 23:23
VLAI
Summary
Reposilite vulnerable to path traversal while serving javadoc expanded files (arbitrary file read) (`GHSL-2024-074`)
Details

Summary

Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files.

Details

The problem lies in the way how the expanded javadoc files are served. The GET /javadoc/{repository}/<gav>/raw/<resource> route uses the <resource> path parameter to find the file in the javadocUnpackPath directory and returns it's content to the user.

JavadocFacade.kt#L77:

fun findRawJavadocResource(request: JavadocRawRequest): Result<JavadocRawResponse, ErrorResponse> =
   with (request) {
       mavenFacade.canAccessResource(accessToken, repository, gav)
           .flatMap { javadocContainerService.loadContainer(accessToken, repository, gav) }
           .filter({ Files.exists(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString())) }, { notFound("Resource $resource not found") })
           .map {
               JavadocRawResponse(
                   contentType = supportedExtensions[resource.getExtension()] ?: ContentType.APPLICATION_OCTET_STREAM,
                   content = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString()))
               )
           }
   }

In this case, the <resource> path parameter can contain path traversal characters such as /../../. Since the path is concatenated with the main directory, it opens the possibility to read files outside the javadocUnpackPath directory.

Impact

This issue may lead to Arbitrary File Read on the server. A potential attacker can read some sensitive file, such as reposilite.db, that contains the sqlite database used by Reposilite. This database contains the sensitive information used by Reposilite, including passwords and hashes of issued tokens. Also, the configuration.cdn file can be read, which contains other sensitive properties.

Steps to reproduce

  1. Start the Reposilite instance on http://localhost:8080/
  2. Find at least one javadoc file in the hosted repositories. For example, the default test workspace contains the /releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar archive that is suitable for our attack.
  3. Send a GET request to http://127.0.0.1:8080/javadoc/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/raw/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2freposilite.db When this request is processed on the server, Reposilite tries to unpack the /repositories/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar file into the /javadocs/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/.cache/unpack folder. Then, it tries to read the ../../../../../../reposilite.db file from this folder, which triggers the path traversal attack.

image

Remediation

Normalize (remove all occurrences of /../) the <resource> path parameter before using it when reading the file. For example:

content = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toPath()))

Changing resource.toString() to resource.toPath() is enough here as the com.reposilite.storage.api.Location#toPath method normalizes the string internally.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
8.8 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.reposilite:reposilite-backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-04T23:23:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nReposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files.\n\n### Details\nThe problem lies in the way how the expanded javadoc files are served. The `GET /javadoc/{repository}/\u003cgav\u003e/raw/\u003cresource\u003e` route uses the `\u003cresource\u003e` path parameter to find the file in the `javadocUnpackPath` directory and returns it\u0027s content to the user.\n\n[JavadocFacade.kt#L77](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/blob/68b73f19dc9811ccf10936430cf17f7b0e622bd6/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocFacade.kt#L77):\n\n```kotlin\nfun findRawJavadocResource(request: JavadocRawRequest): Result\u003cJavadocRawResponse, ErrorResponse\u003e =\n   with (request) {\n       mavenFacade.canAccessResource(accessToken, repository, gav)\n           .flatMap { javadocContainerService.loadContainer(accessToken, repository, gav) }\n           .filter({ Files.exists(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString())) }, { notFound(\"Resource $resource not found\") })\n           .map {\n               JavadocRawResponse(\n                   contentType = supportedExtensions[resource.getExtension()] ?: ContentType.APPLICATION_OCTET_STREAM,\n                   content = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString()))\n               )\n           }\n   }\n```\n\nIn this case, the `\u003cresource\u003e` path parameter can contain path traversal characters such as `/../../`. Since the path is concatenated with the main directory, it opens the possibility to read files outside the `javadocUnpackPath` directory.\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to Arbitrary File Read on the server. A potential attacker can read some sensitive file, such as `reposilite.db`, that contains the sqlite database used by Reposilite. This database contains the sensitive information used by Reposilite, including passwords and hashes of issued tokens. Also, the `configuration.cdn` file can be read, which contains other sensitive properties.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Start the Reposilite instance on http://localhost:8080/\n2. Find at least one javadoc file in the hosted repositories. For example, the default test workspace contains the `/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar` archive that is suitable for our attack.\n3. Send a GET request to http://127.0.0.1:8080/javadoc/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/raw/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2freposilite.db\nWhen this request is processed on the server, Reposilite tries to unpack the `/repositories/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar` file into the `/javadocs/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/.cache/unpack` folder. Then, it tries to read the `../../../../../../reposilite.db` file from this folder, which triggers the path traversal attack.\n\n![image](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/assets/44605151/2f2638e2-2b6a-498d-9ca3-bacc84041d8a)\n\n### Remediation\n\nNormalize (remove all occurrences of `/../`) the `\u003cresource\u003e` path parameter before using it when reading the file. For example:\n\n```kotlin\ncontent = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toPath()))\n```\n\nChanging `resource.toString()` to `resource.toPath()` is enough here as the `com.reposilite.storage.api.Location#toPath` method normalizes the string internally.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93",
  "modified": "2024-11-04T23:23:08Z",
  "published": "2024-11-04T23:23:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/security/advisories/GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/commit/e172ae4b539c822d0d6e04cf090713c7202a79d6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/releases/tag/3.5.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Reposilite vulnerable to path traversal while serving javadoc expanded files (arbitrary file read) (`GHSL-2024-074`)"
}

GHSA-82JV-F4JX-8R27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-09 09:31 – Updated: 2026-03-05 21:30
VLAI
Details

A security issue was discovered in GNU Wget2 when handling Metalink documents. The application fails to properly validate file paths provided in Metalink elements. An attacker can abuse this behavior to write files to unintended locations on the system. This can lead to data loss or potentially allow further compromise of the user’s environment.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-69194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-09T08:15:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A security issue was discovered in GNU Wget2 when handling Metalink documents. The application fails to properly validate file paths provided in Metalink \u003cfile name\u003e elements. An attacker can abuse this behavior to write files to unintended locations on the system. This can lead to data loss or potentially allow further compromise of the user\u2019s environment.",
  "id": "GHSA-82jv-f4jx-8r27",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T21:30:24Z",
  "published": "2026-01-09T09:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-69194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2425773"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82MH-4377-P289

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:38 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:38
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in the Tom M8te (tom-m8te) plugin 1.5.3 for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the file parameter to tom-download-file.php.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-5187"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-08-06T19:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Tom M8te (tom-m8te) plugin 1.5.3 for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the file parameter to tom-download-file.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-82mh-4377-p289",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T04:38:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:38:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5187"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://codevigilant.com/disclosure/wp-plugin-tom-m8te-local-file-inclusion"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-82P2-CCRF-WXW5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-12 00:31 – Updated: 2026-02-14 00:32
VLAI
Details

A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, macOS Tahoe 26.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, visionOS 26.3. An app may be able to gain root privileges.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T23:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, macOS Tahoe 26.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, visionOS 26.3. An app may be able to gain root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-82p2-ccrf-wxw5",
  "modified": "2026-02-14T00:32:41Z",
  "published": "2026-02-12T00:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126350"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/126353"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82P9-9F65-64V5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:03 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:03
VLAI
Details

zzcms 8.2 allows remote attackers to discover the full path via a direct request to 3/qq_connect2.0/API/class/ErrorCase.class.php or 3/ucenter_api/code/friend.php.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-7434"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-02-24T03:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "zzcms 8.2 allows remote attackers to discover the full path via a direct request to 3/qq_connect2.0/API/class/ErrorCase.class.php or 3/ucenter_api/code/friend.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-82p9-9f65-64v5",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:03:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:03:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kongxin520/zzcms/blob/master/zzcms_8.2_bug.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kongxin.gitbook.io/zzcms-8-2-bug"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82Q2-MRHW-3JF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:57 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:57
VLAI
Details

PTC ThingWorx Platform through 8.3.0 is vulnerable to a directory traversal attack on ZIP files via a POST request.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-20092"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-12-17T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "PTC ThingWorx Platform through 8.3.0 is vulnerable to a directory traversal attack on ZIP files via a POST request.",
  "id": "GHSA-82q2-mrhw-3jf5",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T00:57:47Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T00:57:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.doyler.net/security-not-included/ptc-thingworx-vulnerability"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ptc.com/en/documents/security/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure/security-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82Q2-XF4J-JJ8G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:46 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:46
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in image.php in Clear Content 1.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the url parameter. NOTE: the researcher also suggests an analogous PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability, but this may be incorrect.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2009-3535"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-10-02T19:30:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in image.php in Clear Content 1.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the url parameter.  NOTE: the researcher also suggests an analogous PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability, but this may be incorrect.",
  "id": "GHSA-82q2-xf4j-jj8g",
  "modified": "2022-05-02T03:46:03Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T03:46:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/51629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/0907-exploits/clearcontent-rfilfi.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/35726"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.osvdb.org/55742"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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