CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13216 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7VPP-9CXJ-Q8GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-14 00:30 – Updated: 2025-04-14 17:55A Path Traversal "Zip Slip" vulnerability has been identified in mholt/archiver in Go. This vulnerability allows using a crafted ZIP file containing path traversal symlinks to create or overwrite files with the user's privileges or application utilizing the library.
When using the archiver.Unarchive functionality with ZIP files, like this: archiver.Unarchive(zipFile, outputDir), A crafted ZIP file can be extracted in such a way that it writes files to the affected system with the same privileges as the application executing this vulnerable functionality. Consequently, sensitive files may be overwritten, potentially leading to privilege escalation, code execution, and other severe outcomes in some cases.
It's worth noting that a similar vulnerability was found in TAR files (CVE-2024-0406). Although a fix was implemented, it hasn't been officially released, and the affected project has since been deprecated. The successor to mholt/archiver is a new project called mholt/archives, and its initial release (v0.1.0) removes the Unarchive() functionality.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mholt/archiver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mholt/archiver/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T17:55:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-13T22:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Path Traversal \"Zip Slip\" vulnerability has been identified in mholt/archiver in Go. This vulnerability allows using a crafted ZIP file containing path traversal symlinks to create or overwrite files with the user\u0027s privileges or application utilizing the library.\n\nWhen using the archiver.Unarchive functionality with ZIP files, like this: archiver.Unarchive(zipFile, outputDir),\u00a0 A crafted ZIP file can be extracted in such a way that it writes files to the affected system with the same privileges as the application executing this vulnerable functionality. Consequently, sensitive files may be overwritten, potentially leading to privilege escalation, code execution, and other severe outcomes in some cases.\n\nIt\u0027s worth noting that a similar vulnerability was found in TAR files (CVE-2024-0406). Although a fix was implemented, it hasn\u0027t been officially released, and the affected project has since been deprecated. The successor to mholt/archiver is a new project called mholt/archives, and its initial release (v0.1.0) removes the Unarchive() functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-7vpp-9cxj-q8gv",
"modified": "2025-04-14T17:55:15Z",
"published": "2025-04-14T00:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mholt/archiver/issues/267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mholt/archiver/commit/fea250ac6eacd56f90a82fbe2481cfdbb9a1bbd1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mholt/archiver"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mholt/archiver Vulnerable to Path Traversal via Crafted ZIP File"
}
GHSA-7VPP-XW9M-F3GH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:59 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:34XMLLanguageService.java in XML Language Server (aka lsp4xml) before 0.9.1, as used in Red Hat XML Language Support (aka vscode-xml) before 0.9.1 for Visual Studio and other products, allows a remote attacker to write to arbitrary files via Directory Traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-18212"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-23T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "XMLLanguageService.java in XML Language Server (aka lsp4xml) before 0.9.1, as used in Red Hat XML Language Support (aka vscode-xml) before 0.9.1 for Visual Studio and other products, allows a remote attacker to write to arbitrary files via Directory Traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-7vpp-xw9m-f3gh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:34:04Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:59:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18212"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angelozerr/lsp4xml/pull/567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angelozerr/lsp4xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angelozerr/lsp4xml/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#others"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/redhat-developer/vscode-xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://marketplace.visualstudio.com/items?itemName=redhat.vscode-xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.shielder.it/blog/dont-open-that-xml-xxe-to-rce-in-xml-plugins-for-vs-code-eclipse-theia"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7VQ3-WCJW-3FXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-23 20:48 – Updated: 2023-09-11 16:35Affected versions of lab6.brit95 resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "lab6.brit95"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:23:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `lab6.brit95` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-7vq3-wcjw-3fxh",
"modified": "2023-09-11T16:35:29Z",
"published": "2018-07-23T20:48:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/lab6.brit95"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7vq3-wcjw-3fxh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/475"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in lab6.brit95"
}
GHSA-7VX8-GV45-6RJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:55 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:55Directory traversal vulnerability on the HOT HOTBOX router with software 2.1.11 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a URI, as demonstrated by a request for /etc/passwd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-5219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-12-30T04:53:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability on the HOT HOTBOX router with software 2.1.11 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a URI, as demonstrated by a request for /etc/passwd.",
"id": "GHSA-7vx8-gv45-6rjh",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:55:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:55:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-5219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/123901/HOTBOX-2.1.11-CSRF-Traversal-Denial-Of-Service.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPlT09ZIj48"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7W3H-VQP8-323R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-11 18:31 – Updated: 2025-02-11 18:31An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability [CWE-22] in Fortinet FortiManager version 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and before 7.2.5 and Fortinet FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and before 7.2.5 CLI allows an authenticated admin user with diagnose privileges to delete files on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36508"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-11T17:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability [CWE-22] in Fortinet FortiManager version 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and before 7.2.5 and Fortinet FortiAnalyzer version 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and before 7.2.5 CLI allows an authenticated admin user with diagnose privileges to delete files on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-7w3h-vqp8-323r",
"modified": "2025-02-11T18:31:35Z",
"published": "2025-02-11T18:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36508"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-147"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7W42-6F8J-CX26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-16 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:41Insufficient path validation when extracting a zip archive in South River Technologies' Titan MFT and Titan SFTP servers on Windows and Linux allows an authenticated attacker to write a file to any location on the filesystem via path traversal
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-16T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Insufficient path validation when extracting a zip archive in South River Technologies\u0027 Titan MFT and Titan SFTP servers on Windows and Linux allows an authenticated attacker to write a file to any location on the filesystem via path traversal",
"id": "GHSA-7w42-6f8j-cx26",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:41:01Z",
"published": "2023-10-16T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpdesk.southrivertech.com/portal/en/kb/articles/security-patch-for-issues-cve-2023-45685-through-cve-2023-45690"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/10/16/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-south-river-technologies-titan-mft-and-titan-sftp-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7W46-7MWP-F24R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:50 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:50Directory traversal vulnerability in archeryscores.php in the Archery Scores (com_archeryscores) component 1.0.6 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1718"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-05-04T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in archeryscores.php in the Archery Scores (com_archeryscores) component 1.0.6 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-7w46-7mwp-f24r",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:50:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:50:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1718"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39521"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/12282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39545"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7W47-3WG8-547C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-22 14:05 – Updated: 2024-07-08 16:20Summary
During checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application.
Details
Although gix-worktree-state checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in gix-fs and gix-worktree prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule's .git directory. The simplest cases are:
- A tree named
..to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon. - A tree named
.gitto enter a.gitdirectory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed.
A number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past:
- A tree or blob whose name contains one or more
/, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named..or.git, a repository can represent a file named../outsideor.git/hooks/pre-commit. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths. - In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more
\, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike/, these are valid on other systems.) See GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq. - On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of
.git. - On HFS+, a tree named like
.gitor a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores in collation. See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f. - On NTFS, a tree equivalent to
.git(or a case variant) by the use of NTFS stream notation, such as.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION. See GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj. - On an NTFS volume with 8.3 aliasing enabled, a tree named as
git~1(or a case variant). See GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v.
When a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain.
PoC
For simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume sed supports -i, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used.
Example: Downward traversal to install hooks
- Create a new repository with
git init dangerous-repo-installs-hookandcdinto the directory. - Create the stand-in called
.git@hooks@pre-commit, with the contents:sh #!/bin/sh printf 'Vulnerable!\n' date >vulnerable - Stage the stand-in:
git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit - Edit the index:
env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|' .git/index - Commit:
git commit -m 'Initial commit' - Optionally, push to a private remote.
Then, on another or the same machine:
- Clone the repository with a
gix clone …command. - Enter the newly created directory.
- Optionally run
ls -l .git/hooksto observe that thepre-commithook is already present. - Make a new file and commit it with
git. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as apre-commithook to run, printing the messageVulnerable!and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time.
Note that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs git commit is capable of.
Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree
- Create a new repository with
git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up, andcdinto the directory. - Create the stand-in:
echo 'A file outside the working tree, somehow.' >..@outside - Stage the stand-in:
git add ..@outside - Edit the index:
env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig 's|\.\.@outside|../outside|' .git/index - Commit:
git commit -m 'Initial commit' - Optionally, push to a private remote.
Then, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a gix clone … command. Observe that a file named outside is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory.
Impact
Any use of gix or another application that makes use of gix-worktree-state, or otherwise relies on gix-fs and gix-worktree for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well.
In use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability may be lower when gix is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix-worktree-state"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gitoxide"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.36.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix-fs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix-worktree"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.34.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.63.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gitoxide-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.38.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "gix-index"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-22T14:05:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-23T09:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nDuring checkout, gitoxide does not verify that paths point to locations in the working tree. A specially crafted repository can, when cloned, place new files anywhere writable by the application.\n\n### Details\n\nAlthough `gix-worktree-state` checks for collisions with existing files, it does not itself check if a path is really in the working tree when performing a checkout, nor do the path checks in `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` prevent this. Cloning an untrusted repository containing specially crafted tree or blob names will create new files outside the repository, or inside the repository or a submodule\u0027s `.git` directory. The simplest cases are:\n\n- A tree named `..` to traverse upward. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because files can be placed in one or more locations where they are likely to be executed soon.\n- A tree named `.git` to enter a `.git` directory. This facilitates arbitrary code execution because hooks can be installed.\n\nA number of alternatives that achieve the same effect are also possible, some of which correspond to specific vulnerabilities that have affected Git in the past:\n\n- A tree or blob whose name contains one or more `/`, to traverse upward or downward. For example, even without containing any tree named `..` or `.git`, a repository can represent a file named `../outside` or `.git/hooks/pre-commit`. This is distinct from the more intuitive case a repository containing trees that represent those paths.\n- In Windows, a tree or blob whose name contains one or more `\\`, to traverse upward or downward. (Unlike `/`, these are valid on other systems.) See [GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-xjx4-8694-q2fq).\n- On a case-insensitive filesystem (such as NTFS, APFS, or HFS+), a tree named as a case variant of `.git`.\n- On HFS+, a tree named like `.git` or a case variant, with characters added that HFS+ ignores [in collation](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn/tn1150.html#StringComparisonAlgorithm). See https://github.com/git/git/commit/6162a1d323d24fd8cbbb1a6145a91fb849b2568f.\n- On NTFS, a tree equivalent to `.git` (or a case variant) by the use of [NTFS stream](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3) notation, such as `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. See [GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-5wph-8frv-58vj).\n- On an NTFS volume with [8.3 aliasing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#short-vs-long-names) enabled, a tree named as `git~1` (or a case variant). See [GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v](https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/GHSA-589j-mmg9-733v).\n\nWhen a checkout creates some files outside the repository directory but fails to complete, the repository directory is usually removed, but the outside files remain.\n\n### PoC\n\nFor simplicity, these examples stage a stand-in file with a valid name, modify the index, and commit. The instructions assume `sed` supports `-i`, which is the case on most systems. If using Windows, a Git Bash shell should be used.\n\n#### Example: Downward traversal to install hooks\n\n1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-installs-hook` and `cd` into the directory.\n2. Create the stand-in called `.git@hooks@pre-commit`, with the *contents*:\n ```sh\n #!/bin/sh\n printf \u0027Vulnerable!\\n\u0027\n date \u003evulnerable\n ```\n3. Stage the stand-in: `git add --chmod=+x .git@hooks@pre-commit`\n4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig \u0027s|\\.git@hooks@pre-commit|.git/hooks/pre-commit|\u0027 .git/index`\n5. Commit: `git commit -m \u0027Initial commit\u0027`\n6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote.\n\nThen, on another or the same machine:\n\n1. Clone the repository with a `gix clone \u2026` command.\n2. Enter the newly created directory.\n3. *Optionally* run `ls -l .git/hooks` to observe that the `pre-commit` hook is already present.\n4. Make a new file and commit it with `git`. This causes the payload surreptitiously installed as a `pre-commit` hook to run, printing the message `Vulnerable!` and creating a file in the current directory containing the current date and time.\n\nNote that the effect is not limited to modifying the current directory. The payload could be written to perform any action that the user who runs `git commit` is capable of.\n\n#### Example: Upward traversal to create a file above the working tree\n\n1. Create a new repository with `git init dangerous-repo-reaches-up`, and `cd` into the directory.\n2. Create the stand-in: `echo \u0027A file outside the working tree, somehow.\u0027 \u003e..@outside`\n3. Stage the stand-in: `git add ..@outside`\n4. Edit the index: `env LC_ALL=C sed -i.orig \u0027s|\\.\\.@outside|../outside|\u0027 .git/index`\n5. Commit: `git commit -m \u0027Initial commit\u0027`\n6. *Optionally*, push to a private remote.\n\nThen, as above, on the same or another machine, clone the repository with a `gix clone \u2026` command. Observe that a file named `outside` is present alongside (not inside) the cloned directory.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny use of `gix` or another application that makes use of `gix-worktree-state`, or otherwise relies on `gix-fs` and `gix-worktree` for validation, is affected, if used to clone untrusted repositories. The above description focuses on code execution, as that leads to a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, but creating files outside a working tree without attempting to execute code can directly impact integrity as well.\n\nIn use cases where no untrusted repository is ever cloned, this vulnerability has no impact. Furthermore, the impact of this vulnerability *may* be lower when `gix` is used to clone a repository for CI/CD purposes, even if untrusted, since in such uses the environment is usually isolated and arbitrary code is usually run deliberately from the repository with necessary safeguards in place.",
"id": "GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c",
"modified": "2024-07-08T16:20:56Z",
"published": "2024-05-22T14:05:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-7w47-3wg8-547c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35186"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0348.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0350.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "gix traversal outside working tree enables arbitrary code execution"
}
GHSA-7W5X-JM9F-8G7X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:52 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:30A directory traversal exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol in Pidgin. Specially crafted MXIT data sent from the server could potentially result in an overwrite of files. A malicious server or someone with access to the network traffic can provide an invalid filename for a splash image triggering the vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-4323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-01-06T21:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A directory traversal exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol in Pidgin. Specially crafted MXIT data sent from the server could potentially result in an overwrite of files. A malicious server or someone with access to the network traffic can provide an invalid filename for a splash image triggering the vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-7w5x-jm9f-8g7x",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:30:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:52:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201701-38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.pidgin.im/news/security/?id=97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/91335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.talosintelligence.com/reports/TALOS-2016-0128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-3031-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7W68-WXF2-GV4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30D-Link D-View uploadFile Directory Traversal Arbitrary File Creation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to create arbitrary files on affected installations of D-Link D-View. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the uploadFile function. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to create files in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-19527.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32166"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T02:15:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "D-Link D-View uploadFile Directory Traversal Arbitrary File Creation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to create arbitrary files on affected installations of D-Link D-View. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the uploadFile function. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to create files in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-19527.",
"id": "GHSA-7w68-wxf2-gv4h",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:51Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-717"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.