CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13226 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7498-C9FM-G64P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:58 – Updated: 2024-09-27 18:30The way that the hub code validates upload paths allows for an attacker to choose an arbitrary destination for the uploaded file. Uploading still requires login. However, an attacker with credentials could damage the integrity of the Koji system.
Workaround
There is no known workaround. All Koji admins are encouraged to update to a fixed version as soon as possible.
Fix
Koji versions 1.14.3, 1.15.3, 1.16.3, 1.17.1, and 1.18.1 all include patches to solve this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.15.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.17.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "koji"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.18.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-17109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-29T09:53:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-09T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The way that the hub code validates upload paths allows for an attacker to choose an arbitrary destination for the uploaded file.\nUploading still requires login. However, an attacker with credentials could damage the integrity of the Koji system.\n\n### Workaround\nThere is no known workaround. All Koji admins are encouraged to update to a fixed version as soon as possible.\n\n### Fix\nKoji versions 1.14.3, 1.15.3, 1.16.3, 1.17.1, and 1.18.1 all include patches to solve this vulnerability.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-7498-c9fm-g64p",
"modified": "2024-09-27T18:30:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:58:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-17109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/koji-project/koji/commit/91d6f0b607c7f5af666dfb56931f1db4e38c28a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.pagure.org/koji/CVE-2019-17109"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/koji-project/koji"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/koji-project/koji/blob/d0507c4d2d2269daa984db642e3bd957dff18948/docs/source/CVEs/CVE-2019-17109.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/koji/PYSEC-2019-183.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4BGUXMZIAQFFNNQ7PEFDAYQCXXKJR76U"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/7PSCCFHLNVFLDPC7DB4UJGXD6ZWBSY57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DEQYYGWLJBQQVTAC7E7XSDGVF27NPMPB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pagure.io/koji/commits/master"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pagure.io/koji/issue/1634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pagure.io/koji/pull-request/1686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/09/5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "koji hub allows arbitrary upload destinations"
}
GHSA-749V-XF6W-5WCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32The Order Export & Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0 via the download_file() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary log files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T12:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Order Export \u0026 Order Import for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.0 via the download_file() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary log files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-749v-xf6w-5wcx",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/order-import-export-for-woocommerce/trunk/admin/modules/history/history.php#L751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3258567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/users-customers-import-export-for-wp-woocommerce/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dba84eb3-f48a-4175-a652-7c11b12c9afc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-74CP-QW7F-7HPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-06-05 14:10 – Updated: 2020-08-31 18:36All versions of statics-server are vulnerable to Path Traversal. Due to insufficient input sanitization, attackers can access server files by using relative paths.
Recommendation
No fix is currently available. Consider using an alternative module until a fix is made available.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "statics-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-06-05T13:49:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "All versions of `statics-server` are vulnerable to Path Traversal. Due to insufficient input sanitization, attackers can access server files by using relative paths. \n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo fix is currently available. Consider using an alternative module until a fix is made available.\n",
"id": "GHSA-74cp-qw7f-7hpw",
"modified": "2020-08-31T18:36:24Z",
"published": "2019-06-05T14:10:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/355456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/805"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Path Traversal in statics-server"
}
GHSA-74F5-4M28-GQ5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:09 – Updated: 2023-09-11 23:15Affected versions of peiserver resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "peiserver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16214"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:22:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `peiserver` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-74f5-4m28-gq5c",
"modified": "2023-09-11T23:15:12Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:09:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/peiserver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/420"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in peiserver"
}
GHSA-74FR-23M6-MHJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-03 09:30 – Updated: 2024-01-10 21:31Directory Traversal vulnerability in fuwushe.org iFair versions 23.8_ad0 and before allows an attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted script.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47473"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-03T07:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability in fuwushe.org iFair versions 23.8_ad0 and before allows an attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted script.",
"id": "GHSA-74fr-23m6-mhjw",
"modified": "2024-01-10T21:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-01-03T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/THMOAS0/SSR123/blob/main/%E4%BC%81%E8%AF%ADiFair%20Any%20file%20read.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.yuque.com/ssr123/gxhh8t/xv5oxd5i5pxmxd1a?singleDoc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-74HF-JFJP-CF88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 09:31The Fluent Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to and including 6.2.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the getAttachments() method of EmailNotificationActions, which resolves attacker-supplied file-upload URLs into filesystem paths without verifying that the resolved path stays inside the WordPress uploads directory: a strpos() prefix check on the raw URL can be bypassed with traversal sequences, wp_normalize_path() does not resolve "...\" segments, and file_exists() then resolves them at the kernel level. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with administrator access to read arbitrary files readable by the web-server user — including wp-config.php with its database credentials and authentication salts — by submitting a form whose admin notification is configured to attach a file-upload field and supplying a crafted URL of the shape /../../ as the file-field value. The resolved file is attached to the outbound admin-notification email via wp_mail(). While the email can be triggered by unauthenticated users, the email recipient is not user-controlled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6344"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T08:16:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Fluent Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to and including 6.2.1. This is due to insufficient path validation in the getAttachments() method of EmailNotificationActions, which resolves attacker-supplied file-upload URLs into filesystem paths without verifying that the resolved path stays inside the WordPress uploads directory: a strpos() prefix check on the raw URL can be bypassed with traversal sequences, wp_normalize_path() does not resolve \".\\..\\\" segments, and file_exists() then resolves them at the kernel level. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with administrator access to read arbitrary files readable by the web-server user \u2014 including wp-config.php with its database credentials and authentication salts \u2014 by submitting a form whose admin notification is configured to attach a file-upload field and supplying a crafted URL of the shape \u003cupload_baseurl\u003e/../../\u003ctarget\u003e as the file-field value. The resolved file is attached to the outbound admin-notification email via wp_mail(). While the email can be triggered by unauthenticated users, the email recipient is not user-controlled.",
"id": "GHSA-74hf-jfjp-cf88",
"modified": "2026-05-06T09:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T09:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Hooks/Ajax.php#L17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Modules/SubmissionHandler/SubmissionHandler.php#L17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php#L151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3513845/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/FormBuilder/Notifications/EmailNotificationActions.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0101113b-70c2-4db4-b6b1-b2412f6e1214?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-74M3-9QVM-RP9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-25 23:34 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:29Summary The zrok WebDAV drive backend (davServer.Dir) restricts path traversal through lexical normalization but does not prevent symlink following. When a symbolic link inside the shared DriveRoot points to a location outside that root, remote WebDAV consumers can read files and—on shares without OS-level permission restrictions—write or overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem accessible to the zrok process.
- Attack Vector: Network — exploitation is performed entirely over the WebDAV endpoint; the attacker issues HTTP requests to the public zrok share URL.
- Attack Complexity: High — a precondition outside the attacker's direct control must hold: a symlink pointing outside DriveRoot must already exist within it (created locally, not via WebDAV).
- Privileges Required: None — zrok share public --backend-mode drive exposes the WebDAV endpoint with no authentication by default.
- User Interaction: None — once the symlink precondition is met, exploitation requires no user interaction.
- Scope: Changed — the vulnerability allows an attacker to escape the WebDAV root (the security boundary) and access the broader host filesystem.
- Confidentiality Impact: High — arbitrary files readable by the zrok process can be retrieved.
- Integrity Impact: High — the WebDAV PUT handler opens files with O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, meaning symlink targets outside DriveRoot can be overwritten (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys).
- Availability Impact: None — no direct availability impact.
Affected Components
- drives/davServer/file.go — Dir.OpenFile (line 140), Dir.Stat (line 176), Dir.Mkdir (line 133), Dir.RemoveAll (line 151)
- endpoints/drive/backend.go — NewBackend (line 51–52)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openziti/zrok"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openziti/zrok/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:34:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T04:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Summary**\nThe zrok WebDAV drive backend (davServer.Dir) restricts path traversal through lexical normalization but does not prevent symlink following. When a symbolic link inside the shared DriveRoot points to a location outside that root, remote WebDAV consumers can read files and\u2014on shares without OS-level permission restrictions\u2014write or overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem accessible to the zrok process.\n\n- Attack Vector: Network \u2014 exploitation is performed entirely over the WebDAV endpoint; the attacker issues HTTP requests to the public zrok share URL.\n- Attack Complexity: High \u2014 a precondition outside the attacker\u0027s direct control must hold: a symlink pointing outside DriveRoot must already exist within it (created locally, not via WebDAV).\n- Privileges Required: None \u2014 zrok share public --backend-mode drive exposes the WebDAV endpoint with no authentication by default.\n- User Interaction: None \u2014 once the symlink precondition is met, exploitation requires no user interaction.\n- Scope: Changed \u2014 the vulnerability allows an attacker to escape the WebDAV root (the security boundary) and access the broader host filesystem.\n- Confidentiality Impact: High \u2014 arbitrary files readable by the zrok process can be retrieved.\n- Integrity Impact: High \u2014 the WebDAV PUT handler opens files with O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, meaning symlink targets outside DriveRoot can be overwritten (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys).\n- Availability Impact: None \u2014 no direct availability impact.\n\nAffected Components\n\n- drives/davServer/file.go \u2014 Dir.OpenFile (line 140), Dir.Stat (line 176), Dir.Mkdir (line 133), Dir.RemoveAll (line 151)\n- endpoints/drive/backend.go \u2014 NewBackend (line 51\u201352)",
"id": "GHSA-74m3-9qvm-rp9h",
"modified": "2026-05-12T13:29:09Z",
"published": "2026-04-25T23:34:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/security/advisories/GHSA-74m3-9qvm-rp9h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/commit/459bcfc1e121decae1b1d11c37ad94e4ed5bbf2e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/releases/tag/v2.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "zrok: WebDAV drive backend follows symlinks outside DriveRoot, enabling host filesystem read/write"
}
GHSA-74P7-6H78-GW8P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 22:45 – Updated: 2026-06-22 22:45Impact
Following the path-safety patches in GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47 (v0.1.2), a comprehensive multi-angle audit surfaced five further vulnerabilities, now patched in v0.1.3:
source_shaargument injection ingit ls-tree(CRITICAL).InstalledSkill.source_shadeserialized from.skills.toml(committed, PR-mergeable) flowed unvalidated intogit ls-tree -r -z <refspec> -- <path>. Because the refspec sits before--, an attacker who slipped a malicious.skills.tomlinto a PR could setsource_sha = "--name-only"/--abbrev=0/--output=…and corrupt the diff classifier (which drivespull/pushdestructive decisions), or forge a divergence state to trickpush --on-divergence overwriteinto clobbering the wrong content.- FIFO / device / socket denial-of-service in
copy_dir_all(CRITICAL). The file-type branch only checkedis_dir()/is_symlink(); a FIFO inside a skill folder fell through tofs::copy, which blocks indefinitely waiting for a writer. A character device like/dev/zerowould read until OOM. Reachable onskillctl addagainst any adversarial library. add --destarbitrary-directory wipe in agent mode (HIGH).--destaccepted absolute paths and..traversal without validation, so a single invocationskillctl add --dest /Users/victim/.ssh --on-conflict overwrite --skill <maliciously-named>wouldremove_dir_allarbitrary directories — no.skills.tomlround-trip required. Reachable in any non-interactive / agent-driven workflow where flag values may be attacker-supplied.- Commit-message trailer forgery via skill names (HIGH). Skill names were spliced verbatim into
git commit -m "update skill: <name>"and into thecommit.messagefield of--jsonoutput. A skill namedfoo\nCo-Authored-By: evil@xproduced a forged commit trailer that downstream tooling (Linear, GitHub commit-bot, release-notes scrapers) treats as real authorship metadata. - Hardlink exfiltration via the round-trip (HIGH).
fs::symlink_metadatareports a regular file for hardlinks (shared inode), andfs::copyreads the target content. An untrusted agent writing<project>/my-skill/dataas a hardlink to~/.ssh/id_rsawould have shipped the SSH key content to the (possibly public) library on the nextskillctl pushordetect.
Patches
Fixed in v0.1.3:
InstalledSkill::validaterejects anysource_shathat isn't 40–64 hex characters.fs_util::copy_dir_allonly allows regular files and directories; FIFO / socket / device / other special files are rejected withAppError::Config.commands::add::resolve_destinationrejects..unconditionally and rejects absolute paths in non-interactive /--jsonmode.- New
src/sanitize.rsmodule:validate_identifier(strict, no control bytes / newlines / ESC, used for skillname+ individualtags) andvalidate_message_safe(lenient, allows\n+\t, rejects\r+ DEL + C0/C1 controls, used fordescriptionand--message). Wired at theskill::discoverandread_tagsboundaries so poisoned skills are dropped silently and poisoned descriptions/tags are stripped from otherwise-valid skills. fs_util::copy_dir_allchecksmetadata.nlink() > 1on regular files (Unix) and refuses hardlinked content.
All checks are lexical or single-syscall (symlink_metadata, metadata). No canonicalize, no TOCTOU windows. 23 new unit + integration tests cover each rejection class; cargo test: 95 pass; clippy clean; cargo audit clean.
Workarounds
Upgrade to v0.1.3. Pre-patch mitigations are awkward but possible:
- Audit every .skills.toml source_sha field before running skillctl pull / push / detect.
- Audit library content for FIFO / device files and hardlinks before running skillctl add.
- Never invoke skillctl add with attacker-controllable --dest values in agent / CI contexts.
- Never use --message with attacker-controlled content.
Credit
The findings were surfaced by a maintainer-led multi-angle audit (6 parallel sub-agents, one per threat-model dimension) following the firebaguette audit that motivated v0.1.2. The methodology (cross-agent convergence to identify the most exploitable items) is documented in the project's internal decisions log; the strongest signal was the four-of-six independent convergence on the source_sha vector.
Resources
- Fix commit: 28dfce3
- Release: https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3
- Prior advisory (path-safety + symlinks): GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "skillctl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-88",
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nFollowing the path-safety patches in [GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47) (v0.1.2), a comprehensive multi-angle audit surfaced five further vulnerabilities, now patched in v0.1.3:\n\n1. **`source_sha` argument injection in `git ls-tree` (CRITICAL).** `InstalledSkill.source_sha` deserialized from `.skills.toml` (committed, PR-mergeable) flowed unvalidated into `git ls-tree -r -z \u003crefspec\u003e -- \u003cpath\u003e`. Because the refspec sits before `--`, an attacker who slipped a malicious `.skills.toml` into a PR could set `source_sha = \"--name-only\"` / `--abbrev=0` / `--output=\u2026` and corrupt the diff classifier (which drives `pull` / `push` destructive decisions), or forge a divergence state to trick `push --on-divergence overwrite` into clobbering the wrong content.\n2. **FIFO / device / socket denial-of-service in `copy_dir_all` (CRITICAL).** The file-type branch only checked `is_dir()` / `is_symlink()`; a FIFO inside a skill folder fell through to `fs::copy`, which blocks indefinitely waiting for a writer. A character device like `/dev/zero` would read until OOM. Reachable on `skillctl add` against any adversarial library.\n3. **`add --dest` arbitrary-directory wipe in agent mode (HIGH).** `--dest` accepted absolute paths and `..` traversal without validation, so a single invocation `skillctl add --dest /Users/victim/.ssh --on-conflict overwrite --skill \u003cmaliciously-named\u003e` would `remove_dir_all` arbitrary directories \u2014 no `.skills.toml` round-trip required. Reachable in any non-interactive / agent-driven workflow where flag values may be attacker-supplied.\n4. **Commit-message trailer forgery via skill names (HIGH).** Skill names were spliced verbatim into `git commit -m \"update skill: \u003cname\u003e\"` and into the `commit.message` field of `--json` output. A skill named `foo\\nCo-Authored-By: evil@x` produced a forged commit trailer that downstream tooling (Linear, GitHub commit-bot, release-notes scrapers) treats as real authorship metadata.\n5. **Hardlink exfiltration via the round-trip (HIGH).** `fs::symlink_metadata` reports a regular file for hardlinks (shared inode), and `fs::copy` reads the target content. An untrusted agent writing `\u003cproject\u003e/my-skill/data` as a hardlink to `~/.ssh/id_rsa` would have shipped the SSH key content to the (possibly public) library on the next `skillctl push` or `detect`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in [v0.1.3](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3):\n\n- `InstalledSkill::validate` rejects any `source_sha` that isn\u0027t 40\u201364 hex characters.\n- `fs_util::copy_dir_all` only allows regular files and directories; FIFO / socket / device / other special files are rejected with `AppError::Config`.\n- `commands::add::resolve_destination` rejects `..` unconditionally and rejects absolute paths in non-interactive / `--json` mode.\n- New `src/sanitize.rs` module: `validate_identifier` (strict, no control bytes / newlines / ESC, used for skill `name` + individual `tags`) and `validate_message_safe` (lenient, allows `\\n` + `\\t`, rejects `\\r` + DEL + C0/C1 controls, used for `description` and `--message`). Wired at the `skill::discover` and `read_tags` boundaries so poisoned skills are dropped silently and poisoned descriptions/tags are stripped from otherwise-valid skills.\n- `fs_util::copy_dir_all` checks `metadata.nlink() \u003e 1` on regular files (Unix) and refuses hardlinked content.\n\nAll checks are lexical or single-syscall (`symlink_metadata`, `metadata`). No `canonicalize`, no TOCTOU windows. 23 new unit + integration tests cover each rejection class; `cargo test`: 95 pass; clippy clean; `cargo audit` clean.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to v0.1.3. Pre-patch mitigations are awkward but possible:\n- Audit every `.skills.toml` `source_sha` field before running `skillctl pull` / `push` / `detect`.\n- Audit library content for FIFO / device files and hardlinks before running `skillctl add`.\n- Never invoke `skillctl add` with attacker-controllable `--dest` values in agent / CI contexts.\n- Never use `--message` with attacker-controlled content.\n\n## Credit\n\nThe findings were surfaced by a maintainer-led multi-angle audit (6 parallel sub-agents, one per threat-model dimension) following the firebaguette audit that motivated v0.1.2. The methodology (cross-agent convergence to identify the most exploitable items) is documented in the project\u0027s internal decisions log; the strongest signal was the four-of-six independent convergence on the `source_sha` vector.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix commit: [28dfce3](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/commit/28dfce3)\n- Release: https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3\n- Prior advisory (path-safety + symlinks): [GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47](https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47)",
"id": "GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8p",
"modified": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
"published": "2026-06-22T22:45:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-74p7-6h78-gw8p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/security/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/commit/28dfce3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umanio-agency/skillctl/releases/tag/v0.1.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "skillctl: argument injection, path traversal in --dest, FIFO/device DoS, hardlink exfiltration, and commit-trailer forgery"
}
GHSA-74PP-5XHC-PCFC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:52 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:52Directory traversal vulnerability in admin.php in Flashlight Free Edition allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-12-04T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in admin.php in Flashlight Free Edition allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the action parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-74pp-5xhc-pcfc",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:52:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:52:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/50907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8856"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-74PW-3RQ8-72PX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-08 06:31 – Updated: 2026-07-08 06:31The Bulk Order Update for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 1.6. This is due to the bouw_fetch_csv_data() AJAX handler being registered on the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook with no capability or nonce check, and passing the attacker-supplied csv_url POST parameter — filtered only by esc_url_raw() (which leaves absolute filesystem paths intact) and validate_file() (which only rejects '..' traversal patterns) — directly into fopen()/fgetcsv() and reflecting the first parsed line in the JSON response. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the first line of arbitrary files on the server (such as /etc/passwd) and to use the handler as a file-existence oracle.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14500"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T06:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Bulk Order Update for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 1.6. This is due to the bouw_fetch_csv_data() AJAX handler being registered on the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook with no capability or nonce check, and passing the attacker-supplied csv_url POST parameter \u2014 filtered only by esc_url_raw() (which leaves absolute filesystem paths intact) and validate_file() (which only rejects \u0027..\u0027 traversal patterns) \u2014 directly into fopen()/fgetcsv() and reflecting the first parsed line in the JSON response. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the first line of arbitrary files on the server (such as /etc/passwd) and to use the handler as a file-existence oracle.",
"id": "GHSA-74pw-3rq8-72px",
"modified": "2026-07-08T06:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-07-08T06:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14500"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bulk-order-update-for-woocommerce/tags/1.6/inc/plugin-html.php#L23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bulk-order-update-for-woocommerce/tags/1.6/inc/plugin-html.php#L33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bulk-order-update-for-woocommerce/tags/1.6/inc/plugin-html.php#L48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d3aa1f74-6372-4abe-894b-07ad3e81ea81?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.