{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "webauthn-rs-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "webauthn-authenticator-rs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0-dev"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.1-dev"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.0-dev"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "webauthn-rs-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0-dev"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.1-dev"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.6.0-dev"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "webauthn-authenticator-rs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:31:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`webauthn-rs-core` ([Relying Party][rp]) and `webauthn-authenticator-rs` ([client][]) checked that [an `Origin` in `CollectedClientData`][origin] is valid for [an RP ID][rpid] with [`str::ends_with()`][ends-with], [without checking for a dot (`.`) before the RP ID when allowing subdomains][registerable-suffix].\n\nThis check is flawed, and could allow requests from an attacker-controlled domain such as `hermit-crab.example` to be accepted for the RP ID `crab.example` (assuming `.example` was publicly-registerable TLD) when the RP allows authenticating from a subdomain (disabled by default in `webauthn-rs-core` and `webauthn-rs`).\n\n[registerable-suffix]: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#is-a-registrable-domain-suffix-of-or-is-equal-to\n[ends-with]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/std/primitive.str.html#method.ends_with\n[client]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#client\n[rp]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party\n[rpid]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-id\n[origin]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin\n\n* In `webauthn-rs-core`, this **only** applies when:\n  * [`WebauthnCore::allow_subdomains_origin`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-rs-core/0.5.4/webauthn_rs_core/struct.WebauthnCore.html#method.new_unsafe_experts_only) is `true` (the default is `false`), *and*\n  * the attacker could register a domain that ends with the RP ID as a raw string, *and*,\n  * the client does not implement these checks correctly either\n\n  `webauthn-rs` can set `allow_subdomains_origin` via [`WebauthnBuilder::allow_subdomains`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_rs/struct.WebauthnBuilder.html#method.allow_subdomains). Fixing the bug in `webauthn-rs-core` also fixes it in `webauthn-rs`.\n\n* In `webauthn-authenticator-rs`, the flawed check is in [`WebauthnAuthenticator::do_registration()`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-authenticator-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_authenticator_rs/struct.WebauthnAuthenticator.html#method.do_registration) and [`do_authentication()`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-authenticator-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_authenticator_rs/struct.WebauthnAuthenticator.html#method.do_registration). \n\n  A conforming [Relying Party][rp] implementation would reject such requests, but `webauthn-rs-core` did not.\n\n  An application can still provide an incorrect `origin` parameter to `webauthn-authenticator-rs`, or use lower-level APIs that bypass these checks entirely, and this is by design.\n\nThese issues are a violation of [WebAuthn Level 3 \u00a713.4.9](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-validating-origin), [\u00a75.1.3 Step 8](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#CreateCred-DetermineRpId) and [\u00a75.1.4.1 Step 7](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#GetAssn-DetermineRpId).\n\n### Details\n\n* `webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs` line 1213:\n\n  https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs#L1211-L1216\n\n* `webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs` line 274:\n\n  https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L274-L277\n\n* `webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs` line 335:\n\n  https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L335-L338\n\n[`str::ends_with()`][ends-with] performs a raw string suffix match _without_ [enforcing a domain label boundary][registerable-suffix]:\n\nOrigin | RP ID | Expected result | Result with incorrect `ends_with` check\n-- | -- | -- | --\n`hermit-crab.example` | `crab.example` | rejected | accepted **(bug!)**\n`auth.crab.example` | `crab.example` | accepted | accepted (subdomain)\n`crab.example` | `crab.example` | accepted | accepted (exact match)\n`hermit-crab.example` | `auth.crab.example` | rejected | rejected\n`auth.crab.example` | `auth.crab.example` | accepted | accepted (exact match)\n\n### Fix\n\nWhen `webauthn-rs-core` v0.5.5 checks if an `Origin` is a valid subdomain of an RP ID, it will check that it ends with the RP ID prefixed with a dot (`.{rp_id}`). `webauthn-rs` v0.5.5 will be fixed by depending on `webauthn-rs-core` v0.5.5.\n\n`webauthn-authenticator-rs` v0.5.5 now uses `webauthn-rs-core`\u0027s checks in `WebauthnAuthenticator`.\n\nRegression tests for this bug have been added to both libraries.\n\n### Impact\n\nWith a **both** a non-conforming [client][] implementation and vulnerable version of `webauthn-rs-core` configured to allow subdomains (not the default), this bug would allow an attacker at `hermit-crab.example` to phish a target\u0027s credential for the RP ID `crab.example` by directly proxying a legitimate `navigator.credentials.get()` request on the attacker\u0027s domain.\n\nHowever, _conforming_ [client implementations][client] (ie: all web browsers) will refuse to process WebAuthn requests for an RP ID that does not match the `Origin` of the current page and is not [a related `Origin`](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-related-origins).\n\nIn the scenario above with _conforming_ client-side checks, this would force the attacker to change the request\u0027s RP ID to `hermit-crab.example` (the attacker\u0027s `Origin`). This would also change the RP ID hash, [and `webauthn-rs-core` would reject it](https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs#L825-L840) (per [WebAuthn \u00a77.2 Step 15](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash)).\n\n### Severity\n\nPer [WebAuthn \u00a713.4.9](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-validating-origin):\n\n\u003e The [Relying Party](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party) MUST NOT accept unexpected values of [origin](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin), as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid [credentials](https://www.w3.org/TR/credential-management-1/#concept-credential). Although the [scope](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#scope) of WebAuthn credentials prevents their use on domains outside the [RP ID](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-id) they were registered for, the [Relying Party](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party)\u2019s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection in case a faulty [authenticator](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#authenticator) fails to enforce credential [scope](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#scope).\n\nUnfortunately, [the chain needed to exploit this bug makes it difficult to classify with the CVSS framework](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/user-guide#Vulnerability-Chaining). Kanidm came up with anywhere between \"low\" and \"high\" depending on the approach, and GitHub only provides one CVSS field for everything.\n\nAn attacker could easily bypass a _correctly-implemented_ server-side `Origin` check, if they can convince a target to use their authenticator with [an attacker-controlled client device](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-t-1.3.2) or [buggy/malicious client application](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-t-1.3.1). FIDO\u0027s Security Reference [assumes that \"the FIDO user device and applications involved in a FIDO operation are trustworthy agents of the user\"](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-sa-4), and violating that [limits the protections FIDO can provide](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#discussion), so it would be ridiculous to describe those bypasses as a \"high\" severity vulnerability.\n\nHowever, `webauthn-rs-core` should take reasonable steps to prevent these sorts of issues where it can, especially when they\u0027re part of the WebAuthn specification.\n\nDue to the complex preconditions and non-default configuration required to execute a successful attack, and that it is *not exploitable* in popular web browsers, Kanidm considers this a **low severity** issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-22w3-693w-x895",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T23:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T23:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-22w3-693w-x895"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "webauthn-rs-core/webauthn-authenticator-rs: Origin validation mismatch possible when subdomains are allowed"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45179"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-09T04:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in za-internet C-MOR Video Surveillance 5.2401 and 6.00PL01. Due to insufficient input validation, the C-MOR web interface is vulnerable to OS command injection attacks. It was found out that different functionality is vulnerable to OS command injection attacks, for example for generating new X.509 certificates, or setting the time zone. These OS command injection vulnerabilities in the script generatesslreq.pml can be exploited as a low-privileged authenticated user to execute commands in the context of the Linux user www-data via shell metacharacters in HTTP POST data (e.g., the city parameter). The OS command injection vulnerability in the script settimezone.pml or setdatetime.pml (e.g., via the year parameter) requires an administrative user for the C-MOR web interface. By also exploiting a privilege-escalation vulnerability, it is possible to execute commands on the C-MOR system with root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-2v34-3hgh-5vvx",
  "modified": "2024-10-09T15:32:18Z",
  "published": "2024-10-09T06:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45179"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-030.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/polyfill"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/polyfill-intl-idn"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.17.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T19:52:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`symfony/polyfill-intl-idn` provides a userland implementation of `idn_to_utf8()` and `idn_to_ascii()` for runtimes that lack the `intl` extension. Its `Idn::process()` method decodes labels prefixed with `xn--` using Punycode but never enforces the validity criterion added in UTS #46 revision 33 Section 4 step 4.1.2: after a successful Punycode decode, the result must contain at least one non-ASCII code point.\n\nAs a consequence, `xn--` labels whose Punycode payload is empty (`xn--`) or decodes to a string made of only ASCII code points (e.g. `xn--kc1zs4-`) are accepted by the polyfill while PHP\u0027s native `ext-intl` rejects them with `IDNA_ERROR_INVALID_ACE_LABEL`. Originally unequal domain names are therefore regarded as equal, which can lead to blacklist bypassing, inconsistent URL parsing and server-side request forgery (similar to CVE-2024-12224).\n\nExample with `IDNA_USE_STD3_RULES | IDNA_CHECK_BIDI | IDNA_CHECK_CONTEXTJ | IDNA_NONTRANSITIONAL_TO_ASCII`:\n\n| Input | Polyfill output | Native `ext-intl` output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| `poc.xn--kc1zs4-.com` | `poc.kc1zs4.com` | `false` (`errors=1024`) |\n| `poc.kc1zs4.xn--` | `poc.kc1zs4.` | `false` (`errors=1024`) |\n\nApplications using the polyfill to canonicalise or compare hostnames inherit the inconsistency.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`Idn::process()` now records `IDNA_ERROR_INVALID_ACE_LABEL` when a Punycode payload decodes to an empty string or to a string containing only ASCII code points, matching the native `ext-intl` behaviour and UTS #46 revision 33.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/polyfill/commit/1be936e2491ccebe152bd736dfc91eb1422c8bec) for branch 1.x.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Nazy Mad for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-2xf4-cg6j-vhgq",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T19:52:36Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T19:52:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/polyfill/security/advisories/GHSA-2xf4-cg6j-vhgq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/polyfill/commit/1be936e2491ccebe152bd736dfc91eb1422c8bec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/polyfill-intl-idn/CVE-2026-46644.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/polyfill/CVE-2026-46644.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/polyfill"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-46644"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "symfony/polyfill-intl-idn: xn-- labels with ASCII-only Punycode payloads are treated as equivalent to their decoded form"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ory/oathkeeper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.40.10-0.20260320084801-198a2bc82a99"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33496"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-305"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:51:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T18:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\nOry Oathkeeper is vulnerable to authentication bypass due to cache key confusion. The `oauth2_introspection` authenticator cache does not distinguish tokens that were validated with different introspection URLs. An attacker can therefore legitimately use a token to prime the cache, and subsequently use the same token for rules that use a different introspection server.\n\n## Preconditions\n\nOry Oathkeeper has to be configured with multiple `oauth2_introspection` authenticator servers, each accepting different tokens. The authenticators also must be [configured to use caching](https://www.ory.com/docs/oathkeeper/pipeline/authn#oauth2_introspection-configuration). An attacker has to have a way to gain a valid token for one of the configured introspection servers.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nOry Oathkeeper now includes the introspection server URL in the cache key, preventing confusion of tokens.\n\nUpdate to the patched version of Ory Oathkeeper. If that is not immediately possible, disable caching for `oauth2_introspection` authenticators.",
  "id": "GHSA-4mq7-pvjg-xp2r",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T20:59:10Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:51:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-4mq7-pvjg-xp2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33496"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/198a2bc82a99e0a77bd0ffe290cbdd5285a1b17c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ory Oathkeeper has an authentication bypass by cache key confusion"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-10T21:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.24 for Perl does not properly validate IP address and CIDR mask inputs, which may allow IP ACL bypass.\n\nInputs containing a trailing newline or non-ASCII digit characters pass the validators but are then re-encoded by the parser to a different address than the input string spelled. find() and bin_find() can match or miss addresses as a result.\n\nExample:\n\n  my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite-\u003enew();\n  $cidr-\u003eadd(\"::1\\n/128\");\n  $cidr-\u003efind(\"::1a\");  # incorrectly returns true\n\nSee also CVE-2026-45191.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vf8-328m-mxj5",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-10T21:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stigtsp/Net-CIDR-Lite/commit/ca9542adec87110556601d7ce48381ea8d13e692.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/STIGTSP/Net-CIDR-Lite-0.24/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45191"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T18:43:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\n`Config.registryFor` selected a per-registry credential / CA / mirror block by checking `strings.HasSuffix(name, fqdn)` after stripping a single trailing dot.\u00a0\nThe match has no boundary between the configured FQDN and any preceding characters in the request hostname.\nA registry configured as `[registries.\"ghcr.io.\"]` is therefore also applied to any image pulled from a host whose name happens to end in the literal byte sequence `ghcr.io`,\u00a0\nincluding attacker-registered domains such as `evilghcr.io.`\u00a0\nThe imagepuller would then send the configured `Authorization` header (basic auth, registry token, or identity token), trust the configured custom CA bundle,\nfollow the configured mirror, or honour `insecure-skip-verify`, on requests to that hostname.\n\n# Prerequisites\n\nFor this to be applicable, an image or layer must be pulled from a \"sibling\" domain ending in one of the FQDNs configured in the imagepuller config.\nThis may occur due to malicious intent or coincidentally.\n\n# Impact\n\n- Authentication header leaks to the sibling registry.\n- If `insecure-skip-verify` is set on an FQDN, TLS will also not be verified for the sibling registry.\n- Mirrors configured for an FQDN will also be used with the sibling registry.\n\n## Not impacted\n\nImage integrity is **not** impacted. Image bytes remain pinned by digest in the policy and are validated after the pull.\nThis advisory does not allow code substitution.\n\n# Workaround\n\n- If possible, configure explicit subdomains in the imagepuller config. A configuration for `[registries.\".example.registry\"]` is unaffected, only `[registries.\"example.registry\"]` is potentially affected.\n- Audit images and layers configured in the deployment for the existence of sibling domains.\n\n# Patches\n\nAfter this patch, registry matches are determined by exact label equality instead of suffix matching.\nEach `.`-separated part of the FQDN must be an exact match with the corresponding label in the image reference.\n\n# Severity\n\n- `AV:N` because the leak is over the network to a registry under the attacker\u0027s control.\u00a0\n- `AC:H` because exploitation requires the operator to have configured a registry FQDN without a leading `.` AND the attacker to control a sibling-suffix domain that the deployment will pull from.\n- `PR:N` for the eventual recipient.\u00a0\n- `S:U` because impact stays in the imagepuller.\u00a0\n- `C:L` for credential leak (no integrity / availability impact).",
  "id": "GHSA-6c87-g9pw-78fx",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T18:43:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T18:43:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-6c87-g9pw-78fx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/commit/10826b1d82613025767fb094e8aa51a7dcfbd2a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/releases/tag/v1.21.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Contrast\u0027s Imagepuller registryFor uses unanchored suffix matching, leaking auth credentials and trusted CA configuration to sibling-domain registries"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76977"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T01:17:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SAP UI5 does not sufficiently validate the parent frame\u0027s origin against the configured allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker could host a malicious page to bypass framing restrictions. If an authenticated victim visits the attacker\u0027s page and interacts with it, the attacker could trick the victim into performing unintended actions, resulting in a low impact on integrity. There is no impact on confidentiality and availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-6p8v-3qw2-gh8w",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T03:31:13Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T03:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76977"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3783189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://url.sap/sapsecuritypatchday"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "starlette"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48710"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-444"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T13:15:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-26T22:16:44Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn affected versions, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed.\n\n### Details\nWhen a client requests `http://example.com/foo`, it sends:\n\n```http\nGET /foo HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n```\n\nAffected versions reconstructed the URL by concatenating `http://{host}{path}` and re-parsing the result. The `Host` value is only valid as a `uri-host [ \":\" port ]` per [RFC 9112 \u00a73.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#section-3.2-6), where `uri-host` follows the restricted `host` grammar of [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.2.2). When it contains characters outside that grammar - notably `/`, `?`, or `#` - those characters move the path/query/fragment boundaries during re-parsing, so the parsed `request.url.path` no longer matches the path the server actually received. For example:\n\n```http\nGET /foo HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com/abc?bar=\n```\n\nreconstructs to `http://example.com/abc?bar=/foo`, whose parsed `path` is `/abc` - even though routing used the real path `/foo`. The router still dispatches to `/foo` and the endpoint executes, but any middleware or code that reads `request.url.path` sees `/abc`, so path-based authorization checks can be bypassed.\n\n### Impact\nAny application running an affected version that relies on `request.url` (or `request.url.path`) for security-sensitive decisions is affected. The most common case is middleware that gates access to certain path prefixes based on `request.url.path`. Deployments fronted by a proxy or load balancer are mitigated only if that proxy rejects or normalizes the malformed `Host` header before forwarding and the application does not trust attacker-controlled host headers (e.g. `X-Forwarded-Host`) elsewhere.\n\n### Mitigation\nUpgrade to a patched version, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of [RFC 9112 \u00a73.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9112.html#section-3.2-6) / [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.html#section-3.2.2) when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope[\"server\"]` for malformed values.",
  "id": "GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:30:59Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T13:15:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/764dab0dcfb9033d75442d7a359645c9f94648c6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-002-starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.secwest.net/starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48710.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ostif.org/disclosing-the-badhost-vulnerability-in-starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/starlette/PYSEC-2026-161.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Kludex/starlette"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2481742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://badhost.org"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48710"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51357"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:44696"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:43038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34526"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23346"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22993"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22992"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T12:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.8 before 18.8.4 that could have allowed an authenticated developer to hide specially crafted file changes from the WebUI.",
  "id": "GHSA-95p8-ccjw-3g7f",
  "modified": "2026-02-11T12:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-02-11T12:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3502519"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2026/02/10/patch-release-gitlab-18-8-4-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/586483"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fedify/fedify"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42462"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-180",
      "CWE-347",
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-26T23:38:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "As told on Discord earlier, multiple projects are affected, and we would like to coordinate. For now, we are aiming at a May 6th release date, but this is not set in stone yet.\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker can make use of JSON-LD features to restructure a JSON-LD document that would change how Fedify interprets it without changing its Linked Data Signature, allowing them to alter a third-party signed activity they have received.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability essentially boils down to the signature being on the canonical RDF graph representation of the JSON-LD document, and JSON-LD offering many ways to represent the same graph.\n\nOne of the issues is that by taking a signed `Activity` with an embedded `object`, an attacker can move the top-level `Activity` to a `@graph` property and move the activity\u0027s `object` to the top-level. Such a transformation preserves the signature and changes how the payload is interpreted by pretty much all ActivityPub implementations, making them process the object and ignore the formely-top-level activity. This can be used when the graph contains an embedded activity. In Mastodon, that is the case of `{ \"type\": \"Undo\", \"object\": { \"type\": \"Announce\" } }`, but other implementations may sign other activities that can be exploited in the same way.\n\nThe `@reverse` keyword can also be used to change the shape of a JSON-LD document without changing the underlying graph, and could be used in a similar way to reverse an `Activity` and its `object`.\n\nAnother problematic feature is `@included`, which can be used to \u201cmove\u201d properties outside of the normal tree, effectively making them invisible to most ActivityPub implementations, while, again, preserving the signature. This allows removing statuses or actor properties once a signed `Create` or `Update` activity is received.\n\nGiven that we have seen no use of `@graph`, `@included` or `@reverse` in ActivityPub payloads and that they are very complex to handle correctly (the only JSON-LD API functions that \u201cnormalize\u201d `@included` and `@reverse` are flattening and framing, which both lose the root node), we have decided to reject them, and recommend you do so as well.\n\nDetection of `@graph`, `@included` and `@reverse` should happen after compacting the incoming activity to your context, as aliases can be used for those keywords.\n\nAdditionally, after a quick scan of Fedify\u0027s source code, I could not verify that JSON-LD documents with a verified Linked Data Signature were compacted against your local JSON-LD context. Not doing that allows an attacker to rename aliases to non-standard names and use non-mapped aliases to replace existing values, while still leaving the signature intact. This allows an attacker to essentially replace arbitrary portions of any signed JSON-LD document and completely forge any activity while still passing verification. A similar issue was fixed in Mastodon a few years ago: https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/pull/17426.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact is difficult to assess as this depends on the types of activities that are actually signed and processed in the wild.\n\nThe `@included` keyword allows \u201cremoving\u201d arbitrary attributes, thus allowing replaying `Create` and `Update` activities while stripping away any attribute, such as content or metadata, which can lead to integrity and availability issues, although confidentiality issues are unlikely.\n\nThe `@graph` and `@reverse` keywords allow changing the root activity, which in the case of Mastodon allows sending an `Announce` from a `Undo { Announce }`, but might have wider consequences depending on what various servers sign.\n\nThe lack of compacting can allow rewriting any activity arbitrarily, thus leading to major integrity, availability, and possibly confidentiality issues (e.g. by replacing an actor\u0027s `inbox`).",
  "id": "GHSA-9rfg-v8g9-9367",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T13:30:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T23:38:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify/security/advisories/GHSA-9rfg-v8g9-9367"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42462"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify/releases/tag/2.2.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fedify has an LD-Signature Bypass via JSON-LD Named-Graph Restructuring"
}