var-201201-0310
Vulnerability from variot
Cisco TelePresence Software before TE 4.1.1 on the Cisco IP Video Phone E20 has a default password for the root account after an upgrade to TE 4.1.0, which makes it easier for remote attackers to modify the configuration via an SSH session, aka Bug ID CSCtw69889, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-2555. The problem is Bug ID CSCtw69889 It is a problem. This vulnerability CVE-2011-2555 Is a different vulnerability.By a third party SSH The settings may be changed through the session. Cisco IP Video Phone E20 is prone to a remote authentication-bypass vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to gain unauthorized root access to the affected device. Successful exploits will result in the complete compromise of the device.
The vulnerability is due to an architectural change that was made in the way the system maintains administrative accounts. An attacker who is able to take advantage of this vulnerability could log in to the device as the root user and perform arbitrary actions with elevated privileges.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available.
The TE 4.1.0 release has been deferred from Cisco.com and Tandberg.com, and is no longer available for download. The deferral notice can be found at the following link: Software Deferral Notice
Administrators can determine the version of software running on their device by logging in to the command-line interface (CLI) as the admin user and issuing the xstatus systemunit command and finding the SystemUnit Software Version field.
Example:
$: ssh admin@203.0.113.134
TANDBERG Codec Release TE4.1.0.137456
SW Release Date: 2011-11-18
OK
xstatus systemunit
*s SystemUnit ProductType: "TANDBERG Codec"
*s SystemUnit ProductId: "TANDBERG E20"
*s SystemUnit Uptime: 91273
*s SystemUnit Software Version: "TE4.1.0.137456"
*s SystemUnit Software Name: "s52100"
*s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: "2011-11-18"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "M1AD18B023025"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module MainBoard: "101390-6"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2010.06-36"
*s SystemUnit State System: Initialized
*s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized
*s SystemUnit State Cradle: On
*s SystemUnit State CameraLid: Off
*s SystemUnit ContactInfo: "demo.user@example.com"
*s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Name: "9xxPlantronics"
*s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Address: "L023:8F:425M3D"
*s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Type: 2360324
*s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Status: bonded
*s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 LastSeen: "2011-12-20 11:49:36"
** end
OK
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability. This single super account utilized the same password for both the admin and root authentication and was always enabled. With the introduction of TE 4.1.0, an architectural change was made to help harden the devices by allowing administrators to disable the root account. The intended result of this change is to separate the super account into two accounts, root and admin, while subsequently disabling the root account by default.
It was found that in many cases, customers upgrading from a previous release of TE software to TE 4.1.0 are likely to experience an error condition in which the root account is not properly disabled. This creates a situation in which the root account is accessible via SSH with a default password. It was subsequently discovered that the command implemented to allow an administrator to enable or disable the root account does not function correctly.
Workarounds are available in the Workarounds section of this document. These workarounds involve changing the root and admin passwords to administrator-defined values.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has scored the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this security advisory is in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps organizations determine the urgency and priority of a response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can also compute environmental scores that help determine the impact of the vulnerability in their own networks.
Cisco has provided additional information regarding CVSS at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to compute the environmental impact for individual networks at the following link: http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
- CSCtw69889 - Cisco TelePresence TE Software Default Root Account Vulnerability
CVSS Base Score - 10.0 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - Complete Integrity Impact - Complete Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 8.7 Exploitability - High Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to gain root access to the affected device. This could allow the attacker to take arbitrary actions on the device with elevated privileges.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to consult the Cisco Security Advisories and Responses archive at: http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt And review subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.
Cisco TelePresence Software version TE 4.1.1 is available on Cisco.com and replaces TE 4.1.0. Prior to deploying software, customers are advised to consult their maintenance providers or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues that are specific to their environments.
Customers may only install and expect support for feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html Or as set forth at: http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco.com at: http://www.cisco.com
Customers Using Third-Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers with Cisco products that are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers, should contact that organization for assistance with the appropriate course of action.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix depends on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Because of the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult their service providers or support organizations to ensure that any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers Without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC):
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have the product serial number available and be prepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Customers without service contracts should request free upgrades through the TAC.
Refer to Cisco Worldwide Contacts at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html For additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, instructions, and e-mail addresses for support in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco Product Security Incidence Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered internally.
Status of This Notice: Final
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco Security Intelligence Operations at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20120118-te
Additionally, a text version of this advisory is clear signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and circulated among the following e-mail addresses:
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will reside on Cisco.com but may not be announced on mailing lists. Users can monitor this advisory's URL for any updates.
Revision History
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2012-January-18 | Initial Public Release | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information about reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco is available on Cisco.com at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html This web page includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco Security Advisories. All Cisco Security Advisories are available at: http://www.cisco.com/ go/psirt
+-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +--------------------------------------------------------------------
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4.1.0, which makes it easier for remote attackers to modify the configuration via an SSH session, aka Bug ID CSCtw69889, a different vulnerability than CVE-2011-2555. The problem is Bug ID CSCtw69889 It is a problem. This vulnerability CVE-2011-2555 Is a different vulnerability.By a third party SSH The settings may be changed through the session. Cisco IP Video Phone E20 is prone to a remote authentication-bypass vulnerability. \nAn attacker can exploit this issue to gain unauthorized root access to the affected device. Successful exploits will result in the complete compromise of the device. \n\nThe vulnerability is due to an architectural change that was made in\nthe way the system maintains administrative accounts. An attacker who is able\nto take advantage of this vulnerability could log in to the device as\nthe root user and perform arbitrary actions with elevated privileges. \n\nCisco has released free software updates that address this\nvulnerability. \n\nWorkarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. \n\nThe TE 4.1.0 release has been deferred from Cisco.com and\nTandberg.com, and is no longer available for download. The deferral\nnotice can be found at the following link: Software Deferral Notice\n\n\nAdministrators can determine the version of software running on their\ndevice by logging in to the command-line interface (CLI) as the admin\nuser and issuing the xstatus systemunit command and finding the\nSystemUnit Software Version field. \n\nExample:\n\n $: ssh admin@203.0.113.134\n\n\n\n TANDBERG Codec Release TE4.1.0.137456\n\n SW Release Date: 2011-11-18\n\n\n\n OK\n\n\n\n xstatus systemunit\n\n\n\n *s SystemUnit ProductType: \"TANDBERG Codec\"\n\n *s SystemUnit ProductId: \"TANDBERG E20\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Uptime: 91273\n\n *s SystemUnit Software Version: \"TE4.1.0.137456\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Software Name: \"s52100\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: \"2011-11-18\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: \"M1AD18B023025\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Hardware Module MainBoard: \"101390-6\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Hardware Module BootSoftware: \"U-Boot 2010.06-36\"\n\n *s SystemUnit State System: Initialized\n\n *s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized\n\n *s SystemUnit State Cradle: On\n\n *s SystemUnit State CameraLid: Off\n\n *s SystemUnit ContactInfo: \"demo.user@example.com\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Name: \"9xxPlantronics\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Address: \"L023:8F:425M3D\"\n\n *s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Type: 2360324\n\n *s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 Status: bonded\n\n *s SystemUnit Bluetooth Devices 1 LastSeen: \"2011-12-20 11:49:36\"\n\n ** end\n\n\n\n OK\n\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\n+--------------------------------\n\nNo other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this\nvulnerability. This single super account\nutilized the same password for both the admin and root authentication\nand was always enabled. With the introduction of TE 4.1.0, an\narchitectural change was made to help harden the devices by allowing\nadministrators to disable the root account. The intended result of\nthis change is to separate the super account into two accounts, root\nand admin, while subsequently disabling the root account by default. \n\nIt was found that in many cases, customers upgrading from a previous\nrelease of TE software to TE 4.1.0 are likely to experience an error\ncondition in which the root account is not properly disabled. This\ncreates a situation in which the root account is accessible via SSH\nwith a default password. It was subsequently discovered that the\ncommand implemented to allow an administrator to enable or disable the\nroot account does not function correctly. \n\nWorkarounds are available in the Workarounds section of this\ndocument. These workarounds involve changing the root and admin\npasswords to administrator-defined values. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n=============================\n\nCisco has scored the vulnerability in this advisory based on the\nCommon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this\nsecurity advisory is in accordance with CVSS version 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps organizations determine the urgency and priority of\na response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can also\ncompute environmental scores that help determine the impact of the\nvulnerability in their own networks. \n\nCisco has provided additional information regarding CVSS at the\nfollowing link:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to compute the environmental\nimpact for individual networks at the following link:\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\n\n* CSCtw69889 - Cisco TelePresence TE Software Default Root Account Vulnerability \n\nCVSS Base Score - 10.0\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - Complete\n Integrity Impact - Complete\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 8.7\n Exploitability - High\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerability could allow an\nunauthenticated, remote attacker to gain root access to the affected\ndevice. This could allow the attacker to take arbitrary actions on\nthe device with elevated privileges. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, customers are advised to consult\nthe Cisco Security Advisories and Responses archive at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt\nAnd review subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete\nupgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded\ncontain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and\nsoftware configurations will continue to be supported properly by the\nnew release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to\ncontact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their\ncontracted maintenance providers. \n\nCisco TelePresence Software version TE 4.1.1 is available on Cisco.com\nand replaces TE 4.1.0. Prior to deploying software,\ncustomers are advised to consult their maintenance providers or check\nthe software for feature set compatibility and known issues that are\nspecific to their environments. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for feature sets they\nhave purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise\nusing such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of\nthe Cisco software license at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html\nOr as set forth at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml\n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their\nregular update channels. For most customers, upgrades should be\nobtained through the Software Center on Cisco.com at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com\n\nCustomers Using Third-Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers with Cisco products that are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers,\nshould contact that organization for assistance with the appropriate\ncourse of action. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix depends on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Because of the variety of\naffected products and releases, customers should consult their service\nproviders or support organizations to ensure that any applied\nworkaround or fix is the most appropriate in the intended network\nbefore it is deployed. \n\nCustomers Without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract and customers who make purchases through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their\npoint of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical\nAssistance Center (TAC):\n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) \n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) \n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have the product serial number available and be\nprepared to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of\nentitlement to a free upgrade. Customers without service contracts\nshould request free upgrades through the TAC. \n\nRefer to Cisco Worldwide Contacts at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html\nFor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, instructions, and e-mail addresses for support in various\nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco Product Security Incidence Response Team (PSIRT) is not\naware of any public announcements or malicious use of the\nvulnerability that is described in this advisory. \n\nThis vulnerability was discovered internally. \n\nStatus of This Notice: Final\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY\nKIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that\nomits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled\ncopy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. \n\n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco Security Intelligence Operations at\nthe following link:\nhttp://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20120118-te\n\nAdditionally, a text version of this advisory is clear signed with the\nCisco PSIRT PGP key and circulated among the following e-mail\naddresses:\n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will reside on Cisco.com but\nmay not be announced on mailing lists. Users can monitor this\nadvisory\u0027s URL for any updates. \n\n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| Revision 1.0 | 2012-January-18 | Initial Public Release |\n+-------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information about reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco is available on\nCisco.com at:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html\nThis web page includes instructions for press inquiries regarding\nCisco Security Advisories. All Cisco Security Advisories are available\nat:\nhttp://www.cisco.com/ go/psirt\n\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\nCopyright 2010-2012 Cisco Systems, Inc. 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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.