rustsec-2025-0136
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2025-11-07 12:00
Modified
2025-12-17 06:01
Summary
Underflow in aes_key_unwrap function
Details

The aes_key_unwrap function would panic if passed a ciphertext that was too short. In a debug build, it would panic due to a subtraction underflow. In a release build, it would use the small negative quantity to allocate a vector. Since the allocator expects an unsigned quantity, the negative value would be interpreted as a huge allocation. The allocator would then fail to allocate the memory and panic.

An attacker could trigger this panic by sending a victim an encrypted message whose PKESK or SKESK packet has been specially modified. When the victim decrypts the message, the program would crash.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "sequoia_openpgp::crypto::ecdh::aes_key_unwrap"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "sequoia-openpgp",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/sequoia-openpgp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-67897",
    "GHSA-v6x3-9r38-r27q"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "The `aes_key_unwrap` function would panic if passed a ciphertext\nthat was too short.  In a debug build, it would panic due to a\nsubtraction underflow.  In a release build, it would use the\nsmall negative quantity to allocate a vector.  Since the\nallocator expects an unsigned quantity, the negative value would\nbe interpreted as a huge allocation.  The allocator would then\nfail to allocate the memory and panic.\n\nAn attacker could trigger this panic by sending a victim an\nencrypted message whose PKESK or SKESK packet has been specially\nmodified.  When the victim decrypts the message, the program\nwould crash.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0136",
  "modified": "2025-12-17T06:01:32Z",
  "published": "2025-11-07T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/sequoia-openpgp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0136.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia/-/blob/b59886e5e7bdf7169ed330f309a6633d131776e5/openpgp/NEWS#L7-L26"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Underflow in aes_key_unwrap function"
}


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