rustsec-2025-0024
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2025-04-08 12:00
Modified
2025-10-28 06:02
Summary
crossbeam-channel: double free on Drop
Details

The internal Channel type's Drop method has a race which could, in some circumstances, lead to a double-free. This could result in memory corruption.

Quoting from the upstream description in merge request #1187:

The problem lies in the fact that dicard_all_messages contained two paths that could lead to head.block being read but only one of them would swap the value. This meant that dicard_all_messages could end up observing a non-null block pointer (and therefore attempting to free it) without setting head.block to null. This would then lead to Channel::drop making a second attempt at dropping the same pointer.

The bug was introduced while fixing a memory leak, in upstream MR #1084, first published in 0.5.12.

The fix is in upstream MR #1187 and has been published in 0.5.15

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "crossbeam-channel",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/crossbeam-channel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.5.12-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4574",
    "GHSA-pg9f-39pc-qf8g",
    "TROVE-2025-013"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "The internal `Channel` type\u0027s `Drop` method has a race\nwhich could, in some circumstances, lead to a double-free.\nThis could result in memory corruption.\n\nQuoting from the\n[upstream description in merge request \\#1187](https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1187#issue-2980761131):\n\n\u003e The problem lies in the fact that `dicard_all_messages` contained two paths that could lead to `head.block` being read but only one of them would swap the value. This meant that `dicard_all_messages` could end up observing a non-null block pointer (and therefore attempting to free it) without setting `head.block` to null. This would then lead to `Channel::drop` making a second attempt at dropping the same pointer.\n\nThe bug was introduced while fixing a memory leak, in\nupstream [MR \\#1084](https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1084),\nfirst published in 0.5.12.\n\nThe fix is in\nupstream [MR \\#1187](https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1187)\nand has been published in 0.5.15",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2025-0024",
  "modified": "2025-10-28T06:02:18Z",
  "published": "2025-04-08T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/crossbeam-channel"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/crossbeam-rs/crossbeam/pull/1187"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "crossbeam-channel: double free on Drop"
}


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