rustsec-2023-0068
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2023-10-15 12:00
Modified
2025-10-28 06:02
Summary
Sequential calls of encryption API (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`) result in nonce reuse
Details

Problem: Trying to create a new encrypted message with the same cocoon object generates the same ciphertext. It mostly affects MiniCocoon and Cocoon objects with custom seeds and RNGs (where StdRng is used under the hood).

Note: The issue does NOT affect objects created with Cocoon::new which utilizes ThreadRng.

Cause: StdRng produces the same nonce because StdRng::clone resets its state.

Measure: Make encryption API mutable (encrypt, wrap, and dump).

Workaround: Create a new cocoon object with a new seed per each encryption.

How to Reproduce

let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[1; 32]);
let mut data1 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data1)?;

let mut data2 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data2)?;

// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]
// data2: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]

Workaround

For cocoon <= 0.3.3, create a new cocoon with a different seed per each encrypt/wrap/dump call.

let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[1; 32]);
let mut data1 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data1)?;

// Another seed: &[2; 32].
let cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b"password", &[2; 32]);
let mut data2 = "my secret data".to_owned().into_bytes();
let _ = cocoon.encrypt(&mut data2)?;

// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]
// data2: [53, 223, 209, 96, 130, 99, 209, 108, 83, 189, 123, 81, 19, 1]
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "cocoon::Cocoon::dump",
            "cocoon::Cocoon::encrypt",
            "cocoon::Cocoon::wrap",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::dump",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::encrypt",
            "cocoon::MiniCocoon::wrap"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "cocoon",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/cocoon"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21530",
    "GHSA-6878-6wc2-pf5h",
    "GHSA-r2jw-c95q-rj29"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "**Problem**: Trying to create a new encrypted message with the same cocoon\nobject generates the same ciphertext. It mostly affects `MiniCocoon` and\n`Cocoon` objects with custom seeds and RNGs (where `StdRng` is used under\nthe hood).\n\n**Note**: The issue does **NOT** affect objects created with **`Cocoon::new`**\nwhich utilizes `ThreadRng`.\n\n**Cause**: `StdRng` produces the same nonce because `StdRng::clone` resets its\nstate.\n\n**Measure**: Make encryption API mutable (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`).\n\n**Workaround**: Create a new cocoon object with a new **seed** per each\nencryption.\n\n## How to Reproduce\n\n```rust\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[1; 32]);\nlet mut data1 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data1)?;\n\nlet mut data2 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data2)?;\n\n// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n// data2: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n```\n\n## Workaround\n\nFor `cocoon \u003c= 0.3.3`, create a new cocoon with a different **seed**\nper each `encrypt`/`wrap`/`dump` call.\n\n```rust\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[1; 32]);\nlet mut data1 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data1)?;\n\n// Another seed: \u0026[2; 32].\nlet cocoon = MiniCocoon::from_password(b\"password\", \u0026[2; 32]);\nlet mut data2 = \"my secret data\".to_owned().into_bytes();\nlet _ = cocoon.encrypt(\u0026mut data2)?;\n\n// data1: [23, 217, 251, 151, 179, 62, 85, 15, 253, 92, 192, 112, 200, 52]\n// data2: [53, 223, 209, 96, 130, 99, 209, 108, 83, 189, 123, 81, 19, 1]\n```",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0068",
  "modified": "2025-10-28T06:02:18Z",
  "published": "2023-10-15T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/cocoon"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0068.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/fadeevab/cocoon/issues/22"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sequential calls of encryption API (`encrypt`, `wrap`, and `dump`) result in nonce reuse"
}


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