rustsec-2023-0053
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2023-08-22 12:00
Modified
2023-08-27 15:52
Summary
rustls-webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building
Details

When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will spend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each step of path building.

Both TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.

We now give each path building operation a budget of 100 signature verifications.

The original webpki crate is also affected.

This was previously reported in the original crate https://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69 and re-reported to us recently by Luke Malinowski.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rustls-webpki",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rustls-webpki"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.100.2"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.101.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.101.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-fh2r-99q2-6mmg"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "When this crate is given a pathological certificate chain to validate, it will\nspend CPU time exponential with the number of candidate certificates at each\nstep of path building.\n\nBoth TLS clients and TLS servers that accept client certificate are affected.\n\nWe now give each path building operation a budget of 100 signature verifications.\n\nThe original `webpki` crate is also affected.\n\nThis was previously reported in the original crate\n\u003chttps://github.com/briansmith/webpki/issues/69\u003e and re-reported to us\nrecently by Luke Malinowski.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0053",
  "modified": "2023-08-27T15:52:52Z",
  "published": "2023-08-22T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rustls-webpki"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0053.html"
    }
  ],
  "related": [
    "CVE-2018-16875"
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rustls-webpki: CPU denial of service in certificate path building"
}


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