rustsec-2021-0121
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2021-10-08 12:00
Modified
2023-06-13 13:10
Summary
Non-aligned u32 read in Chacha20 encryption and decryption
Details
The implementation does not enforce alignment requirements on input slices while incorrectly assuming 4-byte alignment through an unsafe call to std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut, which breaks the contract and introduces undefined behavior.
This affects Chacha20 encryption and decryption in crypto2.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [],
"cvss": null,
"informational": "unsound"
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"crypto2::streamcipher::Chacha20::decrypt_slice",
"crypto2::streamcipher::Chacha20::encrypt_slice",
"crypto2::streamcipher::xor_si512_inplace"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "crypto2",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/crypto2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45709",
"GHSA-9hfg-pxr6-q4vp",
"GHSA-pmcv-mgcf-rvxg"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "The implementation does not enforce alignment requirements on input slices while incorrectly assuming 4-byte alignment through an unsafe call to `std::slice::from_raw_parts_mut`, which breaks the contract and introduces undefined behavior.\n\nThis affects Chacha20 encryption and decryption in crypto2.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2021-0121",
"modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
"published": "2021-10-08T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/crypto2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0121.html"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://github.com/shadowsocks/crypto2/issues/27"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Non-aligned u32 read in Chacha20 encryption and decryption"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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