rustsec-2020-0116
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2020-11-15 12:00
Modified
2023-06-13 13:10
Summary
PinSlab<T> and Unordered<T, S> need bounds on their Send/Sync traits
Details

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implemented Send & Sync for types PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>. This allows sending non-Send types to other threads and concurrently accessing non-Sync types from multiple threads.

This can result in a data race & memory corruption when types that provide internal mutability without synchronization are contained within PinSlab<T> or Unordered<T, S> and accessed concurrently from multiple threads.

The flaw was corrected in commits 92f40b4 & 6a6c367 by adding trait bound T: Send to Send impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S> and adding T: Sync to Sync impls for PinSlab<T> & Unordered<T, S>.

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption",
          "thread-safety"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "unicycle",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/unicycle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36436",
    "GHSA-686f-ch3r-xwmh"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implemented `Send` \u0026 `Sync` for types `PinSlab\u003cT\u003e` \u0026 `Unordered\u003cT, S\u003e`. This allows sending non-Send types to other threads and concurrently accessing non-Sync types from multiple threads.\n\nThis can result in a data race \u0026 memory corruption when types that provide internal mutability without synchronization are contained within `PinSlab\u003cT\u003e` or `Unordered\u003cT, S\u003e` and accessed concurrently from multiple threads.\n\nThe flaw was corrected in commits 92f40b4 \u0026 6a6c367 by adding trait bound `T: Send` to `Send` impls for `PinSlab\u003cT\u003e` \u0026 `Unordered\u003cT, S\u003e` and adding `T: Sync` to `Sync` impls for `PinSlab\u003cT\u003e` \u0026 `Unordered\u003cT, S\u003e`.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2020-0116",
  "modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
  "published": "2020-11-15T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/unicycle"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0116.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/udoprog/unicycle/issues/8"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PinSlab\u003cT\u003e and Unordered\u003cT, S\u003e need bounds on their Send/Sync traits"
}


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