rustsec-2020-0008
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2020-03-19 12:00
Modified
2023-06-13 13:10
Summary
Flaw in hyper allows request smuggling by sending a body in GET requests
Details

Vulnerable versions of hyper allow GET requests to have bodies, even if there is no Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header. As per the HTTP 1.1 specification, such requests do not have bodies, so the body will be interpreted as a separate HTTP request.

This allows an attacker who can control the body and method of an HTTP request made by hyper to inject a request with headers that would not otherwise be allowed, as demonstrated by sending a malformed HTTP request from a Substrate runtime. This allows bypassing CORS restrictions. In combination with other vulnerabilities, such as an exploitable web server listening on loopback, it may allow remote code execution.

The flaw was corrected in hyper version 0.12.34.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "format-injection"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "hyper",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/hyper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-35863",
    "GHSA-h3qr-rq2j-74w4"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerable versions of hyper allow GET requests to have bodies, even if there is\nno Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header.  As per the HTTP 1.1\nspecification, such requests do not have bodies, so the body will be interpreted\nas a separate HTTP request.\n\nThis allows an attacker who can control the body and method of an HTTP request\nmade by hyper to inject a request with headers that would not otherwise be\nallowed, as demonstrated by sending a malformed HTTP request from a Substrate\nruntime.  This allows bypassing CORS restrictions.  In combination with other\nvulnerabilities, such as an exploitable web server listening on loopback, it may\nallow remote code execution.\n\nThe flaw was corrected in hyper version 0.12.34.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2020-0008",
  "modified": "2023-06-13T13:10:24Z",
  "published": "2020-03-19T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/hyper"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0008.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/issues/1925"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flaw in hyper allows request smuggling by sending a body in GET requests"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…