gsd-2024-26800
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2024-02-20 06:02
Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path, releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done. The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the memory has already been released.
Aliases


To clipboard 

{
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2024-26800"
      ],
      "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption\n\nWhen the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt\nreturns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async\ndecryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption\nwill return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,\nreleasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async\ncallback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.\n\nThe only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns\n -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell\ntls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we\nneed to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new -\u003easync_done flag) that the\nmemory has already been released.",
      "id": "GSD-2024-26800",
      "modified": "2024-02-20T06:02:29.187145Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
        "ID": "CVE-2024-26800",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "Linux",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "cd1bbca03f3c",
                          "version_value": "f2b85a4cc763"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "13eca403876b",
                          "version_value": "81be85353b0f"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "ab6397f072e5",
                          "version_value": "1ac9fb84bc7e"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "859054147318",
                          "version_value": "13114dc55430"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "6.6.18",
                          "version_value": "6.6.21"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "6.7.6",
                          "version_value": "6.7.9"
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": "Linux"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption\n\nWhen the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt\nreturns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async\ndecryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption\nwill return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,\nreleasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async\ncallback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.\n\nThe only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns\n -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell\ntls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we\nneed to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new -\u003easync_done flag) that the\nmemory has already been released."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-5f0117140d9a"
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "n/a"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "cve": {
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption\n\nWhen the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt\nreturns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async\ndecryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption\nwill return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path,\nreleasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async\ncallback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done.\n\nThe only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns\n -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell\ntls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we\nneed to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new -\u003easync_done flag) that the\nmemory has already been released."
          },
          {
            "lang": "es",
            "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se resolvi\u00f3 la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tls: corrige el use-after-free en el descifrado fallido del trabajo pendiente Cuando la solicitud de descifrado va al trabajo pendiente y crypto_aead_decrypt devuelve -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption esperar\u00e1 hasta que se hayan completado todos los descifrados as\u00edncronos. Si uno de ellos falla, tls_do_decryption devolver\u00e1 -EBADMSG y tls_decrypt_sg salta a la ruta del error, liberando todas las p\u00e1ginas. Pero las p\u00e1ginas se pasaron a la devoluci\u00f3n de llamada as\u00edncrona y tls_decrypt_done ya las public\u00f3. El \u00fanico caso as\u00edncrono verdadero es cuando crypto_aead_decrypt devuelve -EINPROGRESS. Con -EBUSY, ya esperamos para poder decirle a tls_sw_recvmsg que los datos est\u00e1n disponibles para copia inmediata, pero debemos notificar a tls_decrypt_sg (a trav\u00e9s del nuevo indicador -\u0026gt;async_done) que la memoria ya ha sido liberada."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2024-26800",
        "lastModified": "2024-04-04T14:15:09.897",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2024-04-04T09:15:09.003",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13114dc5543069f7b97991e3b79937b6da05f5b0"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ac9fb84bc7ecd4bc6428118301d9d864d2a58d1"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81be85353b0f5a7b660635634b655329b429eefe"
          },
          {
            "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
            "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2b85a4cc763841843de693bbd7308fe9a2c4c89"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
      }
    }
  }
}


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