gsd-2021-29474
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:23
Details
HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files from the server's filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: `http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME#` (replace `http://localhost:3000` with your instance's base-URL e.g. `https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#`). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the `noteController.showNote`-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a `.md` appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary `.md` files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending `.md` and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack's usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path.
Aliases
Aliases
{ "GSD": { "alias": "CVE-2021-29474", "description": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files from the server\u0027s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: `http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME#` (replace `http://localhost:3000` with your instance\u0027s base-URL e.g. `https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#`). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the `noteController.showNote`-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a `.md` appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary `.md` files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending `.md` and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack\u0027s usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path.", "id": "GSD-2021-29474", "references": [ "https://security.archlinux.org/CVE-2021-29474" ] }, "gsd": { "metadata": { "exploitCode": "unknown", "remediation": "unknown", "reportConfidence": "confirmed", "type": "vulnerability" }, "osvSchema": { "aliases": [ "CVE-2021-29474" ], "details": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files from the server\u0027s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: `http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME#` (replace `http://localhost:3000` with your instance\u0027s base-URL e.g. `https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#`). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the `noteController.showNote`-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a `.md` appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary `.md` files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending `.md` and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack\u0027s usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path.", "id": "GSD-2021-29474", "modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:36.533797Z", "schema_version": "1.4.0" } }, "namespaces": { "cve.org": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2021-29474", "STATE": "PUBLIC", "TITLE": "Relative Path Traversal Attack on note creation" }, "affects": { "vendor": { "vendor_data": [ { "product": { "product_data": [ { "product_name": "hedgedoc", "version": { "version_data": [ { "version_value": "\u003c 1.8.0" } ] } } ] }, "vendor_name": "hedgedoc" } ] } }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files from the server\u0027s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: `http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME#` (replace `http://localhost:3000` with your instance\u0027s base-URL e.g. `https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#`). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the `noteController.showNote`-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a `.md` appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary `.md` files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending `.md` and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack\u0027s usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path." } ] }, "impact": { "cvss": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 4.7, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1" } }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-20: Improper Input Validation " } ] }, { "description": [ { "lang": "eng", "value": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-p528-555r-pf87", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "url": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-p528-555r-pf87" } ] }, "source": { "advisory": "GHSA-p528-555r-pf87", "discovery": "UNKNOWN" } }, "nvd.nist.gov": { "configurations": { "CVE_data_version": "4.0", "nodes": [ { "children": [], "cpe_match": [ { "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:hedgedoc:hedgedoc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe_name": [], "versionEndExcluding": "1.8.0", "vulnerable": true } ], "operator": "OR" } ] }, "cve": { "CVE_data_meta": { "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com", "ID": "CVE-2021-29474" }, "data_format": "MITRE", "data_type": "CVE", "data_version": "4.0", "description": { "description_data": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files from the server\u0027s filesystem due to an improper input validation, which results in the ability to perform a relative path traversal. To verify if you are affected, you can try to open the following URL: `http://localhost:3000/..%2F..%2FREADME#` (replace `http://localhost:3000` with your instance\u0027s base-URL e.g. `https://demo.hedgedoc.org/..%2F..%2FREADME#`). If you see a README page being rendered, you run an affected version. The attack works due the fact that the internal router passes the url-encoded alias to the `noteController.showNote`-function. This function passes the input directly to findNote() utility function, that will pass it on the the parseNoteId()-function, that tries to make sense out of the noteId/alias and check if a note already exists and if so, if a corresponding file on disk was updated. If no note exists the note creation-function is called, which pass this unvalidated alias, with a `.md` appended, into a path.join()-function which is read from the filesystem in the follow up routine and provides the pre-filled content of the new note. This allows an attacker to not only read arbitrary `.md` files from the filesystem, but also observes changes to them. The usefulness of this attack can be considered limited, since mainly markdown files are use the file-ending `.md` and all markdown files contained in the hedgedoc project, like the README, are public anyway. If other protections such as a chroot or container or proper file permissions are in place, this attack\u0027s usefulness is rather limited. On a reverse-proxy level one can force a URL-decode, which will prevent this attack because the router will not accept such a path." } ] }, "problemtype": { "problemtype_data": [ { "description": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "CWE-22" } ] } ] }, "references": { "reference_data": [ { "name": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-p528-555r-pf87", "refsource": "CONFIRM", "tags": [ "Exploit", "Patch", "Third Party Advisory" ], "url": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-p528-555r-pf87" } ] } }, "impact": { "baseMetricV2": { "acInsufInfo": false, "cvssV2": { "accessComplexity": "LOW", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.0, "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N", "version": "2.0" }, "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "impactScore": 2.9, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "severity": "MEDIUM", "userInteractionRequired": false }, "baseMetricV3": { "cvssV3": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 5.8, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1" }, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 1.4 } }, "lastModifiedDate": "2022-10-24T18:21Z", "publishedDate": "2021-04-26T22:15Z" } } }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.