gsd-2017-9230
Vulnerability from gsd
Modified
2023-12-13 01:21
Details
** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability.
Aliases
Aliases



{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2017-9230",
    "description": "** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability.",
    "id": "GSD-2017-9230",
    "references": [
      "https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2017-9230.html"
    ]
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2017-9230"
      ],
      "details": "** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability.",
      "id": "GSD-2017-9230",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:21:07.948750Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
    "cve.org": {
      "CVE_data_meta": {
        "ASSIGNER": "cve@mitre.org",
        "ID": "CVE-2017-9230",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "n/a",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_value": "n/a"
                        }
                      ]
                    }
                  }
                ]
              },
              "vendor_name": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "data_format": "MITRE",
      "data_type": "CVE",
      "data_version": "4.0",
      "description": {
        "description_data": [
          {
            "lang": "eng",
            "value": "** DISPUTED ** The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability."
          }
        ]
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "n/a"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "98657",
            "refsource": "BID",
            "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf"
          }
        ]
      }
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
      "cve": {
        "configurations": [
          {
            "nodes": [
              {
                "cpeMatch": [
                  {
                    "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:bitcoin:bitcoin:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                    "matchCriteriaId": "E03CE589-44AF-46D4-971C-E780C84F91BE",
                    "vulnerable": true
                  }
                ],
                "negate": false,
                "operator": "OR"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work algorithm does not consider a certain attack methodology related to 80-byte block headers with a variety of initial 64-byte chunks followed by the same 16-byte chunk, multiple candidate root values ending with the same 4 bytes, and calculations involving sqrt numbers. This violates the security assumptions of (1) the choice of input, outside of the dedicated nonce area, fed into the Proof-of-Work function should not change its difficulty to evaluate and (2) every Proof-of-Work function execution should be independent. NOTE: a number of persons feel that this methodology is a benign mining optimization, not a vulnerability"
          },
          {
            "lang": "es",
            "value": "** EN DISPUTA ** El algoritmo de Prueba de trabajo de Bitcoin no considera una determinada metodolog\u00eda de ataque relacionada con encabezados de bloque de 80 bytes con una variedad de fragmentos iniciales de 64 bytes seguidos por el mismo fragmento de 16 bytes, terminando m\u00faltiples valores de ra\u00edz de candidato con los mismos 4 bytes y c\u00e1lculos con n\u00fameros sqrt. Esto viola los supuestos de seguridad de (1) la elecci\u00f3n de la entrada, fuera del \u00e1rea espec\u00edfica de nonce, alimentada a la funci\u00f3n Prueba de trabajo no deber\u00eda cambiar su dificultad para evaluar y (2) cada ejecuci\u00f3n de la funci\u00f3n Prueba de trabajo deber\u00eda Se independiente. NOTA: varias personas sienten que esta metodolog\u00eda es una optimizaci\u00f3n minera benigna, no una vulnerabilidad."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2017-9230",
        "lastModified": "2024-04-11T00:59:26.483",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV2": [
            {
              "acInsufInfo": false,
              "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
              "cvssData": {
                "accessComplexity": "LOW",
                "accessVector": "NETWORK",
                "authentication": "NONE",
                "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "baseScore": 5.0,
                "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N",
                "version": "2.0"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
              "impactScore": 2.9,
              "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
              "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
              "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
              "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
              "type": "Primary",
              "userInteractionRequired": false
            }
          ],
          "cvssMetricV30": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "baseScore": 7.5,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
                "version": "3.0"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
              "impactScore": 3.6,
              "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
              "type": "Primary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2017-05-24T16:29:00.180",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Technical Description"
            ],
            "url": "http://www.mit.edu/~jlrubin//public/pdfs/Asicboost.pdf"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Third Party Advisory",
              "VDB Entry"
            ],
            "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98657"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Technical Description"
            ],
            "url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1604/1604.00575.pdf"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Technical Description",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/013996.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014349.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014351.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014352.html"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
        "vulnStatus": "Modified",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-338"
              }
            ],
            "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
            "type": "Primary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}


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