GSD-2014-7922

Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:22
Details
The GoogleAuthUtil.getToken method in the Google Play services SDK before 2015 sets parameters in OAuth token requests upon finding a corresponding _opt_ parameter in the Bundle extras argument, which allows attackers to bypass an intended consent dialog and retrieve tokens for arbitrary OAuth scopes including the SID and LSID scopes, and consequently obtain access to a Google account, via a crafted application, as demonstrated by setting the has_permission=1 parameter value upon finding _opt_has_permission in that argument.
Aliases
Aliases
CVE-2014-7922
To clipboard 

{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2014-7922",
    "description": "The GoogleAuthUtil.getToken method in the Google Play services SDK before 2015 sets parameters in OAuth token requests upon finding a corresponding _opt_ parameter in the Bundle extras argument, which allows attackers to bypass an intended consent dialog and retrieve tokens for arbitrary OAuth scopes including the SID and LSID scopes, and consequently obtain access to a Google account, via a crafted application, as demonstrated by setting the has_permission=1 parameter value upon finding _opt_has_permission in that argument.",
    "id": "GSD-2014-7922"
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2014-7922"
      ],
      "details": "The GoogleAuthUtil.getToken method in the Google Play services SDK before 2015 sets parameters in OAuth token requests upon finding a corresponding _opt_ parameter in the Bundle extras argument, which allows attackers to bypass an intended consent dialog and retrieve tokens for arbitrary OAuth scopes including the SID and LSID scopes, and consequently obtain access to a Google account, via a crafted application, as demonstrated by setting the has_permission=1 parameter value upon finding _opt_has_permission in that argument.",
      "id": "GSD-2014-7922",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:22:47.685106Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
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        "ID": "CVE-2014-7922",
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      "affects": {
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                    "product_name": "n/a",
                    "version": {
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                          "version_value": "n/a"
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            "name": "https://gist.github.com/isciurus/df4d7edd9c3efb4a0753",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://gist.github.com/isciurus/df4d7edd9c3efb4a0753"
          },
          {
            "name": "http://isciurus.blogspot.com/2015/01/android-app-with-full-control-over-your.html",
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            "url": "http://isciurus.blogspot.com/2015/01/android-app-with-full-control-over-your.html"
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        "nodes": [
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                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:google:play_services_sdk:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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                "vulnerable": true
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        "description": {
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              "value": "The GoogleAuthUtil.getToken method in the Google Play services SDK before 2015 sets parameters in OAuth token requests upon finding a corresponding _opt_ parameter in the Bundle extras argument, which allows attackers to bypass an intended consent dialog and retrieve tokens for arbitrary OAuth scopes including the SID and LSID scopes, and consequently obtain access to a Google account, via a crafted application, as demonstrated by setting the has_permission=1 parameter value upon finding _opt_has_permission in that argument."
            }
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      "impact": {
        "baseMetricV2": {
          "cvssV2": {
            "accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
            "accessVector": "NETWORK",
            "authentication": "NONE",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.3,
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N",
            "version": "2.0"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 8.6,
          "impactScore": 2.9,
          "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
          "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
          "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
          "severity": "MEDIUM",
          "userInteractionRequired": true
        }
      },
      "lastModifiedDate": "2015-02-23T19:03Z",
      "publishedDate": "2015-02-23T02:59Z"
    }
  }
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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