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GHSA-WXHC-3989-9JQ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-12-23 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf()

Fix an 11-year old bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() while addressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds:

arch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]

The problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of data into a one-byte size member config of the wrong structue FW_CONFIGURE_BUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right structure is FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS, instead, because it contains 6 more members apart from the header hdr. Also, the name of the function ngene_command_config_free_buf() suggests that the actual intention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers (which takes place in the function ngene_command_config_buf(), above).

Fix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS into new struct config, and use &com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as the destination address, instead of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config, when calling memcpy().

This also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy().

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47288"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf()\n\nFix an 11-year old bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() while\naddressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds:\n\narch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: \u0027__builtin_memcpy\u0027 offset [12, 16] from the object at \u0027com\u0027 is out of the bounds of referenced subobject \u0027config\u0027 with type \u0027unsigned char\u0027 at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]\narch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: \u0027__builtin_memcpy\u0027 offset [12, 16] from the object at \u0027com\u0027 is out of the bounds of referenced subobject \u0027config\u0027 with type \u0027unsigned char\u0027 at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds]\n\nThe problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of\ndata into a one-byte size member _config_ of the wrong structue\nFW_CONFIGURE_BUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a\nlegitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length\nof \u0026com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right\nstructure is FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS, instead, because it contains\n6 more members apart from the header _hdr_. Also, the name of\nthe function ngene_command_config_free_buf() suggests that the actual\nintention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers\n(which takes place in the function ngene_command_config_buf(), above).\n\nFix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS\ninto new struct config, and use \u0026com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as\nthe destination address, instead of \u0026com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config,\nwhen calling memcpy().\n\nThis also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable\n-Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the\nFORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy().",
  "id": "GHSA-wxhc-3989-9jq8",
  "modified": "2024-12-23T18:30:47Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47288"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4487b968e5eacd02c493303dc2b61150bb7fe4b2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d4abca95ecc82fc8c41912fa0085281f19cc29f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9a178f189bb6d75293573e181928735f5e3e070"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6ddeb63dd543b5474b0217c4e47538b7ffd7686"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e617fa62f6cf859a7b042cdd6c73af905ff8fca3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e818f2ff648581a6c553ae2bebc5dcef9a8bb90c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e991457afdcb5f4dbc5bc9d79eaf775be33e7092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec731c6ef564ee6fc101fc5d73e3a3a953d09a00"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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