ghsa-wjrh-hj83-3wh7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-27 18:03
Modified
2025-05-27 18:03
Severity ?
8.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Summary
Django-Select2 Vulnerable to Widget Instance Secret Cache Key Leaking
Details

Impact

Instances of HeavySelect2Mixin subclasses like the ModelSelect2MultipleWidget and ModelSelect2Widget can secret access tokens across requests. This can allow users to access restricted querysets and restricted data.

Patches

The problem has been patched in version 8.4.1 and all following versions.

Workarounds

This vulnerability is limited use cases where instances of widget classes are created during app loading (not during a request).

Example of affected code: python class MyForm(forms.ModelForm): class Meta: widgets = {"my_select_field": Select2ModelWidget()}

Django allows you to pass just the widget class (not the instance). This can be used to mitigate the session request leak.

Example of affected code: python class MyForm(forms.ModelForm): class Meta: widgets = {"my_select_field": Select2ModelWidget}

References

Thanks to @neartik for reporting this issue. I will address it later. I had to delete your issue, to avoid exploitation of this security issue.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "django-select2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48383"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-402",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-27T18:03:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-27T15:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nInstances of `HeavySelect2Mixin` subclasses like the `ModelSelect2MultipleWidget` and `ModelSelect2Widget` can secret access tokens across requests. This can allow users to access restricted querysets and restricted data.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 8.4.1 and all following versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis vulnerability is limited use cases where instances of widget classes are created during app loading (not during a request).\n\nExample of affected code:\n```python\nclass MyForm(forms.ModelForm):\n    class Meta:\n        widgets = {\"my_select_field\": Select2ModelWidget()}\n```\n\nDjango allows you to pass just the widget class (not the instance). This can be used to mitigate the session request leak.\n\nExample of affected code:\n```python\nclass MyForm(forms.ModelForm):\n    class Meta:\n        widgets = {\"my_select_field\": Select2ModelWidget}\n```\n\n\n\n### References\n\nThanks to @neartik for reporting this issue. I will address it later. I had to delete your issue, to avoid exploitation of this security issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-wjrh-hj83-3wh7",
  "modified": "2025-05-27T18:03:19Z",
  "published": "2025-05-27T18:03:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codingjoe/django-select2/security/advisories/GHSA-wjrh-hj83-3wh7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48383"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codingjoe/django-select2/commit/e5f41e6edba004d35f94915ff5e2559f44853412"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/codingjoe/django-select2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Django-Select2 Vulnerable to Widget Instance Secret Cache Key Leaking"
}


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