Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WF4Q-Q8QJ-834V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-18 18:32

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped

By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache.

Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA.

In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF.

The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk mmap vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event rcuwait_wake_up [UAF]

Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1.

To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation.

[surenb@google.com: v3]

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-38554"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T17:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: fix a UAF when vma-\u003emm is freed after vma-\u003evm_refcnt got dropped\n\nBy inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for\na hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be\nrecycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache.\n\nRace description is borrowed from Jann\u0027s discovery report:\nlock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under\nrcu_read_lock().  At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it\ncan be recycled by another process.  vma_start_read() then increments the\nvma-\u003evm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds,\nvma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA.\n\nIn this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu()\nwill then detect the mismatching -\u003evm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through\nvma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put().  vma_refcount_put() drops\nthe refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma-\u003evm_mm. \nThis is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA\u0027s\nmm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA\u0027s mm,\nso the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF.\n\nThe diagram depicting the race:\nT1         T2         T3\n==         ==         ==\nlock_vma_under_rcu\n  mas_walk\n          \u003cVMA gets removed from mm\u003e\n                      mmap\n                        \u003cthe same VMA is reallocated\u003e\n  vma_start_read\n    __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire\n                      munmap\n                        __vma_enter_locked\n                          refcount_add_not_zero\n  vma_end_read\n    vma_refcount_put\n      __refcount_dec_and_test\n                          rcuwait_wait_event\n                            \u003cfinish operation\u003e\n      rcuwait_wake_up [UAF]\n\nNote that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was\nalready dropped by T1.  At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing\nUAF in T1.\n\nTo avoid this we move vma-\u003evm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and\ngrab vma-\u003evm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation.\n\n[surenb@google.com: v3]",
  "id": "GHSA-wf4q-q8qj-834v",
  "modified": "2025-11-18T18:32:49Z",
  "published": "2025-08-19T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38554"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bcd236a2536a451e385f8d6d2bb589689ec812f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e88fe54721dee17d3496bc998f0c7d243896348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bbffee67ffd16360179327b57f3b1245579ef08"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2025-38554 (GCVE-0-2025-38554)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-08-19 17:02 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:02

Title

mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache. Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA. In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF. The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk <VMA gets removed from mm> mmap <the same VMA is reallocated> vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event <finish operation> rcuwait_wake_up [UAF] Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1. To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation. [surenb@google.com: v3]

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e88fe54721dee17d…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bcd236a2536a451e…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bbffee67ffd16360…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 3104138517fc66aad21f4a2487bb572e9fc2e3ec , < 6e88fe54721dee17d3496bc998f0c7d243896348 (git) Affected: 3104138517fc66aad21f4a2487bb572e9fc2e3ec , < 1bcd236a2536a451e385f8d6d2bb589689ec812f (git) Affected: 3104138517fc66aad21f4a2487bb572e9fc2e3ec , < 9bbffee67ffd16360179327b57f3b1245579ef08 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.15 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.15 (semver) Unaffected: 6.15.10 , ≤ 6.15.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.16.1 , ≤ 6.16.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.17 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: fix a UAF when vma-\u003emm is freed after vma-\u003evm_refcnt got dropped\n\nBy inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for\na hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be\nrecycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache.\n\nRace description is borrowed from Jann\u0027s discovery report:\nlock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under\nrcu_read_lock().  At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it\ncan be recycled by another process.  vma_start_read() then increments the\nvma-\u003evm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds,\nvma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA.\n\nIn this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu()\nwill then detect the mismatching -\u003evm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through\nvma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put().  vma_refcount_put() drops\nthe refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma-\u003evm_mm. \nThis is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA\u0027s\nmm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA\u0027s mm,\nso the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF.\n\nThe diagram depicting the race:\nT1         T2         T3\n==         ==         ==\nlock_vma_under_rcu\n  mas_walk\n          \u003cVMA gets removed from mm\u003e\n                      mmap\n                        \u003cthe same VMA is reallocated\u003e\n  vma_start_read\n    __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire\n                      munmap\n                        __vma_enter_locked\n                          refcount_add_not_zero\n  vma_end_read\n    vma_refcount_put\n      __refcount_dec_and_test\n                          rcuwait_wait_event\n                            \u003cfinish operation\u003e\n      rcuwait_wake_up [UAF]\n\nNote that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was\nalready dropped by T1.  At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing\nUAF in T1.\n\nTo avoid this we move vma-\u003evm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and\ngrab vma-\u003evm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation.\n\n[surenb@google.com: v3]"
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            }
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

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