GHSA-W5C7-9QQW-6645
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:56 – Updated: 2026-02-18 00:56Summary
Inter-session messages sent via sessions_send could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as role: "user" without provenance metadata.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.12(i.e.< 2026.2.13) - Fixed in:
2026.2.13(patched versions>= 2026.2.13)
Impact
A delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.
This is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust role: "user" as a sole authority signal.
Technical details
Before the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.
As a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish: - External user input - Internal inter-session routed input
Fix
OpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.
Key changes:
- Added structured provenance model (inputProvenance) with kind values including inter_session.
- sessions_send and agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs.
- Provenance is persisted on user messages as message.provenance.kind = "inter_session" (role remains user for provider compatibility).
- Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input.
- Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker ([Inter-session message]) for clearer model-side disambiguation.
- Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.
Fix Commit(s)
85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797
Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Disable or restrict sessions_send in affected environments.
- Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.
Credit
Reported by @anbecker.
Thanks @anbecker for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nInter-session messages sent via `sessions_send` could be interpreted as direct end-user instructions because they were persisted as `role: \"user\"` without provenance metadata.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.12` (i.e. `\u003c 2026.2.13`)\n- Fixed in: `2026.2.13` (patched versions `\u003e= 2026.2.13`)\n\n## Impact\n\nA delegated or internal session could inject instructions into another session that appeared equivalent to externally-originated user input.\n\nThis is an instruction-provenance confusion issue (confused-deputy style), which can lead to unintended privileged behavior in workflows that trust `role: \"user\"` as a sole authority signal.\n\n## Technical details\n\nBefore the fix, routed inter-session prompts were stored as regular user turns without a verifiable source marker.\n\nAs a result, downstream workers and transcript readers could not distinguish:\n- External user input\n- Internal inter-session routed input\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now carries explicit input provenance end-to-end for routed prompts.\n\nKey changes:\n- Added structured provenance model (`inputProvenance`) with `kind` values including `inter_session`.\n- `sessions_send` and agent-to-agent steps now set inter-session provenance when invoking target runs.\n- Provenance is persisted on user messages as `message.provenance.kind = \"inter_session\"` (role remains `user` for provider compatibility).\n- Transcript readers and memory helpers were updated to respect provenance and avoid treating inter-session prompts as external user-originated input.\n- Runtime context rebuilding now annotates inter-session turns with an explicit in-memory marker (`[Inter-session message]`) for clearer model-side disambiguation.\n- Regression tests were added for transcript parsing, session tools flow, runner sanitization, and memory hook behavior.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797`\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf immediate upgrade is not possible:\n- Disable or restrict `sessions_send` in affected environments.\n- Do not use role alone as an authority boundary; require provenance-aware checks in orchestration logic.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @anbecker.\n\nThanks @anbecker for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645",
"modified": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T00:56:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/85409e401b6586f83954cb53552395d7aab04797"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.