GHSA-W235-X559-36MG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 22:42 – Updated: 2026-02-18 22:42
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw: Docker container escape via unvalidated bind mount config injection
Details

Summary

A configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.14
  • Fixed version: >= 2026.2.15 (next release)

Impact

If an attacker can influence sandbox Docker configuration (or an operator pastes untrusted config), they may be able to: - mount sensitive host paths (e.g. /etc, /proc, /sys, /dev, Docker socket) - use network=host to bypass container network isolation - use seccompProfile=unconfined / apparmorProfile=unconfined to weaken isolation

This can lead to host secret exfiltration or full host control (via Docker socket exposure).

Fix

OpenClaw now blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings: - runtime enforcement when building docker create args - config-schema validation for network=host, seccompProfile=unconfined, apparmorProfile=unconfined - security audit findings to surface dangerous sandbox docker config

Workarounds

  • Do not configure agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds to mount system directories or Docker socket paths.
  • Keep agents.*.sandbox.docker.network at none (default) or bridge.
  • Do not use unconfined for seccomp/AppArmor profiles.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 887b209db47f1f9322fead241a1c0b043fd38339
  • 1b6704ef5800152c777ea52b77aa2c8a46c13705 (docs)

Release Process Note

This advisory is pre-populated with the planned fixed version (>= 2026.2.15). Once openclaw@2026.2.15 is published to npm, publishing this advisory should be a single-click action.

Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27002"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-250"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T22:42:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA configuration injection issue in the Docker tool sandbox could allow dangerous Docker options (bind mounts, host networking, unconfined profiles) to be applied, enabling container escape or host data access.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Fixed version: `\u003e= 2026.2.15` (next release)\n\n## Impact\nIf an attacker can influence sandbox Docker configuration (or an operator pastes untrusted config), they may be able to:\n- mount sensitive host paths (e.g. `/etc`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, Docker socket)\n- use `network=host` to bypass container network isolation\n- use `seccompProfile=unconfined` / `apparmorProfile=unconfined` to weaken isolation\n\nThis can lead to host secret exfiltration or full host control (via Docker socket exposure).\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now blocks dangerous sandbox Docker settings:\n- runtime enforcement when building `docker create` args\n- config-schema validation for `network=host`, `seccompProfile=unconfined`, `apparmorProfile=unconfined`\n- security audit findings to surface dangerous sandbox docker config\n\n## Workarounds\n- Do not configure `agents.*.sandbox.docker.binds` to mount system directories or Docker socket paths.\n- Keep `agents.*.sandbox.docker.network` at `none` (default) or `bridge`.\n- Do not use `unconfined` for seccomp/AppArmor profiles.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- 887b209db47f1f9322fead241a1c0b043fd38339\n- 1b6704ef5800152c777ea52b77aa2c8a46c13705 (docs)\n\n## Release Process Note\nThis advisory is pre-populated with the planned fixed version (`\u003e= 2026.2.15`). Once `openclaw@2026.2.15` is published to npm, publishing this advisory should be a single-click action.\n\nThanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-w235-x559-36mg",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T22:42:42Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T22:42:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w235-x559-36mg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/887b209db47f1f9322fead241a1c0b043fd38339"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.15"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Docker container escape via unvalidated bind mount config injection"
}


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