ghsa-vgmm-27fc-vmgp
Vulnerability from github
Summary
In Maho 25.7.0, an authenticated staff user with access to the Dashboard
and Catalog\Manage Products
permissions can create a custom option on a listing with a file input field. By allowing file uploads with a .php
extension, the user can use the filed to upload malicious PHP files, gaining remote code execution
Details
An user with the Dashboard
and Catalog\Manage Products
permissions can abuse the product custom options feature to bypass the application’s file upload restrictions.
When creating a product custom option of type file upload, the user is allowed to define their own extension whitelist. This bypasses the application’s normal enforced whitelist and permits disallowed extensions, including .php
.
The file uploaded by the custom option is then written to a predictable location:
/public/media/custom_options/<first char of filename>/<second char of filename>/<md5 of file contents>.php
Because this path is directly accessible under the application’s webroot, an attacker can then request the uploaded file via HTTP, causing the server to execute the PHP payload.
PoC
- Sign in to the
/admin
dashboard as a staff user. Ensure the user's role has access to theDashboard
andCatalog\Manage Products
permissions. -
Navigate to a product catalog listing, for example by clicking on a product linked within the
Most Viewed Products
tab on the dashboard. -
Navigate to the "Custom Options" tab on the product, and create a custom option with a file upload field. Add
.php
as an allowed extension to the file upload configuration. Save the configuration after making the changes. -
In a private window, navigate to the customer facing page for the product, and upload a reverse shell PHP file through the newly configured option. Then click "Add to cart" to complete the upload.
-
Calculate the location of the uploaded file on the web server as
/public/media/custom_options/<first char of filename>/<second char of filename>/<md5 of file contents>.php
- Navigate to the above path directly to execute the file contents and trigger the reverse shell.
Impact
This vulnerability allows remote code execution (RCE) on the server. It requires only the Catalog\Manage Products permission, and does not need full administrative access. By leveraging the custom option upload feature, an attacker can bypass the application’s normal file upload protections and execute arbitrary PHP code within the webroot.
Suggested Remediation
Enforce a whitelist of allowed extensions a user is allowed to configure for file upload fields in Custom Options.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Packagist", "name": "mahocommerce/maho" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "0" }, { "fixed": "25.9.0" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2025-58449" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-646" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-09T20:52:24Z", "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-08T22:15:34Z", "severity": "HIGH" }, "details": "### Summary\nIn Maho 25.7.0, an authenticated staff user with access to the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\\Manage Products` permissions can create a custom option on a listing with a file input field. By allowing file uploads with a `.php` extension, the user can use the filed to upload malicious PHP files, gaining remote code execution\n\n### Details\nAn user with the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\\Manage Products` permissions can abuse the product custom options feature to bypass the application\u2019s file upload restrictions.\n\nWhen creating a product custom option of type file upload, the user is allowed to define their own extension whitelist. This bypasses the application\u2019s normal enforced whitelist and permits disallowed extensions, including `.php`.\n\nThe file uploaded by the custom option is then written to a predictable location:\n```\n/public/media/custom_options/\u003cfirst char of filename\u003e/\u003csecond char of filename\u003e/\u003cmd5 of file contents\u003e.php\n```\nBecause this path is directly accessible under the application\u2019s webroot, an attacker can then request the uploaded file via HTTP, causing the server to execute the PHP payload.\n\n### PoC\n1. Sign in to the `/admin` dashboard as a staff user. Ensure the user\u0027s role has access to the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\\Manage Products` permissions.\n2. Navigate to a product catalog listing, for example by clicking on a product linked within the `Most Viewed Products` tab on the dashboard.\n\u003cimg width=\"648\" height=\"194\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ab69182-68ea-48e4-b50b-46ccf70f40bb\" /\u003e\n\n3. Navigate to the \"Custom Options\" tab on the product, and create a custom option with a file upload field. Add `.php` as an allowed extension to the file upload configuration. Save the configuration after making the changes.\n\u003cimg width=\"836\" height=\"391\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5abe7d80-c16d-4b54-9a19-799bda1bcc34\" /\u003e\n\n4. In a private window, navigate to the customer facing page for the product, and upload a reverse shell PHP file through the newly configured option. Then click \"Add to cart\" to complete the upload.\n\u003cimg width=\"473\" height=\"286\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/326ce37e-026a-4211-8e95-6f5f310727df\" /\u003e\n\n5. Calculate the location of the uploaded file on the web server as \n```\n/public/media/custom_options/\u003cfirst char of filename\u003e/\u003csecond char of filename\u003e/\u003cmd5 of file contents\u003e.php\n```\n6. Navigate to the above path directly to execute the file contents and trigger the reverse shell.\n\u003cimg width=\"910\" height=\"339\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e0e52607-81d5-4dc2-8550-ef324182f889\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows remote code execution (RCE) on the server. It requires only the Catalog\\Manage Products permission, and does not need full administrative access. By leveraging the custom option upload feature, an attacker can bypass the application\u2019s normal file upload protections and execute arbitrary PHP code within the webroot.\n\n### Suggested Remediation\nEnforce a whitelist of allowed extensions a user is allowed to configure for file upload fields in Custom Options.", "id": "GHSA-vgmm-27fc-vmgp", "modified": "2025-09-09T20:52:24Z", "published": "2025-09-09T20:52:24Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/MahoCommerce/maho/security/advisories/GHSA-vgmm-27fc-vmgp" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58449" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/MahoCommerce/maho/commit/db54a1b44e9b3fd26b27ca4d5ece0af99c4dcb53" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/MahoCommerce/maho" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H", "type": "CVSS_V4" } ], "summary": "Maho is Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution via File Upload" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.