ghsa-vf95-55w6-qmrf
Vulnerability from github
Impact
youki’s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, which—combined with path substitution during pathname resolution—can allow writes to unintended procfs locations.
Weak write-target check
youki only verifies that the destination lies somewhere under procfs. As a result, a write intended for /proc/self/attr/apparmor/exec can succeed even if the path has been redirected to /proc/sys/kernel/hostname(which is also in procfs).
Path substitution While resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target.
This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Credits
Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering runc's original vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "youki"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62596"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-363",
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-05T18:45:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T00:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact ###\n\nyouki\u2019s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, which\u2014combined with path substitution during pathname resolution\u2014can allow writes to unintended procfs locations.\n\n**Weak write-target check**\nyouki only verifies that the destination lies somewhere under procfs. As a result, a write intended for `/proc/self/attr/apparmor/exec` can succeed even if the path has been redirected to `/proc/sys/kernel/hostname`(which is also in procfs).\n\n**Path substitution**\nWhile resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target.\n\nThis is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems.\nhttps://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm\n\n### Credits ###\n\nThanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and T\u00f5nis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering runc\u0027s original vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.",
"id": "GHSA-vf95-55w6-qmrf",
"modified": "2025-11-06T15:29:58Z",
"published": "2025-11-05T18:45:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/youki-dev/youki/security/advisories/GHSA-vf95-55w6-qmrf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62596"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/youki-dev/youki/commit/5886c91073b9be748bd8d5aed49c4a820548030a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/youki-dev/youki"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite/procfs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://youtu.be/tGseJW_uBB8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://youtu.be/y1PaBzxwRWQ"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "youki container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.