GHSA-V49W-M7P6-CJ8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-01 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-07 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue
sk->sk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM sockets its RX path takes mux->rx_lock to protect more than just skb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue lock, so race conditions still exist.
We can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux->rx_lock too but this would introduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can be shared by multiple KCM sockets.
So we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle skb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately, skb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by other sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after getting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and kcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets, so it is safe to get rid of this check too.
I ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49814"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T15:16:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue\n\nsk-\u003esk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM\nsockets its RX path takes mux-\u003erx_lock to protect more than just\nskb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue\nlock, so race conditions still exist.\n\nWe can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux-\u003erx_lock too but this would\nintroduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can\nbe shared by multiple KCM sockets.\n\nSo we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle\nskb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately,\nskb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by\nother sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after\ngetting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and\nkcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets,\nso it is safe to get rid of this check too.\n\nI ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any\nissue.",
"id": "GHSA-v49w-m7p6-cj8x",
"modified": "2025-11-07T21:31:19Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T15:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49814"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22f6b5d47396b4287662668ee3f5c1f766cb4259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4154b6afa2bd639214ff259d912faad984f7413a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5121197ecc5db58c07da95eb1ff82b98b121a221"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf92e54597d842da127c59833b365d6faeeaf020"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce57d6474ae999a3b2d442314087473a646a65c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9ad4de92e184b19bcae4da10dac0275abf83931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b0e95071bb4be4b811af3f0bfc3e200eedeaa3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.