ghsa-rrqh-93c8-j966
Vulnerability from github
Summary
A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion.
Details
ruby-saml includes a message_max_bytesize setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code:
https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb
```ruby def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil) return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # <--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block.
settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize
raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected")
end
decoded = decode(saml)
...
end
```
The vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the base64_encoded? function performs regex matching on the entire input string:
ruby
!!string.gsub(/[\r\n]|\\r|\\n|\s/, "").match(BASE64_FORMAT)
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
When successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to:
- Excessive memory consumption
- High CPU utilization
- Application slowdown or unresponsiveness
- Complete application crash in severe cases
- Potential denial of service for legitimate users
All applications using ruby-saml with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable.
Potential Solution
Reorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first
```ruby def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil) settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?
if saml.bytesize > settings.message_max_bytesize raise ValidationError.new("Encoded SAML Message exceeds " + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + " bytes, so was rejected") end
return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) decoded = decode(saml) ... end ```
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "ruby-saml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54572"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-30T13:20:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-30T14:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA denial-of-service vulnerability exists in ruby-saml even with the message_max_bytesize setting configured. The vulnerability occurs because the SAML response is validated for Base64 format prior to checking the message size, leading to potential resource exhaustion.\n\n### Details\n`ruby-saml` includes a `message_max_bytesize` setting intended to prevent DOS attacks and decompression bombs. However, this protection is ineffective in some cases due to the order of operations in the code:\n\nhttps://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/blob/fbbedc978300deb9355a8e505849666974ef2e67/lib/onelogin/ruby-saml/saml_message.rb\n\n```ruby\n def decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)\n return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml) # \u003c--- Issue here. Should be moved after next code block.\n\n settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?\n if saml.bytesize \u003e settings.message_max_bytesize\n raise ValidationError.new(\"Encoded SAML Message exceeds \" + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + \" bytes, so was rejected\")\n end\n\n decoded = decode(saml)\n ...\n end\n```\n\nThe vulnerability is in the execution order. Prior to checking bytesize the `base64_encoded?` function performs regex matching on the entire input string:\n\n```ruby\n!!string.gsub(/[\\r\\n]|\\\\r|\\\\n|\\s/, \"\").match(BASE64_FORMAT)\n```\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nWhen successfully exploited, this vulnerability can lead to:\n\n- Excessive memory consumption\n- High CPU utilization\n- Application slowdown or unresponsiveness\n- Complete application crash in severe cases\n- Potential denial of service for legitimate users\n\nAll applications using `ruby-saml` with SAML configured and enabled are vulnerable.\n\n### Potential Solution\n\nReorder the validation steps to ensure max bytesize is checked first\n\n```ruby\ndef decode_raw_saml(saml, settings = nil)\n settings = OneLogin::RubySaml::Settings.new if settings.nil?\n\n if saml.bytesize \u003e settings.message_max_bytesize\n raise ValidationError.new(\"Encoded SAML Message exceeds \" + settings.message_max_bytesize.to_s + \" bytes, so was rejected\")\n end\n \n return saml unless base64_encoded?(saml)\n decoded = decode(saml)\n ...\nend\n```",
"id": "GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:17Z",
"published": "2025-07-30T13:20:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/security/advisories/GHSA-rrqh-93c8-j966"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/pull/770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/commit/38ef5dd1ce17514e202431f569c4f5633e6c2709"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SAML-Toolkits/ruby-saml/releases/tag/v1.18.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/ruby-saml/CVE-2025-54572.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/09/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ruby SAML DOS vulnerability with large SAML response"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.