GHSA-RH3W-4CCX-PRF9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 21:49 – Updated: 2026-04-29 21:49
VLAI?
Summary
Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that Lets Group Leaders Strip Admin TOTP
Details

Summary

A logic error in Admidio's two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users' TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin's 2FA.

Details

In modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:

// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

By De Morgan's law, this condition evaluates as: - Blocks when: NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId - In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA - Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users' 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)

The intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users' 2FA. The !== operator on line 84 should be ===.

A group leader who holds hasRightEditProfile() permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.

Proof of Concept

  1. As testuser (a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<admin_user_uuid>

Result: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.

  1. As testuser, attempt to reset their own 2FA:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>

mode=reset&user_uuid=<testuser_user_uuid>

Result: SYS_NO_RIGHTS error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.

This confirms the authorization logic is inverted.

Impact

A group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.

Recommended Fix

Change !== to === on line 84 of modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php:

// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users' 2FA
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))
{
    throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

Found by aisafe.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA logic error in Admidio\u0027s two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users\u0027 TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin\u0027s 2FA.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php` at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:\n\n```php\n// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84\nif (!($gCurrentUser-\u003eisAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))\n{\n    throw new AdmException(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nBy De Morgan\u0027s law, this condition evaluates as:\n- Blocks when: `NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId`\n- In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA\n- Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users\u0027 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)\n\nThe intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users\u0027 2FA. The `!==` operator on line 84 should be `===`.\n\nA group leader who holds `hasRightEditProfile()` permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. As `testuser` (a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:\n\n```http\nPOST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=\u003ctestuser_session\u003e\n\nmode=reset\u0026user_uuid=\u003cadmin_user_uuid\u003e\n```\n\nResult: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.\n\n2. As `testuser`, attempt to reset their own 2FA:\n\n```http\nPOST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=\u003ctestuser_session\u003e\n\nmode=reset\u0026user_uuid=\u003ctestuser_user_uuid\u003e\n```\n\nResult: `SYS_NO_RIGHTS` error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.\n\nThis confirms the authorization logic is inverted.\n\n## Impact\n\nA group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nChange `!==` to `===` on line 84 of `modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php`:\n\n```php\n// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users\u0027 2FA\nif (!($gCurrentUser-\u003eisAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))\n{\n    throw new AdmException(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9",
  "modified": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
  "published": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that Lets Group Leaders Strip Admin TOTP"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…