GHSA-RH3W-4CCX-PRF9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 21:49 – Updated: 2026-04-29 21:49Summary
A logic error in Admidio's two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users' TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin's 2FA.
Details
In modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:
// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))
{
throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
By De Morgan's law, this condition evaluates as:
- Blocks when: NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId
- In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA
- Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users' 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)
The intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users' 2FA. The !== operator on line 84 should be ===.
A group leader who holds hasRightEditProfile() permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.
Proof of Concept
- As
testuser(a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>
mode=reset&user_uuid=<admin_user_uuid>
Result: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.
- As
testuser, attempt to reset their own 2FA:
POST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=<testuser_session>
mode=reset&user_uuid=<testuser_user_uuid>
Result: SYS_NO_RIGHTS error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.
This confirms the authorization logic is inverted.
Impact
A group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.
Recommended Fix
Change !== to === on line 84 of modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php:
// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users' 2FA
if (!($gCurrentUser->isAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))
{
throw new AdmException('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
Found by aisafe.io
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "admidio/admidio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41660"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA logic error in Admidio\u0027s two-factor authentication reset inverts the authorization check. Non-admin users cannot remove their own TOTP configuration, but they can remove other users\u0027 TOTP, including administrators. A group leader with profile edit rights on an admin account can strip that admin\u0027s 2FA.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php` at line 84, the authorization check uses an inverted condition:\n\n```php\n// modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php line 84\nif (!($gCurrentUser-\u003eisAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId !== $userId))\n{\n throw new AdmException(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nBy De Morgan\u0027s law, this condition evaluates as:\n- Blocks when: `NOT isAdministrator() AND $gCurrentUserId === $userId`\n- In practice: blocks non-admins from resetting their OWN 2FA\n- Passes: non-admins resetting OTHER users\u0027 2FA (the opposite of the intended behavior)\n\nThe intended logic should block non-admins from resetting other users\u0027 2FA. The `!==` operator on line 84 should be `===`.\n\nA group leader who holds `hasRightEditProfile()` permission on an admin user (checked earlier in the flow) can exploit this to strip 2FA from administrator accounts, reducing their security to password-only authentication.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. As `testuser` (a non-admin group leader with edit rights on admin profiles), send:\n\n```http\nPOST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=\u003ctestuser_session\u003e\n\nmode=reset\u0026user_uuid=\u003cadmin_user_uuid\u003e\n```\n\nResult: the server removes 2FA from the admin account.\n\n2. As `testuser`, attempt to reset their own 2FA:\n\n```http\nPOST /adm_program/modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCookie: ADMIDIO_..._SESSION_ID=\u003ctestuser_session\u003e\n\nmode=reset\u0026user_uuid=\u003ctestuser_user_uuid\u003e\n```\n\nResult: `SYS_NO_RIGHTS` error. The user cannot reset their own 2FA.\n\nThis confirms the authorization logic is inverted.\n\n## Impact\n\nA group leader (or any user with profile edit rights on an admin) can disable two-factor authentication on administrator accounts. This degrades admin account security to password-only, opening the door to credential stuffing or brute force attacks without a 2FA barrier.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nChange `!==` to `===` on line 84 of `modules/profile/two_factor_authentication.php`:\n\n```php\n// Fixed condition: block non-admins from resetting OTHER users\u0027 2FA\nif (!($gCurrentUser-\u003eisAdministrator() || $gCurrentUserId === $userId))\n{\n throw new AdmException(\u0027SYS_NO_RIGHTS\u0027);\n}\n```\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
"id": "GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9",
"modified": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T21:49:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rh3w-4ccx-prf9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Admidio has Inverted 2FA Reset Authorization Check that Lets Group Leaders Strip Admin TOTP"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.