ghsa-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h
Vulnerability from github
Summary
BinaryHttpParser does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol.
Details
Path, Authority, Scheme The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The algorithm to create a variable length integer value is below:
def encode_int(n):
if n < 64:
base = 0x00
l = 1
elif n in range(64, 16384):
base = 0x4000
l = 2
elif n in range(16384, 1073741824):
base = 0x80000000
l = 4
else:
base = 0xc000000000000000
l = 8
encoded = base | n
return encoded.to_bytes()
The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new DefaultBinaryHttpRequest object where no further parsing or validation occurs.
``` //netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java
public final class BinaryHttpParser { ... private static BinaryHttpRequest readRequestHead(ByteBuf in, boolean knownLength, int maxFieldSectionSize) { ... final long pathLength = getVariableLengthInteger(in, pathLengthIdx, pathLengthBytes); ... final int pathIdx = pathLengthIdx + pathLengthBytes; ... /417/ String method = in.toString(methodIdx, (int) methodLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII); /418/ String scheme = in.toString(schemeIdx, (int) schemeLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII); /419/ String authority = in.toString(authorityIdx, (int) authorityLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII); /420/ String path = in.toString(pathIdx, (int) pathLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);
/422/ BinaryHttpRequest request = new DefaultBinaryHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.valueOf(method), scheme, authority, path, headers); in.skipBytes(sumBytes); return request; } ... } ```
Request Method
On line 422 above, the parsed method value is passed into HttpMethod.valueOf method. The return value from this is passed to the DefaultBinaryHttpRequest constructor.
Below is the code for HttpMethod.valueOf:
public static HttpMethod valueOf(String name) {
// fast-path
if (name == HttpMethod.GET.name()) {
return HttpMethod.GET;
}
if (name == HttpMethod.POST.name()) {
return HttpMethod.POST;
}
// "slow"-path
HttpMethod result = methodMap.get(name);
return result != null ? result : new HttpMethod(name);
}
If the result of methodMap.get is not null, then a new arbitrary HttpMethod instance will be returned using the provided name value.
methodMap is an instance of type EnumNameMap which is also defined within the HttpMethod class:
``` EnumNameMap(Node... nodes) { this.values = (Node[])(new Node[MathUtil.findNextPositivePowerOfTwo(nodes.length)]); this.valuesMask = this.values.length - 1; Node[] var2 = nodes; int var3 = nodes.length;
for(int var4 = 0; var4 < var3; ++var4) {
Node<T> node = var2[var4];
int i = hashCode(node.key) & this.valuesMask;
if (this.values[i] != null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("index " + i + " collision between values: [" + this.values[i].key + ", " + node.key + ']');
}
this.values[i] = node;
}
}
T get(String name) {
Node<T> node = this.values[hashCode(name) & this.valuesMask];
return node != null && node.key.equals(name) ? node.value : null;
}
```
Note that EnumNameMap.get() returns a boolean value, which is not null. Therefore, any arbitrary http verb used within a BinaryHttpRequest will yield a valid HttpMethod object. When the HttpMethod object is constructed, the name is checked for whitespace and similar characters. Therefore, we cannot perform complete injection attacks using the HTTP verb alone. However, when combined with the other input validation issues, such as that in the path field, we can construct somewhat arbitrary data blobs that satisfy text-based protocol message formats.
Impact
Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40642"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-18T22:14:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-18T23:15:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`BinaryHttpParser` does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol.\n\n### Details\n\n**Path, Authority, Scheme**\nThe BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The algorithm to create a variable length integer value is below:\n\n```\ndef encode_int(n):\n if n \u003c 64:\n base = 0x00\n l = 1\n elif n in range(64, 16384):\n base = 0x4000\n l = 2\n elif n in range(16384, 1073741824):\n base = 0x80000000\n l = 4\n else:\n base = 0xc000000000000000\n l = 8\n encoded = base | n\n return encoded.to_bytes()\n```\n\nThe parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` object where no further parsing or validation occurs.\n\n```\n//netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java\n\npublic final class BinaryHttpParser {\n ...\n private static BinaryHttpRequest readRequestHead(ByteBuf in, boolean knownLength, int maxFieldSectionSize) {\n ...\n final long pathLength = getVariableLengthInteger(in, pathLengthIdx, pathLengthBytes);\n ...\n final int pathIdx = pathLengthIdx + pathLengthBytes;\n ...\n/*417*/ String method = in.toString(methodIdx, (int) methodLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n/*418*/ String scheme = in.toString(schemeIdx, (int) schemeLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n/*419*/ String authority = in.toString(authorityIdx, (int) authorityLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n/*420*/ String path = in.toString(pathIdx, (int) pathLength, StandardCharsets.US_ASCII);\n\n/*422*/ BinaryHttpRequest request = new DefaultBinaryHttpRequest(HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpMethod.valueOf(method),\n scheme, authority, path, headers);\n in.skipBytes(sumBytes);\n return request;\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\n**Request Method**\nOn line 422 above, the parsed method value is passed into `HttpMethod.valueOf` method. The return value from this is passed to the `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` constructor.\n\nBelow is the code for HttpMethod.valueOf:\n\n```\n public static HttpMethod valueOf(String name) {\n // fast-path\n if (name == HttpMethod.GET.name()) {\n return HttpMethod.GET;\n }\n if (name == HttpMethod.POST.name()) {\n return HttpMethod.POST;\n }\n // \"slow\"-path\n HttpMethod result = methodMap.get(name);\n return result != null ? result : new HttpMethod(name);\n }\n```\n\nIf the result of `methodMap.get` is not `null`, then a new arbitrary `HttpMethod` instance will be returned using the provided name value.\n\n`methodMap` is an instance of type `EnumNameMap` which is also defined within the `HttpMethod` class:\n\n```\n EnumNameMap(Node\u003cT\u003e... nodes) {\n this.values = (Node[])(new Node[MathUtil.findNextPositivePowerOfTwo(nodes.length)]);\n this.valuesMask = this.values.length - 1;\n Node[] var2 = nodes;\n int var3 = nodes.length;\n\n for(int var4 = 0; var4 \u003c var3; ++var4) {\n Node\u003cT\u003e node = var2[var4];\n int i = hashCode(node.key) \u0026 this.valuesMask;\n if (this.values[i] != null) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"index \" + i + \" collision between values: [\" + this.values[i].key + \", \" + node.key + \u0027]\u0027);\n }\n\n this.values[i] = node;\n }\n\n }\n\n T get(String name) {\n Node\u003cT\u003e node = this.values[hashCode(name) \u0026 this.valuesMask];\n return node != null \u0026\u0026 node.key.equals(name) ? node.value : null;\n }\n```\n\nNote that `EnumNameMap.get()` returns a boolean value, which is not `null`. Therefore, any arbitrary http verb used within a `BinaryHttpRequest` will yield a valid `HttpMethod` object. When the `HttpMethod` object is constructed, the name is checked for whitespace and similar characters. Therefore, we cannot perform complete injection attacks using the HTTP verb alone. However, when combined with the other input validation issues, such as that in the path field, we can construct somewhat arbitrary data blobs that satisfy text-based protocol message formats.\n\n### Impact\nMethod is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h",
"modified": "2024-07-19T14:17:55Z",
"published": "2024-07-18T22:14:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-q8f2-hxq5-cp4h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/commit/b687a0cf6ea1030232ea204d73bce82f2698e571"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Absent Input Validation in BinaryHttpParser"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.