ghsa-q7pg-9pr4-mrp2
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-09-12 21:11
Modified
2025-09-12 21:11
Severity ?
5.9 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Summary
httpsig-rs: HMAC verification is vulnerable to timing attack
Details

Summary

HMAC signature comparison is not timing-safe and is vulnerable to timing attacks.

Details

SharedKey::sign() returns a Vec<u8> which has a non-constant-time equality implementation.

Hmac::finalize() returns a constant-time wrapper (CtOutput) which was discarded. Alternatively, Hmac has a constant-time verify() method.

The problem reported here is due to the following lines in SharedKey::sign() of the previous code: rust let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key).unwrap(); mac.update(data); Ok(mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec()) and the merged update changes the third line to directly verify with verify_slice.

Impact

Anyone who uses HS256 signature verification is vulnerably to Timing Attack that allows the attacker to forge a signature.

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "httpsig"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59058"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-12T14:15:41Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nHMAC signature comparison is not timing-safe and is vulnerable to timing attacks.\n\n### Details\n`SharedKey::sign()` returns a `Vec\u003cu8\u003e` which has a non-constant-time equality implementation.\n\n`Hmac::finalize()` returns a constant-time wrapper ([`CtOutput`](https://docs.rs/digest/0.10.7/digest/struct.CtOutput.html)) which was discarded. Alternatively, `Hmac` has a constant-time `verify()` method.\n\nThe problem reported here is due to the following lines in `SharedKey::sign()` of the previous code:\n```rust\nlet mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key).unwrap();\nmac.update(data);\nOk(mac.finalize().into_bytes().to_vec())\n```\nand the merged update changes the third line to directly verify with `verify_slice`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone who uses HS256 signature verification is vulnerably to Timing Attack that allows the attacker to forge a signature.",
  "id": "GHSA-q7pg-9pr4-mrp2",
  "modified": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
  "published": "2025-09-12T21:11:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-q7pg-9pr4-mrp2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs/commit/fc095b6ce6043bb808f5d9c4379cf697899cb458"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/junkurihara/httpsig-rs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "httpsig-rs: HMAC verification is vulnerable to timing attack"
}


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