ghsa-mj2c-8hxf-ffvq
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-05-19 16:25
Modified
2025-05-19 16:25
Severity ?
6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Summary
Cocotais Bot has builtin .echo command injection
Details

Summary

 A command echoing feature in the framework allows users to indirectly trigger privileged behavior by injecting special platform tags. Specifically, an unauthorized user can use the /echo <qqbot-at-everyone /> command to cause the bot to send a message that mentions all members in the chat, bypassing any permission controls. This can lead to spam, disruption, or abuse of notification systems. 

Details

 The framework provides a command /echo that causes the bot to repeat any user-provided message verbatim in the group chat. However, the bot fails to sanitize or filter platform-specific control elements such as <qqbot-at-everyone />, which, when included in a message, mentions everyone (i.e., @全体成员). While normal users are forbidden from using this tag in normal chats, the bot, which has higher privileges, is allowed to do so.  Since the /echo command blindly echoes any content, a user can exploit this by sending:  /echo <qqbot-at-everyone />  The bot will then send a message containing <qqbot-at-everyone />, causing the platform to interpret it as an @全体成员 command, effectively allowing an unauthorized user to @everyone via the bot. 

PoC

 1. Set up a chatbot using the affected framework. 2. Join the chat that includes the bot as a regular user with no permission to use @全体成员. 3. Send the following message in the chat:  /echo <qqbot-at-everyone /> 4. The bot will respond by repeating the message, and the platform will interpret <qqbot-at-everyone /> as an @全体成员 mention. 5. All the chat members receive a notification, despite the user lacking that permission.  

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "cocotais-bot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.5.0-test2-hotfix"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47948"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-19T16:25:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-17T19:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\ufeff\nA command echoing feature in the framework allows users to indirectly trigger privileged behavior by injecting special platform tags. Specifically, an unauthorized user can use the `/echo \u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e` command to cause the bot to send a message that mentions all members in the chat, bypassing any permission controls. This can lead to spam, disruption, or abuse of notification systems.\n\ufeff\n### Details\n\ufeff\nThe framework provides a command `/echo` that causes the bot to repeat any user-provided message verbatim in the group chat. However, the bot fails to sanitize or filter platform-specific control elements such as `\u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e`, which, when included in a message, mentions everyone (i.e., @\u5168\u4f53\u6210\u5458). While normal users are forbidden from using this tag in normal chats, the bot, which has higher privileges, is allowed to do so.\n\ufeff\nSince the `/echo` command blindly echoes any content, a user can exploit this by sending:\n\ufeff\n```\n/echo \u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e\n```\n\ufeff\nThe bot will then send a message containing `\u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e`, causing the platform to interpret it as an @\u5168\u4f53\u6210\u5458 command, effectively allowing an unauthorized user to @everyone via the bot.\n\ufeff\n### PoC\n\ufeff\n1. Set up a chatbot using the affected framework.\n2. Join the chat that includes the bot as a regular user with **no permission to use @\u5168\u4f53\u6210\u5458**.\n3. Send the following message in the chat:\n\ufeff\n```\n/echo \u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e\n```\n4. The bot will respond by repeating the message, and the platform will interpret `\u003cqqbot-at-everyone /\u003e` as an @\u5168\u4f53\u6210\u5458 mention.\n5. All the chat members receive a notification, despite the user lacking that permission.\n\ufeff\n\ufeff",
  "id": "GHSA-mj2c-8hxf-ffvq",
  "modified": "2025-05-19T16:25:05Z",
  "published": "2025-05-19T16:25:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocotais/cocotais-bot/security/advisories/GHSA-mj2c-8hxf-ffvq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocotais/cocotais-bot/commit/d1cf01a9a41b3131241d1833444b890c8d6e70b8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocotais/cocotais-bot"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cocotais Bot has builtin .echo command injection"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.