GHSA-M2CM-222F-QW44

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 18:20 – Updated: 2026-02-25 18:20
VLAI?
Summary
mchange-commons-java: Remote Code Execution via JNDI Reference Resolution
Details

Impact

mchange-commons-java includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote factoryClassLocation values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted jaxax.naming.Reference or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code.

Implementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to false, com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened.

Patches

Mirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java's JNDI functionality is now gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values. Those parameters are documented here.

Workarounds

No. Users should upgrade to mchange-commons-java >= 0.4.0. Earlier versions should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs.

References

c3p0, you little rascal — Hans-Martin Münch c3p0 documentation, security note c3p0 documentation, configuring security

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.mchange:mchange-commons-java"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27727"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T18:20:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nmchange-commons-java includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted `jaxax.naming.Reference` or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code.\n\nImplementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to `false`, `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened.\n\n### Patches\nMirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java\u0027s JNDI functionality is now gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values. Those parameters are documented [here](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security).\n\n### Workarounds\nNo. Users should upgrade to mchange-commons-java \u003e= 0.4.0. Earlier versions should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs.\n\n### References\n\n[c3p0, you little rascal \u0026mdash; Hans-Martin M\u00fcnch](https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2025/02/c3p0-you-little-rascal/)\n[c3p0 documentation, security note](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#security-note)\n[c3p0 documentation, configuring security](https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security)",
  "id": "GHSA-m2cm-222f-qw44",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T18:20:05Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T18:20:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/swaldman/mchange-commons-java/security/advisories/GHSA-m2cm-222f-qw44"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/swaldman/mchange-commons-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mogwailabs.de/en/blog/2025/02/c3p0-you-little-rascal"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#configuring_security"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mchange.com/projects/c3p0/#security-note"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mchange-commons-java: Remote Code Execution via JNDI Reference Resolution"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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